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Abstract 
Islamic veiling has been the subject of many theological, social and legal debates, which are 
fluid and their intensity has been further influenced by its contextualised meanings such as 
religiosity, modesty, identity, resistance, protest, choice and subjugation. Literature on Muslim 
veiling has either examined its treatment by legal or socio-feminist perspectives, whereas this 
thesis critiques the religious, socio-feministic and the legal discourses. The contemporary 
discourse is dominated by competing binaries that label it as a tool of oppression or one of 
empowerment. Many of the assertions are based not on the veil’s multiple meanings or the 
wearer’s true motivations but on misplaced assumptions of moral authority by those who 
oppose or defend the practice, as well as native informants professing to represent veiled 
Muslim women, leaving Muslim veiled women’s voices muted. Having examined the religious 
imperative that has a patriarchal basis, the thesis constructs a critique of the two dominant 
discourses central to the contemporary debates on veiling. One discourse defends the practice 
as empowering whilst the other calls for prohibitions on the practice using liberation from 
oppression as a justification, particularly with issues surrounding the wearing of the full face 
veil. This is followed by a critique of the key cases generated under Article 9 ECHR, which 
attempts to balance the religious rights of those who veil with the rights of others. The case 
law highlights that the ECtHR not only falls short in disclosing satisfactorily how it has struck a 
balance between these competing rights, but also fails to adopt a neutral stance to religious 
expression through symbols, its reasoning being based on contradictory stereotypes of Muslim 
women as passive and victims of gender oppression in need of liberation. The influence of such 
stereotypes and an inadequate application of the margin of appreciation doctrine have led the 
ECtHR in validating state prohibitions on the hijab and the full face veil, thereby failing to 
acknowledge the voices of the veiled women at the centre of a human rights claim, delivering 
a further blow to them. Post the case of S.A.S. v. France the ECtHR has exasperated this even 
further by allowing an abstract principle of ‘living together’ as a justification for the full face 
veil’s prohibition in public spaces, resulting in Article 9 rights of Muslim women who veil being 
endangered even further by the introduction of such an open-ended ground.   
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INTRODUCTION 
No other form of head dress has stirred up as much controversy as the Islamic veil. To a non-
Muslim it may appear to be just another piece of cloth but to a Muslim woman that piece of 
cloth is loaded with multiple meanings such as religiosity, modesty, piety, honour, seclusion, 
resistance, political protest, expression of choice and a means of negotiating entry into public 
space. Lazreg refers to the power of the veil over the minds of men and women as ‘so blinding 
as to be deadly’ and narrates an example of a report by the Saudi media in March 2002 where 
fifteen school girls died in a fire in a school in Mecca because the vice police1 stopped fire 
fighters from approaching the girls as they were not wearing the prescribed religious dress, 
hence it was deemed to be sinful for the firemen to see the girls without their veils.2  
 
Lazreg observes the force of the veil as ‘such is the power of the veil that it captures the 
imagination, frustrates, coerces, inspires, and disempowers’.3 Her reference to the power of 
the veil does not refer to the piece of cloth, but the force of religious prescription that some 
are willing to follow so blindly, even if it means a lack of choice or death. Some may find that it 
brings them closer to God, whilst for others it is a state enforced duty, even if that means that 
it brings death to the woman. No other religious symbol has raised such reactions to non-
compliance. Borneman describes the veil as signifying ‘unbreachable differences between the 
West and Islam, achieving the status of an icon similar to the Christian Cross or the national 
flag’. He further opines that it is ‘most closely identified with the issue of women’s status in a 
politicized Islam’.4  In Shiraz’s opinion ‘to delimit the meanings of the veil is indeed a 
challenging if not an impossible task’.5 Hence Taylor’s desire to have the hijab thought of as 
‘just a scrap of cloth’ is a suggestion that could be considered a deprivation of the different 
meanings of the veil and possibly being considered an affront to those who veil.6 It is not the 
piece of cloth but the symbolism associated with it that is at stake for those who wear it, with 
the piece of cloth being the transmitter of the desired meaning. Such is the power of the veil 
on those who adopt it and those who oppose it. This clearly indicates that it is more than just a 
piece of cloth and sentiments and reactions including fatal ones related to the veil have 
                                                          
1
 In Saudi Arabia the hijab is compulsory under law for all women 
2
 Marnia Lazreg, Questioning the Veil: Open letters to Muslim Women (Princeton University Press 2009) 
5 
3
 Ibid 6  
4
 John Borneman, ‘Veiling and Women's Intelligibility’ (2009) 30:6 Cardozo Law Review 2745 < 
http://cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/30-6/BORNEMAN.30-6.pdf>accessed 3 July 2012 
5
 Faegheh Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled: The Hijab in Modern Culture (University Press of Florida 2003) 175 
6
 Pamela K Taylor, ‘I just Want to be Me: Issues in Identity for One American Muslim Woman’ in Jennifer 
Heath (ed), The Veil: Women Writers on Its History, Lore, and Politics (California University Press 
2008)128 
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surfaced in not only Muslim but European states too. Veiling has invoked solidarity and 
protests throughout the Western world; it has attracted extreme comments from the local to 
the political and even led to a fatal stabbing of a veiled Muslim woman in a courtroom in 
Dresden, Germany in 2009.7 However, in both examples the resultant loss for being unveiled 
and veiled has been borne by a woman.   
 
The power of the veil has not been confined to a singular feature; its multiple and variable 
meanings have been attributed to religious fundamentalism, human rights violations, and even 
terrorism.8 Its utility and the obsession with it has led it to be used as a marketing tool 
advertising consumer products, featured in cinema, played a part in erotica, been the subject 
of literary works, been militarised, politicised and featured in fashion shows. Hussein Chalayan 
a reputed fashion designer showed his provocative collection in spring/summer 1998 which 
Blanchard described:   
 
The show ended with a line-up of six models. The first wore a chador, which 
covered most of her body and allowed a gap just for her eyes. Each veil became 
shorter and shorter until, finally, the last one was nude apart from a mask covering 
her face. 'It was about defining your cultural territory,' he says. 'How a group of 
people define their territory with their clothes. The covering of the body was also 
representative of death, the veil bringing the body to a mummy-like state. It is a 
deathly state. You're pretending you don't exist. By becoming an anonymous 
person, you are creating your own territory. It was such a powerful show - so 
moving for me.9 
 
The debates on veiling are controversial, multi-faceted and are consistently increasing in 
intensity and diversity. It is not possible to examine every perspective on veiling as that would 
                                                          
7
 Daily Mail Reporter, ‘German accused of stabbing pregnant Muslim woman to death inside a 
courtroom goes on trial’ Mail Online (27 October 2009) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1223018/Man-accused-stabbing-pregnant-Muslim-woman-death-inside-German-court-goes-trial-tight-
security.html> accessed 20 October 2010 
8
 Philip J. Rosenbaum, ‘The Role of Projective Identification in Construction of the ''Other'': Why do 
Westerners want to ''Liberate'' Muslim Women?’ (2013) 19 Culture & Psychology 213, 214 
9
 Tamsin Blanchard, ‘Mind Over Material’ The Guardian (24 September 2000) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2000/sep/24/features.magazine37> accessed 4 September 
2013 
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be outside the parameters of this thesis, as there are eleven different frames with each frame 
containing further sub-frames that are associated with veiling.10  
Aims of the thesis 
The wearing of hijab and the Muslim veil has generated a vast amount of literature examining 
the practice from different perspectives. The aim of this thesis is not to incorporate every 
perspective but to focus on the discourses that have dominated the debate on these forms of 
religious clothing. The perspectives examined include wearing of the veil or hijab as a religious 
obligation associated with modesty, as a tool of oppression, as a means of empowerment and 
as a European human right. The existing literature on veiling and hijab examines the practice 
from either a sociological or a legal perspective with a limited crossover of the disciplines. This 
thesis not only crosses over the socio-feministic and the legal perspectives but additionally 
examines the religious discourse too. The thesis will first argue that Muslim women who veil or 
wear the hijab are silenced by the gender biased male interpretations of the sacred texts, 
perceived by Muslims as mandating the hijab or the veil through modesty codes as interpreted 
by male Muslim scholars. These scholars reject polysemic readings of the Qu’ranic verses 
pertaining to the hijab and the veil arguing the texts mandate Islamic modesty through 
covering, which they and some Muslims believe is important for deflecting the male gaze and 
controlling women’s sexuality considered to be a threat to men. The effect of such male 
orientated interpretations silences Muslim women who wish to offer different interpretations 
of modesty and the divine texts. It will be argued that the current interpretations of these 
religious modesty codes suffer from a hermeneutic deficit, which needs to be overcome by re-
interpretations to eliminate the patriarchal bias.  
The thesis then proceeds to argue the oppression discourse on the hijab and veiling, which 
claims they are tools of oppression imposed by patriarchy and women who adopt such 
practices lack freedom of choice, but treats Muslim women as a homogenous category and 
fails to draw on the contexts and situational meanings of these religious symbols. Additionally, 
the allegations of false consciousness or adaptive preferences and the use of cultural insiders 
to corroborate the alleged oppressive nature of covering are self-serving, resulting in 
perpetuation of negative stereotypes whilst ignoring the voices of those women who attach 
their own meaning to the practice. The thesis then examines the emancipation discourse that 
relies on orientalism to rebut the oppression standpoint and claims the practice is based on 
free choice, which liberates women as it empowers them with the ability to penetrate public 
                                                          
10
 Sieglinde Rosenberger and Birgit Sauer, Politics, Religion and Gender: Framing and Regulating the Veil 
(Sieglinde Rosenberger and Birgit Sauer eds, Routledge 2013) 4 
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space, assert their Muslim identity and use it as a form of resistance. The thesis will argue that 
although this view acknowledges the different contexts but is equally problematic as it is also 
essentialist and plays a part in stereotyping those Muslim women who do not cover as 
immodest and mutes women who oppose this position labelling them as dupes of the West. 
Finally the thesis argues that women who veil or wear the hijab having had their voices abated 
by the religious and socio-feministic discourses turn to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Here the applicants claim their religious rights are breached when they are prevented from 
wearing the hijab in schools in Switzerland, higher educational establishments in Turkey and 
the full face veil or the Burqa in the public sphere in France. The thesis will analyse the 
resultant case-law from these claims under Article 9 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)11 and by drawing from perspectives emanating from the religious and socio-feministic 
discourses, will add an additional layer of synthesis to the legal judgements. This additional 
synthesis will enable the argument that the ECtHR has not been polarity neutral as it has been 
influenced by the negative stereotypes emerging from the religious and socio-feministic 
discourses. And that in its failure to uphold the human rights of those who veil or wear the 
hijab, the ECtHR although having moved in the right direction, has also failed to listen to the 
voices of the women who veil or wear the hijab, delivering the final blow. 
It is this triadic approach to the religious, socio-feministic and the legal discourse and how each 
treats those who wear the hijab or the veil, silencing them by their failure to take account of 
their contexts, meanings and motivations and the demonstration of a triple bind on Muslim 
women’s choice of clothing that forms an original contribution to the existing knowledge. 
Definitional issues 
An initial consideration for the thesis was the question of terminology to be employed 
throughout the thesis when examining the veiling discourses on Islamic modesty, oppression 
and emancipation. As the thesis examines feminist theoretical frameworks in part one, simply 
using the label ‘feminists’ across all three discourses, particularly  when referring to the socio-
feministic discourses was problematic considering the multiplicity of feminisms and the 
internal debates and variances amidst the different forms of it. Replacing ‘feminists’ with a 
more narrower term ‘non-Muslim feminists’ and ‘Muslim feminists’ was also found to be 
problematic since not all non-Muslim feminists oppose the veil and not all Muslim feminists 
support it and both categories suffer from divisions within. For example the meaning of 
                                                          
11
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, hereafter referred 
to as ECHR 
12 
 
Muslim or Islamic feminist is highly contested and is still being negotiated by Muslim women, 
just as the different waves of Western feminism. Furthermore such categorisation would have 
excluded all those other women, Muslim or non-Muslim who do not hold themselves out to be 
feminists in the strict sense but still have strong views on veiling by Muslim women. For this 
reason more general and all-embracing terms such as ‘those who oppose veiling’ and ‘those 
who defend veiling’ have been employed throughout the thesis to eliminate definitional 
problems, of course the thesis does not totally exclude the term feminist.  
 
There are many terms used to describe religious clothing by Muslims, the most common ones 
being: hijab,12 niqab,13 abbaya,14 jilbab,15 lithma,16 burqa,17 chador,18 khimar,19 ghunghat20 and 
dupatta.21 These terms are predominately products of culture and diverse Muslim societies 
and the literature is often confusing, as terms such as hijab and veil are used interchangeably 
by commentators. For the purposes of this thesis the term hijab will be used to denote head 
covering with the face and eyes exposed and veil will be used when referring to a head 
covering that includes covering the face with only eyes exposed whilst veiling can refer to 
either or both. The term burqa will be used to refer to a single garment that covers the whole 
body, head and the face, with a slit or meshing of fabric that allows a woman to see through it. 
The distinction between a full covering of the face as in a veil or the hijab that simply covers a 
woman’s hair, neck and chest is important for this thesis, as the hijab has been the subject of 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law surrounding teachers and students, whilst 
the veil and burqa have been subject to a general prohibition in public spaces in some 
                                                          
12
 Hijab is most commonly referred to as a piece of cloth that covers the woman’s hair and upper chest, 
but is also used to refer to covering the face 
13
 The niqab is the covering of the face with just leaving the eyes exposed 
14
 An outer garment worn by women from the Middle East, particularly from Saudi Arabia. It is long-
sleeved, floor-length, and is worn from either the shoulder or the top of the head. The abaya is worn 
over normal clothes when a woman leaves her house and is designed to cover the contours of a 
woman’s body. It usually opens at the front, with overlapping layers or closing with ties or a zip. It is 
worn with a scarf which covers the hair, and often a veil which covers the face 
15
 An over-garment or cloak worn by Muslim women when in public. Sometimes refers to a specific style 
of cloak, similar to the abaya but more fitted and found in a wider variety of fabrics and colours. It looks 
more similar to a long tailored coat 
16
 The lithma is used to cover the head and face in Yemen 
17
 This type of veil and body covering conceals all of a woman's body including the eyes which are 
covered with a mesh screen and is common in Afghanistan 
18
 The chador is a head to toe wrap, generally black and worn by women in Iran  
19
 A general term for a woman's head and/or face veil. This word is sometimes used to describe a 
particular style of scarf that drapes over the entire top half of a woman's body to the waist 
20
 The ghunghat is the end wrap on a saree which Indian women use to cover their head or veil when in 
front of strangers or the elder male members of the family 
21
 The dupatta is a long piece of material used as a head covering and  worn with a shalwar kameez, the 
traditional dress of Pakistani women  
13 
 
European states. Items of clothing used for religious purposes in Islam are subject to diversity 
amongst different Muslim societies, cultures and context and there are variations in the 
terminology, type of covering and the shape and style of religious clothing but it is not 
necessary to go beyond the hijab, veil and the Burqa for the purposes of this thesis.   
Choice of subject area 
The selection of the subject area of this thesis was a result of Jack Straw’s comments on veiling 
in 2006 which led to the sparking of the first major debate on veiling in the United Kingdom. 
This was not the first time the Muslim veil had become the focus of a national debate in a 
European signatory state to the European Convention on Human Rights; there had already 
been considerable public debate and opinion in France leading up to the legal prohibition on 
Muslim headscarves in French state schools, as well as in Turkey, which had banned 
headscarves in higher education establishments. The ensuing socio-feministic debates post 
Straw’s comments were dominated by polarised standpoints of those who opposed and 
supported veiling, whilst the voices of Muslim women who wore the veil were absent. My 
expectations of an informed debate, stepping up from the French discourse on veiling and the 
hijab that was led primarily by those who adopted the practice and their reasons for doing so 
simply did not materialize. Instead two opposing camps emerged, the first arguing that the veil 
is oppressive and needs to be prohibited and the other that it is emancipatory, each using the 
presence and absence of choice as the driving force of their truth. The missing voices of those 
Muslim women who wore religious clothing pre and post Straw’s comments appeared to have 
been replaced by the use of Muslim women as cultural insiders on behalf of those who oppose 
veiling. Surprisingly the same polemic standpoints were adopted when France banned full face 
veiling with the same contradictory claims demonstrating that the oppression and 
emancipation discourses dominate the debates. Indeed it is not just those against veiling who 
do not listen to the voices of veiled women; those who defend the practice are guilty of it too. 
A good example of this was the debate on banning veils in September 2013 by an Islamic 
television channel ‘Ummah’ that broadcasts globally. The TV channel aired the debate 
spanning three days with scholars and experts from various fields but the panel did not have a 
single veiled woman participating, yet the subject concerned a practice adopted by Muslim 
women in the face of adversity.22 Discussions during this debate were primarily focussed on 
the concept of Islamic modesty mandated by Islam and the Qu’ranic interpretations as 
provided by religious scholars vehemently arguing the obligatory nature of veiling. This debate 
                                                          
22
 Ummah Channel, ‘Niqab Debate- Highlights- Ummah Channel Show’ (2013)  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-DpSrwG9Uc> accessed 20 October 2013 
14 
 
clearly demonstrates the part religious discourse plays in silencing Muslim women through 
mandating modesty requirements and it is indeed the reason why the thesis examines these 
interpretations or mis-interpretations in part one of the thesis. 
A substantial element of part one of the thesis is based on the oppressive versus emancipation 
dichotomy of hijab and veiling and I am fully aware that such binaries are reductionist, 
essentialist and serve to oversimplify complex and interwoven issues. I also acknowledge that 
dichotomist perspectives can further create a distance between Islamic and Western cultures 
by focussing too much on differences through religious dress codes. The choice to examine 
these two polarities is specifically due to the ‘head on clash’ of the oppositions with each 
projecting its positioning as the real truth in the absence of alternative interpretations, which 
demonstrates what each discourse reveals and what it hides. This can be illustrated by the 
notion that oppression decreed by one discourse can mean the freedom espoused by another, 
or vice versa and the lack of universal agreement amongst Muslims whether the veil is 
obligatory or not or simply a cultural symbol. Ignoring alternative interpretations in such cases 
leads to a standpoint that can be problematic as it shows that the meaning of the veil is fixed, 
which is clearly not so. Therefore knowledge production based on a particular binary stance 
contains missing elements and in the case of the hijab and veiling they are the voices of the 
women who engage in the practice and attach a particular meaning to the veil with their own 
motivations and contexts. A good example of this can be found in the contradictory viewpoints 
of both discourses. One that supports the French ban on full face veils suggests that Muslim 
veiled women are subjugated, suppress their sexuality and that these women are victims of 
their traditions and patriarchal culture, as they do not wear it through choice, but pressure 
from the family and therefore a ban would emancipate these women,23 yet the voices of those 
who veil indicate that they voluntarily adopt the practice and in many cases in opposition to 
the wishes of their family members.24 
 Another reason for the choice of such oppositional discourses in the thesis is that although the 
socio-feminist discourse may play a part in social acceptance or rejection of veiling, which in 
turn may inspire policies or national laws controlling the practice, it is the ECtHR applicants 
look up to with an expectation of polarity neutral judgments in order to secure their human 
                                                          
23
 Ralph Grillo and Prakash Shah, ‘Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in Europe’ Max Planck 
Institute <www.mmg.mpg.de/fileadmin/.../WP_12-05_Grillo_Reasons-to-Ban.pdf> accessed 21 
December 2014, 17-28 
24
 Open Society Foundations, Unveiling the Truth: Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in 
France (Open Society Foundations, 2011) 15< https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/behind-
veil> accessed 20 January 2014 
15 
 
rights against a state that has interfered with their right to wear the hijab or the veil. An 
assessment therefore of whether any truths, stereotypes or assumptions stemming from the 
binary discourses have influenced the jurisprudence of the ECtHR analysed in part two of the 
thesis would not easily have led to a parity check, unless such oppositional discourses had 
been examined first.    
The choice of discourses for this thesis is not to adopt one position over another but to 
question the existing polemics, which will allow consideration of alternatives helping bring to 
the surface the need to listen to the voices that have been silenced, as that would be a more 
discerning way of going beyond the stalemate created by oppositional stances. As the 
oppressive versus emancipation discourses are so oppositional, exploration of whether those 
women who veil embrace or reject either of the binaries or indeed attribute their own 
meaning to the veil depending on their situations is crucial to the debate. This is something 
those who have contributed to the discourses ought to be well aware of as ‘Feminists know 
first-hand the feeling of being misrepresented and excluded from mainstream discourse’.25  
Polemic positions mask out any third or other position which is why women who veil are 
silenced by the debate leading to production and perpetuation of stereotypes. For example 
those who are pro veiling wish to project the positive stereotype to other others that veiled 
women are modest or pious, but they fail to realise that in holding that view, it leads to the 
negative stereotype that those who do not veil are immodest. Similarly both discourses 
construct the veiled woman as homogenous despite academic criticisms of such approaches26 
and fail to note that not all unveiled women agree with veiling and not all Muslims agree with 
the practice. Examining the two dominant discourses allows the examination of the tensions 
between the two, helping push beyond the static boundaries. This deconstruction will allow a 
space for the silenced voices of the veiled to be unmuted, leading to renewed understandings 
of the relativity of freedom and choice in veiling and penetration of the fixed boundaries by 
which socio-feministic discourses and the ECtHR have been influenced. It also allows different 
veiling contexts to surface instead of Muslim women being inscribed with identities by those 
who don’t veil, yet participate in the knowledge production that affects women who do.  
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Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured in two parts, the first part contains two chapters that examine the 
religious and the socio-feministic discourses associated with the hijab and the veil whilst the 
second part containing three chapters considers the legal discourse. Chapter one begins by 
providing an overview of the theological sources and how they have been interpreted by male 
Muslim clerics mandating religious clothing worn by Muslim women. A substantial part of the 
chapter examines the concept of Islamic modesty believed to be imposed by the religious texts 
and compares it to the general concept of modesty. The patriarchal and gendered bias 
prevalent in theological interpretations is examined including hermeneutical challenges by 
Muslim women who have and wish to re-interpret such sources to eliminate the bias. Chapter 
two of the thesis is a longer chapter and examines the two dominant discourses claiming the 
practice of wearing the hijab and the veil is a tool of oppression of Muslim women and is 
means of empowerment respectively. Theoretical frameworks surrounding freedom and 
choice and what that means to those who oppose the practice and those who defend it are 
examined in detail. The chapter also examines how those who oppose religious clothing have 
made use of cultural insiders to further perpetuate the stereotype that Muslim women who 
wear religious clothing are oppressed.  
The thesis then moves onto part two containing chapters three, four and five, with chapter 
three setting out the legal framework of the European Convention on Human Rights with a 
discussion of the interpretive principles used by the court when adjudicating on human rights 
claims. The emphasis of this chapter is to lay down the operative framework of Article 9, which 
protects religious freedom that has been invoked by all three of the applicants who have been 
prohibited from wearing the hijab in school and higher educational establishments and the 
face veil in the public sphere in France. Chapter four analyses the ECtHR judgements in the 
cases of Dahlab v. Switzerland 27where a primary school teacher was prohibited from wearing 
a hijab in school and Sahin v. Turkey,28 which concerned a student prohibited from wearing the 
hijab in university. Chapter five, the final chapter examines in detail the decision and reasoning 
provided by the ECtHR in S.A.S. v. France29 in denying the claim based on prohibition of the full 
face veil in all public spaces in France. The thesis then finishes with a concluding chapter 
bringing together issues from part one and part two. 
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PART ONE 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE –VEILING AS A RELIGIOUS IMPERATIVE  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, religious imposition of Muslim dress codes and the doctrine of modesty as 
believed by Muslims will be considered. The aim of the chapter is to first give an overview of 
Islamic theological sources that have generated the doctrines relating to veiling and modesty 
and then proceed to an examination of the implications of male oriented interpretations of 
religious texts, which some Muslims believe mandate the hijab and the veil. The Muslim veil 
has become a term loaded with many contextualised meanings and is at variance throughout 
the world, generating support and dissent from all quarters.  The re-interpretation of the 
sacred texts, in an attempt to eliminate patriarchal and gendered readings of the sacred 
Islamic texts by some Muslim feminists is one of the challenges examined in the chapter. The 
focus on the religious principles that give rise to the mandate on veiling is important for the 
later analysis of religious freedom, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This religious freedom is invoked by applicants when an assertion is made that a state 
has breached their freedom by limiting or prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols. The 
more specific socio-feministic debates surrounding patriarchy, agency and oppression 
associated with the hijab and the veil including views of those who support and oppose the 
practice will be analysed in the next chapter. 
The veil as a cultural edict  
Most Muslim women who veil defend the practice on the grounds that it is mandated by 
religion but this standpoint is not without rebuttal, as there is no universal agreement amongst 
Muslims whether that is the case, though there is consensus that the hijab is mandatory. There 
are Muslim scholars who are of the view that it is not mandated by the Qur’an and it is simply 
a historic relic, thus not a duty imposed on women. For example Dr Taj Hargey who is an Imam 
of the Oxford Muslim Education Centre in the United Kingdom insists that veiling has no basis 
in Islam and can be prohibited. He asserts that ‘Women should be reminded that as face-
masking is not found in Islam’s transcendent text; it is therefore a non-Koranic and un-Islamic 
habit, not a fundamental feature of their religion. Islam is not a faith of superficial 
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symbolism.’30 In a debate held by the Cambridge University Union Society on whether the veil 
empowers women, he refers to it as a ‘scrap of cloth that is a relic of the past’ and is not 
imposed by the Qur’an.31 The imam is considered to have radical views since he has departed 
from those of mainstream Muslims by conducting marriages between Muslim women and 
non-Muslim men that is considered to be non-Islamic. He has been accused by a weekly 
newspaper of not being a true Muslim, an allegation considered extremely offensive against a 
Muslim, which led him to successfully suing the newspaper in the High Court receiving 
substantial damages.32  
 
Hargey’s view is corroborated by other Muslim scholars such Tariq Ramadan who giving 
evidence before the French Gerin Commission that was established to consider the prohibition 
of full face veiling in France to the effect that the burqa or face veil are not an Islamic 
requirement.33 El Guindi also asserts that ‘Islam did not invent or introduce the custom of 
veiling’34 suggesting it was a custom prior to the advent of Islam. According to her it was worn 
by women of Hellenic, Byzantine and Balkan cultures and the adoption of veiling in Arab social 
systems holds a different meaning and function to those northern Mediterranean regions. It is 
acknowledged by other commentators that Greek and Roman women veiled in pre-Islamic 
times and that veiling in Arabia had no connection with seclusion of women.35 And it was 
common for women to be seen in public wearing the veil as it was considered a status symbol 
and not a religious one,36 just as it was a custom in ancient Greece.37 Stubbings refers to 
discoveries of remains from Troy that included head dress made from gold,38 whilst discovery 
of early coins have provided evidence of head coverings in Greco-Roman times.39 According to 
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Shirazi during the Assyrian, Greco-Roman, and Byzantine empires, veiling and seclusion were 
badges of prestige and symbolised status as only the wealthy could afford to seclude 
women.40The practice of head covering in the monotheistic religions has been associated with 
nobility of women and a symbol of freedom and virtue41 and it is specifically used as a form of 
respectability, and as a status symbol and as a sign of modesty in countries such as Oman, 
Sudan and Yemen.42  
 
Though there is ample evidence of veiling being rooted in culture pre-dating Islam,43 
interpretations of certain Qur’anic verses discussed later in the chapter lead Muslims to 
believe that post Islam, it has become a religious obligation. However this does not mean that 
Muslim women do not wear the veil or the hijab for cultural reasons. Wing & Smith refer to a 
study carried out by Gaspard and Khosrokhaver, who suggest that some women pre-
adolescent and adolescent veil or wear the hijab in order to comply with important family 
values and the family pressure was to wear hijab to school or they would be prevented from 
attending, whilst there were other times where the pressure was not direct, but hijab was 
worn to maintain the respect of their fathers and brothers. 44 This illustrates that patriarchal 
impositions can and do play a part in women’s decisions to wear the hijab, which in this case is 
used as a symbol of honour and a transmitter of protected sexualities.  Thus freedom and 
choice is negotiated in order to gain access to public spaces and to prevent ‘disgracing family 
honour if they do not choose to wear the headscarf’.45 This may be important as there are 
cultural influences such as pressures on women to choose the right husband and veiling in 
some cases acts as a device that helps in the competition for husbands.46  
 
Conversely, Wing and Smith also cite Hashmi’s study, which shows that some girls wear the 
hijab despite their family disapproving of it and many had mothers who did not veil.47 Such a 
contrast of the lack of or exercise of choice is not uncommon amongst those who wear the 
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hijab or the veil and indicates the importance of situational contexts of those who engage in 
the practice as well as the fluid meaning. However studies have also shown that some women 
may become the targets of violence or would veil in order to avoid being inscribed with 
derogatory labels as noted by one of Killian’s respondent’s: ‘A girl who wears the veil, that 
means that she’s pure and the other who doesn’t wear the veil, she’s not pure…it’s that she’s a 
slut’.48 Veiling as a cultural concept if it is imposed on women has the capacity of limiting a 
woman’s autonomy, particularly if she has no motivations to wear it. Whereas if it was a 
religious obligation, it can be argued she may have made a conscious choice to conform to a 
religious duty. Although there are some who do not believe in God and are of the view that 
religion is a matter of opinion,49 which means that people have a choice in the matter as 
opposed to a religious mandate which negates that choice.  
The veil as a Qur’anic commandment 
There is general consensus amongst Muslims that there is a religious duty for Muslim women 
to wear the hijab but there is no such agreement relating to the veil. However some Muslim 
scholars deny the hijab or the veil as a religious obligation on the grounds that those who 
believe it is mandatory base their convictions on mis-interpretations of religious texts. For 
example Sheikh Mustapha Mohamed Rashed a Muslim scholar at Al Azhar University in Egypt 
defended his PhD thesis concluding that the hijab or the veil is not an Islamic duty. The fact 
that his thesis was allowed to be defended at Al Azhar that is considered by Sunni Muslims as 
the foremost seat of learning adds credibility to his views and at the same time makes it 
controversial. The scholar argued that hijab referring to head covering is not mentioned in the 
Qur’an, but despite that ‘a bunch of scholars insisted vehemently that the veil is both an 
Islamic duty and one of the most important pillars of Islam’. He further adds that the ‘scholars 
de-contextualised the verses of the Qur’an and interpreted them in their own liking…and 
rejected reasoning and relied only on literal text’.50 
 
There has been no general consensus amongst those Muslim scholars who played a part in 
some of the historic interpretations of sacred texts whether veiling is mandatory and it is 
evident from the comments of Dr Taj Hargey, Tariq Ramadan and Sheikh Mustapha Rashed 
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that such lack of consensus still exists amongst Muslims. There is credible theological opinion 
that sways towards veiling being a product of culture, as opposed to a religious requirement 
and there is no shortage of Muslim commentators who share that sentiment.51 There is 
resistance primarily from some Muslim community leaders to label the practice as being 
cultural, because having it declared a religious obligation leaves greater scope for its 
imposition and compliance with other Islamic dress codes.52 This is especially so in European 
countries where acculturation of dress by younger Muslim women can be resisted if veiling is 
universally accepted as a religious injunction. But even if it is mandated by religion, then the 
extrapolation of the principles via strained interpretations of religious texts is questionable, as 
will be seen later in the chapter.  
 
It is apparent from the previous discussion that there is a body of Islamic authority that 
challenges the origin and nature of veiling holding it an object of culture and it will be shown 
later in the thesis that some conservative Islamic scholars propagate it as a religious 
requirement. Despite such uncertainties and the difficulty of settling the debate due to its 
complexity on which a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, what matters is the 
importance of the belief and perception of Muslims that veiling has its origins in the Qur’an, 
which Muslims believe is the word of God transmitted orally to the Prophet Mohammad 
through the archangel Gabriel.53 Islam54conveys a total way of life with its teachings that 
extend to almost every aspect of the believer’s life including modesty and dress,55 which is why 
the question of whether the dress codes are mandatory or not becomes a passionate issue as 
Islam requires Muslims to comply with all religious duties. 
The hierarchy of Islamic rules 
It is believed that the first revelation of the Qur’an took place in 610 AD with the whole of it 
revealed over a period of twenty three years and was written down at around 650 AD after 
Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 AD. The Qur’an is structured into 114 chapters referred to 
as suras which are further divided into verses known as ayats.56 The suras are all of different 
lengths and were revealed whilst the Prophet Mohammad was in Mecca and in Medina. For 
Muslims the Qur’an is the primary source of Islamic law, followed by Sunnah, which are the 
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deeds, teaching, practices and sayings of the Prophet. These were communicated via chains of 
transmissions from the Prophet’s time and recorded in a collection of Hadiths, a secondary 
source of Islamic law. The Qur’an does not contain suras in the order they were revealed, but 
contains the longer suras at the beginning and the shortest and those revealed earliest at the 
end. As the Qur’an is not a narrative or an argument that needs to run sequentially, it contains 
pronouncements that reflect on a multitude of divine and worldly themes.  
 
The deduction and interpretation from the teachings of both the Qur’an and the Sunnah by 
Muslim scholars has become to be known as Sharia or Islamic law. However, the divine 
guidance contained in the Qur’an is not always intelligible to the average mind, as alluded to in 
Scripture, especially when it comes to the extrapolation of law from the Qur’an. There are also 
principles of interpretation that are applied in the attempt at understanding the Divine will. 
This field of expertise is referred to as Tafsir57 or Qur’anic hermeneutics. The field of 
hermeneutics is defined by the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy as ‘both the first order 
art and the second order theory of understanding and interpretation of linguistic and non-
linguistic expressions’.58   
 
In the field of Qur’anic hermeneutics, the first source of law used is the Qur’an, however, if 
particular parts of the Qur’an are not clearly understood by the reader in light of other verses 
on the subject, then recourse is taken to the Hadith or the prophetic tradition, as the Qur’an 
itself confirms the Prophet Muhammad to be the primary human exegete of the divine word.  
This prophetic exposition is followed by the interpretations of those who were the close 
companions of Prophet Mohammed in the era of divine revelation; the Sahabah59 and their 
successors.  The Arabic language and human understanding are additional sources of Qur’anic 
interpretation used to guide authentic elucidation; working within the parameters set by the 
said sources of Islamic law. 
 
The pronouncements on how Muslims should conduct themselves and behave in everyday life 
comes directly from the Qur’an and thus Muslims are highly sensitive to arguments raised 
against any of the Qur’anic injunctions as they are bound by these to obey God’s will.60 This is 
one of the key reasons women who wear the hijab or the veil take objection to challenges to 
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the practice. Interpreting the Qur’an is a highly complex matter and Muslim scholars have to 
pay regard to many principles associated with it and the Sunnah before arriving at an 
authoritative meaning.61 The scholars themselves were required to have had expert training 
and Islamic knowledge, before their interpretations were accepted as a source of Sharia.62 Any 
analysis of the verses of the Qur’an will be limited to the issue of the compulsory nature of 
veiling, as it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in discussion and conflicts surrounding 
the different schools of thought and the resultant jurisprudence stemming from any sectarian 
disputes relating to particular forms of veiling. 
The specific verses in the Qur’an relating to veiling 
The Lanes Arabic/English Lexicon63 gives nine different meanings of the word hijab, the four 
meanings that are relevant to the discussion are given as something that: (1) prevents, hinders 
or precludes (2) conceals, veils, covers (3) intervenes between two bodies (4) a partition or a 
barrier. However, in modern Arabic, hijab has been interpreted as a woman’s veil. This is the 
modern understanding of the term previously not recognised by the Lexicographer’s of Arabic 
and the word is commonly understood as meaning ‘a head covering worn in public by some 
Muslim women’.64  Muslims today understand the word as meaning a total covering of a 
woman’s body including/not including face and hands, face veil or a head covering only. The 
term hijab has been used seven times in the Qur’an65 with all the meanings of the word 
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centred around screening and prevention,66suggesting that its meaning in the Prophet 
Muhammad’s times was understood to be a screen or a barrier, with a further two verses of 
the Qur’an that mention dress codes specifically for Muslim women.67Chronologically the 
Verse of the Qur’an that is associated with the hijab in terms of seclusion of women from men 
is sura al-ahzab 33:53 which states: 
 
Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal without waiting for the proper 
time, unless permission be granted you. But if ye are invited, enter, and, when 
your meal is ended, then disperse. Linger not for conversation. Lo! That would 
cause annoyance to the Prophet, and he would be shy of (asking) you (to go); but 
Allah is not shy of the truth. And when ye ask of them (the wives of the Prophet) 
anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. That is purer for your hearts and 
for their hearts. And it is not for you to cause annoyance to the messenger of 
Allah, nor that ye should ever marry his wives after him….68 
 
This verse is the one that is often referred to as the ‘hijab’ verse and is considered to be the 
very first divine guidance on seclusion of the Prophet’s wives from men, due to the nature of 
their high status and dignity that forbids any man to marry any of them. The verse also gave 
guidance to the community on the manners and etiquette that had to be exercised when 
dealing with contact with the Prophet and his home life. The background and supplementation 
to the revelation of the verse is contained in the Hadith by Sahih Bukhari, narrated by Anas bin 
Malik.69 The Qur’anic verse supplemented by the Hadiths considered a commandment that 
when men were to speak to the prophet’s wives, they were to do that from behind a curtain, 
partition or a screen so as to protect the privacy of the Prophet as his home was part of the 
Mosque where there were regular visitors. The verse led to distinct separation of the Prophet’s 
wives quarters and the mosque, in effect creating the divide between the private and the 
public.  
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Maududi has interpreted the verse to include all women and not specific to the Prophet’s 
wives, insisting that the Muslim woman’s Islamic dress includes the face veil and covering of 
the hands too. His opinion is that despite there being no mention of the veil in the Qur’an it is 
Qur’anic in spirit and strict seclusion of all Muslim women is necessary.70 The majority view of 
Islamic scholars is that the commandment was for the Prophet’s wives themselves to be 
secluded from men due to their status, and as such, the verse only applied to them and not 
women in general. There are those who interpret the same verse to mean seclusion for 
women generally based on the philosophy that emulating the actions of the Prophet’s wives 
results in elevation of their piousness. Madani is of the opinion that these are the etiquettes 
Allah taught the wives of the Prophet and since all of the Muslim Ummah71are required to 
follow their example, these commandments are applicable to all Muslim women.72 Indeed all 
Muslims aspire to follow the ways of the prophet Mohammed and his household, but these 
are strained interpretations that are neither literal nor inter-textual and fail to take into 
account of the context in which the verse was revealed and the privileged status of the 
prophet’s wives, as it specifically refers to his wives and prohibits marriage to them by anyone 
else, clearly excluding any other meaning. 
 
Stowasser’s perspective on the verse is that it ‘legitimised the medieval institution of women’s 
separation that became a distinctive feature of life at least from the upper-class urban 
dwellers among them’.73 In a historical context, the view that the verse applies to all women 
cannot hold true, as during those times women had to leave their homes for open defecation 
and therefore total seclusion was not possible. It is claimed by Rahman that the verse refers to 
the Prophet’s wives only due to their position and not all the women of Medina. He is 
categorical in his approach to the meaning being attributed ‘In no way could this obligatory 
duty of the wives of the Prophet be forcibly thrust upon other Muslim women as a compulsory 
duty’.74 He further states that if women wanted to adopt the verse for themselves, it would be 
their choice and would be considered a ‘noble gesture on their part’.75 But if the Qur’anic 
mandate intended for the wives of the Prophet is emulated by Muslim women in general on 
these grounds, then surely all Muslim women have to remain in seclusion and never come into 
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contact with any men. This would make redundant the other verses discussed later that 
command lowering of the gaze by men and women, and also counter arguments raised by 
Muslim women in Europe against those who deem veiling and seclusion to be oppressive and 
gender biased.   
 
Mernissi takes a disparate approach and claims that the verse was revealed to create 
separation between two men and not men and women and as such, it protected the privacy of 
the Prophet in his nuptial chamber being shielded from other men. She does not state how she 
arrived at that opinion as her view is not substantiated in her discussion about the verse and 
neither does it resonate with the Quoted Hadith relating to the revelation of the verse. If her 
assertion was to be considered, it would leave open the question as to why direct reference 
was made to the Prophet’s wives in the verse.76 She further contends that hijab is dimensional 
in that it is spatial, as it marks or separates a border and ethically it belongs to the forbidden ‘A 
space hidden by a hijab is a forbidden space’.77 Mernissi sees the situation surrounding the 
Prophet’s wedding as an example of Muslim society having become too invasive into the life of 
the prophet and because he was too polite to make any comments, ‘the hijab came to give 
order to a very confused and complex situation’.78 It can be argued that the verse is directed at 
men since according to the Hadith that forms the background for the verse, it was men who 
were overstaying their welcome at the prophet’s household post the wedding ceremony and 
therefore, the signal to men is quite clear to refrain from such behaviour.  The suggestion that 
the verse has universal application and applies to all women would be placing the burden on 
women to bear the consequences of the actions of men. The next verse revealed in the Qur’an 
that has relevance to women’s dress was 33:59: 
 
O Prophet! Tell thy wives and thy daughters and the women of the believers to 
draw their cloaks close round them (when they go abroad). That will be better, so 
that they may be recognised and not annoyed. Allah is ever Forgiving, Merciful.79 
 
This verse is considered to have been revealed in the context of the jaliyah80 period, during 
which women were regularly leered at by men and rude comments made about them when 
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they went out of their homes. Women during that period were considered objects of sexual 
pleasure and property of men, to deal with the way they wanted to.81 Those men engaging in 
the rude gestures and behaviour would plead that they cannot identify the respectable women 
from the unchaste. This was a period where sex was a freely available commodity and 
according to Ahmed ‘Women were purchased and sold like livestock and chattels. They were 
forced into marriage and prostitution; they would be inherited but not inherit; possessed but 
not possess’.82In such times where gender inequality was the norm and as a leader of Muslims 
the prophet bore responsibility for the safety of everyone in Medina the verse was revealed in 
order to deal with this situation.  
 
Although this verse does not create any new form of women’s dress, it does command 
modification of the way that dress had to be worn by them. The verse instructs the Prophet’s 
wives and women in general to cover themselves with their jilbab when coming out of their 
homes. The verse unlike the previous one that specifically mentions the Prophet’s wives, 
suggests that seclusion was not necessary for any woman and the verse applied to all women 
and not just restricted to the Prophet’s wives only. According to Ali the purpose of covering: 
 
was not to restrict the liberty of women, but to protect them from harm and 
molestation under the conditions then existing in Medina. In the East and in the 
West, a distinctive public dress of some sort or another has always been a badge 
of honour or distinction, both among men and women.83  
 
The interpretation of the obligation under this verse did create a two tiered society, where 
females were categorised as believers and non-believers, leaving open the interpretation that 
Islam considered it acceptable for non-believing women to be molested but not believing 
women. The verse meant that women who were slaves and prostitutes would clearly stand out 
from the veiled women, indicating they were open to abuse that was deemed acceptable to 
men. This was a situation that was not favoured by the Prophet but in order to prevent civil 
unrest in Medina, he was forced to tolerate it. Mernissi refers to this situation as ‘the vestige 
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of a civil war that would never come to an end’.84 The verse is also clear in that it allows 
women to step out of their homes so long as they are recognisable which suggests that the 
previous verse cannot call for seclusion of all women. Although the Qur’an did later reveal a 
verse that imposed restrictions on the male gaze and modesty requirements for men too, any 
application of such commandments was considered applicable to Muslims only thus leaving 
the non-Muslim men who did not feel bound, to possibly continue with their inappropriate 
behaviour against non-Muslim women. 
 
As long as women embrace the veil as a portable shelter without which they cannot enter 
public space, considered the domain for men by men, then women who veil transmit the 
message that Muslim society does not have to afford safety for women. If veiling is the only 
method of remaining safe because it wards off unwarranted attention from men, then the 
practice of veiling itself must increase hostility from men towards those who do not veil. 
Arguably, this means a minority of veiled women are responsible for deflecting harassment on 
to a majority who do not veil, thereby playing a role in advancing harassment to others. This 
defies the logic behind veiling if it is a voluntary choice, since it means that being unveiled, a 
woman cannot be held morally blameworthy for subjecting other women to harassment, but if 
veiled then it does have that outcome which defies the pious nature of the veil. The 
application of this verse in current times is difficult to justify, as there are laws that protect all, 
not just women and certainly not just Muslim women from harassment in public places. Thus 
the application of Qur’anic commandments that were aimed at dealing with a specific 
problem, by a specific group of people, at a specific period in history, have no place in modern 
times as those specificities do not exist. As the aim of the verse is to facilitate recognition, it 
cannot have any application in Muslim countries since the issue of differentiating non-Muslims 
and Muslim women does not arise, making the verse confined to history and redundant in 
contemporary society. The verse in the Qur’an that is considered to have the most direct 
relevance to the issue of Islamic dress codes is contained in sura al-nur 24:31: 
 
And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of 
their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their 
bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or fathers 
or husbands' fathers, or their sons or their husbands' sons, or their brothers or 
their brothers' sons or sisters' sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male 
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attendants who lack vigour, or children who know naught of women's nakedness. 
And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their 
adornment.85 
 
This verse is considered significant for Muslim women in a number of respects. Firstly it 
instructs women to lower their gaze and be modest. According to the Hadith, in Islam the first 
look at the opposite sex is considered to be allowed if the purpose is not related to sexual 
desire or attention, but the second look, which would be deliberate is classed a sin.86 The verse 
has been interpreted by Islamic scholars as imposing a requirement of modesty before God 
and men, the notion being that if there is no eye contact between the opposite sex the 
temptation or desire will not arise. Secondly, the verse demands caution in the adornment of 
the body so that it does not attract men, adornment is considered any apparel or the manner 
in which it is worn that would attract such attention. Thirdly, to cover the bosom means to 
wear the hijab and as a minimum the body should be covered so as not to reveal the natural 
curves of a woman and the head to be covered. The verse does not specifically state that 
veiling is required, yet there is a level of consensus amongst some Muslim scholars that it does 
impose a requirement that the head is covered but no real consensus as to the form of 
covering, a point with which Roald agrees on adding that the form is different from one state 
to another and from one culture to another.87 Fourthly, the verse stipulates the category of 
men a woman is not allowed to have sexual relations with88 and needs to observe the hijab 
when in front of them, and those she does not need to cover in front of. Lastly, a Muslim 
woman is forbidden to use jewellery that jingles, such as anklets which by the sound they 
make would naturally attract the male attention to specific parts of the body.  
 
Male attraction by whatever means is at the forefront of the verse, and as such the Qur’an has 
allowed flexibility in the obligation to observe the hijab, for example, old women are exempt.89 
But it is not comprehensible that if the verse as interpreted by Muslim scholars imposes such 
burdens on women then why are there not similar burdens relating to covering of the head 
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imposed on men? If the covering of the hair which is considered to have some sexual quality, 
even though there is no direct evidence of this provided by any Muslim scholar as to what and 
how this sexual quality arises? Then why is that men’s hair does not possess the same sexual 
quality warranting covering? In contemporary society, women and men’s hair can resemble 
similar features in length, texture and even styles. For example many women have short 
cropped hair and many men have very long hair tied in pony tails. It is stated in Sura 24:30 that 
men must lower their gaze and be modest. Despite this clear commandment that applies to 
men to lower their gaze and precedes the equivalent verse that applies to women, there still 
appears to be a belief held by Muslim scholars and men that women are responsible for 
attracting male attention. If men were to obey this Qur’anic commandment as they are 
supposed to, the obligation on women would not be as burdensome. 
 
Doi notes that although the obligation to observe modesty is equal ‘on account of the 
difference between men and women in nature, temperament and social life, a greater amount 
of covering is required for women than for men, especially in the matter of dress’ but he does 
not elaborate on the detail of these differences or their basis.90 This is typical of Muslim 
scholars placing the unequal burden on women who have to bear responsibility to avert the 
male gaze. It is also arguable that since the verse that commands men to avert their gaze was 
revealed first and if acted upon men would not look at a woman in ways that encourage lustful 
desires, then the requirement for women to veil becomes redundant. And as such if men insist 
on unwarranted gazes at unveiled women then they must bear the religious consequences.  
 Madani believes that this command provides the best preventative strategies for the 
protection of the honour of men and women and shapes and cleanses their inner self,91 his 
opinion being closely based on the Qur’anic principle that if some act or behaviour can lead to 
sin, then that act or behaviour would be forbidden. For example adultery is forbidden and 
looking at a woman or a man can lead to that, therefore gazing at the opposite sex is 
forbidden. Maududi takes a social based approach and is of the opinion that the social law of 
Islam is to safeguard the institution of marriage, which prevents sexual anarchy and eliminates 
sexual excitement. According to him, this is achieved by regulating body coverings; a pillar of 
the social system of Islam.92 But he does not expand further on how body coverings would 
protect the institution of marriage? it can be argued that if men and women were modest then 
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the opportunity for attraction to the other sex should not arise and if a man knows that a 
woman who wears the hijab is signalling a ‘no go area’ then not only is the man deterred, but a 
married women would have the comfort that her own husband is not likely to be entertained 
by another women, due to the obligation of body clothing and lowering of the gaze.  
 
Mernissi elaborates on the importance of this social order in Islam: ‘Aggression and sexual 
desire, for example if harnessed in the right direction, serve the purposes of the Muslim order; 
if suppressed or used wrongly, they can destroy that very order’.93 According to Murdoch, the 
way societies regulate sexual instinct divide into two groups, one group is able to enforce 
respect of sexual rules by a ‘strong internalisation of sexual prohibitions during the 
socialization process’, whereas the other regulates the same respect by ‘external 
precautionary safeguards such as avoidance rules’ because these societies fail to internalise 
sexual prohibitions. He then suggests that Western societies belong to the first group while 
societies where veiling exists belong to the second.94   
 
Murdoch’s assertion holds true for Western women who despite the liberal attitudes and the 
use of liberal dress can still be modest without having to build an external barrier as a 
preventative measure. It would also hold true for those Muslim women who do not veil and 
despite that they can still be as modest as those who are veiled, as they have internalised 
modesty. Otherwise veiling would suggest that only those who engage in the practice are 
modest. Such sentiments are expressed by many women who have been the subject of 
research on veiling, for example in a study carried out by Wagner et al some of the 
respondents were convinced that their stature and posture are enough to incorporate their 
identity and rebuff a condemning gaze with some of them stating: ‘My eyes have 
modesty…why should I cover them?’95 
  
In verse 24:31 the Arabic word ‘khimar’ is used which has been translated to mean a head 
covering and the verse has to be read in context, as women prior to the revelation of this verse 
during the jaliyah period would be seen in public with their head coverings deliberately tied 
back in a manner whereby they would expose their neck and chest. They would also have their 
hair exposed and wore jewellery that would dangle particularly anklets that jingled as they 
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walked, all with aim of attracting male attention. These immodest practices during this period 
have been attributed to Arabia being a ‘God-less region’ which none of the more advanced 
religions had managed to penetrate.96 The verse thus directly addressed this aspect of a 
woman’s behaviour and is understood by Muslims as mandating the covering of the neck, 
chest and the hair. For this reason the verse is understood to impose requirements of hijab in 
the form of head dress and not the veil, and has been supplemented further with a number of 
Hadiths corroborating the requirement of the hijab.97 
The hermeneutic deficit in the hijab verses  
There are two suras in the Qur’an discussed earlier in this chapter, which have been 
interpreted and propagated by Islamic Scholars to justify a general obligation to veil for 
Muslim women.98 The interpretations and readings of these passages by conservatives is 
considered by many Muslims as giving fathers, brothers and husbands the right to impose 
covering obligations, which include a number of models from the simple headscarf, to a 
complete burqa and in some cases even covering the hands by using gloves. The coverings are 
justified by men on the grounds that the conservatives have held that women’s bodies lead to 
sexually corrupting men and that necessitates their concealment from men. These views 
originated from the classical exegetes whose own opinions on the issue of women’s bodies 
were in a state of flux. For example Barlas cites al-Tabari who was of the opinion that men and 
women could expose parts of their bodies that were not shameful, whereas al-Baydawi was of 
the opinion that the entire body of a free woman was shameful and eye contact with the 
opposite sex was a messenger of fornication.99 Stowasser gives the example of al-Khafafi who 
decreed that that the face and the hands of a female required concealment. 100 Such male 
orientated interpretations are a major concern for women who wish to enjoy equality, as 
Hussain staunchly asserts: 
 
No matter how many socio-political rights are granted to women, as long as these 
women are conditioned to accept the myths used by theologians or religious 
hierarchs to shackle their bodies, hearts, minds, and souls, they will never become 
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fully developed or whole human beings, free of fear and guilt, able to stand equal 
to men in the sight of God.101 
 
The disparity of views led to different forms of covering that included covering the face, head, 
and hands and feet and is the reason why there is a lack of true consensus amongst Muslims as 
to what form of covering is obligatory and what is not? But the interpretations did not stop 
with just body coverings, but extended to total domestic segregation in some Muslim societies 
such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In such states women are still subject to severe 
punishments even in present times if they are found to be mixing with male strangers or fail to 
abide by Islamic dress codes, this is even though there is no cogent evidence of the existence 
of such penalties in Islamic history. None of these forms of covering were injunctions, 
teachings or punishments of the Qur’an, but rather the inscription of the female body, not by 
divine injunction but individual opinion of exegetes conditioned by a patriarchal society. Such 
opinions ignore the Qur’anic teachings stipulating that gender relations in Islam are based on 
equality with women having positive rights in terms of divorce, inheritance and the right to 
freedom from forced marriage. Furthermore, the Qur’an does not forbid education or 
employment of women and there are many examples of Muslim female leadership, conducting 
of trade and business in history and modern times, a good historical example being that of 
Prophet Mohammed’s wives Aisha and Khadija. Some women have gained powerful positions 
leading states such as Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Despite such examples, the 
male orientated opinions serve only to further misogynist views and practices of those who fail 
to acknowledge the gender equality stipulated in the Qur’an and want to hang on to norms 
which are a by-product of pre-Islamic culture. Although there are some problematic passages 
in the Qur’an, its egalitarian core is explicit102 and it cannot be used to subjugate Muslim 
women. Muslim scholars have resisted any attempts at re-interpretation using contextual 
approaches, particularly by women and those that recognise and attempt to remedy the 
inequalities against women.  
 
The verses in the Qur’an are specific in nature and are highly contextual but the classical 
exegesis suggests there was intent to generalise the application without distinguishing the 
addressees of the first verse, and ignoring its historic specificity. This flaw in interpretation has 
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been perpetuated through the centuries and is still being upheld by the Muslim population at 
large, who have placed blind reliance on the decontextualized meaning attributed to the veil. 
The verses are clearly addressed to the Prophet with a specific purpose. The revelation of the 
verse with the prophet being the addressee himself therefore does not have general 
application for all men in time and space to force their mothers, daughters or wives to comply. 
This compulsion is contrary to Islam as the Qur’an clearly states that ‘There is no compulsion in 
religion’.103 Even the prophet did not have the right to enforce the Qur’anic injunctions using 
the force or threats in order to achieve compliance.104 Yet force and threats have indeed been 
carried out by amongst others, the Saudi Arabian, the Taliban and the Iranian regimes against 
women who refuse to comply, as well as psychological influence exerted by fathers, brothers, 
husbands and the community against those women who reside in Western states.  
 
When looking at the verses with a view to establishing the exact form of covering mandated, 
their requirements are dissonant to those propelled by conservative Muslims. For example, 
the use of the word jilbab, which is a cloak that covers the body and the khimar, which is a 
shawl both of which in ordinary usage of the attire cover the juyub, meaning the bosom and 
the neck. Neither of these items of clothing was historically or customarily used to cover 
anything other than the body or the neck of a woman. There are many Hadiths that reflect 
that,105 yet they are seldom referred to in debates relating to the compulsory nature of veiling. 
To strain the ordinary meaning of the verses in order to compel covering a woman’s face by 
conservative scholars such as Memon Madani,106 is not only out of tune with ordinary rules of 
interpretation but even goes against the grain and spirit of the language used in the Qur’an. 
Such patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an contain what I term a hermeneutic deficit that 
warrants a renewed approach, which is based on re-interpreting of those verses of the Qur’an 
that have been used by conservative Muslim scholars to obligate women with full covering of 
the face and seclusion. This will lead to eliminating the gap between the normative dress 
requirements outlined in the Qur’an and the prevalent covering practice among Muslims, both 
as societies in the Muslim world and as communities in the West.107  
 
There is a lack of evidence that women are mandated by the Qur’an to cover their faces, even 
during Hajj, the most sacred of pilgrimage in Islam when in the presence of millions of men, 
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women perform the rituals without a face covering.108 During Hajj women are freely moving 
around men where bodily contact during some rituals such as the circumambulation109 of the 
Kaaba in Mecca is inevitable as more than three million Muslims undertake the ritual. If 
women had the ability to lead men to succumb to sexual weakness, then one would expect a 
requirement that all women would be veiled in order to prevent such an attack on men’s 
weaknesses during a ‘once in a lifetime’ sacred pilgrimage. And if during such an important and 
faith enhancing act women are not considered dangerous without a veil, then how can they 
pose such dangers on a day to day basis? 
  
Those who believe that the face veil is compulsory use this negative obligation to argue that, 
as there is an Hadith to the effect that women must not veil during hajj means that full facial 
veiling must be the default position. However, this argument lacks the veracity as the direction 
from the Prophet referred to by the Hadith may simply have been to the effect that veiling was 
not a religious requirement and he was highlighting that. Another rebuttal can be that there is 
not an authoritative Hadith that states with clarity that facial veiling is compulsory 110 and if 
God had commanded or wanted women to cover their faces, then the Qur’an would have 
made that obligation quite specific and with the simplicity of language that leaves little room 
for error.  
 
It is also apparent that the purpose behind the two cited verses is also different; the first verse 
does not require women to hide themselves using the jilbab but to make the believing women 
more visible and thus recognisable. According to Barlas, the Qur’an ‘mandating the jilbab 
explicitly connects it to a slave-owning society…[where] only in a slave –owning jahili society, 
then does the jilbab signify sexual non-availability, and only then if jahili men were willing to 
invest it with such meaning’.111 The jilbab was thus used as a marker of identity and sexual 
promiscuity of non- Muslim men at a time when there was no state protection and women 
had to fend for themselves in terms of protection. Islam in those times was in its infancy and 
its survival very much depended on treaties and local agreements and it was important for the 
Prophet to maintain delicate societal relationships. 
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In the modern state however, slavery has been long abolished and men do not generally 
gather in the public square awaiting women who would be prey to their sexual desires without 
any punishment being meted for such actions.112 European states have comprehensive state 
laws that protect women from any form of public harassment and offences of a sexual nature 
are treated as having aggravated features attracting harsh punishments. The status of women 
has improved since the accession of the Qur’an, thereby eliminating the need for women 
whether Muslim or otherwise to have a marker of identity to denote as being untouchable, 
therefore Muslim women do not need to wear the jilbab for that purpose. But Instead of 
confining the jilbab verse to history, the textual interpretations by conservative scholars have 
re-assigned the jilbab verse to the notion of the dangerous body of the female that leads men 
astray. Rather than controlling men who may or may not have sexual desires motivated 
towards a Muslim woman, the women are compelled to conceal themselves. This meaning is 
remote from the Qur’an and even the second verse obligates the lowering of the gaze and 
modesty by both sexes is not premised on such a view. In this respect Barlas citing Levi 
considers the veil as being less a piece of clothing but more of a ‘sexually moral and modest 
praxis on the part of both the sexes, in contrast to their allegedly flaunting manners in the 
jahaliya’.113 
 
Attributing female immorality and inferiority to a woman’s body, leads those who do not 
challenge the patriarchal exegesis to impose the veil on women, under the pretext that, it is 
divine obligation. And those women, who without question internalise that meaning, become 
objects of that oppressive reading, a view echoed by many defenders of the veil and theorists 
of female oppression.  According to Barlas this ‘perversion’ of the Qur’an’s teachings results in 
ignoring the critical issue of what constitutes sexually appropriate behaviour for men.114 The 
question women should be challenging is why they need to defend themselves from sexual 
abuse when they are living in European societies where national laws afford them protection 
from all men, with double protection from Muslim men as they are bound by Islamic rules on 
modesty? The argument that veiling prevents women being corrupted into liberal societies 
thus becomes extreme at one end of the continuum, as that would have to be based on a 
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troubling assumption that the jahaliya ethos still persists in Western societies, when at the 
other end is the equally extreme restriction on contact with Muslim men on equal terms. 
 
Veiling is not the defence women ought to use in order to counter the two extremes, as 
Western societies have positive laws for that protection, and the divine laws imposing 
modesty requirements should protect them from Muslim men without the need for covering. 
The directive in the jilbab verse was a response to a specific aim115 and did extend to male or 
socially-imposed restrictions on the grounds that women are sexually depraved and are easily 
provoked and out of control.116 Sherif argues that most Qur’anic provisions were aimed at 
social conditions prevailing to Arab society fourteen hundred years ago and to treat them as 
binding today would be in many cases lamentable anachronism.117 Similarly Cragg points out 
that the spread of the Qur’an over a period of 23 years was gradual and thus its verses impinge 
upon a succession of temporal events and to make the Qur’an ‘immune from history is to 
makes its own history irrelevant’,118 and failure by Muslims to ‘reckon with moving time, 
however transforms the incidentalism of the days of the Qur’an into the fundamentalism of 
the centuries, an approach that does a disservice to Islam’.119 
 
The re-interpretive approach aligns itself with feminist strategies of dealing with existing texts 
and requires re-reading even if it means against the grain. The re-reading does what good 
criticism is supposed to do and look at religious texts with a different pair of spectacles. These 
spectacles would indeed provide a new education for women and would be different in the 
sense that it will educate women not in what to think but how to. The readings against the 
grain will allow counterbalancing the conservative readings by alternative interpretations 
within those traditions. This will not only provide resistance to patriarchal readings but 
minimise the hermeneutic deficit leading to an alternative to the male gaze through which the 
traditional interpretations have been made and propagated.  
The veil as a deflector of the male gaze 
The male gaze often characterised as male phallic or scopic activity has been the subject of 
extensive feminist critiques and some emphasise the ‘mastery of the gaze’ which has allowed 
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men to ‘eye up’ a woman.120 Feminists are critical of gendered gazing and being gazed at121 
and believe that although observation is conditioned by perspective and expectation, gender 
plays a role in formulating those expectations. They insist ‘these expectations are 
disproportionately affected by male needs, beliefs and desires’ and they object to seeing the 
world through male eyes as; they ‘equate the male gaze with patriarchy’.122 This leads to 
women judging themselves in accordance with internalised standards of what pleases men. 
Bartky notes that girls ‘learn to appraise themselves as they are shortly to be appraised’123 and 
the men are empowered just like spectators and women are objected as the seen rather than 
those who see.124 The concept of the male gaze is also associated with art,125 cinema, 
advertising126 and even pictorial representation on Greek Attic vases.127 It is not simply a male 
orientated phenomenon, but has pervaded to women too.  
 
Muslims believe that the male gaze if not deflected can lead to sexual encounters, which are 
forbidden in before marriage in Islam and anything that may lead to attracting the opposite 
sex for sexual purposes would also be prohibited. Activities such as wearing seductive clothing 
that attracts attention, meeting men alone and reading or watching obscene material would 
fall under this prohibition.128 According to Al-Qaradawy Islam stipulates that clothes worn by 
women must not be revealing, transparent or tight fitting as they would delineate parts of the 
body that are sexually attractive129 and even if modest, perfuming the clothing must not be 
used to attract attention.130 Indeed this suggests that men do not need protection and if that is 
the case, then a woman must be considered to be a sexual animal whose sexuality needs to be 
controlled via the means of dress codes. Clearly then Islam fears the power of female 
attraction over men and the assumption is that the male cannot handle an uncontrolled 
female sexually, leading to an inference that a woman’s sexual capacity is greater than a 
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man’s.  According to Mernissi ‘The entire Muslim social structure can be seen as an attack on, 
and a defence against, the disruptive power of female sexuality’.131 
 
One obvious flaw in the justifications perpetuated by Islamic scholars who assert that men 
need protection from a woman’s sexuality is the question of what protection exists for women 
from the sexuality of men, as they are neither veiled nor secluded. Can a woman not find a 
man attractive and have sexual desires that emanate from a man’s looks? It is questionable 
why such a parity question has avoided an appropriate discussion by Islamic scholars who are 
proponents of veiling. Indeed the polarised view that it is only men who are sexually 
stimulated by the female body, a visual stimuli and the Freudian concept of scopophilia132 
applicable to such assumptions is no longer supportable according to recent research carried 
out in this area. Bergner’s study that involved scans of women’s brains and their responses to 
images of an erotic nature showed that the women’s responses were much stronger compared 
to those of men. He concluded from his research that women remained much more controlled 
in expressing their reactions, thus the window between the reactions to stimuli and the 
expression of such impulses was greater than that of men, who were much more forthcoming 
with an acknowledgement of their reactions.133  
 
The greater gap in a sexual stimulus and acknowledgement, or greater control over a reaction 
is the result of a number of factors associated with women. For example, one reason is the 
internalisation of modesty as argued by Murdoch who states that the Western women have 
‘strong internalisation of sexual prohibitions during the socialization processes’.134  There is no 
universal principle that can be applied to all women and their reactions to sexual stimuli are 
dependent on religious and cultural settings and societal attitudes towards women in those 
contexts which are constantly changing. A  good example being El Feiki’s research of sexual 
attitudes in the Arab world which shows that attitudes towards sexuality are shaped by forces 
such as politics, economics, religion, tradition, gender and generations rather than any 
characteristics inherited by birth. According to her any changes are evolutionary via a gradual 
pushing along the grain of religion and culture, rather than evolutionary and ‘they are all part 
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and parcel of sexuality – that is, the act and all that goes with it, including gender roles and 
identity, sexual orientation, pleasure, intimacy, eroticism and reproduction’.135 
Failure of the veil at averting the male gaze 
Since women are deemed stronger at resisting natural instincts, it can be argued that even if 
the woman does not engage in any eye contact with a man, the face is probably the most 
visually stimulating feature of a woman and as that is not concealed; it can lead to sexual 
attraction. Lazreg notes that ‘Men scrutinise women’s faces whether a woman wears a veil or 
not, for signs of where they stand on sexual matters’.136But the argument suggests Muslim 
men are going against the Hadith that makes it clear that the first glance is permitted but the 
second that would be an intentional gaze of a woman due to her beauty is classed as a sin.137 
The wearing of the veil does not guarantee that the male gaze will be averted; if anything it 
can attract more attention to a woman. This view is also adopted by Borneman who states 
that the veil, in short heightens men’s fantasies about women, making it easier to perceive 
them as a generic category of desirable objects.138  His view being based on the notion that the 
greater the concealment the greater the curiosity and imagination as to what may lie behind 
the veil. Such a plausible view does mean that the veil does not achieve its objective, as it may 
even attract attention from men who may not have given that same attention to an unveiled 
woman, but because the veil generates this curiosity, it attracts such a man. 
 
Lazreg points out that men do, and will scrutinise a woman’s face looking for possible signals 
of willingness on the part of the woman, further commenting that ‘adultery of the eye and the 
heart cannot be stamped out by the veil’.139 But she fails to acknowledge that it is this precise 
scrutiny of the woman the above Hadith is aimed at. A man should not gaze with any sexual 
intent and even if he does and many do not refrain, then the woman should not give the signal 
or the body language the man is waiting for. If she cannot refrain from these signals then 
surely the veil is not worn by her for that purpose. Mernissi on the other hand states that the 
woman when going out in public enters male space and that ‘The veil means that the woman is 
present in the men’s world, but invisible; she has no right to be in the street’ and that ‘Women 
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in male spaces are considered both provocative and offensive’.140It is this latching on to 
historical misinterpretations of Islamic commandments that lead Islamic scholars into 
declaring public space to be the domain of the men, which is contrary to the egalitarian nature 
of the Qur’an. This contributes to gender inequality imposed through culture rather than 
religion. Mernissi attributes this to Islam itself stating ‘desegregation of the sexes violates 
Islam’s ideology on women’s position in the social order: that women should be under the 
authority of fathers, brothers or husbands. Since women are considered by Allah to be a 
destructive element they are spatially confined and excluded …’141 But If her view is to be 
accepted, then it is disturbing that religion should declare the shear presence of a woman as 
provocative to a man; an argument often used by those who advocate gender segregation. 
 
If the Qur’anic commandments are mandatory according to male orientated interpretations 
that demand a blind following and women are to be veiled and segregated. Then the 
requirement for the verse and its application would be devoid of meaning.  The requirement 
to lower the gaze by both sexes suggests that women are free to enter public spaces, without 
covering their face as the application of the verse to men would guard their modesty and 
therefore segregation of women defies the intention of the verse commanding lowering of the 
gaze. But if prohibiting the male gaze is to enhance morality in men by denying them sight of a 
women’s face, then arguably Muslim men can never be moral and virtuous in a Western 
society, as despite veiling by Muslim women who may deny the gaze to men and remain 
invisible, they cannot retain their virtuousness as women of Western cultures would always be 
visible to them and unveiled.  
The modesty doctrine 
The argument used most frequently by Islamic scholars and others who support the wearing of 
the hijab and the veil is that Islam requires modesty from Muslim women and the hijab or the 
veil is a sign of discharging that duty. But this imposed modesty by men not only prescribes the 
type of clothing to be worn by Muslim women; it also attempts to modify their characteristics 
affecting how they will interact with others in public spaces. From what should be a set of 
internalised values, which everyone is entitled have, Muslim women are expected to 
externalise them too. The concept of modesty is contested as there are different 
understandings of its nature and whether the doctrine objectifies women whether Muslim or 
not. There are several definitions of modesty found in various dictionaries that include aspects 
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such as humility, shyness or simplicity. The Oxford Dictionary defines modesty as ‘behaviour, 
manner, or appearance intended to avoid impropriety or indecency.’142 Modesty is not 
confined to such qualities, as a person can possess other positive characteristics such as self-
esteem, self-expression and autonomy. Neither is it limited to Islam or clothing alone; it can be 
deployed in life generally since values such as humility and simplicity are valued attributes. 
These values are clearly mentioned in the Bible143 where head coverings such as the veil were 
customary for Jewish women to wear when going out in public and according to Brayer ‘During 
the Tannaitic period the Jewish Woman’s failure to cover her head was considered an affront 
to her modesty. When her head was uncovered she might be fined four hundred Zuzim for this 
offense.’144 Punishments for failing to follow modesty codes are also believed to be contained 
in the Qur’an, indicating how important the honour of the woman is considered by some 
Muslims and punishment for those who dishonour a woman are severe.145 
 
Even laws in contemporary liberal societies such as in the USA compel the requirement of 
modesty; they are deemed constitutional. For example, nudity in public places is prohibited 
and any mode of public undressing that can be classed as obscene or indecent, even including 
prohibitions at one point on public breast-feeding.146 Modesty relating to sexuality is based on 
traditional morality and considered an ethical virtue shared by the major religious traditions, 
classed as a positive character trait. Hence Allen states ‘There is a close reciprocal connection 
between chastity and sexual modesty. Failures of sexual modesty are a threat to pre-marital 
chastity.’ She further refers to Tocqueville who speculated that ‘nineteenth century American 
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women were chaster than their European counterparts…because they tended to seclude 
themselves inside their homes after marriage.’ For Allen: 
 
 Sexual modesty is a moral virtue, not one that always requires old fashioned 
chastity or head covering scarves. Modesty is a value feminists have properly 
urged societies to question and historically, it has been of a piece with repressive 
traditions of female privacy that feminist have disavowed.147  
 
Not all women, particularly some feminists adopt the view that modesty is such a positive 
value for women. There is a continuing debate questioning the objectification element 
associated with modesty and immodesty.148 However there are also calls for a greater revival 
of pre-marital chastity by pro-modesty feminists such as Shalit, who questions some of the 
current views noting that ‘In this post-sexual revolution era, a young woman may freely 
cohabit, but she may not choose to wait. If she does, there must be something wrong with 
her’149  and attributes them to misogyny ‘the view that for all of world history women have 
been idiots, or the view that gives women more credit, and thinks we have only gone 
overboard in the blip of the last thirty years’.150  
 
However some feminists see modesty as being oppressive to women using the argument that 
modesty is not about fashion, nor about protecting women but about the female body being 
controlled, which men seem to think they are entitled to in order to maintain their privileged 
position of power over women, exerted but regulating the ways which women use their bodies 
and think about them.  They further argue that it is not about women feeling comfortable in 
wearing clothes that signal ‘touch me not’ message nor is it about a woman’s agency 
associated with how she will dress or how she will present herself to others; it is about what 
men feel comfortable with.151  
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The blaming of the woman is a deeply entrenched attitude in patriarchy that often sees the 
woman’s sexuality as being dangerous, a view prevalent amongst many men. According to 
Barry ‘Women have been led to believe for so long that they have an uncontrollable sexuality 
which victimizes men and makes females innately promiscuous, a myth that we must believe 
at the same time that we believe all women are frigid’.152 This clear ‘double bind’ faces women 
who on the one hand are seen as sexual objects, but on the other they are shunned and 
shamed for an expression of any kind of sexuality. The view formed in the patriarchal mind is 
that women would only wear revealing clothes because they want to entice men. A natural 
question that arises is what is wrong with women seeking sexual attention from men? When 
men are allowed to do it is acceptable but if a woman does that she is considered immodest. 
For example if a man was to walk around with only his shorts he is not considered to be giving 
a signal of ‘sexual availability’ but a woman who wears skimpy clothing is considered as 
immodest and an invitation to be objectified. This is exactly what needs to change if women 
are to be considered of truly having freedom to dress the way they want to, without women’s 
bodies and clothing being used as markers of sexuality. According to Gillen and Montemurro: 
 
The right to display one’s body as an authentic expression of sexuality through the 
use of revealing clothes is a very limited one, restricted more to theory than 
practice. In theory, a sexy and desirable woman is one who wears clothes that 
display or accentuate a toned curvaceous body. In practice, a woman who dresses 
in such a manner is usually judged negatively for such presentation.153 
 
However this overlooks the fact that some women may actually feel good about and confident 
about their bodies. It could also be their aesthetic instead of a cultural fear of their sexuality 
and can be considered ‘as an act of resistance and an articulation of their subjectivity’.154 But 
women get caught out with competing ideologies, on the one hand there is pressure on young 
women to ‘dress up and look hot’ but on the other those who are aged run the risk of being 
labelled as promiscuous if they dress hyper sexually. According to Gillen and Montemurro, 
who carried out a study into impressions given off by sexualised clothing the ‘balance between 
authentic embodied representation of sexuality and conformity to heteronormative standards 
                                                          
152
 Kathleen Barry, ‘The Vagina on Trial: The Institution and Psychology of Rape’ Women Against Rape 
<http://www.uic.edu/orgs/cwluherstory/CWLUArchive/vaginatrial.html> accessed 11 April 2014 
153
Beth Montemurro and Meghan M. Gillen, ‘How Clothes Make the Woman Immoral: Impressions 
Given off by Sexualised Clothing’ (2013) 31 Clothing and Textiles Research Journal 167, 168  
154
 Ibid 169 
45 
 
for desirable appearance becomes quite complex and nearly impossible to manage’.155Some of 
the respondents in their research maintain that clothing considered immodest by some may 
‘actually represent women’s taste and preference’ and question the assumption that women 
who dress in sexy clothes just want to have sex: 
 
It’s not like women dress like that just to have sex. They are just dressing like that, 
because maybe they just want to wear [those clothes]. But men think they’re like 
the sexual beings that they’re going to have sex with this woman that’s dressed 
provocatively.156 
 
Similarly Wilkins asserts that Goth women who choose to dress provocatively and are proud of 
their sexuality, just like some women who dress in sexy clothes because it feels good to 
them.157The inference then is not difficult to draw that by imposing dress restrictions by the 
patriarchal forces is an attempt to desexualise women. There are those who are of the opinion 
that this objective is far from being fully achieved, as women do think about sex, more than 
men as recent studies have shown.158 Indeed there are feminists such as Camille Paglia 
considered ‘a veteran of pro-sex feminism who still endorses pornography and prostitution’ on 
the ground that it is a true exercise of their choice and autonomy.159 But equally there are 
those such as MacKinnon and Dworkin who vehemently attack the use of women in the sex 
trade as objectification and violence against women, which harms them. 160  
Objectification and veiling 
One argument over the Islamic veil imposed by modesty doctrines is that it results in 
objectification of Muslim women as ‘it encourages people to think of and treat women as a 
mere object’.161 Objectification in this context means treating women as objects for the 
viewer’s benefit with the focus on physical beauty or indeed lack of it in the case of the veil, by 
denying visibility of it, making it a concern central to feminist theory.  Nussbaum in her work 
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identifies seven features,162 with Langton163 adding another three to her list164 that could be at 
play when a person is being treated as an object.165 She clearly demonstrates that 
objectification as a concept is not just confined to appearance of women; the range of 
application being quite wide In relation to women’s appearance. Bartky points out that women 
tend to be valued based on their looks and are associated with their bodies more than men, 
and to a greater extent,166 whilst Saul reminds of the constant social pressure on women, to 
maintain or correct their body so it conforms to norms of feminine standards.167 There are 
trends that men are also now becoming pre-occupied with appearance and want to be 
appealing to women, but that is considered an accentuation of the problem rather than a 
move in the right direction.168  
 
Bartky draws an analogy with the Marxist theory of ‘alienation’ where for Marx the labour 
being a distinct human activity and the product of the labour being the externalised to the 
worker’s being. But under capitalism the workers are alienated from the product of their 
labour, leaving the worker as a person fragmented. She is of the opinion that in patriarchal 
societies, women get fragmented due to being too closely associated with their body and their 
‘entire being is identified with the body, a thing…regarded as less inherently human than the 
mind or personality’. Therefore as all the focus is placed on her body, her other attributes such 
as personality or mind is ignored, leaving a woman’s person fragmented. And it is through this 
fragmentation that a woman gets objectified because her body has been separated from the 
person and is understood by men as representing the woman.169  
 
Bartky’s view is commonly voiced by Muslim women who cover, for example Nadia who is one 
of the respondent’s in Bullock’s research on veiling and the associated stereotypes states ‘I’d 
like people to judge me for the person I am and not be caught up in how I look’.170 Similarly 
some of Droogsma’s respondents cover for the same reasons as Mona states ‘…I feel like by 
wearing the hijab, the only people who see all of me are the people who know me 
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intellectually, emotionally, you know what I mean?...So people can’t objectify me to the point 
where they would be able to, possibly, if I chose to dress a different way’.171  And Hadia affirms 
that ‘hijab is telling men that they don’t have the rights to look at my body and to judge my 
beauty. It forces men to look beyond just the physical and to see who you are’.172 
 
Since objectification generally involves two people, veiled women in patriarchal societies can 
be considered akin to Bentham’s prisoners of the Panopticon.173 As immodest women feel they 
need to please the man by being sexually appealing and the veiled woman feels she needs to 
deflect the male gaze of the man by covering herself, both women are adapting their 
appearance for the sake of others. In both cases the end result is self - objectification  because 
some non-Muslim women are constantly being reminded of their femininity, checking their 
make-up and dress, whilst the veiled Muslim woman is constantly checking the positioning of 
the veil and being reminded by religious scholars, parents, husbands and the community about 
the importance of it. The consequence being that the actions for both types of women become 
voluntary in the sense that they have internalised it leading to self- objectification.  Indeed this 
does not apply to all women, as there are Muslim and non-Muslim women who ignore and do 
not succumb to such pressures neither are they instigated by anyone.  
 
The objectification theory is clear on the infliction of great damage to the woman by self-
objectification174 occurring, leading to internalisation of the male gaze175 with the woman 
becoming the aesthetic and the object of the male gaze, which in turn leads to an imbalance in 
power between the gazer and the object. Hence the two elements being described as the 
institutions displaying gender inequality.176 This is contrary to the ideals or the egalitarian 
nature of the Qur’an, for example men and women’s relationship with God is on equal footing 
where both are believed to be awarded identical rewards and punishments for their deeds. 
Although the relationship between men and women is defined by the Qur’an, affording 
women varying degrees of rights recognised under Islamic law, the pre-Islamic cultural gender 
differences seem to permeate the Islamic textual interpretations, leading to liberal Islamic 
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scholars and some Muslim feminists highlighting the teachings of equality in Islam, to 
attenuate and eliminate gender power imbalances.  
 
If immodest dress results women in becoming objects of pleasure as opposed to free thinking 
and independent women, then the opposite reaction to this being modesty, also objectifies 
women as the focus on both, is the female body, thereby emphasising its importance. The 
more it is regulated the more obsessive it becomes and instead of eliminating sexualisation of 
the female body, modesty simply contributes to it. Such dangers are evident by comments 
made by Rabbi Dov Linzer quoted when referring to an attack by a group of Orthodox Jews in 
Jerusalem who spat on an eight year old girl accusing her of being immodest: 
 
The modesty obsessed gaze is looking at sexual objects not at a human being. 
Those men who spat on that girl saw her not as a little innocent girl like decent 
human beings would but as a sexual object that offended them. This is not out of 
concern for temples (the body) or for women in general, it is out of misogyny. 
When a man is offended by a woman’s revealing clothing it is because he sees her 
as a sexual object, not a person with desires, dreams, plans ambitions; she is 
simply a series of sexual objects.177  
 
If one of the  aims of the veil is to oppose objectification and gain equal recognition, for 
example as the Iranian women who decided to veil in order to reject Western models of 
‘emphasised femininity with their sexual objectification of women… and replaced [them] by a 
combative model of femininity’.178 Then covering women’s feminine attributes may be 
congruent with that aim, but hiding a woman’s face or the head leads to elements of a 
woman’s personality without any sexual function being concealed too, resulting in an anti- 
objectification strategy becoming a tool of objectification. As Botz-Bornstein a lecturer at a 
Gulf University says ‘In my classes I have more difficulties memorizing the names of my veiled 
students because, to me, many look very much alike’.179 Thus the resistance via veiling 
becomes more an issue of appearance of, rather than being an object of desire that cannot be 
touched. It is possible that this can be attributed to false consciousness, but can also mean 
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that even though it uses the male language against the male, it also has the ability to 
unconsciously adopt the male language resulting in self-objectification. The veil as a piece of 
cloth may hide the sexualised image, but beneath it lays her continuing objectified personality. 
Therefore an unintended consequence of the veil can be an emphasis on, rather than 
concealing the Muslim woman’s body. 
Why is modesty so important in Islam?  
Modesty is considered so important in Islam that Muslims believe that its absence can lead to 
a person to become a disbeliever and engage in sinful behaviour.180 Such condemnation and 
fear of being labelled sinful is precisely the type of influence that coerces women into veiling, 
whereby choice is bypassed because such women will not have any choice if they are 
considered prone to becoming disbelievers or sinful. Mernissi referring to the writings of 
Ghazali notes that ‘a man can do as much damage to a woman’s honour with his eyes as if he 
were to seize hold of her with his hands’.181 But this suggests that the only way for women to 
remain honourable is to totally disappear from public space, thus giving cogency to arguments 
presented by traditionalist Muslim scholars such as Maududi, who has argued for complete 
gender segregation for Muslims when out of the private realm.182 
 
Islamic ethics considers modesty as more than just a question of how people dress and express 
their modesty in front of people; rather it is reflected in a Muslim’s speech, dress, and conduct 
in public or private in regards to God.  Any talk of modesty, therefore, must begin with the 
heart, not the hemline, as the Prophet of Mercy is believed to have said, ‘Modesty is part of 
faith, and that part of faith must lie in the heart’.183Muslims, like conservatist Christians and 
orthodox Jews are not only required to be modest in front of other individuals, but have to be 
modest before God too and this is where the link between modesty and faith has an important 
meaning. The Hadith guides Muslims on this aspect ’Avoid being naked, for with you are those 
who never leave you…so observe modesty before them and honour them’.184 The phrase 
‘those who never leave you’ may appear strange to non-Muslims, but Muslims believe the 
presence of God and the angels185 remain with them throughout their lifetime and even in the 
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absence of other people they must still remain modest. Armstrong notes this point stating 
that: 
 
Muslims have a very pervasive ‘God Consciousness’, making them highly aware of 
the invisible and the omnipresence of Allah and the focus on God and as a 
consequence, the afterlife, makes for a very different way of looking at the world 
from that most common in Western societies.186  
 
Such an approach is based on the assumption that everyone follows Islamic teachings or they 
are bound by the same modesty doctrines, which is clearly not the case as Muslims cannot 
even agree on whether the veil is obligatory or not. It is not uncommon to find people who 
possess positive values analogous to those of faith, yet they do not fit in with the requirements 
of modesty as propagated by religion. For example nudists come from all walks of life and to 
suggest that they have negative values or beliefs would be an affront to them. It can be argued 
that naturalists are more in tune and feel comfortable with their bodies and think less of it in 
sexual terms and their children think less of it in those terms whilst growing up. They are also 
less likely to engage in activities forbidden by the mainstream religions, such as masturbation 
or pornography and live a healthier lifestyle as they are able to suppress or control their sexual 
urges, which seems to be a real issue associated with modesty. This can be evidenced by a 
study carried out by Smith and King in the UK during which they found that practicing naturists 
often suppressed their sexuality via the use of rules, geographical isolation and control of 
thoughts and behaviour, with some participants in the research finding additional ways of 
enjoying their sexuality by keeping feelings hidden.187  
Clothing and modesty 
Clothing in Islam and Abrahamic religions is closely linked with modesty but Dunlap’s theory 
contests that relationship arguing that modesty is simply a product of habit, stating that ‘As a 
matter of observable fact, the connection between clothing and modesty is a simple one. Any 
degree of clothing, including complete nudity is perfectly modest as soon as we become 
thoroughly accustomed to it’.188 
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It is evident that there are still many people who are able to control their sexual urges despite 
a lack of clothing. For example in Ethiopia’s Omo valley the four different tribes of Kara, 
Nyangatom, the Hamer and the Mursi who still remain naked yet their lack of clothing does 
not cause sexual chaos amongst their men.189 This suggests as in Dunlap’s terms that there is 
no connection with clothing or modesty ‘it is merely the breaking of the established 
convention which makes it immodest’.190 For example, amongst certain African tribes if a 
woman failed to wear a distinctive string of beads around her waist even though she wears no 
clothes would be ashamed and dishonoured, just as a European or a Muslim woman is likely 
to.  
 
According to Stimpfl the clothing worn by women can ascend passion over reason and for this 
reason they must be careful in their choice of dress in order to de-emphasise this erotic 
potential.191 Whereas some apportion this erotic potential on women suggesting they are 
predisposed to passion that leads to evoking eroticism.192 Borneman states that ‘while 
Western feminists may not make the link between inner and outer beauty, certainly the 
worldwide popularity of the cosmetics industry testifies the importance many women place on 
outer appearance’.193  He further states that the aim of the woman who veils is to remove the 
gaze from the outer appearance, but questions whether that aim is indeed achieved. He says 
the veil doesn’t prevent objectification but simply slows it down as men still gaze at veiled 
women if they are able to discern the veiled woman’s shape. Indeed there is some weight in 
this argument as simply covering the face cannot be successful at discouraging male lust and 
neither can it eliminate the potential of any flirting from the female. It would be dependent 
upon the individual woman’s reason for veiling, if indeed it is for reasons of modesty as some 
Muslims believe is commanded by Islam, then flirting by women would defeat the object.  
Problems with the modesty doctrine 
The difficulty with the modesty doctrine in Islamic terms is that it places unjust burdens on 
some groups of agents compared to others. In Islamic culture, the expectations of sexual 
modesty are disproportionately placed upon women compared to men and in such situations 
continued propagation of sexual modesty ‘will perpetuate the injustice of these unequal social 
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expectations’.194 A prime example of social injustice resulting from modesty as practiced by 
veiled women is the limited access to employment or certain public services or prohibition on 
access to all public spaces as in the case of the French veil ban discussed in part two of the 
thesis. This is in the sense that modesty poses significant limitations for Muslim women for 
example those employments that require facial recognition such as school nurseries, the 
teaching profession, health services and other manual type employments may not be as 
accessible to women who veil.  Such limitations have been confirmed by Syed’s study that 
found that the patriarchal perspective on modesty prevents women in playing a role in a 
nation’s economy, the consequent being that there is an insufficient utilisation of national 
human resources.195 
 
If the veil is adopted as a cultural practice or as a form of resistance against a host culture, 
then arguably the woman is put into a more powerful position as she can gaze at the object, 
but remain almost invisible herself. This according to Masood puts the woman in a 
commanding position as she is aware the veil ‘denies men their usual privilege of discerning 
whom they desire and by default the women are in command’.196 But if Muslim men were to 
lower their gaze as expected of them by Islam, then irrespective of this transition of power to 
the woman, they would be in a position to escape her gaze. This therefore reveals a difficulty 
with virtues stemming from modesty such as the notion that all men are lewd and obsessed 
with female sexuality. To say that all men who glance at women do so because of sexual 
reasons is certainly an unfair sexual classification, as there is regular contact between different 
sexes in Western societies, where males interact with females in a number of social and 
professional settings without any sexual connotations. Similarly there are Muslim women who 
do not veil and mix with Muslim men in social and employment settings without upsetting any 
sexual equilibrium. 
 
There are polarised views on the modesty doctrine that question its values and those who 
place it within feminism too, in both cases the issue becomes objectification of women. 
Modesty in the patriarchal sense can sexualise the female body and turn it into a sexual object 
just as much as pornography or sexually appealing dress does. If wearing provocative clothing 
puts women’s bodies on a stage for men to deliver judgement and approve leading to their self 
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–objectification, wearing the veil or the burqa in order to hide the body for approval and to 
avoid being sexualised by men does that too. The solution is to allow women to wear exactly 
what they want without having to fear or hope for the male gaze. If Muslim men perceive 
women as sexual objects then irrespective of their attempts to hide women away from public 
space, they will still be kindled by something that reminds them of the sexual. And as they fight 
to suppress their sexual urges they see women everywhere identifying sexual stimulation with 
every reminder of a woman, thus pushing women out of the forefront. Suppressing women is 
not going to achieve modesty as that is making women the victims of men’s inability to restrict 
their gaze and not looking at a woman in a sexual manner, it has to be men who must control 
their sexual desires and take control of their gaze and minds. This way women’s deployment of 
modesty as a form of resistance that attempts to overcome men’s inability may not be 
required, but such paradigms are not simply confined to women who veil but apply to Western 
women too. 
Conclusion 
The meaning of the verses of the Qur’an intended to be of general application and those that 
had a specific meaning such as the one that applied to the Prophet’s wives and the verse that 
allowed Muslim women to be identified by their dress to prevent them being harassed has 
been blurred by Islamic scholars’ interpretations. This is because the specific verses have been 
given an interpretation that is of a general application thus making them applicable to all 
Muslim women irrespective of the temporal contexts. This difficulty can be dealt with by 
adopting a different methodology, whereby the Qur’an in some cases such as veiling must be 
read historically, paying heed to context rather than chronology and hermeneutically. This will 
allow substituting contexts of early Islam with contemporary ones and this can only be 
achieved by reading behind the Qur’an first. Such an approach is consistent with Barlas’, 
Hussain’s, Wadud’s and Mernissi’s re-interpretive strategies to unread patriarchal imposition 
of veiling.197 Furthermore the exegesis of the classical male scholars needs to be untangled 
from the Qur’an and the Sunnah from the Hadiths by parting normative Islam from the 
historical. This can be achieved even though there may be resistance from the successors to 
the classical scholars by re-examining the internal relationships of the texts to one another and 
contexts of textual readings.  
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Male influenced readings of the Qur’an, which compel veiling under the threat of harsh 
punishments for women who do not veil, need to be challenged by Muslim men and women, 
particularly those living in Western states, since the days when lack of education was a 
contributory cause for recourse to the classical exegesis are long gone. Power plays a crucial 
role in determining accepted interpretations and Muslim women need to claim their stake in 
re-interpretations of sacred texts to secure gender neutral outcomes and share power with 
male scholars of the Qur’an. It is in this context that Muslim feminists who have attempted to 
unread patriarchy from the sacred texts can make advances on their feminist goal in line with 
Marshall’s assertion , although in a different context that ‘Feminism requires that women be 
able to share in the power structures that control their circumstances’.198  
 
Modesty is considered by Muslim women to be an essential characteristic that allows them 
being seen as good Muslims as well as a tool that evades the male gaze. However external 
projection is not the only method, as other Muslim and non- Muslim women remain modest 
without the need to project it outwards and to suggest that those women who do not 
externalise it through veiling are not good Muslims is stereotyping those Muslim women who 
do not veil. Conversely the demonstration of external modesty through veiling can be a symbol 
of immodesty as it stands out in Europe as opposed to an Islamic state such as Saudi Arabia 
where all women are legally required to conform to religious dress codes, thus turning 
invisibility to even greater visibility. 
 
The voices of those women who veil is not heard in the religious discourse as male Muslim 
scholars have had sole monopoly over the interpretation of the sacred texts. This leaves the 
women being silenced and the Qur’an has been appropriated in order to justify the muting of 
these women in Muslim societies. This silencing by the religious discourse has further 
ramifications for those who wear the hijab or the veil as it is used as a justification by the 
socio-feminist and the legal discourse which equates it to oppression and considers these 
women as vulnerable victims who need saving. The re-reading of religious texts by women will 
allow women to make a more informed choice as to whether veiling is a product of patriarchal 
culture in which case the motivations are different and such norms need to be re-articulated 
or indeed whether it is a religious duty, either way the choice to veil has to rest with women. 
The drive for change must come from Muslim women whose bodies have been used by men to 
advance cultural and patriarchal control. No one has a monopoly over the Qur’an and the 
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steps taken by some Muslim academics at re-interpretation of troubling distorted readings of 
the Qur’an have to be adopted and furthered by Muslim women whether they veil or not.  If 
veiling is a cultural relic as some believe then its place in Western societies is questionable, not 
because such societies do not respect other cultures but because the veil as a mandatory 
cultural requirement can have negative connotations.   
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CHAPTER TWO – SOCIO FEMINIST DEBATES ON VEILING 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the contested theological origins of Muslim veiling and the silencing of 
Muslim women’s voice by gender biased interpretations of sacred texts were examined. This 
chapter’s aim is to engage in a critique of the dominant socio-feminist debates surrounding the 
practice. The discussion and analysis will be confined to firstly, that veiling is a tool of 
oppression imposed by patriarchal Muslim societies, and secondly that it liberates Muslim 
women. Both discourses will be examined within this one chapter, even though it means that 
the length of it will become longer and equivalent to two chapters. Approaching debates on 
veiling in a binary form does raise issues around essentialism from both polarities, but in 
reality there are many overlaps and the merits of the two discourses and their oppositions 
including their effect on women who wear the hijab or the veil would lead to a better synthesis 
if considered alongside each other. The aim of this chapter is to show that the disagreement 
between the oppression versus emancipation perspective leads to the voices of those women 
who wear the hijab and the veil to be muted from the debates. The chapter will further 
demonstrate Muslim women engaged in veiling practices are often represented by those who 
profess to act on behalf of them acting as cultural insiders and instead of modulating their 
voices, they suppress them with negative stereotypes.  
Why is the veil controversial? 
The practice of veiling by Muslim women ‘remains one of the most controversial issues in post-
colonial feminist studies…and has taken centre stage as a symbol of both oppression and 
resistance’.199 The woman who veils is to be feared, pitied, desired and respected,200 yet some 
of these stereotypes are not reflective of the lives of those who veil and fail to take account of 
the fluid nature of historical, cultural and political practices and their impact on the 
heterogeneity of contemporary veiling.201  
 
Despite the subsistence and coverage in literature, media and academia, Muslim veiling still 
generates confusion and controversy. Instead of it being laid to rest, it is still ignored, attacked, 
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dismissed, trivialised or defended.202 It has even been described as something that is 
comparable to the African American ‘coolness’ in terms of the wearer’s behavioural attitude 
and aesthetics.203  The Muslim veil has become ‘one of the most contested and symbolic motifs 
in Western imagery of the East and of Islam…Despite this not much has been done to decode 
it’.204Whilst some indict the practice, others defend it, each standpoint articulating  views and 
conclusions on its effects and how it oppresses or liberates women, but there has been little 
attempt at a centric approach that would be reconciliatory. More crucially the lens of an 
individual’s perspective on veiling is missing from the debates. Lazreg points out the lack of 
understanding of the experiences of women underneath the veil and claims this leads to 
misconceptions that the veil is simply a symbol of identity ‘it is seldom studied in terms of the 
reality that lies behind it. Women’s strategic uses of the veil and what goes on under the veil 
remain a mystery’.205The veil is ambivalent and a shifting signifier of multiple meanings and 
according to Lindisfarne-Tapper and Ingham ‘The image of the veiled woman is not in any way 
neutral; it is redolent with Orientalist import’.206  
 
An initial observation indicates that the debates on veiling are based on the assumption that 
Islam and its practices are universal in nature amongst Muslims. This has led to pertinent 
issues relating to religious differences being mainly unexplored, especially the differences 
within and across Muslim societies, resulting in those who veil to be treated as having the 
same motivations for veiling, thus being treated as a group that shares similar behaviours and 
understandings which can lead to over generalisation when dealing with women who veil.207 
This results in oppression of women of difference being measured using ‘the Western, most 
often white, yardstick which codes and represents cultural ‘Others’ from a position of 
dominance and superiority’.208 The danger here being that the default position for the veiled 
woman is one of commonality with all other veiled women lacking the individual agency and 
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unable to speak for herself,209 leading to others who oppose or defend the practice including 
some native informants to represent them. 
 
In a socio-feministic context this results in a tripartite representation whereby those who 
oppose the practice offer arguments based on secular Western liberal thought and those who 
defend it propagating their own emancipatory viewpoints, including the use of hermeneutics 
to neutralise challenges based on the oppressive nature of veiling. Additionally, the religious 
scholars impose their own strict interpretations of religious texts in relation to the veil. The 
woman in question who becomes the subject of such discourses receives a further blow when 
she is not heard and inscribed with negative stereotypes when she attempts to claim her 
individual rights before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as will be discussed later 
in the thesis.  
 
Although this thesis aims to confine the discussion to the use of the veil within a European 
context, it is near impossible to fully engage with its significance and fluid meaning without 
some reference to its use in a number of countries where Islam is the dominant religion. This is 
particularly important as there is a clash of binary viewpoints dependent upon the situational, 
cultural and the individual and any attempt at analysing the veil cannot be reduced to a single 
solution, which can result in misleading reductionism. Hence Grace cites Mabro who warns 
about the veil being ‘such a powerful symbol that it can blind us into generalisations’.210 
Cultural pre-conceptions and rejection of some Western forms of female dressing, which can 
lead to objectification play a role in viewpoints about the veil and highlight the deep 
entrenchment of some questionable assumptions about the choices Muslim women make. For 
example Al-Hibri211 questions why is it liberating to wear a mini-skirt but oppressive to wear a 
headscarf? As discussed in the previous chapter both forms of dress can lead to objectification, 
yet veiling by Muslim women is always at the forefront of oppressive effects of clothing. Wikan 
uses the example of Oman where veiling is considered a symbol of high social status to assert 
that veiling ‘is much a symbol of male oppression as Western women wearing a blouse’.212The 
reasons for and the symbolism of veiling is driven by political, gender, social and religious 
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vectoring and thus attempts at structuring religious identity, concepts and social hierarchies 
are very much an open field, however the most important actors in such debates are those 
women who live the experience of veiling.  
The veil as a tool of patriarchy 
A criticism that has been frequently levelled by those who oppose the use of Islamic veiling has 
been based on the grounds that the practice is patriarchal in nature. Muslim societies are 
considered to be patriarchal and ‘There appears to be an assumption that most religions and 
Islam in particular are patriarchal and against gender equality’213 and these inherent features 
play a role in denial of autonomy for Muslim women. Some Muslim men restrict freedom of 
women belonging to their community as an exercise of patriarchal power214 and ‘this 
curtailment usually relies on the invoking of religiously derived modesty laws to regulate 
women’s movement and lifestyle choices’215 resulting in these women being represented as 
passive and repressed victims of their patriarchal cultures.  
 
The term ‘patriarchy’ has its origins in Abrahamic religions216 and is used to describe an 
overarching system of male dominance over women,217 particularly reserved for the father 
exercising his rule over his wife, children and dependants.218 Al-Hibri is of the view that 
religions generally have a patriarchal view of the relationship between genders and writes that 
‘God was declared male and man was declared to be created in His likeness. Eve became the 
symbol of temptation and sin. The woman was consequently judged as a less likely candidate 
for salvation and an everlasting life in heaven than man’.219However, Badawi dissociates such a 
nexus of culpability on women stating that: 
 
The Qur’an does not blame women for the fall of man, nor does it view pregnancy 
and childbirth as punishments for eating from the forbidden tree. On the contrary, 
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the Qur’an depicts Adam and Eve as equally responsible for their sin in the garden, 
never singling out Eve for the blame.220  
 
He further clarifies that ‘men and women have the same religious and moral duties and 
responsibilities’.221 As such the Qur’an does not afford any superiority to any specific gender, 
since it is based purely on righteousness.222 It is objectionable to extend the meaning of the 
term patriarchy to all forms of male dominance over women, as that could give rise to 
universalism which would only exasperate essentialisms associated with biological differences 
between the sexes.223 
Patriarchy in the name of Islam 
The particular form of male dominance with respect to the hijab and the veil as examined in 
the previous chapter has been the inscription of dangerous sexuality on the bodies of Muslim 
women, mediated through gender biased religious interpretations of sacred texts, which have 
then perpetuated through the Islamic social and family structures and been defined as Muslim 
female modesty. Sexuality in Islam is encouraged within marriage but outside of marriage it 
attacks women, as they are deemed an active sexual power and a destructive force that can 
lead men astray. Thus religious doctrine considers it important to restrict their sexual power 
over men by controlling this sexuality outside of marriage.224 It is this element of control over 
women via the imposition of dress codes by men, particularly the presence of any coercion by 
the father, brother, husband situated in the Muslim family structure that gives rise to the 
attack on the veil. The argument based on the notion that the woman is forced and suffers 
from a deficiency of her own individual choice when she decides to wear the hijab or the veil. It 
is no surprise that such an allegation is made since religion is believed to be primarily the 
reason women veil; as it warrants modesty from the woman. It is this visual expression that 
leads Hoodfar to comment that ‘to the Western feminist eye the image of the veiled woman 
obscures all else’.225 But it does not help the cause of veiled women when Muslim scholars are 
of the view that: 
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The restrictions placed upon [the woman] regarding her dress and the display of 
her beauty and ornament is only to guard against all ways of corruption arising 
from such dazzling displays. What Islam has established is not a restriction on 
freedom of women but is a firm protection for her from falling down to the lowest 
levels of humility.226 
 
Or when a reputed scholar such as Allama Ibn Jauzi in Ahkam al-Nisa writes ‘I believe that a 
woman leaving her home and wandering on the streets is the biggest fitna,227let alone 
exhibiting her beauty and her body which is simply adding fuel to fire’.228 Such statements 
from leading scholars who overlook the inroads Muslim women have made in professional 
and political life229 come across as firmly committed to religious conservatism and 
patriarchal. It is not clear who women need saving from? Who does the protecting? Does a 
piece of cloth protect women? And why is such protection not deemed necessary for men? 
What does the reference to the lowest levels of humility mean? Such statements leave the 
possibility of conclusions that Muslim women cannot or do not have the ability to have their 
own voice or even act for themselves. These presumptions are clearly deeply rooted in 
patriarchal traditions that demarcate rights, roles and duties of men and women in Muslim 
societies. The consequence of male maintained religious discourse leads to the voices of 
Muslim women coerced into veiling by the force of religion and tradition being silenced and 
those who attempt speak out by challenging such traditions through re-interpretations of 
the sacred texts are ignored.  
 
The scholars who dominate religious discourse use their power over knowledge production 
to ensure any digression from male pre-determined norms would result in condemnation of 
women who do not adhere to the norms being labelled as immodest or ones who refuse to 
obey holy orders. The consequence of such allegations often results in women being 
ostracised and considered a bad example to other women and letting down the whole 
community. In order to avoid such attacks on a woman’s personhood, wearing the male 
mandated religious clothing allows a woman to remain a part of the community, retaining 
the respect of her family. This is in line with Bourdieu’s observation that people 
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demonstrate their status by appearing the ‘right way’ and those who fail to do that will have 
their taste, morality and social worth being questioned.230 
 
According to Grace, most feminists including some Muslim ones agree that Islamic veiling is a 
result of women being dominated and by patriarchy in the name of religion.231 Penny goes a 
step further and argues that it is not religion that oppresses women but patriarchy. For her the 
question is ‘not to what extent the veil can be considered oppressive but whether it is ever 
justifiable for men to mandate how women should look, dress and behave in the name of 
preserving culture’?232 She further describes the experience when she and her Muslim veiled 
friend swopped clothes for two weeks as a social experiment:  
 
Both of us felt immensely liberated, our bodies were finally our own, hers to show 
off as she pleased, mine to cover if I wanted. For the first time since puberty, I felt 
that people might be seeing the real me, rather than looking at my body… this 
flavour of freedom… is just as valid and important a choice as the freedom to go 
bare-legged and low cut. A truly progressive Western culture would respect both. 
But what European governments seem not to have grasped is that freedom to 
wear whatever little dress we like is not every woman’s idea of the zenith of 
personal emancipation. 
 
This indicates that patriarchy is not just prevalent amongst Muslim women but it is also a live 
issue for some Western women. As for the veiled women Muslim feminists such as Barlas 
attribute patriarchy that prevents women from claiming their body as their own, not to Islam 
but the patriarchal readings of the Qur’an which have been interpreted by men for men.233  
 
Some attribute the male dominance form of patriarchy to be highly prevalent amongst Muslim 
societies and a good example of it is evident in Ramji’s study in which a 21 year old male states 
‘[A] real man wouldn’t need his wife, or sister to go out and work. It’s his responsibility. It’s 
harem (un-Islamic) to have the women in your family working’.234 Here it is being suggested 
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that those men who allow women to get educated with a view to following a career are not 
‘real men’ and in any event women are not supposed to work. To declare a woman working as 
being ‘harem’ is clearly a misconceived understanding of Islam as it does not forbid women 
from working. Indeed it is a classic case of cultural norms being falsely defended using religion. 
Similarly there are those who defend the veil on the same basis as another male asserts ‘What 
do women need degrees for anyway? They’re not allowed to work. They can only work inside 
the home. I certainly won’t let my wife work… She’ll have to observe purdah’.235 Such 
gendered constructions are rooted in contradictions of Qur’anic norms and facilitate the dual 
standards possessed by men, who subordinate women’s position and justify the inequality in 
powers on the basis that they possess religiously sanctioned gender identity and is typical of 
the patriarchy prevalent amongst Muslim men. This is affirmed by one of the female 
participant’s in the study who states that: 
 
It’s not British society that makes being a Muslim difficult, it’s Muslim men…they 
don’t know what being a Muslim is all about…all they’re concerned with is making 
sure everyone only takes them seriously and ignores women.236  
Patriarchy beyond Muslim culture 
Patriarchy can materialise in a number of different guises and is no stranger to Western 
societies;237 it can refer to the organisation of a society (including the economy and paid work), 
a religion and a household. In many societies the patriarchal status quo was, until relatively 
recent times, accepted as the natural order of things, one very much based on a biological 
justification of the inequalities to which women were subjected. Women as mothers, it was 
argued and indeed seldom questioned, were the natural ones to take on the caring domestic 
role, leaving men free to pursue the more physically taxing roles that women were believed to 
be incapable of performing and thus unsuitable. 
 
Johnson describes Patriarchy as ‘A system of male domination that involves the subordination 
of women. Patriarchy takes different forms in different societies and different historical 
periods. It interacts with other forms of oppression, such as class, race and sexuality, in very 
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complex ways’.238 In Walby’s seminal work on patriarchy, she also projects a broad definition 
of patriarchy describing it as ‘a system of social structures, and practices in which men 
dominate, oppress and exploit women’.239 She is able to avoid any challenges of essentialism 
and universalism by breaking down patriarchy into six separate structures240 each being an 
autonomous structure and the permutations of the structures, demonstrating the flexibility of 
patriarchy. Whilst the opponents of the veil would like to believe that classic patriarchy is rife 
amongst Muslim societies and has been undermined and slowly eroded throughout much of 
the Western world, this is not universally accepted as patriarchy is still present within Western 
society and in many instances it is stronger than ever before.  All that has changed, it is 
suggested, is its modus operandi, moving from the domestic to the public space.  
 
Walby suggests that instead of patriarchy being eliminated in the West, it has intensified and 
not only has its degree changed but also its form. She states ‘Britain has seen a movement 
from a private to a public form of patriarchy over the last century’.241According to her six 
structures of patriarchy, the classical form of patriarchy has shifted from the private to the 
public sphere and acknowledges it is present within each structure. Western households still 
retain patriarchal structures with male working partners, women remaining as housewives or if 
in employment they take up part time employment whilst being responsible for childcare 
arrangements, replacing the traditional form of patriarchy where the husband is the head of 
the family. 
 
It is arguable that many European families are still essentially patriarchal institutions and the 
widespread patriarchy beneath the veneer of Western secular societies is well captured by 
Lees when he examined the role of Christian women in British society.242 Indeed all societies 
and religions at some point in their history have suffered or still do from patriarchy as 
Hirschmann notes that: 
 
Islam is no more restrictively patriarchal than other religions, such as Judaism or 
Christianity. Catholic prohibitions on abortions, as well as the surging popularity of 
‘promise keepers’, which urges men to forcibly assert their proper place as the 
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leader of the family, are only two examples  of the ways in which Western 
religions are far from egalitarian in gendered terms. And the Amish, the 
Mennonites, and the orthodox Jews prescribe dress codes for both men and 
women.243 
 
Although the form and degree of patriarchal practices may have changed, its extent and 
impact within the Muslim society is considerably different from that encountered by non-
Muslim women as they are subject to considerably different issues. Despite them being 
subjected to similar public forms of patriarchy as those encountered by non-Muslim women, 
they are also affected by more specifically cultural forms of  Islamic patriarchy, that may be the 
result of cultural as well as religious differences. According to Jawad, this is a ‘double 
oppression’ to which Muslim women are subjected to; she suggests they suffer oppression 
from the culture of their community and also from the culture of their religion: 
 
Our parents’ traditional attitudes… their cultural values, their family honour, their 
stubbornness to let go of the traditions that do not do anything for anyone living 
in Britain.  If a girl stands up for her rights she brings shame on the family.  These 
old fashioned ideas are what oppress Muslim girls not Islam.244  
 
Therefore when integrating religion and culture into the patriarchy equation, it becomes 
evident that Muslim women in the West are likely to face a complex web of patriarchal 
structures. Kandiyoti identifies Islamic culture’s position as the clearest example of classical 
patriarchy existing within the geographical area that includes North Africa, the Muslim Middle 
East (including Turkey, Pakistan and Iran), and South and East Asia (specifically, India and 
China)’.245 The majority of Muslim communities settled in Europe have originated from these 
countries. According to Kandiyoti, the reproduction of these classical patriarchal dynamics 
relies on the operations of the ‘patrilocally extended household… commonly associated with 
the reproduction of the peasantry in agrarian societies’.246  Whilst acculturation into host 
societies and the distance from mother countries has resulted in the dismantling of some 
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patriarchal households, an increase in the number of religious schools, mosques and visibility 
of religious dress indicates that there is retention of traditional practices. According to 
Kandiyoti ‘Even though demographic and other constraints may have curtailed the numerical 
predominance of three-generational patrilocal households, there is little doubt that they 
represent a powerful cultural ideal.’247  
Muslim households and patriarchal practices 
The existence of some practices among Muslims in Europe support claims that Islamic culture 
still remains inherently patriarchal. For example, amongst Muslim communities there are still a 
great number of arranged marriages with a real increase of online websites catering not only 
for Muslims but also different races and castes.248 This suggests some Muslim girls may be 
being influenced by parents and indeed some have been forced to marry partners chosen by 
parents. According to Kandiyoti ‘Under classic patriarchy, girls are given away in marriage at a 
very young age into households headed by their husband’s father. There they are subordinate 
not only to all men but also to the more senior women, especially their mother-in-law.’249 The 
issue of forced marriages is now being dealt with by way of criminalising the practice and a 
number of European states since the Council of Europe report on the matter have enacted 
legislative provisions that impose criminal liability on those who force women into marriage.250 
Domestic abuse is common amongst Muslim households but often goes unreported due to the 
lack of witnesses who are willing to come forward as it is considered as bringing shame on the 
family and so is difficult to quantify, making the problem extremely difficult for the authorities 
to address.  
 
Another patriarchal practice that has gained prominence amongst Muslims is the growing 
availability of prenatal sex identification scans that has led to fears that female foetuses may 
be aborted.251  Women, especially those who have travelled from the Asian sub-continent and 
have married into families that are traditional get cut out from the rest of the community 
becoming highly dependent on their husband and his parents. Although such practices are 
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getting less common due to the many generations of Muslims domiciled in European societies, 
those women who have joined by virtue of arranged marriages from overseas are prone to 
traditional household patriarchy that seeks male heirs.252 However the same women can 
become complicit to such perpetuation of patriarchy and may even ignore or refuse to deviate 
from it. This is what Kandiyoti describes as patriarchal bargaining: ‘… women often resist the 
process of transition because they see the old normative order slipping away from them 
without any empowering alternative.’253 Okin corroborates this point suggesting that older 
women often become co-opted into reinforcing gender inequality, thus she proposes that 
change must be actuated through young women as ‘Their interests may be harmed rather 
than promoted…’ if their views are not represented.254 Of course there are other 
manifestations of patriarchal practices amongst Muslim communities in the form of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) and honour based violence but any discussion of these is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
In terms of veiling as a patriarchal practice, Bartowski and Read (2003) who interviewed veiled 
and unveiled Muslim women in the United States found that the women who veiled were 
extremely defensive about the practice, whilst those who opposed tended to criticise it as a 
patriarchal tool of oppression.255 Furthermore, they noted that a strong sense of ‘sisterhood’ 
came from the women’s affiliation to Islam reinforcing the argument that veiling allows Islamic 
identity to be propagated:  
 
In part, this sisterhood is fostered by the marginalization of Islam from the 
Christocentric cultural mainstream in the United States.  Because some of these 
women don hijab and others eschew it, these women disagree about the meaning 
of the veil and its place in Islam.256  
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According to Weeks this disagreement arises because ‘Struggles around sexuality …are 
struggles over meanings - over what is appropriate or not appropriate’; and in defining 
meanings and regulating practices, religion plays a vital role.257 There is no doubt that 
patriarchy and traditional family structures exist in Muslim and non-Muslim societies but the 
real differences are a matter of degree, with the main distinguishing feature being the extent 
of the freedom of choice available or exercised. If some Muslim women are marrying or 
growing up in such patriarchal households then any lack of freedom of choice relating to a 
choice of dress or the requirement of modesty codes imposed by the husband or in laws 
constitutes the silencing of the voices of these women. It has to be acknowledged that the 
numbers of such women are likely to be small and does not mean that all Muslim women in 
Europe are subjected to the traditional forms of patriarchy, the number of these women who 
enter higher education, employment and do not wear the hijab or the veil is a good indicator 
of this. However despite Muslim women gaining education and employment, it is evident from 
Ramji’s study referred to earlier in this chapter258  that there are a number of Muslim men who 
believe in gendered roles, and retention of patriarchal traditions based on mis-interpretations 
of sacred texts used as justifications for religiously sanctioned male dominance, clearly 
demonstrating the gender inequality prevalent amongst some Muslim men.     
Gender equality and veiling 
The debate between freedom of religion and gender discrimination has become a complex and 
a controversial one in Western states, due to religious manifestations, especially those 
religions where the female and male are not only perceived to be different, but are treated 
differently. According to the Council of Europe,259 this has often led to women’s rights being 
limited and violated with religious justification. The religiously motivated gender stereotypes 
have falsely endowed men with a sense of superiority, leading to discriminatory treatment of 
women by men.260 This is particularly striking when the object happens to be a Muslim woman 
who is expected to wear the hijab or the veil as a religious obligation. Gender equality has 
been frequently referred to as a key objective for the European Convention on Human Rights 
to achieve and has been one of the motivating factor’s leading to claims of wearing the hijab 
as religious right not succeeding on the grounds of it being a symbol of gender equality.261 Thus 
any clash between gender equality and veiling as a cultural or religious motivation will result in 
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gender equality always prevailing.262Thus if the Muslim veil is a product of gender bias, which 
leads to inequality between the sexes, then religion or culture cannot trump the quest to 
eliminate gender inequalities by the European rights framework as that would be one example 
where the state would be justified in constraining one freedom for the greater good, that of 
women as a whole. 
 
The veil has been stereotyped by those who oppose it as an ‘explicit symbol of oppression 
towards the female gender’ and those who adopt it are accepting an unequal female status.263 
Gender equality is particularly pertinent to these oppositional stances as those opposing the 
veil or the full burqa see it as a method of being shrouded in darkness, which leaves women 
engaged in such practices, literally and metaphorically as being invisible to the rest of society. 
This leads to veiling being perceived as means of silencing women and pushed into obscurity 
by men, leaving them invisible, mute and lacking in validity. However, since veiling can be said 
to suppress women it can be argued that this reductionism can offer instances of appreciation 
of a woman’s cognitive capacities, where instead of being judged by their looks and dress, 
which distracts and prevents men from appreciating their mind, non-revealing smart clothes 
worn by women can overcome this judgement of sexuality. The gender equality argument 
proceeds by situating gender against culture and religion on the basis of equality, liberalism 
and human rights and as these are fundamental values in Western societies, veiling is regarded 
as being incompatible with these values. The opposing arguments being that the choice 
exercised through veiling is emancipatory and equalises gender relations as opposed to 
patriarchal oppression.  
 
Female genital mutilation, enforced dress codes, the prohibition on driving, polygamy, lack of 
access to education, unilateral male privilege to divorce, unequal inheritance provisions, 
severe punishments for adultery, forced marriages and honour based violence are all examples 
used to support the contention that Muslim women in Islam lack equality. The lack in equality 
attributed to veiling is further aggravated when the defence to such accusations is solely based 
around religious obligation, which is then used as form of psychological and physical coercion 
to force compliance. Comments such as those made by a senior Muslim cleric in Australia in 
2006 do not help in perceptions of gender equality and are indicative of the psychological 
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coercion. He compared women who do not wear a headscarf to ‘uncovered meat’, implying 
that they invited sexual assault. Sheik Taj Aldin al-Hilali delivered his comments in a religious 
address on adultery to around 500 worshippers in Sydney and was quoted as saying: 
 
If you take out uncovered meat and place it outside ... without cover, and the cats 
come to eat it ... whose fault is it, the cats' or the uncovered meat's? The 
uncovered meat is the problem. If she was in her room, in her home, in her hijab, 
no problem would have occurred.264 
 
It is then no surprise that veiling is seen negatively and directly in conflict with the feminist 
notion that treats gender as an entity that is flexible and not as a binary which appears to be 
the case in Muslim societies. The requirement of veiling whether religious or as an expectation 
of maintenance of Muslim social norms, restricts the psychological negotiation of gender 
identity in a society where visibility is subject to stringent requirements.  This in turn does not 
leave any room for manoeuvre and only leaves definitive polarisation as male or female. For 
example, more recently a Zimbabwean cleric, who studied in Saudi Arabia, has described 
same-sex acts as ‘filthy’, ‘wrong’ and synonymous with ‘acts of immorality’. He has been 
recorded as saying ‘With all due respect to the animals, [gay people] are worse than those 
animals.’265 The dissemination of his comments led to a number of Islamic student societies at 
UK universities where he was due to deliver talks to be cancelled. Although his talks did not go 
ahead, his comments and any affiliations Muslims in Western societies have with such religious 
clerics hinder the progress of those Muslims who want to abide by the principles of equality 
and tolerance, particularly as the organisers of the tour said ‘the tour aimed to promote peace, 
tolerance and justice’.266  
Muslim cultures and gendering 
Muslim cultures although variant to each other, expect that the young will be brought up in a 
gendered way including the way they dress, their access to public space and their freedom to 
engage and interact with the opposite sex. This gendering begins at birth in many Muslim 
societies, for example it is common amongst the south Asian Muslim communities that when a 
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male is born, the birth is celebrated with distribution of sweets, with no such practice if a girl is 
born. This demonstrates the preference and importance attached to males in such societies 
and is due to a male growing up and going to work bringing an income into the household. 
Whereas a woman is burdened as a carrier of the family honour, which is always at risk of 
being lost if she has any type of a relationship with a man who is not a member of the family or 
a sexual relationship outside of marriage. Therefore she has the potential to bring shame to 
the rest of the family. Incidents of honour based violence against women and those men who 
are complicit to any illicit relationship with Muslim women is clear evidence of the unequal 
status of women in Muslim societies.   
 
Early gendering practices are also evident in the Egyptian El-Sebou ceremony that takes place 
on the seventh day after the birth of a child when gendered clay pots267 are used as part of the 
ceremony effectively marking the end of gender neutrality.  El-Guindi describes how the pot 
for the girls is dressed up by women with jewellery and the one for the boy is dressed up by 
the father with his prayer beads. She remarks that: 
 
El-Sebou dress is integral to identity and gender… It is embedded in the process of 
establishing the new-born’s identity publicly and ceremonially – an identity shaped 
by the two most marked aspects of the culture: gender and family. The ceremony 
marks the first point in the ceremonialised life cycle of the individual, ending a 
liminal phase of gender neutrality.268 
 
There are many ceremonies in Muslim societies that delete gender neutrality in early stages of 
an individual’s life including hair cutting, dress, circumcision and the offering made on the 
seventh day of birth as a sign of gratitude to God which is prescribed by the Hadith269 entailing 
the sacrificial offering of two goats if a boy is born and one goat if it is a girl. With respect to 
dress as an indicator of gender, Eicher and Roach-Higgins argue that: 
 
 Dress is a powerful means of communication and makes statements about the 
gender role of a new-born soon after birth and specific types of 
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dress…communicate gender differentiations that have consequences for the 
behaviour of females and males throughout their lives.270  
 
Since gendering takes place at birth, a compelling inference is that Muslim societies relate 
gender directly with biological sex negating the promotion of a gender neutral identity and a 
growing up that is free from influenced gender norms facilitating the individual’s choice of 
identity. Gender should not be a determinant of a person’s treatment by society, yet veiling 
and other Islamic attire requirements emphasise the way which gender is obvious to all, and 
this identity determines the manner by which women navigate around and how they will be 
treated by the rest of society. Muslim societies prescribing different dress requirements on 
women limit the wearers own definitions of womanhood and how they wish to represent 
themselves to others. To be identified as a woman she must conform to how Muslim society 
has characterised her irrespective of her own definition.  
 
How a woman navigates wearing a veil, particularly the full burqa, severely limits physical 
mobility and the ability to engage in certain physical activities that require unrestrictive full 
movement, where the work may be of a physical nature and is fast paced requiring 
instantaneous physical reactions. For example it is rare in Europe if at all that one would see a 
police officer, a military woman or in any of the other emergency services who wears the veil. 
This limitation may not be an intended outcome but nevertheless contributes to the notion 
that the male is stronger, more capable and mobile, thus has better navigation abilities. The 
reduced ability could be interpreted as an attenuation of social mobility, which is linked with 
the fact that the veil is instrumental in identifying the wearer as a female, effectively 
mandating and acting as a limiter to how she interacts with the rest of society. This restriction 
is further compounded by possible health implications from the lack of vitamin D which is 
heavily dependent upon letting sunshine through to the woman. This is a concern expressed 
by Dr Miriam Casey, an expert in Medicine for the Elderly at the Osteoporosis Unit in St James 
hospital in Dublin who warns ‘The Burqa – an all-enveloping outer garment, does not allow 
enough sunlight through to give the woman vitamin D’.271 This could lead to an additional 
inequality in terms of parity of access to the benefits of nature which a man is able to gain 
fully. However, the research in this area is rudimentary and a direct link has not yet been 
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established with veiling and lack of vitamin D, due to the fact that veil wearers may well have 
ample exposure to the sun in non-public surroundings. 
 
In response to such limitations, women who cover fully propagate the argument that wearing 
of the veil allows them to enter public space considered in Islamic cultures as a domain 
belonging to men. And that it further allows them to enter those spaces such as employment 
alongside men which would not be possible without the veil as many of the women cited in 
the works of El-Guindi and Bullock.272 Hirschmann remarks that the ‘[veil] allows women to 
enter the public sphere of work while at the same time making a clear statement that they are 
good women, that is, attentive to the tenets of Islam, not Westernised’. 273 Thus the veil 
becomes an important marker that allows the woman to enter public space as well as assert 
that her Muslim identity has not been chipped by modernity.  
 
Those who argue that veiling permits entry of public space say that it can ‘…serve as a form of 
symbolic shelter that, as a portable extension of the secluded space of the home, enables 
them to enter public male space without being subjected to criticism or male 
harassment’.274But retention of the dual purpose of Muslim identity and entry into public 
space still has limitations for those who veil; as there are places in which men have unlimited 
access yet Muslim veiled women are rarely seen in. For example Gymnasiums, sports and 
leisure activities such as swimming would be out of bounds for the veiled woman unless she 
attends women only pool and gym sessions. This in itself would amount to seclusion and 
therefore only lead to the message that, her Muslim identity is the entity that is self- limiting in 
her achieving gender equality.  
 
As much as access to public space is an enhancement for those secluded, there is a negative 
aspect of this for those who do not veil. It means that Muslim society dominated by men and 
those who succumb to this domination by veiling and secluding themselves have played a part 
in creating an environment that is inherently hostile to women who do not veil. This view is 
corroborated by a respondent of Javed’s research who states her reasons for not veiling:  
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In veil women can be secure and safe while without veil the woman has to face 
the eyes of every one on her body which can spoil her soul and snatch innocence. 
Actually I mean without veil nothing is concealed so women become a hot-cake. 
Women without veil are considered being the public property and men consider it 
their foremost right to steer her.275 
 
In addition to protection from harassment, Hirschmann advances another reason which 
‘allows working, keeps husbands jealousy away so rather than blame men for harassing 
women alter their dress to accommodate to fit the prevailing norm that men should not be 
tempted’,276 and the ‘more women are able to deny their sexuality, the more honourable they 
are’.277 Similarly MacLeod’s research found that religious dress allowed women to work in 
order to assist their husbands whilst at the same time eliminating any jealousy by the husband 
which would prevent them from working: 
 
When I wear these clothes I feel secure, I know I am a good mother and a good 
wife. And men know not to laugh and flirt with me. So it is no problem to go out to 
work, or to shop, or anything. This is a good way to dress, it solves many 
problems.278 
 
But MacLeod’s results are antagonistic to Zuhur’s study279 of veiling in Egypt where she found 
that the women he studied, although not active Islamists, veiled to show affiliation with goals 
of Islamism, whilst Macleod’s women wore the hijab to avoid personal dilemmas as indicated 
above. Similarly, on the issue of whether veiling is a symbol of religiosity the studies carried 
out do not reflect parity on the issue. For example Hoodfar’s study280 of veiling carried out in 
Quebec showed only four women out of fifty nine who veiled held it connected with Arab or 
Muslim identity. Whereas, MacLeod’s study281 in Egypt found little correlation between 
religiosity and veiling as it highlighted only a minority who prayed daily. Thus she concludes 
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that veiling had now become a culturally available way to address women’s issues about their 
roles.  
 
Despite the minor adjustment this religious dress allows women, the consequence of this is 
that it requires them to adapt their identity, because men are not able to control their sexual 
desires. A further implication of this view is that women must veil to remain safe from men. 
This suggests husbands or conservatist Muslims apportion blame not on male sexual desire, 
but rather on the woman’s body which can lead men astray. Therefore veiling can be 
considered a punishment imposed on the woman for possessing a sexuality that leads to social 
chaos and has to be contained. This masculine fear of women is corroborated by Ali’s early 
analysis of Islam where ‘an anxiety that regarded women’s desire as untameable, dangerous 
and thus requiring repression’ existed amongst men and was at the root of the imposition of 
strict codes of conduct and dress, violation of which led to brutal punishment.282  
 
If Ali’s analysis of early Islam is still prevalent in modern times then this punishment via 
seclusion or veiling is being meted to women at an early stage of women’s life. This is so 
because veiling has been forced on young girls in some Islamic schools,283 which can only lead 
to young women growing upon with a sense of guilt and shame associated with their body. 
This can result in attenuation of the positive self- development leading to denial of claiming 
her body if the veil is a constant reminder of being used to cover her body that is considered to 
be the root of conflict. The sense of guilt and shame associated with the female body, 
according to Wagner et al, is a recurring theme in most monotheistic religions and their study 
of Indian women showed that they incorporated the fear of sin and felt guilty under the male 
gaze. In this sense, young women veil not to attract attention but to become invisible in public 
space.284The use of fear and sinning especially associated with the afterlife is a tool that is used 
in order to uphold the gender biased interpretations of the sacred texts, which then allow 
Muslim men to silence women and to keep them silenced in matters relating to Muslim dress 
codes. This silencing not only perpetuates male dominance, but transpires as a lack of freedom 
and choice, which can ultimately be used as a stereotype of women, by those who oppose the 
practice and the ECtHR in the event of a human rights claim in order to prohibit those who 
genuinely exercise their choice and decide to wear the hijab or the veil.  
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Of course there is the possibility that veiling is not just to deflect the male gaze but a 
deliberate step towards concealing her body with the aim of disembodying the woman from 
the self, irrespective of any corporeality. Indeed this lack of reliance on the body corporeal 
may mean that the veiled woman does not have to burden herself with problems surrounding 
‘body image’ which according many studies has become a real issue affecting women’s self-
esteem.285 However this assertion is reliant on the premise that veiled woman are able to 
master their psychological existence when they do not appreciate or even allowed to by men 
of their physical existence. Unless there is mastery of both, the veiled woman has to be in a 
vacuum that leaves the woman deprived of a self and full of emptiness. 
 
Even if the veil is accepted as unleashing Muslim women from obsessions surrounding body 
image enhancing the self-consciousness of their everyday actions, covering is still a force that 
is a constant reminder to women about their faith and the religious duty to be invisible to 
men. This duty can be considered as the controlling gaze which is the same device referred to 
by Foucault when he describes the structure of Bentham’s Panopticon; the very large prison 
that only has one jailor. The principle behind the design of the prison being to allow an 
observer  to watch all prisoners without them knowing whether someone is watching them or 
not thus leading to the perception of an invisible monitor. This then leads to the visibility of 
the prisoner and his awareness and the possible presence of an observer to constantly 
maintaining discipline. The success of the system relies on the fact that the individual ‘assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power,’ making himself ‘the principle of his own 
subjection’ the individual’s constant visibility leads to a feeling of insecurity of the individual.  
Veiling then acts literally as a result of perceived tripartite surveillance by God, men and other 
women but the wearer does not know who is actually monitoring.286 The fears of the constant 
gaze considered as immodest results in the production of docile bodies that internalise the 
power hierarchies to an extent that the practice of veiling becomes natural.287   
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Brenner when discussing the change women go through when they start veiling regularly, 
comments that with covering ‘also came the duty, they felt, to make sure that their behaviour 
matched it; this led to greater self-consciousness and self-regulation than when they had been 
in their unveiled state’.288 But this is not an obligation on just women but also applies to men 
and reminds them not to engage in any inappropriate desires, effectively acting as a wall 
between any immoral interactions between men and woman.  According to Gole the influence 
of the veil leading to self-awareness is accentuated even further by covered women being 
considered in Muslim societies as markers of modesty and morality.289 But if women are 
burdened as carriers of this duty whilst men are able to evade such requirements with the 
ability to act outside of religious injunctions on modesty and morality, yet still remain visible as 
righteous Muslims, then it can considered that this forced ascription of inequality in standards 
is yet another form of gender oppression attributable to the veil, which leaves women 
silenced. 
 
The gaze aversion strategy may work in Islamic countries, but in Europe an opposite effect is 
being achieved as veiling is drawing more focus as women are constantly trying to detract 
attention to them by the practice. This is corroborated by research carried out by Shirazi and 
Mishra where 88 per cent of their respondents said ‘the niqab attracts more attention to the 
person wearing it rather than distracting the unwanted gaze of men, which is the main reason 
behind the concept of modesty in Islam’.290 Indeed this is culturally constructed but a veiled 
Muslim woman in an Islamic country attracts no attention to herself and the veil acts as a 
symbol of gaze aversion but in Europe that same veil draws immediate attention and is leading 
to an exponential increase in physical and verbal attacks thus achieving the reverse effect.291 
This hostility is further confirmed by another respondent of Shirazi and Mishra’s research who 
states that the ‘The niqab…takes away a woman’s identity completely’.  According to them the 
niqab ‘takes modesty to an absurd degree where the female presence doesn’t even exist in the 
public sphere anymore. I hate it because it makes life for other women more difficult and 
dangerous’.292 Thus extending the concept of modesty beyond the internal where it is 
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manifesting by erasing the visibility and a complete silence of veiled women is having a 
detrimental effect psychologically and physically on other Muslim women who do not veil or 
believe it is necessary to express modesty in that manner.   
 
Regardless of whether women want to veil or not Macleod notes a contrary view that ’few are 
willing to criticise the idea of veiling’ and ’few are willing to argue that their religion or cultural 
traditions are in some way wrong’.293 This disparity in views can be attributed to the fact that 
MacLeod’s respondents were located in a Muslim country, whereas those Muslim women in 
Shirazi and Mishra’s research were based in the United States, where veiling would attract 
more attention and acculturation can play a role in Muslim women’s liberal views.  
 
The position of Muslims in the West has a direct correlation between the negative perceptions 
and the need for Muslims to comply with secular Western rights based ideals, in which veiled 
women are identified as a subject benchmark. Huntingdon in his celebrated work 
hypothesised that: 
 
The fundamental source of conflict in this new world order will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural…the principal conflicts of global 
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The clash 
of civilisations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilisations 
will be the battle lines of the future.294  
 
He argues that the most important distinguishing features between civilisation will be culture 
and religion and as people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to 
see an ‘us versus them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity 
or religion. He identifies Islam as one of those clashing civilisations. Similarly, Lewis when 
comparing Islam with Christianity observes that the single most profound difference between 
the two is the status of women.295 Joppke notes that ‘it is therefore no wonder that the 
subordination of women has been at the centre of the Western critique of Islam ever since 
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colonial times, the veil being the most obvious symbol of this subordination’.296 It should 
therefore come as no surprise that Islamic veiling is regularly raised as the most apparent 
symbol of this subordination. But Joppke does label Lewis’s critique as being hypocritical citing 
the example given by Ahmed297 who identifies Lord Cromer who condemned veiling and 
seclusion practices in colonised Egypt, yet back in England he was the founding member of the 
Men’s League for Opposing Women’s Suffrage. Joppke further states that ‘certainly according 
to the Koran men and women are equal before God because both are created by God; but it 
does not follow from that men and women are equal amongst themselves.298  
 
Indeed, some inequalities between the sexes are created by men, however, it must not be 
overlooked that the belief that men and women are equal before God is demonstrated by the 
annual pilgrimage to Mecca known as ‘Hajj’ when millions of Muslims from every country 
merge their differences of status, race and culture, and in complete equality stand before their 
creator. Furthermore, Ali notes that another aspect of Islamic ideology which has a 
tremendous bearing on equalising the ranks of Muslims is the very strong notion of piety, 
which is the ‘only yardstick by which position of men and women in a Muslim society is 
determined’.299 
 
In Western societies perfect equality in all human beings is an ideal feminists aim to achieve. 
Even though according to Ali, that ideal may be set too high because the biological and social 
life of man has certain built in tendencies, which tend to create inequalities and for that reason 
‘even in the most liberal democracies, and under ideologies which boast of perfect equality, 
numerous glaring inequalities continue to persist’.300 The example cited by Ali is one of ethnic 
inequality in America despite having fundamental laws of equality being written in superb legal 
terms and are justiciable in the courts of law but their implementation being difficult if the 
social philosophy is not receptive of them.301 However Ali fails to identify any specific examples 
and overlooks the thrust of feminist work in aiming to achieve that ideal of enforceable total 
equality. Gender equality between Muslim men and women cannot be achieved so long as 
long as the power of control over religious knowledge production lies with traditionalist 
scholars who use the notion of sinning towards women to prevent them from disobeying the 
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mandates of sacred texts as interpreted by them. Thus allowing men to retain control over 
Qur’anic interpretations and these theological justifications act as a great tool to ensure the 
silence of those women who veil and act as a prevention of hermeneutical challenges by those 
women who wish to contest such burdensome and gender biased power structures. 
Is the veil oppressive? 
Oppression is a loaded term and a universal definition acceptable to all disciplines has not 
been possible, as groups or individuals who are subjected to oppression are not all oppressed 
to the same extent or in identical ways and it is not possible to attach a single set of criteria 
that describes the conditions and specific commonalities. Young describes oppression in its 
general sense as people who are suffering from ’some inhibition of their ability to develop and 
exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts and feelings’ and in this abstract 
sense, all oppressed people face a common condition.302 She also highlights that there are five 
types of oppression and states these as: violence, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, 
and cultural imperialism.303But Harvey is of the opinion that oppression is much more subtle 
than once thought and refers to it as civilised oppression that ‘involves neither physical 
violence nor the use of the law. Yet these subtle forms are by the most prevalent in Western 
industrialised societies.’304 In order to consider feminist arguments that project veiling as 
oppressive, it is important to establish whether veiling as perceived to be oppressive satisfies 
some criteria of oppression. Cudd in her work identifies four criteria that are necessary for 
oppression to exist: some form of physical or psychological harm, harm inflicted due to 
membership of a group, the oppressor must benefit from the oppression and there must be 
some element of coercion or force. 305  
 
The debate on whether the veil is oppressive or emancipatory is schismatic with powerful 
arguments and depends on the prism through which the veil is viewed. If the view is one that 
is based on secular Western liberal values, and the example of veiling under focus is the Saudi 
Arabian one; where women are clad in head to toe coverings that are imposed by the state 
and women are secluded from the opposite sex, not allowed to drive, need permission from 
the husband to leave the house and mingling with unrelated members of the opposite sex is 
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forbidden.306 And where failure to adhere to these impositions can result in severe penalties, 
then the view is one of subjugation.307  
 
Such inequality leads feminists to declare the practice of veiling as being oppressive, however 
it must be borne in mind that in contrast there are many Muslim countries where veiling is not 
mandatory and laws have been enacted to prohibit the practice or European states such as the 
United Kingdom where there are no prohibitions and the choice is left to the individual 
women. This demonstrates the importance of situational contexts associated with veiling. 
Fernandez quotes the prominent French feminist Badinter who refers to the veil as ‘the symbol 
of the oppression of a sex…Putting the veil on the head, this is an act of submission. It burdens 
a woman’s whole life’.308 These views are not only held by those who are non-Muslim but are 
also held by Muslims too and the views are not exclusive to feminists only. Such perceptions 
are not illusory or simply based on the ‘Orient other’ but on realities of women living under 
such regimes, where there is strict application of Shariah law and where men are considered to 
be superior than women. To someone who is not Muslim, Islamic practices are perceived to 
stem from the religious and thus erroneous conclusions can be drawn by linking the practice to 
the religion. One cannot expect a non-Muslim to have detailed knowledge of the intricacies 
and the disparate interpretations and as such what is seen in the public sphere and the 
visibility of women, becomes an issue perceived or actual gendered inequality.   
 
Not all non-Muslims are of the opinion that veiling is oppressive, Howard cites Wiley who 
writes that ‘there are many feminists who argue that the headscarf is far from inimical to 
principles of gender equality, and that to portray it is as such is to misunderstand and 
misrepresent it’.309 But the issue is one of extremity and the starkness of oppressive practices 
against Muslim women particularly young Muslim girls; for example, Saudi Arabia's Grand 
Mufti310 Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Al al-Sheikh endorsed marriage for girls starting at ten years of age 
and criticised those who wanted to raise the legal marriageable age. There are many examples 
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of young girls of very tender age being married311 as there is no legal age limit for marriage in 
Saudi Arabia and what is more surprising is that there has been no official dissent from 
Western governments to this practice and as noted by one commentator who observes that 
‘As with many pernicious practices, child marriage312 would not exist without tacit support and 
approval from the country's leadership. Far from condemning child marriage, allegedly the 
Saudi monarchy itself has a long history of marrying very young girls’.313  
 
The practice of child marriages is prevalent amongst other Islamic countries too,314 but some 
leading clerics are pushing the boundaries of the imposition of religious clothing to include 
new born girls, albeit in a controversial manner.315 Such examples of the treatment of women 
in Islamic societies, where men simply hide behind strained interpretations of religious texts to 
suit their misogynist norms, hardly surprises the resultant opinions on the status of women 
under Islam and the need to save these women from their oppressed lives. Along this line of 
thought the veil does inhibit freedom, as it prevents women leading their lives they want to 
lead, and represents female subjugation to others with the Islamic veil deeply embedded as 
part of that repression. 
 
To some non-Muslims and some Muslims the veil itself is just a piece of cloth and no essential 
meaning could be derived from its simple materiality and lacks any universal signs of its legal 
or rational meaning. The veil itself does not oppress women and if it does then that is because 
the veil as symbolic marker is the symptom of a deeper cultural, social and economic 
discrepancies and power. The veil itself does not inhibit and demobilise women, but responses 
to the practice such as negative stereotyping or legal mandates or prohibitions to veiling do. 
The veil itself has no agency and thus cannot subjugate women; it is the power of man and the 
patriarchal authority existing in some Muslim social structures that impose the veil on women 
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that not only inhibits their agency but deprives them of the voice to speak out against the 
practice. Removing the veil by legally enforced mechanisms, as in France where full 
concealment of the face is prohibited under law and is a criminal offence misses the point that 
the veil is simply a symptom of oppression or a refusal to integrate with wider members of 
society, the disease lies at the use of that tool by man for his means which includes 
subjugation, seclusion, restricting the balance of power in social relations and controlling a 
woman’s sexuality. 
  
It cannot be denied that women are forced to wear the veil against their will in Islamic regimes 
and some in European states. Though the coercion in Islamic states carries with it the force of 
law and in European states the force of patriarchy and for some women it would amount to 
oppression but the leap from that to stating the veil is inherently oppressive is quite a large 
one. For example we may say that some women are sexually abused but we don’t ban sex as 
something inherently bad. Of course it cannot be said that the veil has never been misused, 
there are examples of the use of the veil for improper purposes by both women and men. For 
example, recently in the UK a terror suspect allegedly used a burqa to escape from a mosque 
whilst he was under surveillance breaching the terms of a terrorism prevention measure used 
to restrict the movements of suspects.316 Similarly a College employee in the North West of the 
UK who was found guilty of a number of counts of theft from her employer abused the use of 
the Islamic veil by attending and leaving court in a veil, attempting to avoid her identity being 
revealed in press photographs. The employee was well known to have been very much against 
any form of religious clothing and had pictures of her on a social networking site without any 
face covering, yet she used a full face veil going into and out of court during her trial in order 
to conceal her identity from the cameras and on-lookers.317  
 
The veil gives meaning and identity and invisibility in some cases to the wearer, but 
independently it is just a piece of cloth. It gathers its meaning in a culturally and socially 
contextualised setting within a system of meaning and symbolism which cannot penetrate 
those who are not part of it. The purpose prescribed by the wearer regardless of its origin, 
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whether in Islamic law or not bears a cultural, religious and historical importance for the 
woman who chooses to wear it. These women find and express their identity through the 
performance of wearing the veil. Furthermore, there are different kinds of veils, not just one 
monolithic entity. People within the Islamic system recognise meanings which may not be 
obvious to non-Muslims. Most Westerners see the veil in their own lives and their own 
perceptions and do not understand it in a place and society that are unlike their own, or in 
their own society where a minority of women adopt it. Indeed in order to evaluate whether 
the veil is emancipatory or oppressive, it is imperative that it is established whether the 
practice is one that is imposed on Muslim women or if it is one that is a product of freedom 
and exercise of choice.  
Freedom and choice 
In order to analyse the relationship of veiling with choice it is important consider the defining 
features of freedom first, which in turn will help determine whether veiled women have a 
choice that is free willed. Values such as freedom and liberalism for the West have been the 
benchmark of European secular progression from the pre-modern to the modern. ‘The 
concepts of freedom, equality, and rights originated in the West and became the basic tenets 
of classic liberalism’318  and ‘Europe - and other civilised countries – have progressed from a 
state of benighted, pre-modern ignorance, superstition and unfreedom towards a more 
enlightened state of modernity characterised by freedom and other secular values’.319 The 
importance of liberalism for European states leads to a natural use of freedom as a 
fundamental liberal value upon which to base the assertion that veiling is oppressive. A society 
that is liberal will value and allow its citizens to exercise their autonomy, so they could as 
individuals make those choices that are in their best interest as opposed to the community at 
large. This approach goes hand in hand with the Millian view that the collective good is best 
served by letting individuals to pursue their best interests.320 This primacy of the individual’s 
interests over the utilitarian argument has been further corroborated by more modern 
philosophers such as Rawls.321  
 
Any state must allow for individuals to make choices that support their own good through the 
availability of individual rights rather than attempting to enlarge the collective good or a 
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different good at the expense of individual’s rights. Indeed the individual who is free to choose 
that what is in her/his best interest and has acquired individual rights has a reciprocal duty to 
ensure this does not interfere with another’s right to enjoy the same liberalism, this being the 
balancing exercise in adjudication of conflicting rights, a very good example being the right of 
Muslim women in France to wear the veil against the wider French majority who disagree with 
the practice. It is not about a particular good that an individual chooses but rather the ‘agency’ 
that is imperative to the individual, as that precedes any choice exercised by a free agent.  
 
Freedom itself is a contested concept where the challenges to it have been primarily based in 
questions surrounding definitions. As the question of freedom spans many disciplines there 
are divergent stakes. For example its importance to the feminist project is encapsulated by 
Nedelsky who says that ‘Feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape our 
own lives to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the definition given to us by 
others (men and male-dominated society, in particular)’322 and this is echoed by Marshall 
‘Feminists want to free women to shape their own lives, and form their own self- definitions, 
rather than simply accepting pre-existing definitions given to them by others. 323 
Positive and negative freedom 
The theory of freedom most commonly324 utilised by feminists when referring to veiling is 
based on Berlin’s classic formulation and his metaphor for freedom being the number of doors 
open to a person, thus defining freedom in terms of the number of options open to a person. 
His theory of freedom which encapsulates both the concept of positive and negative freedom 
will form the basis of questioning veiled women’s freedom.325  
 
By negative freedom Berlin refers to the absence of any external obstacles to self-guided 
choice and action, better known as ‘freedom from’ external constraints. Whilst he defines 
positive freedom as ‘freedom to’, which is the ability rather than the opportunity to aim for 
and pursue those goals that are willed by the agent without dependency on others, also 
referred to as autonomy or self- rule.  Marshall interprets Berlin’s concept of positive freedom 
where individuals are ‘able to make their own choices and decisions through some sort of 
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rational method, which fosters an element of internal liberation’.326 She adds that ‘Many 
feminist theorists have criticised such conceptions of freedom, arguing that they privilege male 
norms: rationality and reason being associated, both historically and conceptually, with the 
male way of knowing and often being defined by the exclusion of the feminine’.327 
 
External constraints can be by way of laws that prohibit certain behaviours or practices, an 
example of this would be freedom from torture, inhumane, degrading treatment or 
punishment, which is an absolute right protected by a number of international Treaties.328 
However, if a state was to enact a law that prohibited a woman from wearing a veil, then that 
would be interfering with her right to dress and manifest her religion as in the case of France, 
which has prohibited the full face covering in public, enforceable by a criminal penalty.329It can 
be argued that the state can promote freedom of its citizens on their behalf and thus a 
question arises that is it appropriate for the state to limit someone’s freedom whilst 
attempting to promote the freedom of others? Such an issue became live and forms the basis 
of the S.A.S.330 case discussed fully in chapter five.  The problem in such cases under Berlin’s 
formulation of negative freedom is that the state would be limiting or influencing one’s 
freedom. Negative freedom is also applicable to cases where a woman is free to choose 
whether she veils or not without any compulsion or influence by family, community or the 
state.  
 
A Muslim woman may assert that she is a free agent when she decides to veil but arguably she 
does not have the capability or freedom not to veil, as that could be fashioned by external 
influences such as family, tradition, religion, culture and community. Just as Nussbaum notes 
that ‘too many women think they are free when in fact they are not; they take for granted a 
particular ordering of society or family, and fail to see that the order is unjust’.331 Hence the 
argument that women veil for reasons of modesty and not through any other form of 
compulsion through free choice is fallible, as how can a choice be free if it is imposed by 
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religion? Then there are those who veil in order to attract a prospective marriage partner and 
then remove the veil post marriage, which would also not be a free choice as it is fuelled by 
external expectations.  Thus for the negative concept of freedom the real question is ‘what is 
the area within which the subject…is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons’?332That is why Taylor refers to this negative freedom as 
an ’opportunity concept’.333 Berlin further clarifies that ‘Freedom is the opportunity to act, not 
action itself’334 and that freedom is determined by ‘the number of doors open to me’ 
suggesting that the more doors that are open, regardless of whether the person goes through 
any of them, or even desires to go through any of them, the more free the person is.335Thus 
freedom in this sense is about having a number of different options open to a person. 
 
This leads to the question of whether a woman’s choice is indeed free if it is made under 
oppressive conditions or not and made in circumstances that are in her real interest? For 
example, the woman may want to veil through choice but the state is denying her that 
freedom. This would correlate to the argument propagated by the oppression discourse that 
veiling is a patriarchal imposition and even if the women think that they are making a free 
choice in absence of external influences, it is still not a choice as it is not in their real interest. 
But such an argument fails to realise that those who oppose the veil would be complicit in 
limiting women’s freedom as they would be acting as external agents who are pushing the 
prohibition in the name of emancipating veiled women; when in reality they would be limiting 
the freedom of those who do veil through choice. 
Veiling and choice 
One of the most contentious issues surrounding veiling by Muslim women has been the 
question of whether women who veil do so through their own free willed choice or not? This is 
a dimensional issue that has dominated not only the discourse on the veil but feminism 
generally. The matter of choice involves substantial vectoring on part of the individual woman 
and is imperative when examining the purpose and effects of veiling. If she chooses not to veil 
then there are a number of social implications for her, for example what will the community 
and her family think? What about the visibility of her religiosity? Will it affect her prospective 
marriage prospects? If the woman then takes these factors into account and then decides to 
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veil, would that be exercising her choice? Of course if she adopts veiling then it is at least 
considered an option, rather than simply being coerced. However, either option questions true 
choice as one can be religiously imposed and the other as a result of socialisation. Hirschmann 
argues, ‘patriarchy and male domination have been instrumental in the social construction of 
women’s choices…. liberty must begin from the basic understanding that the context in which 
women live constrains women’s choices more than it does men’.336 Here it has to be 
acknowledged and understood that veiling has different meanings in different contexts, the 
Male Tuareg veil is different from female veiling, the social status veil in Oman is different from 
the religiously inspired, veiling in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia is different to Pakistan and 
veiling in European states raise a myriad of different reasons including modesty, expression of 
identity, resistance to modernity, a fashion statement, as a means of rejecting or attracting the 
right marriage partner, as a method of self- imaging and as a symbol of culture. Thus veiling 
cannot and must not be considered as a monolithic entity otherwise essentialism from both 
the oppressive and the emancipatory discourse cannot be reconciled. 
 
It has to be borne in mind that there is crucial difference between those women who veil with 
a clear intent and purpose as opposed to those that do so because of the prescription by men. 
Of course it is questionable whether veiling could ever be considered a true choice as its 
rejection by Muslim women is considered to prevent them from being true Muslims in the 
eyes of the patriarchs. This diametrically opposed question has been explored by Secor who 
found that: 
 
While some women felt that a true understanding of the Koran necessitated 
women’s veiling and while others felt that they were unable to remove the veil 
due to their ingrained ideas of womanhood and sin, there were also those who 
considered themselves religious but saw veiling as a personal choice, an option 
they could forego without compromising their religious beliefs.337  
 
Secor’s study indicates a divide amongst Muslim women as to whether it is a religious 
requirement or a voluntary practice. Indeed feminists are more inclined towards acceptance of 
a practice chosen freely than one that is imposed. Abu Lughod uses the example of Muslim 
women who on receipt of a marriage proposal will pray before they consent. The reason 
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behind praying is explained by Lazreg as who states that the decision taken by the women 
them will have divine blessing and although this is not a free choice idealized by international 
human rights Treaties or feminist discourse but it is very much about choice.338 Furthermore, 
influences from the family and communities are social ‘binds’ that need factoring in to ‘any 
discussion on what it means to freely choose or to consent’.339 The influence of social factors is 
the precise element that attenuates or even negates choice in terms of the perception of free 
choice in a free liberal state. Mahmood argues that the Muslim women cannot be free agents 
if they do not have the capacity to realise their own interests, despite there being customary 
or traditional influences whether individual or collective.340 
 
In order to delve deeper into the question of whether veiled women have a choice or not, an 
issue persistently raised by some liberal feminists is the alleged lack of freedom Muslim 
women have, which deprives them of choice. Marshall when referring to concepts such as 
freedom, equality and rights as tenets of classic liberalism341 notes that ‘These concepts have 
been translated into modern liberalism as variants of the idea that each person, by virtue of 
their capacity for reason, is of equal worth’ she further adds that ‘However, there are many 
different conceptions of when people are free and autonomous’342 thus Marshall is more in 
tune with the importance of situational contexts when considering freedom of choice. A 
problematic with the poles of oppression and emancipation is that both fail to acknowledge 
alternate perspectives avoiding revelation of situational contexts and meanings ascribed to 
veiling by those who live through the practice and not listening to them. In respect of freedom, 
the danger of adopting a particular stance is that it does not acknowledge that what one 
discourse perceives as oppressive is considered freedom for another and unless the voices of 
those who wear the hijab or veil are heard by proponents of both discourses, the meaning of 
veiling will be projected as static, which is clearly not so. For example veiling is considered 
oppressive as it makes Muslim women invisible but at the same time it allows them freedom 
to enter public spaces and mixed sex environments giving them access to education and 
employment prospects, which may have been denied to them, albeit through patriarchal 
family structures. Similarly as evidenced in the first chapter, some women wear the hijab or 
the veil in defiance of parental wishes against veiling, whilst some may adopt the practice in 
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order to comply with male specified requirements of maintaining family honour and respect in 
front of the family and Muslim community. The motivations behind such oppositions can only 
be understood by listening to and acknowledging the voices of those who veil by both 
discourses and not silencing them through inscribing fixed meanings to veiling, thereby adding 
objective truth to the knowledge production on veiling. 
Choice and false consciousness 
The ability of Muslim women to make choices about how they will dress and make such 
decisions through some kind of a rational method is highly dependent upon them not only 
being able to identify but to choose what is in their best interests. This is one of the most 
contentious issues amongst those who contest the veil; this is so because there is a level of 
social conditioning that plays a part in that choice. Social constructions play a powerful role in 
dominating choices, even though they may not appear as directly external to the agent and 
though the veiled woman may know what she really prefers, the forces of her social 
construction can modify her desires in the sense that they become socially formed. In other 
words she mistakenly thinks she desires to veil, a Marxist concept referred to as ‘false 
consciousness’ described by Engels in his letter to Mehring: 
 
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so- called thinker consciously indeed but 
with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to 
him; otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines 
false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form 
and its content from pure thought, either his own or his predecessors.343  
 
This is an allegation levelled frequently by those who oppose veiling at those women who say 
that they veil through choice. In this sense women are making choices that are not real choices 
but only identifying their socially formed desires in that they are mistaken in what they desire 
under ‘false consciousness’. And furthering these desires which are socially conditioned, help 
internalise the oppressive practice of veiling, which women either become ignorant to or 
tacitly accept without any questioning of their social structures and knowledge of viable 
alternatives. For example veiled women who do not question the meaning attributed to 
religious texts by men and do not even consider or question the lack of female interpretations 
of Qur’anic texts considered as imposing modesty rules or indeed the option of not veiling at 
all. Khan also gives an example of false consciousness when she states: 
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Many women choose to wear the hejab, but for many women their lives are set up 
in such a way that the hejab is the only logical choice. Their families expect it of 
them, and the community they belong to reinforce the notion of the authentic 
Muslim woman as one who wears the hejab.344 
 
The exercise of free choice in these circumstances is considered to be lacking345and according 
to Marshall, this interpretation ‘actually entrenches [veiled women’s] lack of freedom’ and 
leads to acceptance of ‘wants and preferences that have developed through living in 
patriarchal societies’.346 Feminists such as Mackinnon refer to such state of affairs as false 
consciousness and a denial of agency.347 From a liberal feminist perspective these women do 
not possess any power, lack autonomy and simply become docile victims of their culture, 
which inhibits their real freedom that can only be gained with the acquisition of gender 
equality.348 For example this can happen when a supposedly the chosen veil can become a 
coerced veil since women are expected to live up to patriarchally defined norms of what a 
Muslim woman should be. Thus an initial autonomous decision to wear the veil, can impact on 
future autonomy, a point starkly put by Laborde: 
 
If the actual choice opened to young Muslim women is either to wear a headscarf 
and be shown respect by her male peers, or opt for Western clothing and be 
subjected to abuse and harassment, they may seek to maintain their dignity and 
self- esteem by convincing themselves that their choice is a free one.349 
 
Muslim women’s  claims that they act as free agents when they decide to veil is rebutted by 
some radical and liberal feminists such as Mackinnon and Okin for whom veiling is one of the 
methods used by men in order to ensure that women hold on to an inferiority complex and is 
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thus a symbol of oppression. According to MacKinnon350 and Okin’s351 views on internalising 
oppression even if Muslim women believe that they wear the veil through choice, that is false 
consciousness because how they perceive themselves and the imposition of unequal gendered 
roles upon them are a coercive feature of their surrounding culture. 
 
If Muslim veiled women are surrounded by others who veil as a religious symbol of modesty 
required by Islam and never question that obligation, then the authenticity of that choice is 
under question and potentially false. However a natural question arising here is that if Muslim 
women who veil or wear the hijab are victims of false consciousness then how it can be 
discerned that they would not have chosen to cover if they did indeed have a free choice. Thus 
the argument is premised on the notion that the choice to veil is not choice recognised by 
those who allege false consciousness. It is arguments such as these that lead to claims of 
ethnocentrisms and colonialism by those who defend veiling and leads to the voices of those 
who veil to be drowned. This muting occurs because irrespective of the veiled women’s 
authentic free choices, they are being treated as victims of social construction who are unable 
to make the right choices for themselves and have to be saved from such oppression and are 
blamed for tolerating the hijab and the veil. The argument that these women have internalised 
the effect of external influences on them that expect them to veil, very much like the position 
of battered women who come to accept the abuse that it is a part of their life and somehow 
they themselves are to blame for not leaving their abusive partners.352 
 
Thus the argument is that Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil may not have their 
freedom directly limited by a form of external influence, but their desires and preferences 
have been internally moulded and limited in unjust ways. The ‘fact that girls defend the [veil] 
does not make any difference [to the reality of their domination]’.353 According to Lazreg  
women believe to have ‘freely chosen the veil, her act was perhaps not based on decisions in 
full knowledge of one’s motivations and the consequences of one’s acts, after weighing the 
pros and cons and consider alternatives’.354 Women are not free from external influences such 
as the ‘dangers of brainwashing that subsist’355 as described by Ahmed who refers to the pro-
veiling propaganda working through the more classical method of inception style 
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indoctrination: ‘In contrast to the Iranian regime, which imposed veiling, the quiet revolution 
that the Sunni Islamists were setting in motion in Egypt was seemingly rather implanting in 
women the will and desire to wear the Hijab’.356  An example of this can be found in a study 
carried out by Botz-Bornstein who refers to one of her respondents who tells her story and 
says ‘Sarah…was brainwashed into veiling at age thirteen in her religious school’.357 But 
religious indoctrination through schools or Mosques is not the only source that influences the 
choice to veil. Botz-Bornstein found in her study that close family members who have 
conservatist affiliations also play a part: 
 
Lulwa’s great uncle, who is the family’s eldest, turned salafist relatively recently. 
Consequently, he requires all women in the extended family to veil even though 
the rest of the family, including Lulwa’s parents seem to be against it. Lulwa tells 
me of her friends who get bribed into veiling by their parents, who offer them 
much higher allowances or other material rewards’. She offers further 
corroboration of such practices ‘Muneera says that her father has offered her 
large sums of money if she adopts the veil.358 
 
Similarly Ahmed commenting on Macleod’s study of veiling in Egypt states that: 
 
The pressure for women to wear Hijab was distinctly growing. There was evidence, 
Macleod found, that women were being pressured not only by men in their 
families but also by male religious authorities. Several women now mentioned that 
they had decided to wear Hijab because of their local religious leaders. Others 
mentioned that male religious activities would cite the authority of religious men 
in their attempts to persuade fiancées, wives or sisters to veil.359 
 
Such examples add cogency to the view that the veil is imposed by men through coercion and 
in some cases through material motivations. This is affirmed by Zuhur’s study, where he found 
that women did not believe the veil was an Islamic obligation, with many claiming veiling was 
spreading because women were being paid to wear it by Islamist groups and funds from Saudi 
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Arabia.360 Thus there is no categorical stance that can be adopted over whether veiling is a 
product of free choice or not as there are situations where it may not be directly coerced but 
certainly the existence of social and family influence plays a role in the choice. Similarly, simply 
because some women may be subject to external influences does not mean that every Muslim 
woman is subjected to such influences, the answer can only lie with the motivations of each 
individual who adopts the practice making her voice an integral part of the debate.  
Authenticity of choices 
The content of autonomy is accentuated in the oppression discourse and it can be 
acknowledged that choices made by indoctrination, coercion or manipulation are not free 
choices. However, an argument that seems to be overlooked by those who profess as truth 
holders to their convenience is what if the woman who veils had a desire to conform to 
religious prescriptions despite the option of not veiling and she had evaluated such an option 
rationally? Arguably if such a woman decides that she prefers the subservient actions and 
remains obedient to religious prescriptions propagated via men, then there is nothing to 
suggest that she is any freer or unfree for having such desires, since the main concern for free 
will is the mode of choice formation as opposed to the content. In such cases women should 
not be criticised for making the ‘wrong choice’ or one which would have been preferred. 
Rather she should be seen as an autonomous agent and even though the veil has been classed 
as a tool via which men have dominated or oppressed women, it can in a given context be 
considered a marker of religious or individual agency.361 Just as Hirschmann says that ‘I do not 
think that feminist freedom requires that women’s decisions be respected, regardless of what 
they choose; feminists must support, in principle, if not politically, women’s choices to oppose 
abortion, stay with abusers, report rape or sexual harassment, or become full time mothers 
and housewives’.362 If women decide to choose the veil in accordance with their free will, then 
that decision has to be supported even though others disagree with it, just as Beaman reminds 
that Sometimes freedom will mean freedom to be orthodox, or to make choices that some or 
many of us would not make.363 
Deformed desires and veiling 
Deformed desires are related to the concept of autonomy which is commonly defined as self-
determination or self-direction which has a direct bearing on oppression. This is because, if a 
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woman’s acts are primarily motivated by her deformed desires then some believe there is the 
possibility that she is contributing to her own oppression. Bartky describes deformed desires 
as those that: 
 
Fasten us to the established order of domination, for the same system which 
produces false needs also controls the conditions under which such needs can be 
satisfied. False needs, it might be ventured, are needs which are produced through 
indoctrination, psychological manipulation, and the denial of autonomy; they are 
needs whose possession and satisfaction benefit not the subject who has them but 
a social order whose interest lies in domination.364 
 
It is clear from Bartky that one feature of deformed desires is that their source plays a part to 
their deformation. The formation of such desires is attributed to unjust social conditions and 
that includes conditions where men hold themselves to be superior and women treated as 
inferiors.365 Elster explains the acquisition of deformed desires and their adaptation to their 
inferior subordinated status by using the example of the ‘sour grapes’ phenomena where the 
fox is not allowed to eat grapes and he convinces himself that they are sour and therefore 
adapts his preference of not eating the grapes accordingly366 and in the context of veiling this 
phenomena has been termed as an ‘adaptive preference’.367 Similarly women who are 
subjected to unjust social conditions adapt their preferences to conditions that give them 
fewer options thereby limiting their freedom. Not all cases of unjust social conditions result in 
deformed desires, but social influences play a causative role. Nussbaum puts forward three 
generic factors that produce deformed desires found in patriarchy and form ways women are 
indoctrinated, manipulated and denied their autonomy. She identifies the factors as lack or 
false information about facts, lack of deliberation or reflection about norms and limited 
options.368 
 
The lack of or false information can be associated with the patriarchal interpretations of the 
Qur’an whereby the hijab or the veil is projected by men as being obligatory when there is lack 
of consensus on their compulsory nature and any re-interpretations by women are treated 
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with contempt. Furthermore the message sent out to women is that they need to guard their 
modesty by covering and deflecting the male gaze, whereas in reality the Qur’an mandates 
men to lower their gaze too and the burden thus lays on women and men equally. The lack of 
options is a factor that applies to women who veil, as there is a level of manipulation albeit not 
direct, from the community, religious leaders and family that exerts a certain amount of 
pressure on women to upkeep their modesty and enhance their piousness. This is achieved 
through the use of reminders of religious prescription, which warrants veiling and seclusion in 
order to reach higher levels of piety, even though this mandate is contested by many Muslims.  
 
Despite these desires often conflicting with these women’s other desires to promote their 
welfare, the result is that women refrain from entering into employment and are left content 
with home life at the expense of developing their intellectual capacities, thus leading to a lack 
of options. This does not necessarily mean these women do not care, a point  MacKinnon takes 
up suggesting that irrespective of patriarchy’s influence, women apart from the ‘complete 
dupes’ of patriarchy are concerned about their welfare.369 This conflict of desires here is that 
women do not prefer oppression or subordination to equality, but instead they simply end up 
desiring social roles that lead to their oppression.370 
 
However, a question that remains unanswered is whether these desires belong to women and 
if so at what point do they become their own?  According to Narayan, women make the 
desires their own by bargaining with patriarchy and with respect to veiling she refers to their 
choices to do so as containing a ‘bundle of elements’, some of which they want, such as those 
connected to their socio-religious domain and communal identities. As for those they do not 
want, for example where they do not have the power to ‘untie the bundle’ they will only 
choose the ones needed.371 This suggests that women have knowledge that these desires are 
caused by patriarchy which is indicative of agency and her views are thus contrary to 
MacKinnon’s who images these as ‘Zombie like acquiescence to patriarchal norms with their 
agency completely pulverised’.372  
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Indeed women make choices in patriarchal societies, but women who veil after Narayan’s 
patriarchal bargaining of their conflicting desires perpetuating their modesty and piousness to 
men, are arguably also lacking in belief of their self-worth. This is because they should be the 
ones who should be vocal in asserting that it should be men who should change their attitudes 
towards those women who do not veil. In practice, even if veiled women due to their struggles 
with patriarchy do not fully assent to patriarchy, they are still bound by it, and conforming to 
patriarchy propagates women’s oppression by perpetuating stereotypes which instead of 
benefitting, harms these women.  
 
This stereotyping conveys messages of inferiority to women in patriarchal societies the 
receiver can lead to them living up to that message, thus contributing to psychological 
oppression by attenuating their self-determination. This is further accentuated if they are 
being forced to view things from a dominant culture’s perspective, which could be in the case 
of veiled women and leads to cultivation of incapability of these women perceived as 
oppressed.373 Those women who then come to believe under false consciousness that Muslim 
woman’s place is in the home looking after the patriarchal family and away from the male gaze 
would be supporting the oppression because she would be maintaining the harmful 
stereotype.374  
 
A person cannot be said to have freely chosen their desires if they are a conceived through 
external coercion, otherwise it would be the equivalent of someone selling themselves to 
slavery which according to Mill’s could not be done: 
 
By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of 
it beyond that single act. He, therefore, defeats in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself.375  
 
Deformed desires limit autonomy because choosing them would be a paradox; you cannot use 
autonomy to abdicate autonomy. Coercive desires are not freely chosen by those possessing 
full agency because it would lead a person to act in a way they would not do but for the 
coercion and thus lacking self-direction, this then confers benefit to patriarchy itself instead to 
the agent. Veiling allows the patriarchs to control the dissemination of religious knowledge, 
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effectively preventing women from seeking the deeper knowledge that would allow 
themselves to question whether veiling is indeed compulsory and modesty enhancing, a point 
made eloquently by King who states ‘it is not enough to ask what we know about religion, but 
equal attention must be paid to how we come to know what we know’.376 
Veiling as collective and self-contribution to oppression  
It is not just the self-serving religious knowledge related to veiling and the silencing of these 
women as well as those who attempt to re-interpret the Qur’anic that is being controlled. 
Some feminists are of the opinion that men are ‘collectively responsible’ for aspects of 
oppression of women. This notion introduced by May & Strikwerda was applied to issues 
surrounding rape but can also apply to impositions of the hijab and the veil. Men could be held 
collectively responsible as it is in their interest to veil women and propagate modesty 
requirements under Islam, as it serves them to keep women from educating themselves in 
religion thus allowing them greater control as holders of that knowledge. Even those men who 
do not impose veiling amongst their own household would benefit from the others’ 
impositions, as it allows them to retain control of women as the head of the household, which 
would be a consequence of an attitudinal climate generated by veiled women on those who 
are unveiled encouraging them to also adopt the practice. Thus even though some men may 
not directly play a part in imposing religious veiling, they can be considered as harbouring 
oppression since they do not condemn the practice.377 
 
If women due to Islamic modesty impositions remain at home then the man deemed the head 
of the household is put in a position of greater control over the women. And the men, who 
associate a woman’s body with enticing the man to lose control of his sexual desires itself, can 
lead women to form inferior images of their bodies and also pits them against women who do 
not veil, who would be placed under great influence. The consequence of this is that it 
perpetuates the patriarchy and benefits even those who do not impose veiling in their 
household. Young affirms this benefit to groups who have an interest in this continued 
oppression ‘Indeed, for every oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to 
that group’.378 
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Additionally the veiled women could be considered as contributing to their own oppression as 
well as encouraging it upon those who do not veil, albeit it is not directly. The strong beliefs 
held by veiled women on religious compliance can lead to considering that the non-veiled 
women belong to stereotypical roles and  makes them, not only possessors of, but act out the 
same attitudes as the sexist men. There is however a disparity of thought as to whether 
women could be held blameworthy for their own oppression. There is a school of thought that 
does not apportion blame and who believe that women can be indoctrinated into believing in 
patriarchy and the associated values attached to such practices, and attribute their position to 
the greater divine plan, leading to these women to not only accepting their positions but also 
to possess those patriarchal beliefs.379  
 
The opposing view by Hay is that some of these women are under an obligation to act as 
resistance to oppression, even though it might be limited to certain conditions, and therefore 
responsible for resistance. This may be the case even though it means that it may restrict their 
choices and would lead to attachment of blame on these victims of oppression.380Hay accepts 
that patriarchal forces can act internally or externally, and can limit the autonomy of women, 
but asserts that it is not enough not to expect them to fight the oppression; if women have 
autonomy then they are subject to a moral obligation to resist oppression. However Hay 
concedes that it would be unfair to expect moral obligations of those who are incapable of 
fulfilling them. Even though it may be unjust to expect women to resist the acting forces of 
oppression, discharging the obligation can increase women’s autonomy, which is important in 
the removal of oppression. Hay further accepts that the imposition of any moral obligation to 
resist adds to the burden on the oppressed woman, and therefore is an additional reason to 
eliminate it. Hence it is crucial that those women who have the veil imposed or question the 
Islamic injunctions on veiling must resist by making their voices heard through supporting 
polysemic readings of the sacred texts or indeed to arrive at their own interpretations 
following the methodology adopted by Islamic scholars. Indeed this would entail an advance in 
religious knowledge acquisition and may be burdensome but that is a prerogative they possess 
as there is no monopoly over religion and would break the mould of male religious truth 
holders. 
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Hay’s views are supported by Cudd, who states that women should resist their own oppression 
if they are aware of it and not under the influence of deformed desires and the instances of 
oppression are not so persuasive, that it would leave open the woman to any serious risk or 
impossibility. She does not believe that blaming the victim would be wrong, as it would be no 
different to a case where someone has cut their finger through carelessness with a sharp 
scissors, where that person would not be blamed for the carelessness, but would be blamed if 
they lost a hand through not caring for the cut. She asserts that neither the oppressed woman 
nor the one that has cut her hand is the initial cause of the harm but participates in the harm 
in one way or another.381 
Agentic empowerment through piety and resistance 
Although Muslim women who veil are accused of lacking agency associated with choice to veil, 
there are circumstances where Muslim women have displaced social norms by being obedient 
to divinity as opposed to will and have demonstrated their agency with such compliance, such 
examples demonstrate the importance of the contexts and the meaning of the veil other than 
oppression. For example Mahmood’s study of women’s mosque movement in Cairo challenges 
not only Western norms but Islamic norms too. The women teachers belonging to the 
movement attend mosques, use primary and secondary texts in educating other women by 
‘bringing women’s interpretive practices to bear upon the male exegetical tradition in new 
ways’382 thereby mediating their beliefs as part of their internal goal that aims to achieve piety. 
These goals are similar to someone praying five times a day, a ritual that is considered one of 
the pillars of Islam. This is so even though the person praying might not actually understand 
the prayers themselves, it is understood that he or she will eventually cleanse their soul via the 
prayers. Similarly then a woman who veils may not fully understand her veiling  but it is a step 
towards becoming pious, as Mahmood says through the act which would ultimately become a 
habit that the woman’s ‘inner quality’ will develop through performativity.383 This 
performativity is described by Mahmood who following Judith Butler’s384 approach states as ‘a 
theory of subject formation in which performativity becomes one of the influential rituals by 
which subjects are formed and reformulated’.385  
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The women believe that Islam calls all Muslims to be pious and maintain internal and external 
modesty, thus veiling becomes an external projection of this modesty that reminds veiled 
women of the inner modesty.386 Grima who carried out research with veiled Maltese women 
calls this inner spiritual engagement with the divine an ‘affair of the heart’ and an outward 
symbol of the inner piety marking out women as Muslims.387Therefore veiled women are 
engaged in performativity in reformulating what is dear to them. Thus by veiling with the 
intention to enhance piety, women take control of their lives which is a form of agency, which 
enables women to use veiling as a form of empowerment through piety. These women’s 
voluntary obedience is not to patriarchal systems, but to a divine authority which is voluntary, 
which projects the pious woman as someone who is considered respectful and autonomous. 
As women’s Mosque movement requires this discipline, it demonstrates that although the 
women are subjected to relations of power by displacing the traditional Islamic norms, such as 
mosques being a place of worship for men only, the carving up of their own space is an 
exercise of agency.  
 
Such exercise of agency where religion itself is used to overcome socio-cultural norms is 
consistent with Butler’s concept of agency388 in that autonomy and agency is present when 
power is challenged. This is also in line with the Foucauldian principle that struggling 
conditions are the same ones that can lead to resistance389 and individuals are the vehicles of 
power, with the body being the site where dissent is articulated.390 Such conceptions of 
freedom take account of the effect social conditions have on individuals and promote the 
development of autonomy. At the same time they allow for variations and retain an element 
of agency, reflection and choice available in women’s existing circumstances. ‘Thus, women  
can make choices and act under circumstances in which they find themselves. This may mean 
that some women can make choices that others may not find palatable’.391 Therefore one 
cannot discount that there are veiled women, who despite assumptions that they are living 
under oppressed conditions, such as imposed religious doctrines, find the circumstances they 
are living under are sufficient for them. Some women who veil may indeed prefer the 
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traditional family structure and extended families and might wish to remain within such 
cultural bounds. And these are acceptable to allow them to make such decisions, which may 
not be recognised as such to others. Such women’s choices have to be registered as being 
authentic as they choose to live the way they want to in accordance with their own desires. 
Indeed if the liberal autonomous person is to be able to pursue her goals in the manner that 
accords to her desires, beliefs and values then the same autonomous agent has to be 
recognised as exercising choice in the circumstances that exist for her surroundings, allowing 
her values to be moulded. Therefore those women who veil and say they are not oppressed 
and veil through choice for reasons of piety or modesty have to be recognised as free agents 
and their  voices heard by the debates. 
 
Thus with this structure versus agency debate there are no hard and fast binaries, rather 
women’s real life situations are dialectically interdependent, whereby nothing is an absolute 
result of structure and nothing is absolutely open to free will.392Abu-Lughod asserts that 
wearing of religious head dress should not be assumed as an indication of lack of free will. She 
confirms this by her ethnography of Bedouin women in Egypt who veil on a voluntary basis and 
are firmly committed to honour tied to the family. But the honour aspect is not the veiling but 
management of the household property; the women choose who they will veil for and who 
they will not veil for as a matter of respect that is context contingent.393 Whilst in Europe some 
women have stated that they ‘adopted the full face veil as part of a spiritual journey’394 thus 
for those who oppose the practice of veiling to simply conclude that veiling is unequivocally 
related to passivity and external influence is rather arbitrary. 
 
But if the availability or exercise of choice is truly absent or restricted, be it for reasons of 
forced veiling by the state, or indeed by religion itself, or by forces of patriarchy, then the 
argument that the veil is oppressive and should be banned in Europe can be justified by 
liberalists. If this view is adopted then it follows that the veil as a symbol of submission for the 
woman must mean that the wearer lacks the choice or the agency. This has been pointed out 
bluntly by the Canadian Sociologist Bilge: ‘agency involves free will; no free woman freely 
chooses to wear the veil because it is oppressive to women; thus veiled women have no 
agency. The construction of veiled women as non-agentic and the veil as a tool for women’s 
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oppression are hence intertwined’.   She further states that ‘the depiction of veiled women as 
devoid of agency, which has generated criticism within feminist scholarship, making the veil a 
site of contention between different strands of feminism’.395However, there is lack of 
conclusive research where women have stated that they are forced into the practice, leaving 
feminists to argue that those who veil through choice do it not due to true, but deformed 
desires.   
The oppressive or emancipatory dichotomy  
Earlier in the chapter the issue of veiling as a symbol of oppression and patriarchy was 
analysed, together with the debates surrounding freedom, choice and agency. The opposing 
discourses to the debate on whether veiling is a symbol of oppression suggest that it is a sign 
of emancipation, resistance and power. Some Eastern feminists advocate the emancipatory 
and resistive nature of veiling, invoking allegations of orientalism against the essentialist 
viewpoints of those feminists who declare that veiling is oppressive. The dilemma between the 
emancipatory/oppression debate and the dangers of polarisation are clearly articulated by 
Nussbaum who says: 
 
To say that a practice endorsed by tradition is bad is to risk erring by imposing 
one’s own way on others…To say that a practice is all right whenever local 
tradition endorses it as a right and good is to risk erring by withholding critical 
judgement where evil and oppression are surely present.396 
 
Two of the dominant debates on veiling are between the discourses opposing and defending 
Muslim veiling; the former often claim that veiling is oppressive, whilst the latter claim that it 
can be empowering and accuse the oppositional discourse of essentialism and the otherising 
of Muslim women arguing that the different veiling contexts need to be understood397 and 
that those who oppose the practice want to liberate veiled women from their oppressive 
cultures, emphasising their cultural superiority in the process.398 According to Wade, this 
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points to a gendered binary where ‘the West is considered modern, while the non-Western 
remains pre-modern with an adherence to tradition that inhibits progress. [And] because the 
binary is gendered, the condition of women becomes a measure of the advancement of 
society’.399  
 
The advancement of Western society understood as being ahead of the rest of the world 
according to Wade is not a value neutral idea but one with connotations of a multidimensional 
‘positional superiority’ and thus Western culture is understood to be the ‘pinnacle of 
civilisation’ which she terms ‘exemplarism’.400 This exemplar is unlike ethnocentrism which 
simply passes judgement of superiority, but imposes a moral imperative on those cultures 
deemed inferior to emulate this exemplar, emphasising cultural rather than racial 
superiority.401 It is thus no surprise that veiling has generated conflicts with those who engage 
in the practice being considered as oppressed and in need of saving,402 a point highlighted by 
the French feminist Elisabeth Badinter, who claims that veiling represents oppression even if 
freely chosen. She invokes the Millian view, that one cannot freely submit to slavery, nor 
prefer a slothful life to one of Socratic questioning, she argues: 
 
The choice to wear the veil…is tantamount to renouncing one’s personal 
autonomy…even if Muslim girls appear to choose this practice autonomously, this 
does not mean that they are autonomous. This is because the content of their 
cultural norms – namely, the Muslim values of female restraint, modesty and 
seclusion – are opposed to personal autonomy.403 
Orientalism 
Those who support veiling as a form of emancipation frequently level claims colonialism 
against those who oppose the practice. Feminists such as Spivak and Ahmed influenced by the 
work of Said404contend that declaring veiling as oppressive is rooted in colonialism,405 where 
the West was considered more advanced and culturally superior to the culturally inferior East 
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where women were subjugated and were ‘victims of their culture’406 and in need of liberation 
by colonialists. Spivak has referred to such attempts as ‘white men saving brown women from 
brown men’.407 The work of Said illustrates that the West viewed itself as enlightened, civilised 
and rational whereas the East was considered barbaric and backward. This view led to the 
construction of ‘othering’ of the East and gave the West the misplaced moral authority to 
justify its imperial conquests. Feminists such as Badinter are of the opinion that veiling is 
oppressive and still see Muslim women who wear the veil through the same oriental lens and 
the oppression discourse is reflective of that, where instead of assigning orientalism to the 
past, it is still continued.408However such opinions on veiling are not just perpetuated by 
feminism but according to Scott409 and Al-Saji410  they can be motivated by racism where 
liberation or lack of is used as a justification. A good example being the women recruited into 
the far right group English Defence League, the self-styled ‘EDL Angels’ yet they don’t 
challenge patriarchy itself.411 
 
According to Yegenoglu, during colonisation the Orient was quite alluring and mysterious, 
particularly the veiled women who signalled eroticism because of the mystery of the veil and 
oppression because it was a device that allowed the separation of the sexes. The 
mysteriousness hidden by the veil provoked erotic fantasies from the colonisers enhancing 
their desire to dominate. Where the ‘purdah’412 acted as an erotic invitation and there was a 
linked desire on part of the colonisers to free the women from their barbaric culture by 
unveiling women and freeing them from the chains of a backward culture.413 Hoodfar notes 
that between 1800 and 1950 sixty thousand books were published on the Arab orient alone in 
the West and their primary function was to ‘depict the colonised Arabs/Muslims as 
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Inferior/backwards who were urgently in need of progress offered to them by the colonial 
superiors’.414 One example of such writing’s contains the following passage: 
 
It needs the widespread love and pity of the women of our day in Christian lands 
to seek and save the suffering sinful needy women of Islam. You cannot know how 
great the need unless you are told; you will never go and find them until you hear 
their cry. And they will never cry for themselves, for they are down under the yoke 
of centuries of oppression, and their hearts have no hope or knowledge of 
anything better.415 
 
This help from the West would not only free Muslim women from the traps of patriarchy but 
also allow them to dominate such societies.416 However when the colonised societies fought 
back for their freedom from the colonisers, the romanticised erotic invitations of the veil was 
transposed as a tool of oppression and denunciation of Western values, Algeria being a prime 
example where forced unveiling was attempted by the French in May 1958. In Europe, 
especially among non-Muslims, there is a tendency to view veiled Muslim women as victims. 
Many of the negative opinions held by some Westerners about Islam have their roots in the 
distant past. However, Lord Cromer’s condemnation of the treatment of Muslim women at the 
hands of native Egyptians is centred on veiling when he states:  
 
It was Islam’s degradation of women, expressed in the practices of veiling and 
seclusion that was the fatal obstacle to the Egyptian’s attainment of that elevation 
of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of Western 
civilisation.417 
 
According to Cromer’s views, if colonisers were to succeed in destroying ‘the structure of the 
native societies, together with their capacity for resistance, they first had to conquer the 
women’.418 In order for the colonisers to exert power over the Orient, unveiling women was 
considered the method of removing the resistance leading to a new generation of women, 
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who would be released from the clutches of Islam and lead straight into the coloniser’s 
control. The orientalist view is still pervading amongst Westerners, as Mancini citing Ahmed 
states: 
 
Most Westerners know that Muslim women are terribly oppressed. Often, this is 
all they know about Islam, let alone gender relations in Middle Eastern societies. 
Many also think that the Western should intervene in defence of Muslim 
women.419 
 
She further exemplifies such views by referring to comments made by Will Hutton, a leading 
columnist in Britain, published in the Observer newspaper in the UK: 
 
Islam is predominantly sexist and pre-enlightenment…Thus, the West has to object 
to Islamic sexism whether arranged marriage, headscarves, limiting career options 
or the more extreme manifestations, female circumcision and stoning women for 
adultery.420 
 
Said uses the term ‘Orientalism’ to describe these deep seated attitudes ‘Orientalism, [is] a 
way of coming to terms with the Orient’s special place in European Western experience’.421  
According to Mancini422 who cites Yegenoglu,423  liberal feminists in the last two decades are 
emulating the defective ‘orientalist thoughts’ and have ignored valuable contributions made 
by female Muslim academics. This is analogous to the feminist thought during attempts by 
colonisers to unveil women where some feminists were deflecting the existence of their own 
patriarchies by focussing on the oppressed other. This position in Mancini’s view is no different 
with the feminist liberal thought on veiling in the last two decades which under the pressure of 
patriarchy, being hostile to liberalism have re-focussed on the veil. This re-focus Mancini 
suggests, has led to liberal feminists falsely projecting repressed patriarchies women in the 
West are subject to, onto the cultural minority or the illiberal other. Thereby the host liberal 
society fulfilling its ‘repressed patriarchal desires’ just as ‘Christian feminism in the 1970’s and 
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1980’s also portrayed Judaism as the patriarchal religion par excellence, and Christianity as a 
feminist corrective to it’.424 In Mancini’s view: 
 
Blaming Islam for patriarchy does not free the occident from its roots in it, nor 
does it, by the same token, dislodge it from the orient. It just continues a well-
known standard rhetoric…that…leads us to condemn other societies while 
minimising the deficiencies of our own. Hence it obstructs fruitful cross-cultural 
criticism, and fosters social hypocrisy, perhaps even moral obtuseness and 
parochialism.425 
False projection of repressed patriarchal desires 
Mancini argues that denouncing veiling as oppressive and the use of such ’feminist language in 
populist rhetoric is not accompanied by any serious commitment to gender equality’ but 
rather a misuse of feminist language and rhetoric that is a part of a strategy that allows a false 
projection of patriarchy on to the ‘other’. She bases her argument on the work of Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s Dialectic Enlightenment426 in which they use psychoanalysis as a tool to show 
how ant-Semitism originated in what they termed ‘false projection’. In their explanation of 
false projection, a subject attributes impulses to others, the objects, which are denied as 
belonging to the subject, despite them being so. This involves construction of the subject’s 
own intimate experiences as hostile which are projected falsely outward onto others, thereby 
destroying the intolerable within the subject.427  This according to Mancini allows majority 
societies to project onto minority cultures ‘some features of their own which they seek to hide 
from themselves’. And since patriarchy has been construed by feminism as hostile to 
liberalism, the projection enables liberal majority societies to project patriarchy onto the 
illiberal other with the resultant that the liberal society fulfils its repressed desires.428  
 
Mancini’s false projection theory does indeed have a base in the post-colonialist feminist 
literature in which some feminists joined in imperialist missions aimed at freeing oppressed 
Muslim women. One example is where Ahmed notes that Lord Cromer who was tasked to 
colonise Egypt and unveiling Muslim women under the guise of liberating them used feminists 
to corroborate his emancipatory aims. However, she adds that ‘this champion of the unveiling 
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of Egyptian women was, in England, founding member and sometime president of the Men’s 
league for opposing Women’s Suffrage’.429 Although feminists were struggling with patriarchy 
themselves in their homelands, it was being falsely projected onto the native women of Egypt. 
 
Similarly this deflection of gender equity is not just part of colonialist thoughts but can be 
traced in current trends in Britain and Germany  where women are disarticulating feminism 
through the process of individualisation and construction of themselves as empowered selves 
via the ‘othering’ of Muslim women. In a study carried out by Scharff430 who asserts that 
although feminism is active in Western Europe, it is ‘overwhelmingly unpopular’ and younger 
women are dis-identifying with it. Her research shows that ‘un-gendered and responsible 
individualisation’ plays a part in the perception that feminism stances are not desirable in 
Western societies.431 The responses from her interviewees show the individualist nature, as 
Larissa states: 
 
I’ve always been taught to – to do whatever I want re – you know, be not 
necessarily because I’m a woman but because I’m an individual, you know and – 
no – one’s ever said to me you can’t do that because you’re a woman.432 
 
Whilst Christine’s individualist rhetoric is evident in her statement, she is more direct with her 
desire not to engage with feminism: 
 
I have opinions on what is male and what is female, but really think that actually, 
people are individuals, there are traits amongst gender groups, but as much – we 
are also individuals, so, I don’t want to, I don’t mind exploring, but I don’t want be 
fixed with a group of erm thinking of, constantly thinking of women.433 
 
Whilst the respondents in her study feel they do not need to adopt feminist stances. When it 
came to other cultures and particularly Muslim women, they were pictured as powerless 
victims, who were oppressed and in need of collective action offered by feminist politics, 
whilst the respondents themselves felt they were liberated drawing a dichotomy between the 
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egalitarian West and the rights deficient ‘other’. This dichotomy is evident in Vicky’s statement 
when she was asked about whether she would campaign for women’s issues: 
 
Well, the thing – it’s difficult living in England or well, Western Europe where it’s – 
we’ve reached such a high level of kind of democratic connotation and values 
already. Like if – if I was in the Middle East, er, then obviously I would.434 
 
It is apparent that Vicky feels that the gender regime she lives under is progressive and not in 
need of feminist intervention, whereas she would campaign for the lack of women’s rights in 
the Middle East. The use of the word ‘obviously’ by her suggests that she feels that in the West 
the optimum in terms of women’s rights and gender equalities have been reached, whereas in 
other cultures there is a void that needs addressing through feminist movements. However, 
Scharff’s and her respondents’ third wave feminist stance are reminiscent of Walter’s 
positioning in her earlier work when she argued that the feminist agenda for women was 
healthy and robust and ‘part of the very air they breathe’.435However, just over ten years later 
in her work she admitted that she was wrong, and reflecting on her previous position she 
states: 
 
It was easy for me to argue, and I was glad to be able to do so, that feminists could 
now concentrate on achieving political and social and financial equality. In the 
past, feminist arguments had often centred on private lives: how women made 
love, how they dressed, whom they desired. I felt that the time for this had 
passed. I believed that we only had to put into place the conditions for equality for 
the remnants of old-fashioned sexism in our culture to wither away. I am ready to 
admit that I was entirely wrong. While many women relaxed and believed that 
most arguments around equality had been won, and that there were no significant 
barriers to further progress…The rise of hypersexual culture is not proof that we 
have reached full equality; rather, it has reflected and exaggerated the deeper 
imbalances of power in our society.436 
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There is now recognition that there is a fourth wave of feminism with the younger generation 
taking an active part and taking their struggles on the worldwide web and the streets437 where 
use is made of social media and information technology in raising issues surrounding sexism. 
For example Laura Bates founded the ‘Everyday Sexism Project’ in 2012 whose motto has been 
the feminist phrase ‘the personal is political’ and has been so successful that in 2013 it has 
rolled out in 27 countries. The project allows women to write in via social media the stories of 
sexual harassment, discrimination and body shaming and is meant to be a ‘conscious-raising 
exercise that encourages women to see how inequality affects them, proves these problems 
aren’t individual but collective, and might therefore have political solutions’. In 2013 women 
had sent 6,000 stories about harassment and assaults targeted against them.438 
The veil as a symbol of resistance 
The veil has been used as a tool of protest and resistance against not only colonial powers 
attempting to modernise and Westernise Muslim societies but also against forced unveiling by 
leaders of Muslim states.439 The most symbolic use of the veil as an anti-colonialist movement 
is the example of Algeria. The arrival of the French in Algeria in 1830 led to it being deemed an 
integral part of France in 1848 bringing with it aims of civilising and instilling republican, 
secular, universalist values and assimilating the underdeveloped Algerians.440 The French 
colonial mission was ‘legitimised by racist depictions of Arabs which inevitably called into 
question the very possibility of the civilising project.’ 441 Local resistance to the French rule led 
to warfare in 1954 and in the ensuing seven year battle, women had become ‘an object of 
attention on both sides.’442  
 
For the French, just like the British in Egypt, the veil was a sign of backwardness and 
subjugation of women and any attempt to civilise meant unveiling of women. The veil was a 
symbol of Islam and a refusal to be subjected to Westernised values.  It was during the struggle 
that the veil gained political significance and Scott notes that it was this phase that led to the 
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veil first being associated with dangerous militancy.443 The National Liberation Front (FLN) had 
attained a strong influence amongst the native people and had offered a wall of resistance 
against the French attempt. In response, the French tried to mobilise feminine solidarity and at 
a pro France rally in 1958 unveiled Muslim women in public. This unveiling of Muslim women 
was also considered a military strategy as the FLN had been using veiled women to carry 
weaponry hidden behind veils and the forced unveiling would deprive the FLN of such 
strategies.  
 
The use of the veil in this manner of resistance has been documented and captured very well 
in film media,444 academic commentary and in visual culture.445 This example of the use of 
veiling signifies an extension of the meaning of the veil to outside of the traditional parameters 
of religiosity and modesty, where Algerian women representing different socio-economic 
ranges joined in the resistance effort by donning the haik,446 playing a vital role in reclaiming 
their socio-cultural values.447 This resistance was further strengthened by the solidarity shown 
by women from the middle-class who were French educated and had never before worn the 
veil leading Fanon to say ‘Spontaneously and without being told, the Algerian women who had 
long since dropped the veil once again donned the haik, thus affirming that it was not true that 
woman liberated herself at the invitation of France and of General de Gaulle’.448 Fanon further 
comments that what started as a mechanism of resistance, its value to the social group 
remained strong and it was worn because tradition demanded a strict separation of the sexes, 
although the French occupation ‘was bent on unveiling Algeria.’449 This banning of the veil is 
described by Scott as ’a way of insisting on the timeless superiority of French civilisation in the 
face of a changing world.’450 According to El Guindi the French tactics led Arabs to: 
 
Link de-veiling of Muslim women with a colonial strategy to undermine and 
destroy culture. The effect was the opposite of that intended by France – it 
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strengthened the attachment to the veil as a national and cultural symbol on the 
part of patriotic Algerian women, giving the veil a new vitality.451  
 
Her reasons for this carry weight, as the veil bears complex symbolic meanings and 
emancipation can be expressed by veiling or unveiling, it could be secular or religious and 
represent tradition or resistance.452Similarly, Iran has been at the centre of forced unveiling 
and veiling using the force of the law and is a prime example of the use of the veil as a method 
of resistance to both types of oppression and was the first country to introduce prohibition on 
veiling. The obsession with Westernised dress codes began in the 1920’s when Iran intimated 
that women should follow the example of Turkey and replace the veil with a kerchief. Although 
this was not a legal injunction for women, in 1927 a dress code for men was imposed by the 
Shah when the Pahlavi hat, a French emulation was declared the official head dress for men. 
This was followed in 1936 by the legal prohibition of the female veil carrying a penalty for 
those failing to obey the law. The prohibition was enforced by the police and socially it became 
increasingly difficult for women to enter public places and gain employment if the wore the 
veil. However, the compulsory unveiling was relaxed after Reza Shah’s abdication but was still 
a barrier to climbing the social ladder. It became a symbol of backwardness and a visible 
marker of class. 
 
In the 1970’s the hijab was represented as a virtuous symbol to the Pahlavis as a rejection of 
their rule and as a symbol of resistance to the forced Westernising efforts and many middle 
class women voluntarily took up the hijab. However, on return from exile of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in March 1979, the intention of the new regime was to rid of all Westernisation and 
the same women once again took to the streets, except this time they were protesting against 
the forced veiling. But it was too late and the hijab became compulsory and an offence 
punishable by seventy four lashes if seen in public uncovered.  Betteridge summarises the use 
of the power of hijab as a symbol of protest: 
 
Just as Reza Shah unveiled women before the Islamic revolution the Islamic 
republic veiled women after the revolution….the enforcement of Hijab can be as 
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empowering as its ban. Whilst it undoubtedly restricts some women, it 
emancipates others by legitimizing their presence in public life.453 
 
The use of the veil as a form of resistance is still evident in current times where the 
motivations of some women who veil is to not only resist some Western norms such as mixing 
of the sexes, dating, frequenting pubs and clubs, but also to resist the modern stereotypes by 
the West such as those held by Badinter, very much framed in Orientalist terms. Moruzzi cites 
her: 
 
The veil, it is a symbol of oppression of a sex. Putting on torn jeans, wearing 
yellow, green, or blue hair, this is an act of freedom with regards to social 
conventions. Putting a veil on the head, this is an act of submission. It burdens a 
woman’s whole life. Their fathers or their brothers choose their husbands, they 
are closed up in their own homes and confined to domestic tasks, etc. when I say 
to this to the young people around me, they change their opinions immediately.454 
 
Such views corroborate allegations of orientalist thoughts and silences Muslim women who 
veil, being more concerned with speaking on their behalf as opposed to allowing them to 
speak for themselves. Furthermore, it ‘detracts attention from gender oppression in the 
dominant culture’.455  
 
Although Badinter’s well-rehearsed stereotypes ring connotations of Orientalism, which 
supporters of veiling claim, some caution has to be exercised with such allegations as not 
everyone who opposes veiling images the veiled Muslim woman through an orientalist lens as 
evidenced by Hirschmann’s and Nussbaum’s work.456  The stereotypical images painted by 
Badinter are the type which according to Wagner, are the ones some women who veil aim to 
resist, by adopting the practice.457 For example Fareena Alam an editor of a leading Muslim 
magazine corroborates the use of the veil as a form of resistance against stereotypes:  
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Modesty is only one of many reasons why a woman wears a scarf. It can be a very 
political choice too. I began wearing it at the age of 21, against the wishes of my 
family…I wanted to assert my identity and counter common stereotypes of Muslim 
women. A woman who wears a hijab can be active and engaged, educated and 
professional…Does this democratic society have any room for a British-Muslim 
woman like me who chooses to wear the Hijab on my own terms?458  
 
Veiling as a form of resistance is not confined to opposing mandatory or prohibitory veiling 
regimes, but also acts as a form of resistance against commercial consumerism and modernity 
where self- imaging problems have become acute, cosmetic surgery is within reach of most, 
aggressive marketing of cosmetics and designer brands has become the norm. However it has 
to be acknowledged that this perspective of women in Islam is romanticised and over reliant 
on cultural relativity, furthermore it mutes women opposed to some cultural practices, who 
are then treated as dupes of the West.459 
Stereotyping 
It is generally agreed that the introduction of the term ‘stereotype’ and its study in the field of 
social sciences and social psychology started with the publication of Walter Lippmann’s book 
Public Opinion in 1922.460  In his book he describes stereotypes as ‘pictures in our heads’ that 
simplify how we think about people around us recognising the value of stereotyping as a 
fundamental human mechanism for perceiving and making sense of the world.461 These 
pictures would be created by cultural representations and attributing a set of characteristics to 
people, eliminating the need to analyse them again the next time they are encountered. 
Lippmann’s claim was that the construction of stereotypes was false, rigid and the content 
incorrect. However more recent research conducted by social psychologists on stereotypes has 
challenged this perception and has led to academic acknowledgement that stereotypes are not 
always rigid, incorrect or faulty462 and that they also exist from the stereotyped person’s point 
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of view.463 Furthermore they are ‘cognitive schemas used by social perceivers to process 
information about others’.464 The cognitive approach with a consideration of culture playing a 
role in representation of people and groups is currently the dominating approach to 
stereotyping.465  
 
There have been many definitions offered since Lippmann’s work and Schneider lists no less 
than fourteen classic ones, indicating the lack of ‘real consensus’ on a universal definition of 
stereotypes.466 All fourteen definitions cited by Schneider appear to diverge on three aspects 
of stereotypes: accuracy, whether the reasoning and consequences of stereotypes is bad and 
whether stereotypes have to be shared amongst people rather than an individual who has 
beliefs shared by no one else.467 Research in addressing these features of stereotypes has 
generated a vast amount of literature with the contemporary views emphasising the more 
functional and dynamic elements of stereotypes associated with simplifying the complex 
environment.468 An in-depth analysis of the multiple issues and contested concepts associated 
with stereotypes is beyond the remit of this thesis, therefore the discussion on stereotypes will 
be confined to the base definition as commonly referred to by the literature in this area and 
the type of stereotypes applicable to Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil.  
 
The definition that captures the essential qualities of stereotypes and contains the least 
number of constraining assumptions as well as common usage is that they are ‘a set of beliefs 
about personal attributes of a group of people’.469 This shows that stereotyping becomes a 
method of categorising people based on cues such as sex, gender, race, age, culture, ethnicity 
and intellect where on encountering people their specific features are selected, followed by an 
emphasis of generalisations beyond those characteristics that are specific to individuals. 
Essentially all stereotypes have three important elements.470Firstly, a specific characteristic 
identifies people or groups, for example Muslim women who veil. Secondly, additional 
attributes are assigned to that person or group as a whole, so with the example of Muslim 
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veiled women this extra characteristic would be that veiled Muslim women are oppressed. 
Finally, once a person or group has been identified with the original meaningful characteristic 
i.e. veiled Muslim women, the additional characteristic that she is oppressed is applied to her 
with the inference that like all other Muslim women who veil, this veiled Muslim woman is 
oppressed too. It is through this process of categorisation or grouping that stereotypes 
emerge. 
  
Categorisation based on characteristics or traits is not always negative and although people 
tend to perceive stereotypes as such but they can be positive too.471 For example women can 
be stereotyped negatively as being weak, but positively as being caring. But this lack of 
neutrality leads those who place others in groups as positively identifying their own group 
belonging as more worthy than others, creating group bias. This is particularly so when the 
group being stereotyped and one that is doing the stereotyping has differences based on 
culture, religion and women’s choices. This is evident in the oppression versus emancipatory 
polarities, where the binaries start to take greater prominence in their respective discourses as 
‘the actual differences between groups may be detected and then become accentuated and 
magnified’.472A consequence of the construction of such ‘group realities’ is that they ignore 
individual subjectivities, reflecting ethnocentric beliefs, rather than objective reality.473 This 
coupled with group hierarchy and power dynamics is what results in oppressive effects on 
groups and individuals, thereby making stereotypes particularly harmful for Muslim women 
who wear the hijab or the veil. The power in this case is that over discourse, where the in- 
group is the one that argues they have freedom of choice and are liberated whilst the out-
group comprises of those women who veil, whose choices are not real choices and who are 
oppressed. 
  
Since the thesis is about women who wear the hijab or the veil, it is the gender stereotype that 
applies. Ashmore and Del Moca define gender stereotypes as ‘the structured set of beliefs 
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about the personal attributes of men and women’474 and this includes appearance of 
women.475 A particular characteristic of gender stereotypes is that they are ‘pervasive’ and 
‘persistent’476 posing potential harm to women depending on their localities and situations.477 
Furthermore gender stereotypes degrade women when they have been denied choices on 
how they wish to live their own lives or when they treat ‘them in ways that do not take into 
account their actual situations’.478 Cook and Cusack have identified two ways of identifying the 
harms perpetuated by stereotypes; the first one is described by them as a ‘recognition 
effect’479 which infringes women’s dignity by misrecognition of their equal worth as human 
beings or marginalising them. Thus the refusal to recognise that women who veil can and do 
interact with others in public spaces and are entitled to form their own identity as in S.A.S. 
would be an example of the recognition effect. The second way is the ‘distribution effects’ 
which is a denial of a fair distribution of public goods. This would apply where in Sahin480 the 
applicant was denied higher education facilities whilst in S.A.S.481 the applicant was denied her 
dignity as well as access to public services if veiled.  
 
Gender stereotypes supporting gender ideologies reproduce gendered differences and 
facilitate the maintenance of male hegemonies and subordination of females.482 This is done 
by inscribing fixed identities on women because they are not seen as individuals but belonging 
to a gendered group. However this gendered group would include all women and not 
specifically Muslim women as they are not only women, but Muslim too. Thus the specific 
subset of gender stereotypes that applies is what is referred to as a ‘compound gender 
stereotype’. Cusack and Cook define compound gender stereotypes as those that ‘that interact 
with other stereotypes, which ascribe attributes, characteristics or roles to different subgroups 
of women’.483 Thus traits other than gender compound gender stereotypes, for example 
lesbians do not make good mothers, which was the subject of a successful human rights claim 
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under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.484 In the case of veiling the oppression characteristic 
would apply, first of all because you are referring to women, secondly that they are Muslim 
and thirdly that they are veiled with the result that the second and third characteristics 
compounding the gender stereotype. Such stereotypes are known to reflect preconceptions of 
Muslim veiled women that are false and the stereotypes arise because of the way those who 
oppose veiling articulate such opposition by targeting patriarchy and power structures 
affecting Muslim women. 
Stereotyping the veil by non-Muslims 
The perception that veiling is oppressive is not a standpoint adopted by non-Muslims only; it is 
also borne by many Muslim feminists who oppose the practice.485 This highlights the divergent 
feminist issues cross cutting national and global contexts that cannot be separated from 
transnational political and economic forces.486 Although there are no comprehensive surveys 
of Muslim women that suggest there is dissent against veiling from within, there is limited 
research that does point out negative views on veiling by Muslim women. For example, 
research conducted using Muslim women who do not veil and their views on veiling do suggest 
that not every case of veiling is considered a choice based practice.487 Whilst a survey of North 
African women carried out in France by Elle magazine showed that eighty one percent were 
against wearing a veil whilst fifty one percent were opposed to hijab in state schools,488 
although the value of this survey in research terms is limited. Nevertheless, this dissent 
extends beyond these women and there are prominent Muslim writers such as Ali Bhai Brown, 
who condemns veiling of young girls being trained to internalise the practice: 
 
Parents of tiny girls with headscarves tell me they are training them to cover 
themselves. Informed choice is one thing, but trained choice? Or a choice where 
females know they will be ostracised if they don’t comply?489 
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The Egyptian El-Sadaawi, a staunch proponent of Arab women’s human rights articulates 
clearly that the veil is not only a symbol of subjugation of the Muslim woman, but it also veils 
her mind from liberation, she states:  
 
The call to liberate the mind or to raise the veil from the mind…is an essential for 
the liberation of the Arab person, man or woman, but especially woman. For she is 
ruled by two authorities (inside and outside the home) which deprive her of her 
rights over her own mind and body from becoming the moving force behind her 
own deeds.490 
 
The veil represents to the West and some Muslims a symbol of physical segregation of the 
sexes, which is associated with the subordination of women and according to El-Solh and 
Mabro gender segregation where there are separate spaces for men and women are the most 
extreme symbols that ‘limit women’s physical mobility to the home’.491 Moreover, the authors 
recognise the role that Islam has taken in the Western psyche in filling the void left by 
communism ‘In the Western mind, Muslim women all too often tend to conjure up a vision of 
heavily veiled, secluded wives, whose lives consist of little more than their homes, their 
children, and the other women in the harem or immediate kinship circle’. This they point out, 
has limited relevance to the lives of the majority of Muslims today, especially those living in 
the West.492 The existence of such stereotyping according to Wagner leads to Muslim women 
in the minority to veil that acts out a form of resistance to the negative attitudes by the 
majority.493 The prevalence and rebuttal of such stereotypes is clearly articulated in research 
on Muslim women’s participation in Higher education carried out by Tyrer and Ahmad: 
 
Throughout the fieldwork respondents dispelled stereotyped assumptions of 
Muslim women at University… leading double lives and experiencing cultural 
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clash…These representations rely on reductionist stereotypes about the alleged 
backwardness of Muslim families.494  
 
The researchers conclude their study by emphasising that the ‘findings that emerged from this 
research interrupt and challenge dominant stereotypes about Muslim women and in doing so 
point both to the need to recognise the diversity among Muslim women …and their agency’.495  
This illustrates the difficulty of simply confining the issue of veiling to a binary of oppression or 
emancipation. Andreassen and Lettings acknowledge this and the difficulties it has caused for 
feminists and refer to the Danish Feminist Forum that argues that ‘Headscarves and veils must 
be interpreted as multifaceted practices that cannot simply be reduced to female 
oppression’.496  
 
Women wear the hijab or the veil for different reasons and they argue that the motivations 
‘can only be understood in relation to the woman in question’.497 The question here is not just 
of oppression but one that concerns those who claim veiling is emancipatory, just as Gohir, a 
Muslim feminist questions: ‘There are those who want to make a political statement or do it 
for reasons of fashion or culture or are simply going through a fad. Many have told me they 
feel liberated in the veil. I can’t see how the veil is liberating…’498 The arguments presented 
show that the meaning of veiling is fluid and cannot be singularly signified. Feminism itself is 
shifting dependent upon one’s polarisation and whether it is used in a global, national, cultural 
or a social context. This has led to a debate about veiling by those who make allegations of 
colonialist imaging of veiled women and those who argue it is oppressive into an inconsistent 
one. And as Andreassen and Lettinga note, the debate results in one that is: 
 
Not simply about headscarves and gender equality but also about gaining 
hegemonic support for one’s ascribed meaning to the symbol and getting one’s 
version of feminism accepted as the common version.499 
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Such difficulties are further compounded by the different frames that can be employed when 
discussing the regulation of veiling. Rosenberger and Sauer citing Snow & Benford define 
frames as ‘interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘’world out there’’ by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences 
of action in one’s present environment’.500 Rosenberger and Sauer highlight eleven major501 
and thirty two sub frames502 associated with veiling, which not surprisingly lends to the 
difficulty of the adoption or the veracity of any one position, as attempted by the debate on 
the oppressive or emancipatory nature of veiling. Therefore inscribing negative and positive 
stereotypes of oppression and emancipation respectively overlooks the individual 
subjectivities of those who veil and silencing of such Muslim women by both discourses. 
Using native informants to affirm the oppressive veil 
There are many strands that play informative roles in the feminist discourse on veiling and 
immersed in the discourse, although muted, are the veiled women whose voices are replaced 
by those Muslim women who toe the oppression discourse. Bilge labels such women as 
‘accredited insiders’503 or as the post-colonial literature refers to, as the ‘oriental insiders’ or 
‘native informants’. The discourse surrounding veiling deploys many Muslim women who have 
been put forward to convey to the world that the practice of veiling is oppressive and that the 
arguments put forward by those who oppose the practice are cogent. The fact that these 
women are Muslim and/or  have experience of Islam and supposedly have managed to free 
themselves from the clutches of Islam, has been used as a means of corroborating and 
modulating arguments put forward by those who oppose veiling. However it is the women 
who veil who should be the most important entity of the debate, yet there are few whose 
voices are actually heard in the West504 and those who are placed to speak on their behalf ‘are 
increasingly loaded and are likely to represent those with educational and social privilege’.505 
Furthermore those voices that air their own personal accounts have a tendency to belong to 
what Phipps calls the ‘victim discourse around women’ whereby a sizeable group of ‘experts’ 
or ‘native informants’ present or portray the oppression of women.506   
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
One such native informant is the controversial Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somalian born Muslim who 
became an Atheist when she went to the Netherlands as a refugee in 1992 allegedly under 
threats of a forced marriage. On gaining asylum in the Netherlands she worked as a translator 
in various women’s shelters and graduated in political science. She entered Dutch politics, first 
joining the Labour party (PvdA) and then switching to the Liberal party (VVD) on the back of 
which she became a member of the Dutch Parliament in 2003. Ali became well known for her 
radical standpoints on Islam’s treatment of women and Islam per se and has published a 
number of books condemning Islam as a religion and associated practices. Her Dutch 
citizenship was eventually revoked as it was admitted by her that she had lied on her asylum 
application to the Dutch authorities. On leaving the Netherlands Ali gained a position with the 
American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC.507 She is highly critical not only of veiling but 
of Islam as a religion and a social system despite as noted by Carle that ‘for a while, Hirsi Ali 
was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and she covered herself from head to foot and is 
quoted as saying that the hijab ’had a thrill to it’ and ‘it made [her] feel powerful’.508  
 
According to Ali, Muslim nations are lagging behind the West because of three reasons: firstly 
Muslims relationship with God is based on fear; secondly, Muslims believe that the prophet 
Muhammed is the only moral source; and finally, Islam is strongly dominated by a sexual 
morality derived from tribal Arab values.509 She professes to represent Muslim women on the 
basis of her experiential status at the hands of Islam and that someone has to speak on their 
behalf, in her work she states: ‘I am determined to make my voice heard …Muslim women are 
scarcely listened to, and they need a woman to speak out on their behalf’.510  As a young girl 
she became the victim of female genital mutilation at the hands of cultural norms, which are 
justified by men as a requirement of religion, even though the religious justification is made 
through an obscure historical practice which has survived primarily in the African states.511  Ali 
had the opportunity to discern such practices from religion and could have used her 
experiential status to highlight the plight of women who undergo such torment in the name of 
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religion but fails to do so. Instead, she encourages women to break out of the cage of Islam, 
even offering coping strategies and tips for women to exit the clutches of Islam. 
 
She further urges women to break free from the oppression suggesting that all Muslim women 
know that they are oppressed, devalued and docile, reminding them ‘You know you are worth 
more than this. You think and dream about your freedom! You no longer have to tolerate 
oppression’.512 Ali’s approach is problematic in a number of ways; she does not propagate her 
feminism, but rather her total stance against Islam. Instead of denouncing patriarchy 
universally for the benefit of all women, she targets Islam specifically as a religion. This is 
evident in her work: 
 
Islam is strongly dominated by a sexual morality derived from the tribal Arab 
values dating from the time of the Prophet received instructions from Allah, a 
culture in which women were the property of their fathers, brothers, uncles, 
grandfathers, or guardians. Her veil functions as a constant reminder to the 
outside world of this stifling morality that makes Muslim men the owners of 
women and obliges them to prevent their mothers, sisters, aunts, sisters-in-law, 
cousins, nieces, and wives from having any sexual contact.513 
  
Patriarchy in Islam is acknowledged as discussed previously in the thesis and by Karmi notes 
that ‘The Arab family is patriarchal and hierarchical in relation to age and sex, the old males 
having authority over the young and the females…In this structure sexes become extremely 
polarised; the man is expected to be strong and dominant and the woman is weak, dependent 
and inferior’.514But patriarchy is still prevalent in Western societies as noted by Walby515 and as 
Nawal Sadawi says, it is not simply because of being Arab or Muslim:  
 
We, the women in Arab countries, realise that we are still slaves, still oppressed, 
not because we belong to the East, not because we are Arab, or members of 
Islamic societies, but as a result of the patriarchal class system that has dominated 
the world since thousands of years.516 
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There is cogency in Ali’s arguments relating to the oppression of women and the exertion of 
male dominated laws imposed where men use religion as the moral authority, to impose such 
laws as in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan. The intolerable and legally enforced veiling in 
these states is indicative of that. But to declare all women in Islam are oppressed is painting all 
Muslim countries and women with one broad brush of bleakness, whilst the whole of the West 
being expressed as free from oppressive practices is not objective.  She overlooks the fact that 
some women may find strength from their faith and piety, where the quest for equality can 
come from within and not only outside of religion, a good example being ‘the women’s 
Mosque Movement’ in Egypt studied by Mahmood.517  
 
There are now a number of Muslim feminists including Asma Barlas,518 Riffat Hussain519 and 
Amina Wadud520 who are striving to re-interpret the Qur’an, to eliminate the traditional 
interpretations that have allowed some men to justify their patriarchal power over women and 
gender inequalities. However Ali rightly refers to some deeply embedded gender inequalities 
which even some pious women have accepted without challenge. For example, she mentions 
the Turkish Imama521 who gives an opinion of the verse in the Qur’an that men use to justify 
beating their wives:522 ‘Beating is degrading, but if there is no alternative, then it has to 
happen’ and as pointed by Ali ‘The effect of this social control is that Muslim women maintain 
their own oppression’.523 This is precisely the form of interpretation that is being tackled by 
those scholars who wish to overcome such male dominated textual interpretations. 
 
Ali raises some important issues which Muslims find disturbing and rather than challenge 
those face-on which would allow oppressive practices to be addressed. They tend to avoid, 
something which Ali has not shied away from, and it has to be acknowledged that her 
experiential status gives her the moral authority to raise them in the blunt manner. However 
she comes across as incongruent, throughout her work she uses interchangeably labels such as 
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‘we Muslims’ or ‘we in the West’.524 This makes it difficult for her to connect with Muslim 
women since they do not know if she is speaking as a Muslim or rather an ex-Muslim since she 
has become atheist or indeed whether she is speaking as a Western woman who is an Atheist. 
She further intimates that women who wear the hijab resist change and that hinders Muslim 
women generally in Europe.525In this respect there are many other Muslim feminists who 
concur in her opinion. But it is in her work that she does not believe that Muslim women are 
able to make choices for themselves, and even if they do, it is false consciousness and this 
pervades her work as she appears to be shocked that Muslim women choose to wear the 
hijab: 
 
When I visited with the women of the Turkish movement Milli Gorus, I found them 
assertive and clamorous, almost to the point of being aggressive. They angrily 
defended their own oppression: ‘’I want to wear a hijab, I want to obey my 
husband’’ I have also met a Moroccan woman who said: ‘’I want to wear the hijab, 
because Allah the Exalted commanded it’’. ‘’Well’’, I respond, ‘’if you want to do 
everything that Allah the exalted has said, then you will stay in your cage’’526 
 
For Ali the Muslim veiled woman is denied her personhood by the veil which restricts the 
woman’s body, attenuates her mental capacity and her destiny. This according to her leads 
women in suppressing their desires, becoming docile and selfless, ashamed of their bodies all 
of which negates their individuality: 
 
The veil deliberately marks women as private restricted property, nonpersons. The 
veil sets women apart from men and apart from the world; it restrains them, 
confines them, and grooms them for docility. A mind can be cramped just as a 
body may be, and a Muslim veil blinkers both your vision and your destiny. It is the 
mark of a kind of apartheid, not the domination of a race but sex.527 
 
Ali’s targeting of veiling is not just confined to women she perceives as being oppressed, who 
tolerate such oppressive practices, but is also at those Western societies who do nothing about 
such practices, clearly expecting veil bans to be imposed by all Western societies. She makes 
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this clear when referring to her visit to the East End of London, an area inhabited by a large 
number of Muslims of Bangladeshi origin with many Muslim women veiling: 
 
As we drove down White Chapel Road, I felt anger that this subjugation is silently 
tolerated, if not endorsed, not just by the British but by so many Western Societies 
where the equality of the sexes is legally enshrined.528  
 
Ali professes to be an enlightened liberal woman and urges Islam to have its own Voltaire, yet 
fails to acknowledge Muslim women’s self-willed choice  even though she disagrees with them, 
a principle contrary to Voltaire’s philosophy in terms of freedom ‘I disapprove of what you say, 
but I will defend to the death your right to say it’.529 Ali’s heightened liberal positioning that all 
Muslim women are oppressed, acting as their self-appointed representative and her opinion 
that these women need to abandon their faith and culture is received with dissent by many 
Muslim women. Some of whom challenge Ali speaking on behalf of them, for example, 
Fareena Alam the editor of the Muslim magazine Q news is unequivocal that Ali does not 
represent Muslim women:  
  
It’s obvious what I’ve been waiting for all my life: a secular crusader – armed with 
enlightenment philosophy, the stamp of liberal establishment and the promise of 
sexual freedom – swooping into my harem and liberating me from my ‘’ignorant’’, 
‘’uncritical’’, ‘’dishonest’’ and oppressed Muslim existence. At least that’s what 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali thinks I’ve been waiting for.530  
 
Alam adds that Muslim women in Europe have been fighting their negative stereotypes and 
are still engaged in that battle, consistently pushing boundaries and participating in important 
public roles, where they are able to encourage real change, albeit slowly, but surely and in any 
event long before the arrival of Ayaan Hirsi Ali.  She rebuts Ali’s opinion that the ‘Western way 
is the only way’ using herself as an example demonstrating that Muslim women in Europe have 
the ability to be both, European and Muslim, she states:  ‘As a British Muslim, for instance, I 
am as Western as I am anything else’.531  
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Ali does not appreciate or at least fails to acknowledge that it is often faith itself that makes 
women realise their oppressed positions and abandoning that faith may further cause 
difficulties for those women who are trying to overcome patriarchy. Dissent by Muslim women 
against Ali’s ideals that all Muslim women should exit Islam is also evident in Buruma’s work 
who charts the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the producer and director of the film ‘Submission’ 
made in collaboration with Hirsi Ali. He refers to an interview with a woman from a domestic 
violence refuge in Amsterdam who says Ali is wrong and states: ‘My faith is what strengthened 
me. That’s how I came to realise that my situation at home was wrong’.532 It is worth noting 
that the same writer does not refer to any Muslim women who have been liberated directly 
due to Hirsa Ali’s pronouncements on oppressive practices in Islam. 
 
Many issues raised by Ali in her work533 including forced marriages, domestic violence, FGM, 
access to education, economic inequality and gender discrimination are real contemporary 
challenges facing Muslim women and she rightly raises these to the surface. But her chosen 
approach in highlighting such problems has not served her well. For example, rather than 
simply advocating Muslim women to leave Islam which has the effect of making the same 
women defensive about their religion, had she chosen to concentrate on specific practices 
which are oppressive, her views may have been better accepted.  It is her academic approach 
that has had the effect of alienating other Muslim women who fled oppressive regimes and 
were subjected to similar experiences as herself. For example Halleh Gorashi a refugee who 
fled from Iran to the Netherlands writes about Ali overstepping the mark with her initial 
arguments related to emancipation of women in Islam: 
 
Her arguments on the incompatibility of Islamic belief and women’s emancipation 
were sharp. She stood up for the rights of Islamic women, who she believed were 
suppressed by Islamic tradition and law. I found Hirsi Ali’s approach to the 
emancipation of Islamic women attractive and identified with her…However; my 
identification with Ayaan did not last long. The woman I initially considered a 
pioneer for the emancipation of Islamic women, turned out to hold dogmatic 
views that left little room for nuances. I soon realised that Ayaan had become a 
welcome mouthpiece for the dominant discourse on Islam…who could better 
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represent the dominant view that a person with an Islamic background?...she 
sailed on the conservative ideas in the Netherlands that push migrants – the most 
marginalised group in society – even further into isolation.534 
 
It is then no surprise that Ali’s assertions that she represents all Muslim women are displaced 
because of her dogmatic views and despite having little or no support from Muslim women, 
she is projected as a native informant who corroborates the standpoint that Muslim women 
who veil are oppressed. This dissonance is also noted by Anthony: 
 
It’s fair to say that her [Ali’s] audience is made up largely of white liberal males, 
rather than the Muslim women she wishes to liberate. In Holland, a female Muslim 
politician named Fatima Elatik told me: ’She’s appealing to Dutch society, to 
middle class Dutch-origin people. She talks about the emancipation of women but 
you can’t push it down their throats. If I could talk to her, I would tell her that she 
needs to get a couple of Muslim women around her.535 
 
Fadela Amara 
Another ‘insider’ woman, just like Hirsi Ali winning accolades for her work and opinions on 
Muslim women who veil536 is the Algerian born French Fadela Amara.537 In the translated 
version of her book she is described as ‘a human rights activist with both a personal and  
collective voice…She also speaks for a group, the children of North African immigrants in 
contemporary France’. 538 The emergence of Amara as a cultural insider stems from the social 
problems faced by the French North African Muslims living in the socially deprived banlieues or 
suburbs. These banlieues according to her have been the subject of high levels of 
unemployment, racism, subjugation of women and young men desperately trying to assert 
their authority over Muslim girls by subjecting them to physical violence. Such acts lead to 
feminist protests and in order to act urgently a feminist group was formed and led by Fadela 
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Amara and seven others. This new movement was provocatively and intentionally named ‘Ni 
Putes, Ni Soumises’ translated ‘neither whores, nor submissives’ (NPNS) of which Amara 
became the president and the movement is still active today.539  
 
The ‘neither whores’ was aimed at the male gang members in the suburbs who referred to all 
women as whores except their mothers and ‘neither submissives’ was aimed at signalling 
those politicians, academics and observers that just because Muslim women were oppressed, 
does not mean they were passive540 or ‘refuse to rebel’.541 The thrust of the movement was 
aimed at ‘freeing Muslim women to speak out against rising male violence and oppression’.542 
The movement visited many community groups in the French suburbs with a view to bringing 
about a social and economic change in the suburbs heavily populated by immigrant 
communities. In February 2003 Amara accompanied by five other women and two men 
organised a protest march leading through twenty three different cities in France receiving 
endorsements and support. The march ended in Paris with thirty thousand people of different 
affiliations joining the procession, coinciding with international Women’s day and leading to a 
meeting between Amara and members of the French government. The march was in response 
to questionnaires sent out by the group that received over five thousand responses from the 
different projects in the suburbs highlighting women’s personal experiences of:  
 
Mounting violence, social breakdown, ghettoization, retreat into sectarian politics, 
ethnic and sexual discrimination, the powerful return to tradition, the weight of 
myth about virginity, but also practices like excision and polygamy still [prevalent] 
in certain African communities543 
 
For Amara, the socioeconomic issues that marginalised the Muslim women in the suburbs was 
further exasperated by the rise of what she describes as ‘basement Islam’ in the suburbs which 
led to policing of the behaviour of young Muslim women. One method used for regulating 
female behaviour of young Muslim girls was the imposition of Islamic dress codes that led to 
men forcing women to wear the headscarf. The term ‘basement Islam’ was originally coined by 
Nicolas Sarkozy when he was an Interior Minister in 2002 when he formed the first Muslim 
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Council in France that would represent Muslims in France, to address issues of fundamental 
Islam and stated that: ‘What we should be afraid of is Islam gone astray, garage Islam, 
basement Islam, underground Islam. It is not the Islam of the mosques, open to the light of 
day’.544  
 
Amara was accused by several organisations during her campaign of defending secular values 
which was perceived as a part of neo-colonialist project and that she was being used along 
with her movement by the French government545 and other French leftist intellectuals ‘who 
support the right to difference…in defence of wearing headscarves, now banned in French 
Public schools’.546 But she views the headscarf as the most visible sign of ‘obscurantist minority 
pressure’.547 According to her the woman who wears a headscarf is oppressed, alienated and 
symbolises the use of power by men over women. 
 
Amara has her own typology of hijab wearers, the first type being those who wear it by choice 
which she says is in the ‘spirit of religious practice’ and as a ‘banner of identity’ with the 
‘impression of being recognised and respected’. Then there are those who use the headscarf 
as a form of protection from male aggression, preventing harassment from young males, but 
away from the suburbs remove their headscarves and don Western dress and make up. There 
are those who resist the wearing of the headscarves and although in the majority they become 
the target of male harassment facing daily insults and ‘…sometimes they are the first victims of 
rape. These women’s lives are often hell’.548 The final category being is what she describes as 
the ‘soldiers of green fascism’. These women are educated and want to show that they are 
emancipated, whereas in reality they are militants. Amara is not alone in highlighting the 
stance of the Muslim militant women, Afshar also notes that: 
 
Islamist women are particularly defensive of the veil…many women have chosen 
the veil as a symbol of Islamisation and have accepted it as the public face of their 
revivalist position. For them the veil is liberating, and not an oppressive force. 
They maintain that the veil enables them to become observers and not the 
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observed; it liberates them from the dictates of the fashion industry and the 
demands of the beauty myth.549 
 
Amara describes herself as a practising Muslim and during the French schools headscarf 
controversy she was against the ban and was in favour of the expelled schoolgirls: 
 
 I was among those who said that these young women should not be 
excluded...we were counting on the republican school system, where they would 
learn to make their own choice and then to refuse the headscarf.550 
 
Clearly for Amara the only right choice is to refuse the headscarf, as she fails to acknowledge 
that a young woman in education may make an informed choice that she wishes to wear the 
headscarf and so long as that choice is free from coercion, then that must be respected. Even 
though she was against the initial banning of headscarves in public schools, she later changed 
her position to one of being in agreement saying that ‘looking back over all my encounters in 
France, I realise that this law was more necessary and that it was even much anticipated’.551 
Amara now openly and without reservation declares headscarves as being oppressive and 
declares that the ‘veil is the visible symbol of the subjugation of women’ and for those French 
feminists who defend veiling on the grounds of tradition, Amara feels enraged calling them 
‘totally contradictory’.552 Yet at the same time she asserts that French feminism has forgotten 
the Muslim women in the ghettos and had shirked the ‘social question’ including basics such as 
the ‘right to wear a skirt and not get raped’.553 She is right in alerting to such rights related to 
choices available to Muslim women, but conveniently ignores the fact that the same women 
should also have the right to choose the wearing of a headscarf. And though, the right to wear 
skirts should be open to the same women, if they decide on the headscarf over the skirt then 
that choice must be respected.  
 
If Amara wanted to break the silence of the Muslim women in the Ghettos, she overlooked the 
research carried out by Gaspard and Khosrakhaver whose study of French Muslims and 
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headscarves showed that some women self - consciously made the choice to wear the hijab in 
order to affirm their identity as ‘being both French and Muslim, modern and Voilee, 
autonomous and dressed in Islamic costume’.554 They concluded that the women engaging in 
the practice were positively affirming their individual difference which they perceived as 
French racism and wanted to be visible as opposed to feeling invisible before adopting the 
headscarves. The research also showed that ‘all forms of the headscarf worn by those young 
women interviewed were non-political’.555 
 
It seems that for someone who formed a feminist protest movement whose manifesto stated 
‘We have had enough of others speaking for us’,556 she simply wants other Muslim women she 
supposedly represents to accept her own opinions being the correct ones when she says: 
‘Personally, I believe the headscarf is nothing more than a means of oppression emanating 
from a patriarchal society’.557 She uses herself as the ideal yardstick for other Muslim women 
who wear the headscarf, professing that ‘I am a practicing Muslim and I have never worn it, 
neither has my mother or my grandmother before me’.558 Yet by her own acknowledgement 
she does not refer to any discussion on the interpretation of the Qur’an or its precepts related 
to veiling, stating that she has no claim to do so, something which Muslim feminists are using 
as a strategy to overcome patriarchal practices. Not only does Amara thrust her own personal 
opinions guised as the collective voice of Muslim women in the French suburbs, but for 
someone asserting that such women lack choice or are making the wrong choices,  she 
appears to view negatively those who do fight back male power and ‘hold their own’ 
describing them as:  
 
Young women who want to resemble men and force others to respect them. They 
adopt mannish attitudes, tactics, and gear…dressing in jogging clothes and 
sneakers, all-purpose unisex clothes that hide their femininity…They are 
sometimes worse than the young men559 
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For Amara who became a staunch defender of secularism, she considers that ‘in the case of 
Muslim women, Islam must adapt itself to modernity’.560 She is a firm supporter of the burqa 
ban in France and in a talk delivered at the University of Chicago in May 2013 affirmed her 
opinion that the burqa is both oppressive and an assault on French republican values and 
blames the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the French banlieues that led to the burqa ban.561 
Just like Hirsi Ali, Amara has also held high profile positions with the French government; she 
was the Urban Regeneration Minister under the French Prime Minister Francoise Fillon.  
 
Unlike Amara, Hirsi Ali in an interview on Australian television was against a full burqa ban and 
said ‘it misses the point’562 whereas Amara was insistent to the Financial Times that full veiling 
which covered everything except the eyes represented ‘oppression of women’ and that she 
was ‘in favour of the burka not existing in [her] country’ and that it represented ‘not a piece of 
fabric, but political manipulation of religion’.563 For someone who holds herself as the 
spokesperson on behalf of the silenced Muslim women in France, it appears that Amara is 
predominantly concerned with forced adoption of French secular values with the effect that 
those women who veil have been silenced by her. Not surprisingly Amara’s analysis of veiling 
has served politicians against veiling very well as noted by Bowen ‘[F]or politicians the NPNS 
analysis was a pure gift’.564 
The voices of the veiled and unveiled women 
The reference to the use of native informant women does not dispute their subjective 
experiences but rather challenges the legitimacy of their belief, that they act as 
representatives who speak on behalf of all Muslim women who veil, considering these women 
have not been seconded any moral authority to do so. Not only have some Muslim women in 
high profile positions abandoned the voices of those who veil, but another problem for such 
women that has pervaded the discourse is that any attempts to challenge oppressive cultural 
practices adopted in the name of religion, are perceived as disregarding cultural relativity and 
any internal challenges are perceived as signs of disloyalty.  
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Controversies and debates surrounding the use of Islamic head coverings initially started off 
with concerns over the use of the hijab in educational settings but the debate has since been 
steered towards full face coverings such as the veil or the burqa in the public sphere. Islamic 
veiling is contentious in many parts of the world where it has been used as either a form of 
political control565 or as a means of legal control over women by male dominated 
regimes.566Europe has seen an incremental and obsessive interest in Muslim women’s head 
coverings over the last twenty years or so. Arguably the issue of religion with its wider 
implications in Europe being of a greater concern has been camouflaged by the discourse on 
religious clothing. The values head covering embody or do not are the ones that get 
microscopic focus albeit to a point now where the debates are getting saturated. Politicians, 
intellectuals, observers and the media want to have an input in the debate whilst the women 
at the centre who engage in the actual practice are being silenced and ignored. 
 
A good example of the missing voice of the women at the centre of the veiling debate is 
illustrated by Ardizzoni who conducted research into the presence of these women’s voices in 
news articles and publications during the French headscarf ban discussions. She found that in 
the French daily newspaper Le Monde and two of the weekly newspapers L’Express and Le 
Point contained contributions from politicians, school principals, journalists, Islamic leaders 
who were exclusively men. The only female voice gaining any recognition was the French 
President’s wife Danielle Mitterand.567 The French Muslim women who wore the hijab were 
only quoted briefly on one occasion, clearly suggesting women who are at the centre of the 
debate are denied a voice, and instead, their choice or resistance is overtaken by men. 
According to Ardizzoni the lack of women’s self-representation is supportive of binary 
polarisations and a patriarchal discourse.568  The issue is not just of lack of women’s voice but 
also of a dismissive attitude towards their narrative. For example Wing and Smith illustrate this 
from the same French debate stating: 
 
When three young women were quoted in the paper describing their reasons for 
choosing to wear the veil, their words were not looked at as a re-vindication of 
women’s voices, but were rather seen as insolent and contemptuous.569 
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Indeed during the French headscarf affair the absence of the voices of the girl’s at the centre 
of the debates is strikingly apparent, something which Scott questions: 
 
Although there was evidence to the contrary – that many girls had chosen the 
headscarf on their own initiative, indeed against the wishes of their parents – the 
[Stasi] commission members could not accept this as an exercise of free choice.570 
 
A major empirical study into women who wear or wore a veil in five European countries571 was 
carried out by different research teams at different times and in differing contexts.572 The 
research is the leading study carried out into listening to the voices of those women who veil. 
The result of the research in all five European countries shows that there are: 
 
Strong similarities…in a number of crucial fields. One concerns the credible 
assertion that they wear the face veil as a matter of free choice in their personal 
religious journey. Another is the finding that the face veil does not indicate a 
withdrawal from society. These women interact not only with family, friends and 
neighbours, they do not shy away from teachers, shopkeepers and any other 
people they come across in daily life.573 
 
The study indicates towards positive evidence that husbands did not force the veil upon their 
wives574 and in many cases the families discouraged veiling,575 with some women especially 
younger girls veiling against their parent’s wishes.576 Some women in the study reported that 
they had made an informed decision and waited until being convinced on the need to veil.577 
Whilst others said that they knew veiling was not obligatory but did so in order to enhance 
their piety by trying to emulate the Prophet’s wives,578 or to avoid the male gaze.579 For some 
women the veil was not worn for religious purposes but practical aesthetic reasons; to prevent 
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their looks being discerned.580 Similarly there were many women who wore the veil for 
reasons of Islamic identity581 or as a demonstration of their autonomy.582However, the 
research also showed, albeit the examples were limited, that some women veiled in order to 
please their husbands. But the study did appear to be frustrated by the lack of identification 
and voices of those women who may have been coerced into veiling, although the researchers 
acknowledged the difficulty in accessing such research respondents.583  
 
The study also indicated strong dissent on veiling from within the Muslim community, who 
apportioned blame on veiled women for the negativity perpetuated against Muslims 
generally.584 Furthermore, veiling was viewed by some women as a cultural rather than a 
religious symbol and worn to maintain family respect, which affirms the lack of consensus on 
whether it is a religious requirement with some women veiling to comply with cultural 
norms.585This research goes a long way in attenuating the stereotypical arguments forwarded 
by those who point out that veiling is oppressive and is adopted through lack of choice and in 
any event, even if the veiled women say they veil through choice, they are suffering from false 
consciousness. However, what is lacking in the research, although there are indications that 
some Muslims from within do not agree with the practice, or that it is a cultural and not a 
religious practice imposed by patriarchal attitudes, are the voices of those Muslim who agree 
that veiling is oppressive. For example Kadyja in Shirazi and Mishra’s study who is of the 
opinion that in a Western country full veiling is unnecessary:  
 
In a Western country, I think it is counterproductive to Islam’s message and 
universality. As a hijabi woman, I feel uncomfortable around niqabis. If a woman 
feels that she needs to cover that much, she probably shouldn’t leave the house at 
all. Being in public with such dress attracts more attention and defeats the entire 
purpose of hijab. 586  
 
Her comments are interesting considering she wears the hijab, which indicates that some 
Muslim women are of the opinion that not only is the full face veil not necessary, but it creates 
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divisions amongst Muslims in terms of creating degrees of piety. This not only exerts pressure 
on those who do not veil but also those who do and consider it a requirement of modesty in 
Islam. Similarly Sharifa is of the opinion that it is the wearing of the face veil which results in a 
loss of identity and not its absence. She elaborates ‘the face tells a lot. Suppose a man came 
and said this to his wife, how do you know she is his wife? My modesty is my own [version of] 
modesty [Nobody should impose their definition of modesty on me.]’587 Whilst Zainab 
intimates that the full veil results in a loss of social interaction and gives off signals of seclusion 
as she states ‘I don’t think women should wear it. Maybe, in Saudi Arabia, you can wear it. The 
problem with the face veil is it makes you unapproachable. But you have to be accessible to 
people’.588 There are others who disagree with the hypocrisy of the face veil. For example it is 
not uncommon for women who veil to be seen with bright eye shadow colours, coloured 
contact lens and designer apparel that catch the eye rather than deflect which arguably makes 
veiling immodest as it is attracting more attention.  Fatima elaborates on this point adding that 
for some veiling is cultural as opposed to religious: 
 
They wear short skirts at parties/weddings, even though Islam specifies a woman 
isn’t supposed to show anything between her chest and knees…they should care 
more about religion and show more Islamic behaviour in order for them to wear 
the niqab…my relatives are doing it because of culture, not religion.589 
 
It is not only the veiled woman whose voice has been missing from the discourse on veiling, 
there is another group of women in much greater numbers than those veil whose voices 
appear to be missing from the debates on veiling and they are Muslim  women who do not 
veil. According to Ahmed there are an estimated 90% of Muslim women who do not wear a full 
veil.590In European countries there are more women who do not veil than those who do and 
the actions of those who fully veil have a negative impact on them. For example the internal 
divisions created based on the notion that the fully veiled women may be considered 
damaging to the unveiled women, as modesty is not just external but also internal and the 
influence exerted even though not directly can be great. The inroads made by unveiled women 
who have accultured into the host societies has been fractured by the ensuing debates on 
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veiling, which considering the majority Muslims do not consider as obligatory is a practice that 
is being propagated by a minority of Muslim women. Furthermore, the negative stereotypes 
stemming from full veiling result in the fostering of harassment and an ‘us versus them’ 
division, which reverses the integration efforts made by those who do not veil. The arguments 
based on veiling and identity also suggest that those women who do not veil could be 
considered not real Muslims or that their personal identity is being questioned by veiled 
women. 
 
Studies on the voices of unveiled Muslim women on veiling are rare and one such study carried 
out by Fadil indicates the discomfort felt by those who do not veil. For example one of her 
respondents shows the torment she feels over whether she could live Islam a different way, 
due to its influence by those who do because she doesn’t veil, Leila says: 
 
The veil, it’s one of the major problems of my life it’s not that it’s a problem, it’s 
that I don’t understand it…I can’t believe in it. It might seem incredible, because 
well, everybody wears it, and for everybody [it’s like] you have to wear it. But I 
don’t see its logic…What’s its purpose...And to look at veiled women. And my first 
impression was that …it was an instrument to annihilate the personality of 
women.591 
 
Whilst Leila was initially unsure about the nature of the veil, her views change to it being a tool 
of oppression and sexism. Similarly she was not on her own in her conclusions; Huda says that 
she initially started wearing the headscarf due to pressure from her parents when she was in 
education. But she became unconvinced of its religious utility, she elaborates: 
 
For me the headscarf wasn’t the proof of…it didn’t mean that: ‘’yeah, you are 
virtuous or pious because of it’’. I still believe in God, and I will always pray, but 
that headscarf is only a symbol for me…I can be faithful without the headscarf.592 
 
Fadil notes that anyone who challenges the compulsory nature of the hijab is in effect 
challenging the dominant consensus, which means that the challenger is putting herself in a 
position of marginality against the Muslim orthodoxy.593 Although such challenges place 
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unveiled women under immense pressure, they are precisely the type of challenges needed in 
order for Muslim women to challenge the religious texts and their correlation with the current 
veiling practices. This in effect will allow women to challenge hermeneutically the scholars who 
are self-appointed to be the guardians of the knowledge and interpretations of religious texts. 
Furthermore, if such challenges to veiling practices came from Muslim women who do not veil 
then some legitimate arguments raised by those who oppose veiling may not result in rebuttal 
by default and can only improve the position of women; those who may be the victims cultural 
practices under the guise of religious compulsion. 
 
Wing and Smith highlight the dangers of ignoring the valuable narrative of women at the 
centre of the debate saying: ‘This leaves the public unable to read and understand beyond 
what few words the media has allowed these women to say in public’.594 To remain outside the 
position of the veiled women in question, it is not difficult to arrive at conclusions regarding 
their freedom, choice and autonomy but these conclusions are loaded with oppressive or 
emancipatory viewpoints. The position of the woman who veils needs to be considered not 
only in the collective but in the singular too as veiling is context sensitive. This entails dealing 
with a number of questions such as why does a particular woman veil? Is it for reasons of 
modesty? Enhanced piousness? Is it an expression of her communal identity? Is it as a choice 
of everyday attire? Is it because she wants to fuse east and west fashion? Is it as a sign of 
resistance to Westernisation? Or is it simply because she makes an autonomous choice? The 
way to address such questions without adopting strict polarities of the debate on veiling is to 
listen to those who wear the hijab or the veil and to take account of their individualities, 
differences and understand the meanings they ascribe to veiling. It is only then that these 
women will be seen as possessing the freedom and exercising their agency with individual 
narratives to tell rather than treating them as mere objects.  
Veiling as a means to opposing power 
Veiling has multiple contexts and one of these is that it can be used as a tool of opposition to 
being an object of power and the sexual male gaze and imbalance of female/male power 
relationship in Muslim societies: 
 
The disparities of power between the sexes within Islam determine that male 
members are those who are in a position to determine and articulate the group’s 
beliefs, practices, and interests. This limits the possibility of women belonging to 
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such culture to live with human dignity equal to that of men, and to live as freely 
chosen lives as they can. The veil, or certain types of it, thus represents unjust in-
group power dynamics.595 
 
It can be argued that veiling can lead to a reversal in power and this can be considered taking 
the Foucauldian approach to power, linked to knowledge and established through various 
practices of society, observation, categorising and putting tenets of knowledge in an order. 
Some people gather knowledge, describe and categorise information about others who 
become objects. The discourses of knowledge operate in a similar manner with certain people 
holding themselves as holders of truth and engaged in forming a hegemonic discourse, with 
the ‘others’ being marginalised from stating or possessing the truth. For example, Islamic 
scholars deem themselves as the benefactors of religious knowledge, whilst feminists who 
essentialise and ignore the contexts of Muslim women holding them as victims of oppression 
with assertions of false consciousness against those women who veil through choice. The 
result is that the voices of Muslim women who veil are ignored not only by Islamic scholars 
who act as self-proclaimed holders of truth but also by the feminist and political discourses 
aided by the media which constructs veiled women as objects. This leads subjects who feel 
more privileged and in better positions serving as experts and holders of the truth about veiled 
women; a case with some feminists and those ‘native informants’ who profess to represent 
Muslim women. The outcome of this privileged position is that Muslim women are inscribed 
with the identity of being veiled and oppressed.  
 
Foucault stated that there are cracks in every discourse and ‘where there is power there is 
resistance’ and yet ‘this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’.596 
The wearing of the veil can thus be a form of resistance against the male gaze and the existing 
relationship of power. There may not be an escape from the power relations between male 
and female or the majority/minority culture but the resistance allows the woman to take 
control of her identity being constructed by others. Thus the veil becomes a vehicle for 
resistance, identity negotiation and power reversal.597 This uses ‘male language against them’ 
and in Hirschmann’s terms these women ‘subvert the practice by turning its norms against 
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itself’.598 This strategy of resistance has been acknowledged by those who have analysed 
veiling and cognise that: 
 
Power is not only oppressive but also creative: every relation of subordination and 
domination also creates a capacity for action and resistance, whereby dominated 
individuals assert their selfhood through adaptation to, manipulation or 
subversion of the normative order they are subjected to.599  
 
Scott believes that the veil may be a way of adhering to community norms and asserting pride 
in one’s identity like the adoption of the word ‘nigger’ by blacks in the United States. Wearing 
a headscarf assumes the stigmatised object as a positive attribute…and might be a variation on 
the slogan of the American gay-rights group Act-Up ‘(‘’ We’re here, we’re from here, get used 
to it’’)’.600 But it is important for those who attribute veiling as an act of resistance that the 
women do it on their own accord, as El-Guindi notes ‘They reached this state of religiousness 
by iqtina’ ( conviction). No overt pressure or force was exerted’...601 
 
One method of manipulating the power relationship by those who wear the hijab or the veil is 
through patriarchal bargaining, which can be demonstrated by the girl who was photographed 
in her hijab at a Bradford City Football match jeering at the opposition players.602 By wearing 
the hijab she placed herself as a pious Muslim girl amongst those she may not have been able 
to without it, as the community would have seen her as deviating from Islam. This 
participation allowed her to maintain her signal of external decency but at the same time 
gaining a greater freedom to act. The girl makes no attempt to distance herself from the 
majority society; rather the hijab becomes a means of freedom and a vehicle that allows a 
young woman to expand her own options. Her actions resonate with Kandiyoti’s concept of 
bargaining with patriarchy.603 Her idea of bargaining with patriarchy is based on women 
negotiating strategies with the constraints of a patriarchal system’s constraints which she calls 
‘patriarchal bargains’. These allow women in such situations to maximise the benefits within 
an oppressive system.  
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These bargains also influence any future or specific types of women’s active or passive 
resistance against the oppression they face. The patriarchal bargains also serve to highlight the 
social constructs that oppress and what women will or will not tolerate, which helps 
understand how the power of men in a household operates and maintained. Thus the girl by 
not conforming to the practice of hijab was preventing from integrating with the main stream 
society and she utilised the hijab, as a symbol that enabled her to break free from the confines 
of Islam. Similarly there are those who have been accultured and combine religious head dress 
with Western dress, a phenomena that illuminates the crack in the hegemonic discourse, but 
that is a topic in its own right and outside the scope of this thesis. 
Conclusion 
It is evident from the arguments prevailing throughout the discourses of oppressive and 
emancipatory effects of the Muslim veil that not only is it paradoxical, but it is a shifting 
signifier of meanings that are dependent upon the context of those women who veil. Both 
discourses deploy their arguments for and contra oppression and emancipation in a binary 
form, overlooking the overlap and the blurring that occurs. Although there is a tendency to 
rebut allegations of the veil being oppressive and a tool of patriarchy that still prevails in 
Islamic culture, there is evidence that in some cases veiling is imposed on women due to 
cultural norms and not theological doctrines. Such impositions of veiling have the ability to be 
internalised and lead to the formation of adaptive preferences especially when young girls in 
Islamic schools are being made to wear the veil resulting in freedom and the ability to form 
real choices being denied to them. Thus the false consciousness argument, although weak and 
open to criticism is not totally baseless and to counter every such argument with colonialism, 
buries opportunities to eliminate oppressive practices that perpetuate patriarchy that denies 
women their agency.  
 
 Similarly those who claim Muslim veiling as oppressive need to acknowledge that although 
some choices can be the result of deformed desires, many women freely choose to veil for a 
number of reasons. Such choices cannot be deemed to have been made under false 
consciousness simply because one may not agree with them or due to ethnocentric bias. 
Otherwise it leads to the perpetuation of negative stereotypes such as veiled women need 
saving by the removal of the veil, which itself is a form of oppression. The use of native 
informants in order to legitimise arguments against opposing views and to silence those who 
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veil is self-serving. This does not advance the discourse to anyone’s benefit resulting in loss of 
understanding the different reasons for veiling. 
 
The competing and polarised positions that simply want to maintain a binary meaning of 
veiling are muting those women who veil with the result that a great contribution that could 
be made to both discourses by listening to such women is being lost. These missing links 
provide and explain many other meanings of the veil as well as an appreciation that one 
person’s oppression may be another’s freedom and veiling as a means of opposing power and 
its use to bargain with patriarchy are good examples of this. Acknowledgement of these 
meanings would further and unify the plight of women which would be of a greater benefit to 
those who veil rather than ignore them in order to enhance polarised views with a risk of 
leaving inequalities and oppression against women unchecked. 
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PART TWO 
 
Introduction to part two 
Part one of the thesis showed that the veil worn by Muslim women has situational and 
contextual meanings, dependent on the subjectivities of those women who wear rather than 
singular or universal. The religious discourse in the first part of the thesis made it evident that 
there is no agreement between Muslims on whether the veil is a religious duty or an object of 
cultural tradition imposed by male patriarchs. Part one demonstrates that Muslim women 
adopt veiling practices primarily for modesty reasons, which is achieved via the hijab or the 
veil. But this modesty requirement is imposed on women by the patriarchal readings of the 
sacred texts, which attempt to justify the need for controlling women’s sexuality. The first part 
of this thesis also questions whether veiling is necessary to achieve that purpose, since the 
practice can lead to objectification of those women who veil, especially as the wearer of the 
veil can attract the male gaze instead of its intended aim of deflecting it. 
Similarly the socio-feministic discourse examined shows that there are oppositional viewpoints 
on the Muslim veil, asserting that it is either a tool of oppression or emancipation. Both 
positions place reliance on the presence or absence of choice to strengthen their respective 
stance. Additionally, the oppression perspective offers corroboration via cultural insiders, who 
affirm it as a tool of oppression, while both positions inscribe gender stereotypes on Muslim 
women who are veiled. The first part of the thesis also showed that both socio-feministic 
perspectives are open to challenges on their essentialist and self-serving positions. These 
tensions and oppositions between the religious and the socio-feminist discourse have made it 
difficult to discern, whether veiling is a religious mandate or not and whether Muslim women 
who veil have the freedom of choice when adopting the practice. This is a core issue for the 
legal discourse on veiling as the determination on whether the veil is a religious duty, which is 
voluntarily undertaken without any coercion, is an important factor in religious freedom claims 
under Article 9 ECHR.  
The aim of part one has been to show that the religious and the socio-feministic discourses 
have silenced the voices of the women, who live the veiling experience. This failure to listen to 
those who veil has enabled the assertion and ascribing singular meanings to the veil as the 
truth, by those who control the discourses or profess to represent Muslim women who veil. 
Such half-truths and disagreements between the binary discourses have led to many 
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controversies surrounding the practice in some European states. Those who oppose the 
practice call for legal prohibitions on the full face veil in all public spaces on the grounds of 
gender oppression, whilst those who support it claim protection on the grounds that it is an 
exercise of the right to religious freedom, placing reliance on the European Convention on 
Human Rights to secure the right to wear the veil publicly.  
Freedom of religion is protected by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
has been declared by the ECtHR as a foundation of a democratic society and a vital constituent 
element of a believer’s identity and conception of life.604 Part two of the thesis examines the 
force of this protection and examines how effective Convention rights have been in securing 
the rights of those who wear the hijab or the veil. The relational link between part one and 
part two is examining if and how, the social standpoints and negative stereotypes emerging 
from part one have influenced the European court of Human Rights in its jurisprudence 
concerning the hijab and the veil. Not all human rights under the ECHR are absolute or free 
from state interference and the protection human rights afford, or any state interference they 
allow is influenced by freedom and choice people exercise in engaging in religious practices for 
the purposes of an Article 9 claim. However such freedom has to be balanced against any 
detriment to the individual or society as a whole. Therefore the positive freedom ‘to’ veil as a 
religious right cannot be realised, unless it accompanies the negative freedom ‘from’ 
constraint or influence, which in the case of veiling can include coercion to veil by the family or 
the community. Such paternalist protection can be achieved by national laws prohibiting the 
hijab or the veil on the grounds that the practice may have a detrimental impact on others, or 
in order to further gender equality by prohibiting gender oppressive practices. If the veil is 
indeed oppressive, as claimed by the socio-feministic discourse, then the ECtHR can uphold 
national legal restrictions on the practice, since the court has consistently emphasised that a 
major objective for states is to achieve gender equality that is a key principle of the ECHR.605  
Human rights laws are prone to influences from the discourses on veiling, just like the national 
laws can be. For example, the French government set up the Stasi Commission to receive 
evidence from a number of parties, including leading academics and feminists, before passing 
the law prohibiting the wearing or display of conspicuous religious symbols such as the hijab in 
public schools.606 Similarly the French Gerin Commission was established to gather evidence, 
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before the law prohibiting concealment of the face607 was enacted. During the commission 
hearings Tariq Ramadan a leading Muslim academic gave evidence that the veil is not a 
requirement of Islam,608 whilst the French feminist Elizabeth Badinter who strongly opposes 
the veil, equated it with radical Islam.609 In the same way, European debates and the socio-
feministic discourse can and do play a part in influencing the European Court of Human Rights, 
when claims are made by women who veil on the grounds of religious freedom under Article 9 
ECHR. 
Part two of the thesis engages in an analysis of the three key ECtHR cases, where claims of 
interference with the religious right to wear the hijab or the veil have been made against 
national laws of Switzerland,610 Turkey611 and France.612 Through an analysis of the case-law, 
this part of the thesis gauges whether the ECtHR has discharged its duty to consider individual 
complaints by listening to the voices of Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil. By 
doing so, the ECtHR would have confirmed that veiling has no single meaning and is not 
confined to religious duty alone. For example, it can be used as means of experimenting with 
or expressing one’s identity too; in which case, claims by the applicants extend to other 
Convention rights too. Therefore this part of the thesis examines the reasoning and 
justifications provided by the ECtHR, in order to establish whether the court has followed the 
pattern of muting of women who veil, by assimilating the oppression discourse including the 
negative stereotypes into its jurisprudence. If this is so, then the value neutral judgement of 
the court is questioned when the matter before it concerns Muslim veiling, with the 
consequence that the court has played a part in the triple bind of silencing Muslim women 
who veil; first by the male orientated interpretations imposing modestly, secondly by the 
socio-feministic discourse articulating the oppressive or emancipatory meaning, and finally, 
the ECtHR by failing to listen to the women who live the experience of veiling and hold the true 
meaning of it. It is this relational link between the religious and socio-feministic discourses in 
part one and the legal discourse in part two on veiling that binds the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 – LEGAL PROTECTION OF VEILING 
 
Introduction 
The first part of the thesis engaged in a critique of the socio-feministic perspectives associated 
with Islamic veiling. Whilst arguments in the previous chapters relating to whether Muslim 
veiling is cultural or a religious mandate was a concern with respect to whether Muslim 
women’s choice to veil may have been free willed or a product of oppression. In this part of 
the thesis the jurisprudence arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
will be critiqued and it will be demonstrated that some states have used the law to prohibit 
the hijab and veiling in public spaces by utilising some of the negative stereotypes, which 
emerged from the discourses in part one of this thesis. The use of legal force to prohibit 
Muslim women from wearing the hijab or the veil in public spaces has led to challenges to such 
restrictions under the European Convention on Human Rights primarily under Article 9 which 
guarantees freedom of Religion. It will become apparent that for the purposes of the law the 
debate about whether veiling is cultural or religious does not have the same veracity, so long 
as the applicant holds the belief that it is a religious requirement. This will be followed by a 
detailed examination of the structure and operation of Article 9 and the criteria that needs to 
be satisfied by a state, in order to justify interference with religious freedom. The content of 
this chapter is descriptive as the aim of this chapter is to set out the European human rights 
framework and the key interpretive principles that come into play in the case analysis in 
chapters four and five, as opposed to an analysis of religious freedom as a stand-alone right, 
which is outside the parameters of this thesis. 
The European Convention on Human Rights   
The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted in Rome on 4th November 1950 and 
entered into force in 1953 with only a handful of states ratifying the ECHR as they lacked 
possession of effective human rights protection systems.613 There are now forty seven member 
states614 of the Council of Europe who have ratified the Convention,615 and as well as the 
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increase in signatory states, the ECHR has also been enhanced by extending in its reach in 
terms of rights protection by the addition of separate protocols.616  
 
The aim of the ECHR was to prevent a repeat of the human rights atrocities committed during 
the Second World War and afford a minimum standard of protection of human rights to 
citizens of states sharing similar notions of democracy, but different legal, cultural and moral 
norms. However it was difficult to identify a uniform set of human rights standards in Europe 
that reflected this diversity and as such, the ECHR was never intended to prevail over national 
legislatures. It was to rely on the good faith of the signatory states to give effect to it and was 
developed in order to strike a balance between the views held by member states on human 
rights and the intended uniform application of the values embodied in the Convention.617  
Interpreting the Convention 
The fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR are grouped into three 
categories: absolute rights, limited rights and qualified rights. Absolute rights such as freedom 
from slavery618 cannot be interfered with by a signatory state under any circumstances 
whereas limited rights contain an element of an absolute right but with some exceptions 
whereby the right can be limited under certain circumstances. For example the right to liberty 
is a limited right where a person’s freedom can be curtailed by detention following a court 
conviction. Qualified rights are those where the balance between the individual’s rights against 
the wider interests of the community or the state has to be struck. Any interference by the 
state needs to be justified by showing that it had a clear basis in law, seeks to achieve a 
legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. Article 9 of the ECHR guarantees 
freedom of religion which is the subject matter of this thesis and as freedom of religion is a 
qualified right, there is greater discretion in the hands of the judges and the state, thus a 
greater scope for interpreting the right.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. 
616
 A protocol is a later addition to the ECHR, for example Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 is a general 
prohibition on discrimination and states that: The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. And no one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any of the above grounds. 
617
 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2002) 
618
 Article 4 ECHR 
150 
 
There are a number of principles used by the ECtHR in interpreting the Convention when a 
case is being adjudicated by the ECtHR619and these are: effective protection,620 positive 
obligations,621 autonomous interpretation,622 evolutive/dynamic interpretation,623 review and 
proportionality.624 These are further allied by the principle of legality, rule of law and 
procedural fairness. The principles of interpretation as applied by the ECtHR are not contained 
in the Convention itself but are derivatives of the teleological principle flowing from Articles 
31-33 of the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties 1969. This lays down the basic 
requirements when interpreting the text of international Treaties. In Golder v. UK625 the court 
expressly stated that any interpretation of the Convention should be guided by Articles 31-33 
of the Vienna Convention. The essence of Articles 31-33 requirements are that international 
Treaties are to be interpreted in good faith, an ordinary and a contextual meaning is to be 
accorded to the terms626 of the Treaty and should be interpreted in the light of its overall 
objective and purpose. The ECtHR adjudicates on disputes arising from the rights enshrined in 
the Convention against member states and has consistently stated in its jurisprudence that, 
the Convention is a ‘living instrument,’ which means it must be interpreted in the light of 
present day conditions in order for it to be practical and effective. Therefore sociological, 
moral and scientific changes in society together with evolving standards in human rights are 
considered by the court when applying the Convention to claims before it.  
 
As the Convention is subsidiary to domestic laws of signatory states, the ECtHR examines the 
means used by the state to justify any interference with qualified rights and the court assesses 
the proportionality of the measures used for the means to be achieved. State authorities do 
not have an unfettered discretion to employ any means of interference as the ECtHR has 
supervisory jurisdiction, however the court can defer to national authorities a margin of 
appreciation, which is granting them a window of flexibility in order to comply with the ECHR.  
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The ECHR and the margin of appreciation doctrine 
The margin of appreciation supports the subsidiary role of the court and although the doctrine 
is an interpretive principle, it is found in many rights enshrined in the ECHR. Yourow in his 
major works on the doctrine defines it as:  
 
The latitude of deference or error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to 
national legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies before it is 
prepared to declare a national derogation from the Convention, or restriction or 
limitation upon a right guaranteed, to constitute a violation of one of the 
Convention’s substantive guarantees.627  
 
The doctrine was developed to allow the Strasbourg court to defer to member states, a 
window of discretion as to the manner in which they implement requirements of the 
Convention with due regard to particular circumstances and prevalent conditions of the state 
in question. This is acknowledgement by the ECtHR that there are variations of legal, social and 
moral traditions of different states requiring appropriate deference when necessary. 
Essentially, when the margin of appreciation is invoked, the court is exercising self-restraint on 
its power of review on the basis that state authorities are best placed to settle disputes.628The 
doctrine clearly reflects the subsidiary nature of the Convention where primary responsibility 
for human rights of individual citizens rests first with the state and any recourse to the ECtHR 
is only if the state has failed to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention. The 
subsidiarity of the Convention is clearly stated in Z and Others v. United Kingdom629 and 
Handyside v. United Kingdom 630 requiring Contracting parties to secure within their domestic 
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jurisdiction the Convention rights and systems, where any failure by the state to provide an 
effective remedy is a breach of the Convention itself.631  
 
Although there has been a level of uniformity amongst European states in terms of the values 
attached to human rights, there was variation in the implementation of national human rights 
protection amongst many states.632 For example homosexuality was acceptable in one country 
but a criminal offence in another. Thus the doctrine of margin of appreciation reflects the 
courts respect for pluralism and the remoteness of the court to settle disputes involving 
sensitive matters.  This delicate balancing act by the ECtHR on the one hand allows discretion 
to the state that takes account of its diversity and on the other requires it to act as a guardian 
to safeguard the rights of individuals against state interference of Convention rights. 
MacDonald emphasises this delicate issue and asserts that the margin of appreciation requires 
‘good faith’ and ‘continuing cooperation’ of contracting states633 and gives the flexibility 
required to balance the fragile relationship of state sovereignty and obligations under the 
Convention  
 
The doctrine is well established but its use has lacked consistency, making it difficult to predict 
how it will be applied. This unpredictability makes matters difficult in evaluating precedents set 
by the court and individual certainty over the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention. The doctrine has attracted considerable academic criticism, for example Fenwick is 
of the opinion that it is criticised because it may have undermined the growth of the 
Convention,634 and she refers to Van Dijk and Van Hoof who portray blunt disapproval of the 
use of the doctrine and have described it as ‘a spreading disease. Not only has the scope of its 
application been broadened to the point where in principle none of the Convention rights or 
freedoms are excluded, but also the illness been intensified in that wider versions of the 
doctrine have been added to the original concept.’635 
 
The first major case that used the margin of appreciation with some definitive principles 
being drawn under the limitation clauses contained in Articles 8-11 came in Handyside v. 
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UK.636 The case involved an allegation by the UK that a book intended for school children was 
obscene and therefore the state was justified in banning it on the grounds that it was 
necessary in a democratic society. The complainant argued that the prohibition constituted a 
breach of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10. The notion of obscenity in the 
case raised the question of morals; a ground of justified interference under the Convention.637 
The issue for the court was the sheer diversity of opinion in the member states as to what 
constitutes public morals? The court emphasised that states enjoyed a margin of appreciation 
in assessing whether a certain measure was ‘necessary in a democratic society, in particular, 
whether there existed a pressing social need justifying the interference in the interests of 
public morals.’ The court stressed:  
 
It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various contracting states a 
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws 
of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, 
especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far reaching evolution of 
opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the 
vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position 
than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as the ’necessity’ of  a ’restriction’ or ’penalty’ intended to 
meet them… Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the ‘necessity’ in 
this context. Consequently, Art 10(2) leaves to the contracting states a margin of 
appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator (prescribed by 
law) and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret 
and apply the laws in force.638  
 
Although the court set an explicit foundation for a margin of appreciation, it made clear that 
the requirements of proportionality and a pressing social need had to be satisfied and that 
domestic practice was subject to supervision. In effect the court was asserting that the width 
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of the margin is not unlimited; the court in affording the state a margin of appreciation 
exercises a degree of restraint before making a decision on the compatibility of a domestic 
measure and balances it with the state’s obligations under the Convention. This restraint is in 
effect an acknowledgement of the court’s subsidiary role in the protection of human rights and 
also recognises the right of a democratic state to choose the content and the level of 
protection that is suited to the particular democratic society. This deference also needs to be 
measured carefully by the court; otherwise it could be seen as evading its supervisory 
responsibility as claimed in the veiling cases discussed in the next two chapters. This 
responsibility was made clear in Handyside where the court emphasised that Art 10(2): 
 
Does not give the Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The 
Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of 
those States' engagements… is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by 
Article 10 (art. 10). The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision. Such supervision concerns both the aim of the 
measure challenged and its ‘necessity’; it covers not only the basic legislation but 
also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent court.639 
Factors determining the width of the margin of appreciation 
The matrix of factors that come into play in determining the width is complex640 and difficult to 
specify mechanistically. Schokkenbroek in his general report to the Directorate of Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe describes the width of the doctrine as variable and identified 
factors that would influence the width of the margin of appreciation as: the existence or non-
existence of  a common ground in the law of the member states, the nature of the aim pursued 
by the measure and its policy context, the nature of the applicant’s activity and interests 
protected by the right including the seriousness of the interference and emergency 
situations.641 The court in Buckley v. UK also confirmed the variety of factors that can be taken 
into account as ‘the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual 
and the nature of the activities concerned.642  
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These factors are not invariable and have increased, for example a trend by the court has been 
to exercise judicial restraint if the higher courts of a state have analysed comprehensively the 
nature of the interference by the state authorities.643 Additionally, once the court has 
considered the breadth of the margin of appreciation only serious reasons could lead it to 
substitute its own assessment for that of the national authorities.644This additional factor 
signals further uncertainties for new cases as there is a danger that any new cases involving the 
use of Islamic head dress are likely to lead to a greater chance of a wide margin of appreciation 
being afforded to state authorities, so long as the domestic court has analysed the case in hand 
in accordance with established European case law on the freedom to wear religious head dress. 
Alternatively it could be argued that this should lead to state authorities engaging better with 
the existing Convention jurisprudence and a more open discussion of the factors that play a 
part in determining the width of the margin of appreciation, ultimately resulting in a more 
balanced and transparent application of the principles being laid down by the European court. 
It is beyond the scope this thesis to analyse the case law relating to all the different factors 
associated with the width of the margin of appreciation and thus the discussion will be limited 
to those factors that have played a prominent role in the decisions of the court relating to 
religious symbols and these are consensus and proportionality.  
Consensus amongst signatory states 
The different nature of the rights protected by the Convention and the diversity of individual 
interests means the protection of such interests may not be uniformly applied, due to the 
diversity of values and traditions amongst all forty seven signatory states to the Convention. 
The commonality of approach or consensus amongst states is a factor the court has 
consistently relied upon in interpreting the Convention to determine whether a wide or a 
narrow margin of appreciation should be afforded to a state. The reference to commonality 
amongst member states by the court reflects the need to maintain a delicate balance between 
the court and national legal systems, both progressing ‘hand in hand’645 and consistent with the 
Convention system’s respect for common heritage of political traditions and ideals to which the 
preamble to the convention affirms to. Benvenisti646 identifies legal consensus, expert 
consensus and European consensus as distinct factors relied upon by the Strasbourg organs in 
determining consensus for margin of appreciation purposes.  
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The use of consensus amongst the member states as a factor in determining the width of the 
margin of appreciation first surfaced in the judgement in Handyside647 where the court was 
satisfied that the interference was prescribed by law and was for a legitimate aim, namely the 
protection of morals but in assessing of the necessity of this interference in a democratic 
society, it stated that:  
 
It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various contracting states a 
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws 
of the requirement of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, 
especially in our era, which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution 
of opinions on the subject by reasons of their direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries , state authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judges to give an opinion on the exact content of 
these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ 
intended to meet them … Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 leave to the contracting 
states a margin of appreciation.648 
 
The presence or absence of consensus is not an automatic guarantee of a narrow or a wide 
margin and it is this difficulty which resonates through the hijab and veiling Jurisprudence 
that is troubling, as it replaces certainty and precision with a lack of consistency in application 
of the margin doctrine.   
The proportionality of state interference 
The assessment of the proportionality of state measures interfering with an individual’s 
Convention rights is also an important factor. It is described as the last stage of the court’s 
decision making process.649This means that having considered the availability of the margin of 
appreciation to the state authorities, the court finally proceeds to assess whether the 
measures employed by the state are proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. Hence the 
proportionality doctrine being described as ‘the other side of the margin of appreciation,’650 
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‘corrective and restrictive of the margin of appreciation’651 and ‘probably the most important 
and perhaps even the decisive factor’652 impacting the margin of appreciation. Although the 
importance of the impact of proportionality on the margin of appreciation is echoed by 
commentators, the explanation of the detail of that impact on the margin of appreciation is 
lacking in academic commentary.653 
 
Proportionality like the margin of appreciation has no mention in the Convention and has no 
history in the drafting of the Convention.654Klatt & Meister describe proportionality as a 
concept that is ‘by far the most important criterion for the analysis of fundamental rights’ and 
an element that is ‘both widely accepted and highly contested,’655 just as the court has 
remarked that ‘the search for balancing is inherent in the whole of the Convention.’656The 
discourse on proportionality is surrounded by those who advocate it and those who are 
adherents of a ‘fair balancing’ approach. A full structural analysis of the proportionality 
doctrine or the near mathematical attributes associated with balancing is beyond the scope of 
this thesis as any analysis would require a thorough evaluation of the different human rights 
models such as the interest based theories, rights as trumps, priority to rights and the 
balancing theory.  
 
The three essential requirements or the test of proportionality in International law as 
advocated by leading commentators are: suitability, necessity and fair balance.657 Suitability 
requires the interference against a right to be suitable for the purpose of achieving that aim 
and thus the state should ‘exclude the adoption of means which obstruct at least one right 
without promoting any other right or interest’.658 Necessity means that there must be no other 
suitable measure available that is less intrusive to the protected right, often described as the 
least onerous means of achieving the aim. The court suggests the adoption of this approach by 
using phrases such as ‘public policy should be pursued in the least onerous way as regards 
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human rights’ 659 Fair balance refers to the principle of proportionality in the strict or narrow 
sense, in other words a suitable and a necessary measure employed by the state should not 
upset the fair balance or destroy the essence of the right.660 Under the European Convention 
the courts when referring to proportionality establish whether the least onerous means of 
achieving the legitimate aim has been used by the state and balancing conflict between rights 
has been considered by the court. This is evident from the court’s use of language such as the 
grounds for interference must be ‘convincingly established’661 or be ‘convincing and 
compelling’.662  
 
The use of the fair balancing test in proportionality analysis has led to the most controversy, as 
this would require balancing between Convention rights with the general interest of the 
community as suggested by the court,663 but without offering any explanation how this fair 
balance is to be achieved. Balancing rights against the collective community interest 
undermines the higher status human rights deserve if there is to be effective protection of 
liberties and individual interests. Collective interests of the community have a tendency to 
outweigh individual rights as apparent in the S.A.S. judgement discussed in chapter five where 
the rights of the French society outweighed of those Muslim women who veil. It should be the 
case of rights granting protection to individuals in order for them to realise their interests 
which are of central importance to them.664 This philosophy has been conceptualised by 
Dworkin’s rights as ‘trumps’ theory 665 where individual rights trump utilitarian preferences 
and that rights cannot be overridden by simply calculating costs and benefits. Similarly, 
Habermas refers to rights as deontological ‘firewalls’ which act as an insulator from 
interference by reasons of welfare alone. 666  
 
The utilitarian approach to rights can be criticised since it leads to uncertainty in law, as one 
will never know the weight attached to various interests by the court. It is therefore 
conditional on circumstances and with a change in circumstances the weight accorded to 
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interests would change, without any certainty of the past rule or how a future case is likely to 
be decided. Thus the possible permutations involved in balancing can be incomprehensible 
without any firm guidance or principles enumerated by the court as to precisely how balancing 
would be carried out. This aspect of balancing is the most controversial in legal commentary 
with some commentators who are of the opinion that it will involve ‘delimiting a right into 
technical questions of weight and balance’667 and as Tsykirakis argues that with this approach 
the interests of the majority tend to outweigh the interests of the minority or individuals.668 
Protection of religious freedom 
There is a rich variety of interactions between law and religion and protection of religious 
freedom exists both in international law and national law in most jurisdictions.669 Religious 
interests are important to the individual concerned, of great significance to communities and 
hence the great utilitarian arguments for its respect.670 Adherents of the majority and minority 
religions need to feel protected by the state and perceptions of this close protection in the 
United Kingdom are reported by Bloomsbury and others who state that ‘over the past decade 
there has, in general been a reduction in the reported experience of unfair treatment on the 
basis of religion or belief’. 671 But such positive perceptions are not confined to all groups as 
some Christian groups had reported that they were being marginalised as they felt other 
religions were getting a fairer treatment. Whilst non-religious groups were of the opinion that 
the special privilege religion gets results in unfairness to them.672 A good example of this is 
when the Prime Minister of the UK David Cameron made a public statement that ‘Britain is a 
Christian Country’673 leading to a public letter of protest from a number of academics and 
public figures including members of other and non-faith groups to the Telegraph newspaper.674 
                                                          
667
 GCN Webber, ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179 
668
 Stavros Tsakyriakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights’ (2010) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 468, 471 
669
 Greg Sisk, ‘Stating the Obvious: Protecting Religion for Religion's Sake’ (1998) 47 Drake Law Review 
338 
670
 Peter W. Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006) 7 
671
 Paul Weller and others, Religion or Belief, Discrimination and Equality (Bloomsbury Academic 2013) 
208 
672
 Ibid 210 
673
 ‘My Faith in the Church of England’ Church Times (16 April 2014) 
<http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2014/17-april/comment/opinion/my-faith-in-the-church-of-
england> accessed 20 June 2014 
674
 ‘David Cameron Fosters Division by Calling Britain a 'Christian Country': Most Britons are not 
Christians’ The Telegraph (20 April 2014) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/10777417/David-Cameron-fosters-division-by-calling-
Britain-a-Christian-country.html> accessed 20 June 2014 
160 
 
The significance for communities is further asserted by Adams who notes that religious 
interests being considered are a test of the rights culture prevalent in a particular society: 
 
Religious liberty and the provision of fundamental human rights are ultimately 
inseparable…the international community will never ensure free association 
without permitting religious minorities to meet, free speech without allowing 
religious speech, non-discrimination and due process without granting religious 
minorities equal substantive and procedural rights under the law, democracy 
without allowing religious minorities to vote and run for office, indigenous rights 
without protecting indigenous religions, the rights of parents and children without 
protecting their right to sectarian education, and women's rights without ensuring 
their freedom to follow or reject religious teachings and customs.675 
 
The importance of freedom of religion as a human right is evident by its inclusion in 
fundamental international human rights instruments676 and has also been made clear by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Kokkinakis  v. Greece:   
 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the convention. It is, in 
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements which go to make up the 
identity of the believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset 
to atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, 
depends on it.677 
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Despite the importance attached to freedom of religion by the ECtHR, the sheer amount of 
case law generated under Article 9 ECHR suggests that the right is not free from difficulties or 
state interference. There is a lack of consensus in the ECtHR jurisprudence and throughout 
Europe as to what the freedom under Article 9 entails,678 since there is no uniform conception 
of religion in society throughout Europe.679 This has resulted in the court allowing considerable 
deference to states to the detriment of those Muslim women who veil and bring actions under 
Article 9 which as a result of the lack of certainty are afforded far less protection than those 
who invoke the other freedoms under the convention.680 Any interference to religious freedom 
by the state is a result of the inevitable difficulties arising from living in a religiously pluralistic 
society, as highlighted by Knights:  
 
Freedom of religion has always been one of the most controversial of rights at the 
international level. It is no less so in the domestic setting…the diversity of views on 
substantive beliefs, on the position of religion in the public sphere, and the 
balance between the right to express and manifest religious views on the other 
hand, and the legitimate restrictions that may be imposed by the state on the 
other, all create considerable challenges for society today.681 
 
She further argues that any agreement by states to the existence of the general principle of 
freedom of religion or belief, does not necessary mean that the different states share an 
understanding of what is at stake, resulting in different outcomes when that broad principle of 
freedom of religion is applied to specific circumstances. 
The operation of Article 9 ECHR 
The right to freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which provides that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
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2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedom of others. 
 
Article 9 differentiates between two aspects of religious freedom; the forum internum and the 
forum externum. The forum internum is the inviolable internal dimension of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This inner realm cannot be limited or coerced 
and confers on people the right to choose, change or adopt any belief or religion or belong to 
any religious group. The forum internum carries a corresponding negative freedom not to 
belong to any such group or have a belief or religion and to be free from compulsion of any 
religious confession. Thus states are under an obligation to refrain from interfering with 
citizens’ inner convictions including ideological indoctrination, or other forms of manipulation 
and ensure others do not use improper means in interfering with this freedom. There is no all-
encompassing definition for the forum internum, the standard recital used in case law is that 
‘Article 9 protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the area which is 
sometimes called the forum internum’.682 Where the forum internum protects one’s inner 
convictions, the forum externum refers to the manifestations of belief and religion subject to 
state limitations, in effect creating a divide between an absolute freedom to believe and 
permissible limitations on actions based on beliefs held. However the distinction between the 
forum internum and the forum externum is not as clear cut with no judicial decision or scholar 
asserting a simplistic bright line between the two, nor any consensus between scholars as to 
the precise boundaries of the forum internum, other than the freedom to choose, change or 
maintain a religion and a corresponding freedom from coercion related to such choices. A 
believer can leave his faith or community,683 not be compelled to reveal religious conviction in 
order to avoid talking an oath in court proceedings,684 or to disclose religion in identity 
documents,685 or requiring elected politicians to be sworn in parliament by taking the oath on 
the Gospels.686  
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The only case, which discloses attempts to change beliefs by the state is Riera Blume v. 
Spain,687 in which the state interfered with the applicants’ beliefs as they belonged to a sect 
and the authorities attempted to ‘deprogramme’ them, but the court dealt with the case in 
terms of deprivation of liberty under Article 5 and found it unnecessary to examine Article 9.688 
The rationale behind the forum internum being inviolable has been clearly expressed by the 
ECtHR in Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,689 where the applicant a 
Muslim had observed a religious holiday, which according to the state’s constitution was a 
public holiday but he was penalised by his employer as he could not demonstrate his 
adherence to the Muslim faith ‘the notion of the state sitting in judgement on the state of a 
citizen’s inner personal beliefs is abhorrent and may smack unhappily of past infamous 
persecutions…’690   
 
Although the ECtHR has not defined  religion and ‘exceptionally claimants have been required 
to prove the existence of the religion or belief in question, it is the definition of belief rather  
than religion that is often employed as a filter’.691 In Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom 
the court has stated that opinions are not the same as beliefs and that it would accept a belief 
if it attains ‘a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ and for non-
religious philosophical convictions, they must be worthy of ‘respect in a democratic society… 
and are not incompatible with human dignity’,692 thus affording equal protection to non-
religious beliefs under Article 9 providing the minimum criteria is satisfied. 
 
The first part of Article 9(1) has not posed any real problems for the court and it has said 
relatively little about it. According to Evans ‘it is only possible to discern its scope by examining 
what falls within the ambit of forum externum, perhaps better described as the sphere of 
external manifestation, to which considerable attention [by the court] has been paid’.693 The 
second part of Article 9(1) is referred to as the forum externum. The provision stipulates four 
ways religion and belief can be manifested outwards and these are: worship, teaching, practice 
and observance. It is this part of the provision that has posed challenges for the court. The 
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term ‘manifest’ suggests ‘a perception on the part of adherents that a course of activity is in 
some manner prescribed or required’.694  
 
The public manifestation of a religion or belief can be apparent by the activities of adherents 
of a religion or belief. For such actions to qualify as a manifestation it must be befitting of the 
categories of manifestation stipulated by Article 9(1) and It is this area that has raised some 
difficult challenges for the court. Evans raises one of the difficulties and questions that if an 
applicant was to engage in an action due to their religion or belief, is the court entitled to deny 
that the action is based on the facts presented to the court, or should the court accept the 
‘subjective characterisation’ of the applicant’s actions?695 The exact issue arose in Valsamis v. 
Greece696 where Jehovah’s Witness parents disallowed their young daughter to take part in a 
school parade which would be preceded by military parades and official mass to 
commemorate an earlier war. This refusal led to the child being expelled from the school. 
Participation in the activities was objectionable to the child’s parents who held pacifist views 
as Jehovah’s witnesses. The expulsion of the child was challenged on the grounds that the 
parent’s freedom of religion was denied. The court in rejecting the applicant’s views stated 
that ‘it can discern nothing, either in the purposes of the parade or in the arrangements for it, 
which could offend the applicants’ pacifist convictions…’697 and that ‘the obligation to take part 
in the school parade was not such as to offend her parents’ religious convictions.’698  
 
The court adopted a similar reasoning in Efstratiou v. Greece where the facts were similar,699 
however the approach taken by the court raised serious questions as it was trying to force its 
own opinion as whether an action amounts to an act that is of religious nature or not. This has 
led Evans to question the basis on which the court ‘can determine that a person does not 
understand an issue to be of a religious in nature if they say that, for them, it is’.700 Similarly 
Martinez-Torron and Vavarro-Valls assert that the court had made a ‘dangerous mistake. This 
could initiate an unacceptable itinerary leading to the court determining which beliefs are 
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‘’reasonable’’ and which are not’.701 The role of the court is to establish whether an applicant is 
relying on moral convictions they don’t hold to avoid a legal duty, but that doesn’t mean that 
the court can objectify the consistency of a person’s beliefs, since that would be a dangerous 
path as Harris and others argue that: 
 
Whilst this approach… may have the advantage of excluding bogus or trivial beliefs 
from Article 9(1), it can also bring the court dangerously close to adjudicating on 
whether a particular practice is formally required by religion – a task which its 
judges, given the relevant theological issues, appear ill-equipped to handle. 702 
 
It appears that in Valsamis the court had deflected the fact that individual convictions must be 
respected and instead opted for an objective assessment, which is problematic because this 
could lead the court to inquisitions into the veracity of truths, rather than holding individual 
convictions as necessary to individual autonomy in Western societies. This is why the 
Convention system disallows any interference with that right unless it interferes with other 
individuals’ rights as will be seen during the discussion of Article 9(2). This upholds protection 
of freedom of religion as it allows European citizens to choose what they want to believe in.   
 
However this does not mean that the ECtHR court does not have competence to engage in a 
fact finding inquiry. An example where a court may have to question an applicant’s ‘subjective 
characterisation’ as an act of manifestation is where the applicant is attempting to seek a 
benefit as in Kosteski703 and X v. Austria704 where a prisoner was seeking a certain benefit 
under the guise of religion. In this case the Commission disallowed an inmate access to prayer 
beads and to grow a beard on the grounds that it was not an ‘indispensable element in the 
proper exercise of the Buddhist religion’. The court justified the refusal on the grounds of 
health and discipline and difficulties in identification. Although on the facts the applicant 
would have been the only person in the prison to have a beard, of course that would not have 
prevented other inmates from alleging the same. The decision in these cases begs the question 
as to when is a manifestation attributed to that of a belief so both the forum internum and 
forum externum are triggered for an applicant to have protection of Article 9? 
                                                          
701
 Javier Martinez-Torran and Rafael Navarro-Valls, ‘Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of 
the Council of Europe’ in Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham and Bahia Tahzib-Lie (eds), Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 234 
702
 David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Second edn, Oxford 
University Press 2009) 433 
703
 Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, supra (n 689) 
704
 X v. Austria App no 1753/63, (15 February 1965) 
166 
 
What amounts to a manifestation of religion or belief? 
The manifestation through ‘worship, teaching, practice and observance’ amongst others 
affords protection to acts of worship, rites, rituals and attempting to convert others. The 
categories although only four are fairly broad and open to wide interpretation; the resultant 
case law generated has lacked consistency as to what amounts to a manifestation of a belief.  
According to the earlier ECtHR cases ‘there was comparatively little debate surrounding the list 
of protected manifestations of religion or belief…Since then, however, the list has become a 
closed one and the use of religious symbols has been definitely identified as a form of 
practice’.705 The link between the forum internum and forum externum, holding a belief and 
manifesting that belief was considered by the Commission in Arrowsmith v. UK,706  a case 
involving a pacifist who distributed leaflets to soldiers discouraging them from serving in 
Northern Ireland. The Commission distinguished between a belief being held and a belief being 
communicated and acts motivated by that belief but not being central to the expression of 
that belief. Although pacifism had been acknowledged by the Commission as a belief, the 
distribution of the leaflets was not a manifestation for the purposes of Article9 (2). Acts that 
are simply ‘motivated or influenced by a belief’ were held by the Commission to be excluded, 
suggesting that a very direct link is needed between the belief and the action if it is to amount 
to a ‘practice’ under Article 9.  
 
The Arrowsmith test of a ‘very direct link’ often referred to as the ‘necessity test’ was 
considered and affirmed by the ECtHR,707 indicating that the necessity approach excludes 
behaviour that is merely encouraged or permitted by religion from the ambit of manifestation 
as opposed to behaviour that is actually required by religion. This test has been applied to a 
situation where an Islamic marriage between a man of 21 years of age and a girl of 14 years of 
age was held not to be required by Islam; rather it was simply permitted as one could marry a 
girl of 12 without her parent’s consent under Islamic law. However the age of marriage in 
English law was 18 years of age in the absence of her parents’ consent and therefore the 
Commission held that his criminal conviction for abduction disclosed no breach.708 Another 
case adopting similar reasoning related to the Moonies wanting to set up a legal association 
where the Commission held that the setting up of a legal association was not necessary for 
them to practice their religion.709 Though the test was an innovative device to control the open 
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ended term ‘practice’, one of the high watermarks of the test was the application of it to other 
forms of manifestations as in X v. UK710 where a Muslim teacher was refused time off on 
Fridays by his employer for him to attend mosque. The Commission decided the case on other 
grounds suggesting that no Article 9 issue was raised as the applicant had not shown it was a 
requirement that he attends Friday prayers.  
 
The Commission has created inconsistency by deviating from the necessity test711 by asking 
whether the acts of the applicant ‘give expression’ to the belief or religion. Further 
inconsistency has been caused by the ECtHR by using a different test stating that Article 9 
protects acts that are ‘intimately linked’ to personal convictions and beliefs.712 The necessity 
test is widely discussed in Article 9 literature713 and criticised heavily714 whilst others argue that 
the necessity test for manifestation is a myth715 as it was never expressly stated in Arrowsmith 
and needs to be treated with caution.716The criticisms are valid as it would involve the court 
playing ‘God’ because it would be deciding whether an action was actually obligated or 
necessary for the belief or could their religion and belief have been manifested in a different 
way? Similarly Sandberg cites Edge to show that motivation of the applicant is important and 
the manifestation and motivation distinction has proved controversial: 
 
Consider an individual with their hands clasped, reciting the Lord’s Prayer aloud. 
This would seem to constitute an act religious in nature. Add the individual’s 
Atheism, a camera crew, and a line in a film script ‘Actor Prays’ and it is no longer 
religious in nature. The distinctive feature is the presence or absence of religious 
motivation.717 
 
Therefore not surprisingly the retreat from the ‘manifestation motivation’ distinction and the 
adoption of the more favourable ‘intimately linked’ to the religion or belief of the applicant has 
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been more welcomed.718 The burden is much lighter as the applicant need only evidence a 
form of causation between his or her actions and religion or belief,719 a position also welcomed 
by The Equalities and Human Rights Commission.720 
The specific situation rule 
The specific situation rule referred to as the ‘free to leave’ rule by Harris and others721 or 
‘interference attributed to the state’.722 This is not a universal test as such but has been used 
as a filter by the ECtHR covering situations where the applicant has put themselves in a specific 
situation and potentially losing the protection as opposed to the state being responsible. For 
example in Stedman v. UK723 where a Christian applicant who refused to work on Sundays had 
resigned from her job and brought an action under Article 9 which the ECtHR rejected on the 
grounds that she had the choice of resigning from her post if she disagreed with working 
Sundays. Similarly in X v. UK724 a Muslim teacher who wanted an extended lunch on Fridays so 
he could attend congregational prayers at a nearby mosque. His Article 9 application was 
rejected as the court said that he remained free to resign if and when he found that his 
teaching obligations interfered with his religious duties.725 This approach has been widely 
applied to areas other than employment. For example those who voluntarily join the armed 
forces,726 get detained by the authorities on the ground they breached their contract with 
society,727 or voluntarily commenced university education.728 Similarly a more stricter 
approach based on ‘impossibility’ of manifesting a religion or belief before an Article 9 claim 
can succeed was evident in Ch’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France,729 where the court upheld a 
refusal to issue a licence allowing ritual slaughter to an Orthodox Jewish association because it 
could obtain ‘glatt’ meat from other sources, Belgium in this case. The court stated:  
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A refusal of approval was capable of affecting the practice of their religion by Jews 
only if it was impossible for them, on account of that refusal, to find meat 
compatible with the religious prescriptions they wished to follow.730  
 
The specific situation rule has been criticised as being highly limiting and detrimental to the 
sphere of employment as it would limit application of Article 9 to such areas731 and the ECtHR 
has been criticised for being ‘slow in giving acknowledgement to the complete range of 
manifestations of religion or belief that have been long recognised at United Nations level…’732 
 
Although the judicial organs would require evidence of a link between acts and beliefs there 
has been a dramatic turn on the reliance of the ‘belief and manifestation’ filter and the use of 
the ‘specific situation rule’. This dramatic shift does have its roots in the veiling cases, although 
it is not contended that such cases were specifically identified by the court or for any ulterior 
motive. Such a shift in approach by the ECtHR can only be welcomed. In the case of Dahlab v. 
Switzerland,733 a case concerning a prohibition against wearing the hijab by a teacher in a 
primary school coming before the ECtHR,734 the court did not engage in any discussion about 
the belief and manifestation filters, thus totally omitting a discussion on the forum internum or 
forum externum of Article 9(1) and proceeded straight to weighing up the states interests 
against the applicant’s. Furthermore, as this was a classic employment case, where invoking 
the ‘specific situation’ rule would have been apt, the court did not even mention it, the result 
was that the court’s attention remained on the justification of interference with the claimant’s 
Article 9 rights. 
 
Initially this approach may have been considered as confined to a particular case, but the 
affirmation of such a wholesale change came about in the landmark case of Sahin v. Turkey 
which was the first hijab case decided by the Grand Chamber. In the initial chamber judgement 
on the issue of the belief and manifestation filters, the court reiterates the Arrowsmith 
principle that ‘Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief 
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and does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is 
dictated by a belief’.735  Yet the court then proceeds and makes a startling statement: 
 
The applicant said that, by wearing the headscarf, she was obeying a religious 
precept and thereby manifesting her desire to comply strictly with the duties 
imposed by the Islamic faith. Accordingly, her decision to wear the headscarf may 
be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and, without deciding 
whether such decisions are in every case taken to fulfil a religious duty, the Court 
proceeds on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions 
of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, 
constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion.736 
 
The chamber after reminding itself of the principle in Arrowsmith that not every act motivated 
or inspired by a religion or belief is guaranteed by Article 9 simply concludes that the 
applicant’s decision to wear the hijab may be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion or 
belief. The same principle that led to the court rejecting the applicant’s case in Arrowsmith was 
now being accepted without any assessment or a fact finding exercise by the court in order to 
reach a conclusion on the belief filter. The court here simply bypasses those earlier 
requirements and assumes the existence of interference. The chamber judgement was 
approved and the above paragraph from the judgement was endorsed by the Grand Chamber 
without any discussion of the principles surrounding Article 9(1) with the court simply 
assuming there was interference. The Grand Chamber here lost an opportune moment to unify 
the previous approaches to the belief and manifestation filters discussed. Had a discussion 
taken place the court could have laid down a universal test as to what amounts to a 
manifestation of a belief? Instead, a conclusion that can be drawn is that the court wanted to 
repudiate the Arrowsmith test and commence a change of approach allowing actions that are 
motivated by a religion or belief to be classed as manifestations.  
 
An alternate explanation is that the court simply wanted to move away from a focus on Article 
9(1) which had proven to be a highly contentious approach and concentrate on Article 9(2). 
The effect would be that the ECtHR simply accepts practices which are merely motivated by 
belief or religion as manifestations. This would overcome criticisms of the court  indulging in 
theological inquiries which the court itself has warned against Manoussakis and Others v. 
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Greece ‘The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any 
discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to 
express such beliefs are legitimate’.737 This is something which Lady Hale a Supreme Court 
Justice in the UK reminded the Irish Law Society in an annual lecture on freedom of religion 
and belief: 
 
If the law is going to protect freedom of religion and belief it has to accept that all 
religions and beliefs and none are equal. It cannot realistically inquire into the 
validity or importance of those beliefs, or particular manifestation of them, so long 
as they are genuinely held.738 
 
The trend of leaving behind the principle in Arrowsmith was further followed in Dogru v. 
France another hijab case739 and in Jakobski v. Poland, where the applicant demanded a 
vegetarian diet in accordance with his Buddhist beliefs which he was denied and upon avoiding 
non-vegetarian meals he was punished for going on a hunger strike.  The ECtHR held his 
decision to maintain a vegetarian diet was motivated or inspired by his religion and the denial 
by the prison authorities was a breach of his Article 9 rights.  The court affirmed the passage in 
Sahin adding a gloss to the effect that so long as the action was motivated or inspired by 
religion, it was not unreasonable: 
 
Without deciding whether such decisions are taken in every case to fulfil a 
religious duty… as there may be situations where they are taken for reasons 
other than religious ones, in the present case the Court considers that the 
applicant's decision to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated 
or inspired by a religion and was not unreasonable. Consequently, the refusal of 
the prison authorities to provide him with a vegetarian diet falls within the scope 
of Article 9 of the Convention.740 
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But the approach of allowing motivations inspired by religion by the above case law has been 
thrown into further disarray by the ECtHR in Eweida and Others v. UK,741 a case concerning the 
restriction on wearing of a Christian cross by employees.  On the issue of whether the wearing 
of the cross was a manifestation the court affirmed this: 
 
It was not disputed in the proceedings before the domestic tribunals and this 
Court that Ms Eweida’s insistence on wearing a cross visibly at work was 
motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian faith. Applying the 
principles set out above, the Court considers that Ms Eweida’s behaviour was a 
manifestation of her religious belief, in the form of worship, practice and 
observance, and as such attracted the protection of Article 9.742 
 
But this does not resonate with another part of the court’s judgement where it is clearly re-
stating the complexities caused by Arrowsmith and rather than clarify or universalise the 
principles, it simply restates the permutations and the pre-Sahin position: 
 
Even where the belief in question attains the required level of cogency and 
importance, it cannot be said that every act which is in some way inspired, 
motivated or influenced by it constitutes a “manifestation” of the belief. Thus, for 
example, acts or omissions which do not directly express the belief concerned or 
which are only remotely connected to a precept of faith fall outside the protection 
of Article 9 § 1… In order to count as a “manifestation” within the meaning of 
Article 9, the act in question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief. An 
example would be an act of worship or devotion which forms part of the practice 
of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form. However, the manifestation 
of religion or belief is not limited to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close 
and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined 
on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the applicant to 
establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in 
question.743 
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In this reversal, the court once again opens up opportunities for academic criticism on the 
motivation manifestation link. However the ECtHR does repudiate the ‘specific situation’ rule 
which in some of the previous employment cases had proven detrimental to an Article 9 claim: 
 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court 
considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of 
religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job 
would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to 
weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the 
restriction was proportionate.744  
 
Suggestions of adding the factor of ‘could the employee have resigned and moved employer’ 
to the proportionality assessment does not make matters easier for the court or for the 
applicant, as the proportionality assessment itself is riddled with inconsistencies and 
difficulties. However, the court has indicated an approach which should be welcomed. 
Whether that would be followed by later judgements concerning Article 9 cases would be the 
acid test. But the Grand Chamber in S.A.S. v. France the most recent case concerning the ban 
on full face coverings the Court simply reiterated the Arrowsmith approach.745 The Grand 
Chamber in this case appears to be re-stating the original Arrowsmith principle but then fails to 
engage in any discussion on the link between the applicant’s religion and manifestation of it, 
without expressly stating so and simply proceeds with interference and state justification 
issues. Once again as in Sahin the Grand Chamber failed to capitalise on an opportunity to add 
clarity to the law or clearly re-instate or repudiate the Arrowsmith equation leaving 
inconsistencies and omissions with its own jurisprudence.   
Article 9(2) the limiting clause 
Once an applicant has shown that the nature of the right asserted falls within the scope of 
Article 9(1), the applicant will have to show there has been an interference with that right by 
the state. Interference can take many forms dependent upon which one of four manifestations 
are asserted. For example it can take place if the state fails to discharge its positive obligations 
to protect Article 9 rights. Article 1 of the ECHR states that ‘The High Contracting Parties shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
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Convention’. Thus imposing a positive obligation on a state to protect religious rights and this 
could be achieved by affording religious rights protection in law and the availability of 
sanctions if infringed, ensuring prevention or a remedy in the event of a breach by state 
authorities. An example of this would be to prevent religiously motivated attacks on adherents 
of minority religions. Similarly the state also has negative obligations towards protection of 
religious rights and this is reflected in the wording of Article 9(2) ‘Freedom to manifest one's 
religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as…’ that imposes an obligation on a 
state to refrain from interfering with peoples rights’, thus requiring the state to refrain from 
interfering with religious and non-religious beliefs of organisations and individuals. Article 9(2) 
limits the rights contained in Article 9(1) and allows states to interfere with religious rights only 
if it can show that the interference is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic 
society for one or more of the following interests: public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. from these 
the ‘rights of others’ is the only category that has been invoked in cases involving the hijab an 
the veil.  
Prescribed by law 
This has been described as a ‘rule of law’ criterion developed by the Strasbourg case law, 
whereas the content of the ‘democratic necessity’ test is regarded as ‘highly fluid and 
indeterminate.’746 The first criterion the state has to satisfy if it has interfered with an Art 9 
right is that the measure that has allegedly interfered with that right is prescribed by law. This 
ensures that any interference by a state has a legal basis for it and is not arbitrary. This legal 
basis can be satisfied by statutory laws, case law or rules enacted by executive and 
administrative bodies, hence covering primary and secondary laws in member states.747 Case 
law has identified two essential elements to be met before it can be classed as law for the 
purpose of this standard: national law allowing interference must be accessible to the citizen 
and must be formulated in a way to be foreseeable or clear.748 Access to the law does not raise 
any conceptual issues and the Sunday Times case held that that it means the citizen ‘must be 
able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to 
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a given case.’749 However, foreseeability does require a more rigorous assessment by the 
court, which has expanded on the requirement: 
 
Foreseeability’ is one of the requirements inherent in the phrase ‘prescribed by 
law’ in Art 10(2) …of the Convention. A norm cannot be regarded as ‘law’ unless it 
is formulated with a sufficient precision to enable the citizen – if need be, with 
appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail…750 
 
The level of precision required is relative and dependent on three factors: the content of the 
provision, the field it was designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is 
addressed.751 Thus the words prescribed by law ‘not only require the impugned measure 
should have some basis in law, but also refer to the quality of the law in question, requiring 
that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects’.752 
Legitimate aims 
The second part of the limitation clauses contain the legitimate aims in a democratic society 
for which restrictions on the particular right can be justified by the state. For example, Article 
9(2) contains the following aims: public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It is claimed that this 
standard on its own rarely leads to a violation as, ‘no democratically accountable state wishes 
to be accused of expressly at or impliedly incorporating arbitrary purposes into its 
legislation.’753 These aims will be confined to individual facts of a case and assertions made by 
a state. In terms of veiling cases, other than protection of health or morals, all the other 
interests have been asserted by states in case law pertaining to religious clothing discussed in 
later chapters. 
Necessary in a democratic society 
This standard in the context of an Article 9 complaint is the most controversial. The right in 
question and the context is an important factor in the application of this standard, however 
some interpretations are common to all the limitation clauses contained the limited rights 
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afforded by Articles 8-11. Before commencing with the analysis of the assessment of this 
standard in an Article 9 context, it is important to highlight the distinction that has been drawn 
between the terms ‘necessary and ‘in a democratic society.’ The court in Handyside stated: 
 
Whilst the adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 para 2, is not 
synonymous with ‘indispensable’, the words ‘absolutely necessary’ and ‘strictly 
necessary’ and…neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible’, 
‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’  or ‘desirable’. Nevertheless, it is for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need 
implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in this context.754 
 
The distinction drawn by the court is important as it means that any interference by the state 
must be justified by a ‘pressing social need’ associated with one or more of the legitimate aims 
being pursued by the state.755 When the court is determining if such a pressing social needs 
exists, it will assess the prevalent circumstances at the time of the alleged interference as the 
state’s interference and. The court in Handyside when discussing the term ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ then went on to say that the reasons put forward by the state as 
justification for the interference must be both relevant and sufficient.756  This means that the 
method used by the state that interferes with a right must be ‘proportionate’ to the legitimate 
aim being pursued and when the state evaluates whether a pressing social need exists; it is 
allowed a margin of appreciation.  
 
The interpretation of the term ‘necessary in a democratic society’ exemplifies the tension 
between individual rights and protection of the wider public interests of the state involved in 
an action under the Convention. The court will deploy the principle of proportionality when 
assessing the rights of the individual and the wider interest of society as a whole. Thus the 
application of the necessity test cannot be absolute as it requires a complex set of factual 
matrices to be applied by the court when assessing interference,757 but the text of the 
Convention does not contain this complex matrix; they have been introduced by the court.758 
The Commission has indicated the factors involved when weighing up the requirement of 
necessity: 
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The necessity test cannot be applied in absolute terms, but requires the 
assessment of various factors. Such factors include the nature of the right 
involved, the degree of interference, i.e. whether it was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, the nature of the public interest and degree to which it 
requires protection in the circumstances of the case.759 
 
Thus the determinative principles for the necessity in a democratic society are the margin of 
appreciation and the principle of proportionality and it is the inconsistent application of these 
two that has led to the problematic justifications being provided by the ECtHR in upholding 
prohibitions of the hijab and the veil.  
 
The Strasbourg organs have attempted to identify some of the key components of a 
democratic society. For example, cases concerning Article 10 have led the court and the 
commission to describe freedom of expression as an ‘essential foundation’ of a democratic 
society requiring a narrow interpretation of the limitation clauses. The court made some 
specific references when referring to the Handyside case. In Young, James and Webster v. 
UK760 a case concerning closed shop union agreements the court said ‘pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society… Although individual interests must 
on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the 
views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and 
proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position’.761 This dictum is 
particularly important as it echoes with the philosophy of protecting the rights of the individual 
as opposed to the utilitarian approach to human rights protection, which has been evident in 
cases relating to the hijab and the veil. In respect of Article 9 the court in Kokkinakis was 
particularly emphatic about the features of a democratic society: 
 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the convention. It is, in 
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements which go to make up the 
identity of the believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset 
to atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
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from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, 
depends on it.762 
 
Further elaboration or guidance has not been forthcoming from the European court’s 
jurisprudence and this has led to particularly challenging issues faced by the court with respect 
to religious symbols, as much of the European population is now religiously pluralistic, yet the 
restriction on the use of religious symbols based on the majority society’s opinion as in S.A.S. v. 
France appears to be necessary in a democratic society at the expense of an individual’s 
religious freedom. 
Conclusion 
The protection of religious freedom under Article 9 ECHR attempts to balance the religious 
rights of an individual with the needs of the state to limit those in specified circumstances. 
Admittedly it is not easy to strike such a balance, but considering the ECtHR has accepted that 
religious belief is ‘one of the most vital elements that goes to make up the identity of believers 
and their conception of life’, the court appears to have struggled in giving effect to this 
principle, a sharp increase in cases since the first Kokkinakis763 judgement is evident of that. 
The lack of quality in the reasoning has led to such an increase, an obvious example being the 
court wrestling with what amounts to a manifestation? This has been further compounded by 
the court’s own substitutions instead of the conscience of the applicant as in Valsamis764, 
which although a troubling suggestion, means that the court has been keen on demonstrating 
that it understands beliefs better than the adherent. It appears that the court is unclear of its 
role when dealing with religious freedom cases. This tendency of the court appears to have 
persisted in its judgements throughout the veiling cases as will be seen in the next two 
chapters. Effective protection of religious freedom with respect to veiling requires the court to 
interpret Article 9(2) limitations narrowly, particularly the necessity of a prohibitory measure 
in a democratic society. This requires an objective assessment of the factors involved and what 
appears to be lacking is the court’s indication as to what are the essential ingredients of a 
democratic society? In the absence of such an indication, the balancing exercise between the 
rights of others and the rights of veiled women can lead to tilting in favour of the state. This 
can only be avoided if the court does not allow religious rights to be overridden in the absence 
of strong countervailing objectives, unless there is no other alternative. Whether the court has 
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based its reasoning on strong evidence and lack of alternatives will transpire in the next two 
chapters covering the three key cases in relation to the hijab and the full face veil. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE HIJAB AND ARTICLE 9 JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the framework of the ECHR with Article 9 that guarantees protection of 
religious freedom was examined, with identification and application of the key principles and 
case law of the Convention to claims of interference with religious rights. This chapter 
addresses the specific application of Article 9 to the two key cases concerning the hijab; 
Dahlab v. Switzerland765 and Sahin v. Turkey.766 Although there have been a number of cases 
related to the hijab which the ECtHR has dealt with, the Dahlab case was one of the first cases 
that received real consideration by the ECtHR whilst Sahin was the first case concerning the 
hijab adjudicated by the Grand Chamber. Factually the cases are distinguishable as Dahlab 
related to a teacher at a primary school whereas Sahin concerned a student at a university. 
This chapter critiques the ECtHR jurisprudence on the issue of Islamic religious symbols and 
questions the failure by the court to give effect to the applicants’ Article 9 rights. The chapter 
considers the factual differences between the two cases with specific legal articulation by the 
court for both judgements followed by an analysis of the court’s legal reasoning. The chapter 
then offers specific arguments that highlight the failure by the court, in giving full 
consideration to the issues at stake and the adoption of negative stereotypes associated with 
the hijab, coupled with the ECtHR failure to listen to the applicants’ voices.  
 
Karaduman v. Turkey767 was the very first case concerning the hijab that came before the 
European Commission. In this case the dispute was between the applicant and Turkey where a 
student was refused a photograph on her university diploma with her wearing a headscarf, as 
the university regulations required uncovered hair on the applicant’s photograph. The claimant 
alleged a breach of Article 9 ECHR. The Commission rejected her claim on the grounds that 
there had been no interference with her Article 9 rights and stated that: 
 
By choosing to pursue her higher education in a secular university a student 
submits to those university rules, which may make the freedom of students to 
manifest their religion subject to restrictions as to place and manner intended to 
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ensure harmonious coexistence between students of different beliefs. Especially in 
countries where the great majority of the population owe allegiance to one 
particular religion, manifestation of the observances and symbols of that religion, 
without restriction as to place and manner, may constitute pressure on students 
who do not practise that religion or those who adhere to another religion. Where 
secular universities have laid down dress regulations for students, they may 
ensure that certain fundamentalist religious movements do not disturb public 
order in higher education or impinge on the beliefs of others.768 
 
Thus in the first case that considered the hijab, the Commission did not even acknowledge that 
there was an interference with the applicant’s Article 9 rights. Although there have been a 
number of other cases involving the issue of hijab that have come before the ECtHR,769 analysis 
in this thesis will be limited to three of the most important cases on the hijab and full face 
veiling, as they contain the important jurisprudence on the application of the ECHR to religious 
clothing, these being Dahlab v. Switzerland770, Sahin v. Turkey771 and S.A.S. v. France. 772  
Dahlab v. Switzerland 
The Dahlab v. Switzerland773 case was the second after Karaduman v. Turkey774 to be decided 
on the Islamic headscarf, raising issues of religious freedom before ECtHR to be adjudicated on 
admissibility. The applicant was a primary-school teacher in Geneva who having abandoned 
the Catholic faith, converted to Islam in March 1991 and began wearing an Islamic headscarf in 
class, she had not attracting any complaints to the authorities or any adverse comments from 
parents on the subject. The applicant had been forbidden to wear the hijab by the authorities 
on the grounds that it contravened section 6 of the Public Education Act as it was a visible 
means of imposing her religious identity on her pupils, especially in a public secular education 
system. The applicant lost her appeal to the local authorities and a further appeal to the 
Federal court, which examined the issue of whether the hijab was indeed a religious symbol, 
and if  so, whether it was a core aspect of freedom of religion. It concluded that the issue in 
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question was the wearing of a powerful religious symbol in the performance of the applicant’s 
professional duties whilst teaching and thus the wearing of the headscarf was an outward 
manifestation which is not an inviolable core of religious freedom.775  
 
In accordance with the established Convention principles, for any limitations to be justified 
under Article 9, the state had to show that the interference with the applicant’s wearing of the 
hijab was prescribed by law and was for a legitimate aim that was necessary in a democratic 
society. The court in determining whether the interference was justified in a given set of 
circumstances must interpret the freedom of religion and belief under Article 9(1) in its widest 
sense, whilst any limitations to such a fundamental right must be construed narrowly. Thus a 
distinction is drawn between a violation of freedom of religion and belief and a limitation on it, 
so it is not a question of whether prohibitions on the hijab in this case limits religious freedom 
but whether the state imposed limitations are justifiable. Having considered the limitations, 
the court must then proceed to an assessment of the margin of appreciation that could be 
granted to the state, having balanced the individual’s rights at stake and the state interests. 
Finally the court must carry out a proportionality analysis of the measures used by the state to 
ensure it was the least restrictive means of achieving the stated legitimate aims.  
 
The ECtHR found that the legal basis for the restriction does not have to be precise since civil 
servants were bound by a voluntary special relationship of subordination to public 
authorities.776 The court stressed that by the displaying of powerful religious symbols, the 
applicant may have interfered with religious beliefs of her pupils and parents and that the lack 
of complaints does not mean they were not affected, as some may have decided to avoid any 
direct action or aggravation of the situation.777The court held that their decision was in 
accordance with the principle of denominational neutrality in schools to ensure religious 
harmony and that if teachers were allowed to manifest their religious beliefs using clothing, 
then schools would become places of religious conflict where the public interest demands the 
restrictions to avoid such conflicts in schools. The court’s reasoning set the scene for schools to 
be places free from religion as followed by France, where Muslim girls in Public schools are 
prohibited from wearing headscarves.  
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The applicant argued that the purpose behind the wearing of the hijab was as an ordinary item 
of clothing that could be widely purchased and used for aesthetic reasons and as such, the 
prohibition amounts to a restriction on the way teachers would wish to dress. On this point the 
Federal Court said: 
 
There is no doubt that the appellant wears the headscarf and loose-fitting clothes 
not for aesthetic reasons but in order to obey a religious precept which she 
derives from the following passages of the Koran…The wearing of a headscarf and 
loose-fitting clothes consequently indicates allegiance to a particular faith and a 
desire to behave in accordance with the precepts laid down by that faith. Such 
garments may even be said to constitute a ‘powerful’ religious symbol – that is to 
say, a sign that is immediately visible to others and provides a clear indication that 
the person concerned belongs to a particular religion…778  
 
To the Federal court, the Islamic headscarf amounted to a ‘powerful symbol’ that was 
represented by a state employee and it was the symbol that was in issue and not regular 
clothes, or even outlandish clothes with no religious connotations. On the issue of balancing 
the interests of the applicant’s religious interests, in the sense of obeying a religious precept 
against the denominational neutrality of the educational system, the Federal court reminded 
that ‘religious freedom cannot automatically absolve a person of his or her civic duties – or, as 
in this case, of the duties attaching to his or her post… Teachers must tolerate proportionate 
restrictions on their freedom of religion.779 
 
The Federal court acknowledged that the hijab forces a difficult choice between an important 
Islamic precept and her job and that her pupils are of an impressionable age even though she 
is not accused of proselytising or even discussing her beliefs with her pupils. However, she 
could not avoid questions by her pupils about the headscarf without referring to her beliefs. 
The court also noted that allowing headscarves in classrooms would result in acceptance of 
garments that are powerful symbols of other faiths such as soutanes and kippas, emphasising 
that as a matter of proportionality, the government allowed teachers to wear discreet religious 
symbols such as small pieces of jewellery. The Federal court reminded that you cannot prohibit 
crucifixes in the classrooms but allow powerful religious symbols of whatever denomination.780 
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The ECtHR agreed with the Federal court that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the rights of others, public safety and public order. The court noted in its reasoning 
that although the impact of a powerful external symbol such as the hijab is difficult to assess, 
the children were very young and easily influenced and in such circumstances, thus the 
proselytising effect of the hijab worn by a teacher could not be ignored. This was particularly 
so since it appeared to be imposed by a precept of the Qur’an, which the Swiss federal court 
had considered hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality. The court further found 
that the wearing of the hijab was difficult to reconcile with the message of tolerance, respect 
for others and the gender equality expected to be conveyed to pupils from teachers in a 
democratic society. Therefore the court having regard to the young age of the children and the 
preservation of religious harmony in the classroom outweighed the applicant’s right to 
manifest her religion and held the interference was within the margin of appreciation deferred 
to the Swiss authorities.781 The European court declared the application inadmissible as ill-
founded without it going to a full hearing and only gave brief reasons without any real signs of 
supervisory jurisdiction being exercised, despite the fact that this was an important case on 
religious symbols coming before the court.  
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey 
In this case the applicant Leyla Sahin, a Turkish national from a traditional family of practising 
Muslims considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. At the material time 
she was a fifth-year student at the faculty of medicine of Istanbul University. On 23 February 
1998 the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular directing that students with beards 
and those wearing an Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and 
tutorials. In March 1998 the applicant was refused access to a written examination on one of 
the subjects she was studying because she was wearing the Islamic headscarf. Subsequently 
the university authorities refused on the same grounds to enrol her on a course, or to admit 
her to various lectures and a written examination. The faculty also issued her with a warning 
for contravening the university’s rules on dress and suspended her from the university for a 
semester, for taking part in an unauthorised assembly that had gathered to protest against the 
dress restrictions. The applicant brought an action before the ECtHR alleging a breach of 
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 with Article 2 of Protocol No.1 of the ECHR.782 
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ECtHR Chamber Judgement Sahin v. Turkey 
The ECtHR chamber judgement783 proceeded noting that there were polarised views on hijab 
in schools and universities; those who favoured the wearing of it saw it as a duty and/or 
expression linked to religious identity, whereas those opposed to it saw it as a political symbol 
based on religious precepts that threaten civil unrest and undermine women’s rights in Turkey. 
The court also noted the use of the hijab as a political symbol, a matter that was taken into 
consideration by the Turkish constitutional court when dissolving political parties in the past, 
even those who were in government. The court acknowledged the Turkish constitutional 
court’s explanations that secularism had acquired constitutional status and for Turkey it was 
an essential condition for democracy, preventing the state from showing a preference for a 
religion or belief, and that once outside the private sphere of individual conscience, freedom 
to manifest one’s religion could be restricted on public interest grounds in order to defend 
secularism. And although individuals were free to dress how they wanted, when a particular 
dress code was imposed on individuals by reference to a religion, the religion concerned was 
perceived and presented as a set of values that were incompatible with those of contemporary 
society. The court was of the opinion that in Turkey, a majority Muslim country, if the hijab 
was to be considered a mandatory religious requirement, then those who do not wear it would 
be perceived as irreligious. And since students were expected to pursue their education 
without religious distractions, granting legal recognition to hijab wearers in state education 
would defeat the principle of neutrality of state education, potentially leading to conflicts 
between students of differing convictions or beliefs.784 
Issues arising under Article 9 ECHR 
The applicant alleged that a prohibition on wearing a hijab in higher education institutions was 
an interference with her Article 9 rights, whilst the government denied a breach and argued 
that in any event the interference was justified. On the issue of interference the applicant’s 
argument was that the hijab had to be treated as a religious rule which amounted to a 
recognised ‘practice’ under Article 9 and its restriction was a clear interference. The court 
proceeded on the basis that there was an interference with her Article 9 rights, simply 
bypassing the belief and manifestation tests. On whether the interference was prescribed by 
law and had legitimate aims, the court acknowledged the national court’s decision and 
accepted the interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting 
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the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order, a point which was not in 
issue between the parties. 
 
It is surprising from a legal perspective that the court simply assumed the interference with 
manifestation of religion, thereby failing to realise an opportunity to clarify or formulate a test 
to be applied in later cases as to what amounts to an interference.785 On first appearance it 
may appear that this was an advertent demonstration of the underlying reluctance by judicial 
bodies to recognise values of key religious practices outside Christianity.786 However it can be 
argued that the ECtHR is an international court that takes account of international human 
rights standards, for example, when assessing whether there is European consensus on a 
matter under consideration, the court can look at international human rights instruments.787 
And as religious symbols are accepted as manifestations of religion, it is possible the court 
alluded to the observations of the Human Rights Committee who have elaborated on Article 
18 of the ICCPR which is analogous to Article 9 (1)788 ‘The observance and practice of religion 
or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also customs as…the wearing of distinctive 
clothing or head coverings…’ 789 It is noteworthy how the court recognised the negative 
stereotyping effects of the hijab on those who do not wear the hijab, even though those who 
wear it or support it may see it as a positive expression of  their faith and this was one of the 
essentialist viewpoints of those who support the hijab and see it as emancipatory as 
highlighted in part one of this thesis.  
 
The major issue that arose in terms of whether the legitimate aims pursued by the state was 
the requirement of necessity in a democratic society, the most onerous hurdle for a state to 
pass in order to justify interference with Article 9 rights. The applicant asserted that her 
religious manifestations were extremely serious, as she was a practising Muslim and that she 
had not opposed or protested against the principle of secularism. And that the manner in 
which she complied with her religious beliefs was not intended as a form of protest to exert 
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pressure, provoke or proselytise.790 Furthermore during her studies at the university the state 
could not show that her wearing a hijab had caused any disruption, disorder or a threat to the 
university and that no university would allow her to pursue her higher education if she wore 
the hijab.791 She also affirmed that the majority of Turkish people committed to secularism 
were opposed to theocracy but not the hijab. And as the hijab did not question republican 
values or the rights of others, it was therefore not incompatible with secularism and neutrality 
of state education, as reflected in the practice of various European states.792 The applicant 
further contended that if there was a risk of tensions between opposing groups, which was 
inevitable in a pluralistic society, the authorities in such cases should ‘not eliminate the cause 
of the tensions by doing away with pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups were 
tolerant of each other’.793  
 
The government contended there were factors peculiar to Turkey which meant that the 
principle of secularism on which the Turkish Constitution rested had assumed particular 
importance compared to other democracies and protecting the secular state ‘was an essential 
pre-requisite to the application of the Convention in Turkey’. 794The government argued that 
the domestic courts and the situation in Turkey demonstrated that the hijab was a symbol 
used by religious extremists for political purposes and threatened the rights of women. And 
any legal recognition of the hijab in public institutions would be tantamount to religious 
privilege, giving rise to plurality of legal status of individuals. The government further argued 
that principles of Sharia were incompatible with secularism as well as with the Convention and 
higher education authorities were justified in prohibiting access to those men with beards and 
women wearing hijab. This restriction according to the state was imposed as a preventative 
measure after the receipt of complaints from other students of pressure from students 
belonging to fundamentalist groups. Furthermore there had already been one confrontation 
between opposing radical groups and regulation of religious symbols preserved the higher 
education institutions’ neutrality.795 Clearly the government considered the hijab incompatible 
with Turkish secularism, which had acquired constitutional status and asserted that just 
because the regulations prohibiting the practice were not applied rigorously, did not mean 
that the rules were not justified. 
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The ECtHR then cited Kokkinakis v. Greece, re-affirming that in democratic societies where 
there is religious pluralism, it may be necessary to restrict Article 9 rights in order reconcile 
interests of other groups to ensure everyone’s beliefs are respected.796 Thus affirming its 
decision in Karaduman v. Turkey and Dahlab v. Switzerland without any real discussion as to 
why the wearing of the Islamic headscarf was incompatible with the pursued aim of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety?797 Or how Turkish secularism 
was in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human rights?798 Instead the court 
proceeded to justify the local factors in play, elaborating that where the majority population 
was Muslim, measures taken by universities to prevent fundamentalist groups exerting 
pressure on non- practising Muslim students and those of other faiths to ensure peaceful co-
existence of various faiths and to protect public order and beliefs of others was justified.799The 
court based this view on account of complementary principles of secularism and equality and 
as secularism protects individuals from external coercion, the right to manifest one’s religion 
could be restricted in order to protect these values and principles. The court further noted that 
Turkish secularism is consistent with Convention values and accepts that ‘upholding that 
principle [of secularism] may be regarded as necessary for the protection of the democratic 
system in Turkey’.800  
 
The court emphasised the achievement of gender equality, a key Convention value by member 
states. In respect of the hijab,  the court highlighted that in the Turkish context it can have an 
impact on those who choose not to wear it, the issues at stake being the rights of others and 
public order requirements. Thus its prohibition could be regarded as meeting a ‘pressing social 
need’, especially since it had political connotations since there were ‘extremist political 
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole, their religious symbols and 
conception of a society founded on religious precepts’.801 The ECtHR chamber unanimously 
concluded that having regard in particular to the margin of appreciation left to Contracting 
States, the university regulations prohibiting head scarves and the measures implementing 
them were justified, proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. The court also found 
no separate questions arose under Articles 8, 10 ECHR and article 2 of Protocol 1 and simply 
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reached this verdict on alleged breaches of these rights without any discussion of the 
principles. The applicant requested the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 
43 ECHR which the Grand Chamber accepted with the case being heard on 18 May 2005.802 
The Grand Chamber Judgement Sahin v. Turkey 
The GC noted the diversity of approaches that existed amongst European states in regulating 
the hijab in educational establishments, just as the chamber had done and affirmed the 
Chamber’s findings with respect to the existence of an interference, the interference being 
prescribed in law, and being in pursuance of legitimate aims, namely protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others and of protecting public order, the fundamental issue being the necessity 
of the prohibition in a democratic society.  
 
The applicant in challenging the chamber’s findings formulated an additional argument before 
the GC based on notions of democracy and republic being dissimilar in the way that totalitarian 
regimes may claim to be democracies, but that principles of pluralism and broadmindedness 
could only be found in true democracies. She argued that the framework of the judicial organs 
and the higher education systems in Turkey were products of successive military coups d’état.  
And in view of the ECtHR jurisprudence that had been adopted in a number of European 
countries, contracting states should not enjoy a wide margin of appreciation allowing 
restriction of students’ dress. This was especially since no other European State prohibited the 
hijab at university and there had been no tensions reported warranting such draconian 
measures. 803She further explained that students in higher education had capacity and 
capability, to make their own decisions about appropriate behaviour and the allegations by the 
government that she demonstrated lack of respect for other students’ convictions by wearing 
hijab were unfounded. Furthermore her choice to wear the hijab was based on religious 
conviction, the most important fundamental right that pluralistic liberal democracy had 
granted her. Therefore she claimed it was not fair to allege that simply wearing the hijab 
contravened gender equality as ‘all religions imposed such restrictions on dress which people 
were free to choose whether to comply with them or not’.804 
  
The GC emphasised the ECHR jurisprudence on Article 9 acknowledging the importance of 
religious rights,805 reiterating that where several religions coexist in democratic societies, at 
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times restrictions on manifestation of religion or belief may be necessary for the reconciliation 
and respect of all beliefs.806The GC moved onto emphasise the importance of maintaining 
neutrality by the state in matters associated with religious beliefs placing emphasis on the 
margin of appreciation left to contracting states:  
 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at 
stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the 
role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance…This 
will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious 
symbols in educational institutions, especially (as the comparative-law materials 
illustrate…in view of the diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities 
on the issue. It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception 
of the significance of religion in society …and the meaning or impact of the public 
expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context … Rules in 
this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to 
national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order... Accordingly, the 
choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left 
up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic 
context’.807  
  
On allowing a wide margin to Turkey, the GC asserted that it must have regard to the need to 
‘protect the rights and freedoms of others, to preserve public order and to secure civil peace 
and true religious pluralism, which is vital to the survival of a democratic society.808 The GC 
also took opportunity to affirm the two hijab cases of Karaduman v. Turkey and Dahlab v. 
Switzerland justifying restrictions on wearing the headscarf in order to protect the rights of 
others, public order and public safety. As for the case on hand, the GC simply cites the part of 
the judgement from the chamber and affirms it along with the Turkish Constitutional Court’s 
findings and proceeded to discuss the requirements of proportionality, without any discussion 
of the principles and merely cites the cursory: 
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By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the education community, 
the university authorities are in principle better placed than an international court 
to evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course… 
Besides, having found that the regulations pursued a legitimate aim, it is not open 
to the Court to apply the criterion of proportionality in a way that would make the 
notion of an institution’s “internal rules” devoid of purpose’ and that Article 9 
does not always guarantee the right to behave in a manner governed by a religious 
belief… and does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that 
have proved to be justified.809  
 
The court held that the Turkish authorities had the benefit of a wide margin of appreciation in 
this sphere and that the interference in issue was not only justified in principle but was 
proportionate to the aim pursued, therefore there was no violation of Article 9. It further held 
that there had been no breaches of Article 8, 10 or 14, the only dissent coming from Francoise 
Tulkens of Belgium, one of the female judge’s in the Grand Chamber.  
Analysis of Dahlab and Sahin 
Although both cases concerned the restriction on wearing the hijab by Muslim women in 
educational establishments, there is a factual distinction in that one applicant was a teacher in 
primary school and the other a student in higher education. The reasoning of the ECtHR 
displays commonality of approach in both cases, thus the analysis has been undertaken on 
that basis, but drawing on differences as required. The ECtHR reasoning in both cases is 
founded on: the hijab as powerful external symbol; the difficulty of reconciling the hijab with 
gender equality; and the incompatibility of the Hijab with a tolerant, secular society and 
respect for rights of others. Thus the analysis will focus on these constituent elements of the 
judgements followed by the application of the margin of appreciation and proportionality 
analysis.    
The hijab as a powerful external symbol  
In Dahlab the court expressed that the wearing of hijab had the potential of a proselytising 
effect on primary school pupils by referring to it as ‘a powerful religious symbol’. It has to be 
acknowledged that a school teacher has a lot of influence over young children being in a 
position of power and such influences can have profound effects on how children make 
choices in their later years. A teacher is a role model to those children and as such 
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denominational neutrality as required of all state employees and plays a crucial role in 
moulding those choices. Therefore a distinction has to be drawn between diversity in society 
and the maintenance of state neutrality in the education system; one reason why the Swiss 
state did not allow Christian crosses in the classroom, ensuring the Swiss education system 
was free from state enabled indoctrination of beliefs or ideas that approve or disapprove 
morals against the will of the parents.810 
 
The aim of the state is to achieve a level playing field for religious freedom, individually or 
collectively. Hence the court stated in Manoussakis & Others v. Greece that under the ECHR 
the right to freedom of religion ‘excludes any discretion on the part of the state to determine 
whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate’.811 One of 
the issues arising from the Dahlab812 reasoning has been that the state has positively 
attempted to erase religion from the public school, in the name of state neutrality. The state in 
this case did have a duty to maintain neutrality in its schools which means the state does not 
express any allegiance to particular beliefs and in prohibiting the applicant from wearing a 
symbol of religious affiliation since she was a representative of the state, it complied with that 
duty. In this respect the neutrality argument itself cannot be criticised but, the subsequent 
reasoning and attitudes adopted by the state and the ECtHR is not immune from challenges.  
At no point did the teacher encourage Islam, nor did she even inform the children that she 
wore the hijab for religious reasons. In her evidence she said that she told the children it was 
to keep her ears warm, which is an indication that she took positive steps to ensure that her 
headscarf did not propagate any proselytising effects, if there were any. The court failed to 
refer to any empirical data pointing to the harmful effects of the hijab on the children and any 
inferential evidence of proselytising was acknowledged by the court as very difficult to assess. 
On this very issue of the proselytising effects of hijab on young children, the German 
Constitutional court in the Fereshta Ludin case which was identical to Dahlab,813 concerning a 
primary school teacher wearing a hijab, confirmed the lack of veracity of such an inference 
stating that ‘there was insufficient empirical data to indicate any harmful influence of the hijab 
on children’.814   
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There was no evidence of any of the children converting to Islam or any complaints from the 
children or their parents during the four years of the applicant wearing the hijab. It is then 
questionable that on the one hand the court stated that the impact of the hijab is ‘very difficult 
to assess’ which if anything should act as attenuation of its proselytising effects and the fact 
that the court qualifies the effects by stating that there was the possibility of some kind as 
opposed to a direct claim of it. Yet on the other, the court still accepts the government’s mere 
assertion that proselytising effects may exist, despite the lack of evidence adduced to that 
effect, a point that Ungureanu concurs with:  
 
The conjecture that wearing the veil may negatively influence pupils cannot be 
taken for granted, especially when it is not backed by expert studies… it is 
reasonable to envisage that pupils be exposed in schools to a plurality of opinions 
and lifestyles.815  
 
Surprisingly the court made no reference to some of the Muslim children at the school who 
wore traditional Islamic clothing and any negative signals they may have sent to the other 
children, although the neutrality argument only applies to servants of the state and not the 
school children. Since the alleged proselytising effect of the hijab was one of the primary 
reasons behind the judgement, if the court had a sound basis it would have referred to 
Kokkinakis v. Greece816 the leading  case concerning proselytism under Article 9 ECHR. The case 
concerned a couple who were Jehovah’s witnesses and went round knocking on the door of a 
house which was answered by the wife of a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. The 
Jehovah’s witnesses engaged in a dialogue with her in order to relay their faith trying to 
convert her, a practice which was a criminal offence at the time in Greece. The court in that 
case held that that convincing others of the truth of one’s religion is a manifestation of 
religious freedom that is protected under Article 9 and that there was a difference between 
proper and improper proselytising. The former was where someone simply tries to convince 
others to change their religion and was not a breach of Article 9, whereas the latter form 
contained elements involving threats, monetary incentives or some form of control. 
Understandably the issue of proselytism has to take a different turn when the parties being 
influenced are vulnerable adults or more so in this case; young children.  
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The paternalistic approach adopted by the authorities could be understood in this context 
since the state a neutral state has to be vigilant of such practices in a neutral environment 
involving children. However the applicant in Dahlab did not engage in any such activities, 
although there was the existence of a power relationship which was not abused. Neither did 
the court refer to the abuse of such a relationship utilised to proselytise those in vulnerable 
positions as in Larissis v. Greece817 where an Air Force Officer used his senior military rank to 
exert repeated pressure on junior ranking airmen to change their beliefs, the court holding it a 
breach of Article 9 rights of the junior servicemen.  
 
Instead the court in Dahlab818 attempted to justify its reasoning by stating that ‘children 
wonder about many things’ suggesting that there was a possibility of the hijab having such an 
effect due to the ages of the young children involved. But on the curiosity trait inherit in 
children, if anything, there was the possibility that the young children might have questioned 
why their teacher had suddenly been removed from school. This could lead to possible 
formation of negative stereotypes associated with religion, or even re-inforce those that have 
already been formed in the minds of the children from exposure to rest of society. Evans notes 
that the messages sent to children are entirely contradictory as on the one hand the message 
is that women need to be protected from the oppressive practice of veiling, yet on the other, 
children need protection from the women who proselytise using their veils.819 Allowing the 
adoption of such views could hardly be conducive to instilling in children, values such as 
respect and tolerance on religious matters. Diversity, plurality and the message of tolerance 
have to be given respect by all and children grow up in a such an environment will adopt such 
values, whether that is through play with others or observing different and changing identities 
amongst adults, but if they were removed from the early years setting in schools then arguably 
such values would only have meaning in the later years of life, by which time there is a danger 
that other people’s identities or diversity is categorised negatively. 
 
The court’s weak arguments on proselytising effects of the headscarf in the absence of any 
convincing evidence or arguments by the state lead to the consequence that the threshold of 
the requirement ‘necessary in a democratic society’ was kept very low by the court. The 
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necessity of the measure is the distinguishing feature between a legitimate state interference 
and a violation of an Article 9 freedom. The burden of justifying the interference rests with the 
state, and a mere possibility of the hijab having a proselytising effect is not a convincing 
argument, considering a fundamental religious right was in issue for the applicant and 
especially since the limitations to rights need to be interpreted in narrow terms. The 
consequence of such a low threshold for the necessity requirement goes against the courts 
own jurisprudence where it has stated that the interference has to be ‘relevant and 
sufficient’820 and thus prevents the requirement acting as a check that ensures an individual’s 
rights are not interfered with by the state without a real justification. This approach by the 
court questions the court’s guardianship of religious freedom when it comes to religious 
symbols and the flawed reasoning of the court was effectively sanctioning double standards 
with respect to the hijab as a religious symbol and neutrality in the classroom. This is evident 
from the Federal Court’s assertion about proportionality of response with respect to religious 
symbols, whereby the Canton government allowed teachers to wear discreet religious symbols 
such as small jewellery; presumably small Christian crosses.  
 
In Sahin821 the ECtHR instead of providing its own reasoning on the effects of the hijab, if any, 
simply adopted the Dahlab822 court’s reasoning and the assumption that it was a powerful 
external symbol and therefore had a proselytising effect on adult students in a higher 
education setting, justifying its prohibition under Article 9(2). But the court did not distinguish 
between the younger children in Dahlab823 who may have been more susceptible to the effects 
of external religious symbols and the higher education students who are maturing adults and 
have the ability to decide for themselves what meaning they wish to attribute to such symbols. 
The court in Sahin824 just as it followed the Dahlab825 reasoning, it also failed to consider the 
ECtHR own previous reasoning826 on ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ proselytism, where the former 
has been considered protected under article 9 and the latter unprotected. Judge Tulkens 
dissent captures the objections to such assumptions and the ease with which the ECtHR was 
convinced of the need for prohibition: 
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The possible effect which wearing the headscarf, which is presented as a symbol, 
may have on those who do not wear it does not appear to me, in the light of the 
Court’s case-law, to satisfy the requirement of a pressing social need.827   
 
The ECtHR appears to have relied in both headscarf cases on the notion of lack of compatibility 
of the hijab with the Convention’s core values deferring a wide margin of appreciation to 
Switzerland and Turkey. Yet in Lautsi v. Italy 828a case concerning a Christian religious symbol, a 
different conclusion was reached. The case involved an action by a parent whose children 
attended Italian state school where the mother objected to the presence of large Christian 
crosses in the classroom on the grounds that she wanted her children brought up in a 
religiously neutral education environment. In this case even though the chamber judgement 
followed Dahlab’s829 reasoning that the Crosses were a powerful external symbol that could 
have a proselytising effect on the children, the Grand Chamber reversed the decision.830 The 
hijab had been declared a powerful external symbol by the ECtHR, yet the Grand Chamber in 
Lautsi 831concluded in what appeared to be inverted logic, that the crosses were a passive 
symbol. And on that basis, a wide margin of appreciation was afforded to the state on the 
grounds that the mandatory presence of the crosses in the classroom did not violate the 
parent’s right to educate her children in accordance with her non-religious beliefs. This 
reasoning is not reconcilable since by the ECtHR own acknowledgement that the Italian 
domestic courts ‘were divided over the legitimacy of the display of the crucifix’ the Grand 
chamber still defers to the Catholic religion and the Italian state. Whilst in Dahlab832 the 
position was the reverse, where the court deferred to neutrality in the classroom and refused 
to acknowledge the non- proselytising effects of the hijab.833According to Mancini and 
Rosenfeld the Lautsi 834judgement defies all logic as it implies that representing Christ’s 
suffering on the cross as less likely to have an impact on children than the wearing of a mere 
piece of cloth on a teacher’s head.835  
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Difficulty of reconciling the hijab with gender equality 
The court in both Dahlab836 and Sahin837 advanced the gender equality argument to justify 
their findings in favour of Switzerland and Turkey. The ECtHR has frequently emphasised that 
gender equality is a major objective for member states to achieve and the first case where the 
ECtHR affirmed the advancing nature of sexual equality was Abdulaziz, Caabales and 
Balkandali v. UK,838 a case concerning different immigration rules based on sex for spouses to 
join their partners in the UK. In Sahin the court said gender equality was a key principle of the 
Convention839 and used it as a justification for its decision. Considering the level of importance 
such an issue had on those who wear the hijab, neither court gave it the consideration that 
was expected. The courts did not explore what gender equality means, or how the behaviour 
of the applicants threatened the concept or indeed the way the principle could be justified 
against two independent women, who had adopted the hijab that was important to them 
personally. In the first part of the thesis it was shown that the imposition of dress codes on 
Muslim women could be the consequence of gender biased interpretations and that patriarchy 
was still prevalent amongst Muslim households in Europe. And that the imposition of dress 
codes such as the hijab or the veil were on women only with no such requirement imposed on 
men, although the Qur’an mandates the same level of modesty from men in terms of gaze 
aversion. The state and the court are mindful of gender discrimination against women and 
remedying inequalities is a key Convention objective, which means that where there is a clash 
of gender equality and religious or cultural rights the court would give prominence to 
eliminating inequalities against women, but this does require justifications and the reasons to 
be stated by the court.    
 
The court in Dahlab840 did not explain or substantiate their broad claims as to why they found 
the headscarf hard to reconcile with gender equality and non-discrimination.841 Instead it 
simply made a statement lacking cogency: ‘appears to be imposed on women by a precept 
which is laid down in the Koran’ and which, as the Federal Court noted, is ‘hard to square with 
the principle of gender equality’.842 The reasoning of the court suggests a construction of 
equality in a formal sense equating with sameness whereby Muslim women who wear the 
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hijab are perceived as lacking equality and being different.  The discriminatory effects of the 
hijab are at odds with the outcome of the prohibition on the hijab since that in itself equates 
to gender discrimination resulting in denial of the freedom Muslim men would possess. The 
state and the court are attaching distorted meanings to a religious symbol and in doing so 
effectively silence the voice of women who adopt the hijab whilst proclaiming to save them. It 
appears that the court is using a broad –brush approach and including all women who wear 
the hijab as being objects of gender equality, without listening to the individualities of the 
applicant. If the court had done so it could have led to evidence emerging and pointing to a 
different conclusion, as well as acknowledgement that the meaning of veiling is loaded with 
multiplicities dependent on the individual woman who veils.  
 
The court’s approach signals an acceptance of the persisting negative stereotypes associated 
with women who wear the hijab or the veil; that those who choose such practices, do so 
because they are oppressed. Therefore ignoring those women who may have freely chosen to 
wear the hijab, which was made evident in part one of this thesis and the court by default 
implying that such women’s choices cannot be authentic. This line of reasoning clearly ignores 
the possession of autonomy of Muslim women and rejects their agency and in effect gives 
incorrectly credence to the false consciousness argument.  It is a concern that the ECtHR and 
the federal court overlooked or failed to understand that such a Qur’anic precept is for the 
maintenance of modesty applying equally to both sexes, although men are not required to 
wear the hijab, they still need to maintain their modesty and the hijab is not to oppress 
women. The ECtHR reasoning is further questionable when it avoids closer scrutiny on the 
grounds that it is not best placed to assess the necessity of the measure, yet it finds itself apt 
to criticize a mainstream religion. Although the court’s decision in on the grounds of 
maintenance of neutrality is understandable, the objectivity of the court in reaching its 
conclusions is questionable, as will be demonstrated by an analysis of the choice of language 
used in the judgement.   
The court’s use of the term ‘appears to be imposed’ 
The use of the term ‘appears to be imposed’ in Dahlab843 is suggestive of negative 
connotations, in the sense that there is a doubt on such a prescription which has a basis in the 
Qur’an, which would be questioning whether it is a manifestation of a belief, an issue the court 
had avoided a discussion on. The fact that the court proceeded to discuss Article 9 (2) means 
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the assumption was already made, something which was directly affirmed in Sahin.844 The use 
of such a phrase is surprising, considering most religions impose requirements on their 
followers of one form or another, so why would it be an issue if it was a Qur’anic imposition? 
The impositions can come from culture, family, or indeed the state itself as in Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Afghanistan. More importantly the Qur’an simply offers a way of life which Muslims 
can choose in accordance with an important Qur’anic injunction that there is no compulsion in 
religion. The phrase used by the court has subordinate connotations, suggesting the women in 
question had no choice but to comply with the imposition. Considering in both cases the 
women were adults who were both educated and autonomous, there is no reason to suggest 
that the wearing of the hijab was due to an imposition, rather it was a voluntary act which 
both applicants freely decided to engage in thus there is no cause to question their choice. 
The hijab as a ‘precept’ of Qur’an 
The Federal court used the term ‘precept’845 in a fleeting manner which should not have been 
used without discussion of the influences different interpretations of Islamic texts can have 
and lead to different contextual meanings associated with the hijab. Indeed some radical 
interpretations of the Qur’an can lead to unjust treatment that is gender biased and as 
discussed in previous chapters there is a body of literature and a drive by some Muslim 
feminists who aim to eliminate gender inequalities with re-reading of the Islamic texts from a 
woman’s perspective. It is inappropriate for the court to use such a term in the absence of the 
associated discussion of its relevance, particularly in the absence of any evidence of a forced 
imposition of the hijab on the applicant. Such disparaging comments by a national court 
should have been meted with disapproval by the ECtHR rather than acceptance, and has 
rightly attracted academic criticism: 
 
The role of the court is not to ‘put on trial’ books like Koran – the milestone of a 
hugely complex and changing religious tradition of practice and interpretation…it 
is also noteworthy that the ECtHR has double standards: the court has never 
passed such sweeping negative verdicts over the Bible, even if one can easily find 
statements that are at loggerheads with the contemporary understanding of 
democracy and gender equality.846 
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The ECtHR was wrong in endorsing the Federal court’s views on imposition of Qur’anic 
precepts and instead of condemnation of such disparaging comments, since they had no 
relevance to the legal reasoning and neither was it a matter for the ECtHR to consider as that 
would be outside the court’s competency, it tacitly approved them. The court’s generalized 
approach to this issue indicates that it is more at comfort to attributing negative stereotypes 
which deem Muslim women who veil as oppressed and in need of saving, irrespective of the 
assertions by both applicants that they wore the hijab through their own free will. And despite 
the applicants’ arguments that it was the state that was imposing rules on how they were to 
dress, the court still proceeds on the reasoning that rules of religious clothing were imposed 
on the applicants by the Qur’an. The court clearly does not acknowledge the different 
motivations and contexts associated with those who wear religious dress which is a 
consequence of the failure to listen to the voices of women who engage in that practice.  
The hijab being ‘difficult to reconcile’ with gender equality 
The use of the phrase ‘difficult to reconcile’847 raises similar issues. The court having made such 
a strong statement to the effect that Muslim women who wear the hijab are subjugated 
irrespective of the facts before them; both women were educated, professional and strong 
willed who protested against restrictions on hijab, raised gender inequality arguments against 
the authorities and were able to litigate in order to realize their rights. Judge Tulkens’ dissent 
questions such a paternalistic approach taken by the European court: 
 
It is not the Court’s role to make an appraisal of this type – in this instance a 
unilateral and negative one – of a religion or religious practice, just as it is not its 
role to determine in a general and abstract way the signification of wearing the 
headscarf or to impose its viewpoint on the applicant. In this connection, I fail to 
see how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from 
following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be 
taken to have freely adopted. Equality and non-discrimination are subjective rights 
which must remain under the control of those who are entitled to benefit from 
them. ‘Paternalism’ of this sort runs counter to the case-law of the Court, which 
has developed a real right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8.848 
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This type of paternalism does not resonate well with Howard either who states that ‘Banning 
headscarves and other religious symbols is just as paternalistic and oppressive of women as 
forcing them to wear these’.849Indeed there are cases where the state needs to adopt a 
paternalistic approach in order to further gender equality. This may be where there is  
evidence that there could be pressure on children or that there may be other choices available 
to an applicant that don’t depart from the basic tenets of their beliefs as in the UK case of 
Shabina Begum.850 The issue in the case was of a young girl in secondary school who wished to 
wear a jilbab (an Islamic cloak) instead of a prescribed school uniform chosen after 
consultation with the faith communities. The uniform chosen by the school was Salwar 
Kameez which was agreed by both the school and the parents. The then House of Lords 
dismissed her appeal under Article 9 on the ground that if the applicant was allowed to wear a 
Jubba it would exert unjust pressure on the other girls against their wishes to wear the same. 
Although Poulter argues the distinction between what amounts to a debate between parents 
and children as to what constitutes religious clothing and what amounts to patriarchal 
impositions of clothing is a very fine one.851 
 
It is a concern that in both cases concerning the hijab, the ECtHR appeared to be endorsing the 
stereotypical viewpoint that Muslim women who veil are oppressed and those who say they 
do so through choice, are victims of false consciousness. In this case the adoption of such 
restrictive viewpoints by the court highlights that women at the centre of wearing religious 
attire, are not only unheard by the religious and feminist discourses discussed in part one of 
the thesis, but by the courts too, who should be listening to and protecting the rights of 
Muslim women when they come before them to claim their human rights. It is unfortunate 
that the interpretation of gender equality in both cases failed to consider the individual 
applicant’s perspective of wearing the hijab and could deprive them of education and 
employment which would promote the gender equality of Muslim women rather than erode 
it. The court failed to realise that for some Muslim women, the hijab offers a means of 
accessing public spaces and to education, through which Muslim women can make the 
advances in life, renegotiating the gender imbalances, which may exist and at the same time 
enable other younger women in a household further opportunities of the public space. By 
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prohibiting the use of the hijab in public institutions the women are being confined to 
practicing certain aspects of their faith in the private, with the same if not more gender 
inequality.  Furthermore the hardship that may be caused to those who are coerced into 
wearing the hijab by family or the community can only be compounded as such legal 
pronouncements could only further endorse such practices and deprive them of educational 
and employment aspirations. The consequence of the court’s failure to consider the 
perspective of the woman at the centre of the debate is that the principle of gender equality 
was directly pitched against personal autonomy and as such, the court went against its own 
jurisprudence on the right to personal autonomy. 
 
According to Marshall the court in Sahin failed to offer an adequate analysis of such a pitting of 
these issues and should have involved ‘upholding a form of equality that acknowledges 
difference,’ the re-inforcement of ‘women’s sense of their own identity’ through the 
promotion of individual choice. This choice includes what they wish to wear and if veiling 
practices are going to be declared oppressive, that should be furnished with evidence and 
evaluation of the social impact prohibition of veiling would have on them.852  Similarly Radacic, 
in tune with Marshall’s assertions, argues that ‘The ruling displays a lack of sensitivity to 
difference, including cultural and religious identity…’853 She notes that, had the court 
‘conceptualized equality as challenging disadvantage’ and applied an ‘ethics of care approach’ 
then the court could have ‘found a way to reconcile the principle of gender equality with the 
right to personal autonomy’. And that the disadvantage approach would mean that forcing and 
prohibiting veiling would both constitute a breach of the Convention, the focus being on the 
equality of treatment rather than the results.854  
 
The identification of gender equality as a reason to prohibit the wearing of the hijab by the 
ECtHR in both cases simply imposed an abstract reasoning that the hijab is a symbol of gender 
inequality imposed on women only, irrespective of their free choice and therefore oppressive. 
There does however, exist a body of feminist discourse that supports this view 855 but 
conversely there is discourse that declares the wearing of hijab is a method of achieving 
gender equality in public space, and is certainly not perceived as subjugation by those Muslim 
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women who decide to wear it on their own will.856 There is no doubt that there may be some 
Muslim women who may be coerced into wearing such religious attire and thus laws 
prohibiting such practices may have the effect of protecting their dignity and equal rights, 
whilst preserving secular values. But there is a lack of empirical evidence to this effect, due to 
the difficulty of accessing such women and the effect of religiosity of the researcher that can 
distort the responses.857 The adoption of a stance by the court without any empirical evidence 
can lead to an inference that it is because the hijab was perceived as a threat from a specific 
religion and not because the woman at the centre was the focus of protection. The court 
simply used the label ‘gender inequality’ without engagement into the meaning of the term 
and how it applied to the applicant, and in any event, it was contrary to the applicant’s 
assertion of Article 14 ECHR that the prohibition on hijab against her itself was discriminatory 
to her as a woman.  
 
In Dahlab, the applicant raised the argument that the restriction of the hijab was 
discriminatory against her as a male Muslim teacher can teach in state school without any 
restrictions, whilst a Muslim woman manifesting her beliefs could not. But the court avoided a 
direct response to her and instead, forwarded a comparator with someone of a different 
religion and on the issue of gender discrimination by the applicant, the Dahlab court in 
dismissing the Article 14 claim stated: 
 
The applicant was prohibited, purely in the context of her professional duties, 
from wearing an Islamic headscarf was not directed at her as a member of the 
female sex but pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the neutrality of the State 
primary-education system. Such a measure could also be applied to a man who, in 
similar circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identified him as a member of a 
different faith.858 
 
Although the court had already dealt with the issue of the same prohibition that would apply 
to religious symbols of other faiths, it would have been interesting to see how the court would 
have dealt with a male teacher of the Sikh faith with a turban and whether that would have 
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been termed a ‘powerful external symbol’, begging the question if Sikh men who wear turbans 
can ever become primary school teachers in Switzerland? It is also possible that the applicant 
could be the subject of gender discrimination if a Muslim male school teacher who wore a 
beard on the grounds that it was an Islamic mandate in Islam, which some Muslim men believe 
to be the case, was allowed to teach. In such a case a distinction would have to be made 
between religious clothing as symbols and other forms of symbolism such as beards or if an 
orthodox Jewish female teacher wore a wig which the children could clearly identify as such? 
Such questions warranted exploration by the court due to a strong claim by the applicant but 
were evaded by the court.  
 
Indeed the discourse that perceives the hijab as a sign of male domination brackets all Muslim 
women as homogenous without exploring contextual and situational meanings of the hijab. It 
also fails to address the question why all Muslim women do not wear the hijab? The hijab does 
not have a static meaning and a good example of some of the permutations that can exist is 
implicit in McGoldrick’s statement: 
 
The empirical evidence is that different members and generations within the same 
family can take different views on the headscarf-hijab. A grandmother might wear 
it, a mother not. One daughter then follows the grandmother, the other the 
mother. A wife might wear it even though her husband would prefer that she did 
not. In an immigration context, the first generation may seek to be invisible so as 
to gain acceptance, while the second and subsequent generations seek to be 
visible so as to gain recognition. If each individual seems to make their own free 
and informed decision then a very strong interest would be needed to override 
their views.859 
 
It is contended that this ‘very strong interest’ overriding the applicant’s case, particularly in 
Sahin860 was absent, and assertions that the applicants and other Muslim women do wear the 
hijab through their own free will was not considered by the ECtHR. Furthermore, it was not the 
court’s role to make judgements about gender inequality in the absence of any empirical 
evidence and the dissenting judgement of Judge Tulkens is explicit in the misappropriation of 
the court’s role in this respect. Although it is questionable whether the state can ever have a 
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positive obligation to prohibit headscarves in the private sphere under Article 9 or any other 
provision in the absence of some identifiable harm:  
 
It is not the Court's role to make an appraisal of this type — in this instance a 
unilateral and negative one - of a religion or religious practice, just as it is not its 
role to determine in a general and abstract way the signification of wearing the 
headscarf or to impose its viewpoint on the applicant... Finally, if wearing the 
headscarf really was contrary to the principle of the equality of men and women in 
any event, the State would have a positive obligation to prohibit it in all places, 
whether public or private.861 
 
The wearing of the hijab does not signal an absence of choice and there are many other 
positive reasons for wearing it despite the politicization of the religious symbol862 from a 
Muslim woman’s perspective, as shown in the previous chapters of the thesis. Although the 
position of teachers in schools is different as they have a choice, but for a student faced with a 
higher education establishment prohibits the hijab or leaving and not being able to pursue 
higher education has major ramifications for Muslim women’s options when it comes to 
making choices, thereby attenuating their freedom. Restrictions on the hijab can drive young 
girls to remain at home in effect depriving them of a right to education or the placing of them 
in religious schools which tend to be segregated by gender and therefore can actually 
propagate gender inequality, instead of eliminating or protecting them from it, a consequence 
which the court failed to consider.  
The hijab as a symbol of intolerance  
The court in Sahin863 by asserting that the hijab is not compatible with a tolerant, secular 
society respecting rights and freedoms of others appears to be politicizing the issue on the 
grounds of the surge of extreme political movements. The court here is imposing its own 
failure in giving recognition to the fundamental freedom of religion and holding it inferior to 
the opinion that secularism is a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of human rights. Secularism 
does not mean the absence of religion altogether from the public sphere since the principle of 
toleration itself requires respect for diversity and difference. 
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The Dahlab 864court’s judgement was a first indication that the hijab worn by teachers in 
schools had the effect on the rights of others and some Islamic precepts were not compatible 
with the ECHR. Considering it was the first case where a state employee was involved and the 
issue was becoming an important one, it is surprising that the ECtHR judgment is limited in 
discussion in comparison to the Federal court. In neither case was there any evidence 
tendered to show that the applicants had imposed their own views on either the children in 
the Dahlab case, or other older university students in Turkey. Understandably there was a 
requirement from a state employee to be seen as religiously neutral in a state school, even 
though Muslim pupils were allowed to wear Muslim dress. However the requirement for a 
university student to be religiously neutral in classes cannot be readily understood as it is the 
state or state employees who are required to be neutral and not the students. There was no 
intolerance of others’ beliefs demonstrated in either case, nor were there any indications of 
violent protests. Although Leyla Sahin the applicant did organise a peaceful protest at the 
university’s rules on restricting the wearing of the hijab, but at no point of her stay at the 
university was she linked to any contact or belonging to extreme groups. Despite the lack of 
any link between the applicant and extremist movements, the court in Sahin informed by the 
state’s arguments is suggesting that by manifesting the requirements of Islam, as in the 
applicant’s case, it sends out a message of intolerance, whilst the Turkish principle of secularity 
is a principle of tolerance under threat from fundamentalism or as the court notes ‘political 
Islam’. 865  
 
There was no concrete evidence of the proselytising effects or indeed any particular student 
who had been subjected to such effects by the hijab. Neither the university nor the court made 
any reference to the existence of such evidence, nor was there any evidence presented from 
any other university in Turkey. Yet the conjectural linking of the hijab to what could be 
considered proselytism and political Islam by one university, leads to Muslim women in every 
Turkish university to be deprived of their right to freedom of religion. This reasoning follows 
what can only be described as illogical, as it suggests that the approach taken by the court was 
that, as there were fundamentalist political groups in Turkey who believe Muslim women 
should wear the hijab in public spaces, any restriction on the wearing of hijab would be Article 
9 compliant.  
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The correct approach to the issue should have been the court establishing the existence and 
the nature of activities such groups had been engaged at the university in question and 
whether such activities did indeed threaten public order at the university, and if so, were those 
students disciplined for the disruptive activities?. Furthermore if there were any activities by 
extremist groups trying to impose pressure on non-hijab wearing students to conform to their 
pressures, were any measures put in place by the university that proved unsuccessful and 
hence the ban was in response to that failure? But the court did not engage in such fact finding 
enquiry, had it done so it would not only have highlighted the weakness of the state’s case but 
would also have alerted the court to the questionable approach it had adopted. Thus the court 
without any explanation seemed to have endorsed a relationship between the hijab and its 
fundamentalist connotations that disrupt public order and threaten Turkish secularism, a point 
to which Judge Tulkens made a strong objection noting that simply because the GC gave 
recognition to the importance of secularism for protection of democracy in Turkey, the court 
was still obliged to show that restricting the hijab was a democratic necessity, since religious 
freedom was also a founding principle of democratic societies.866 
 
In declaring the hijab as a symbol of intolerance, the ECtHR seems to have relied on a 
hypothetical argument stating that the ‘impact which wearing such a symbol which is 
presented as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who chose not to wear it’.867 This 
line of reasoning is almost analogous to the Dahlab868 case except in the present case the 
‘others’ are not children and has the hallmarks of conjecture as justification, especially since 
the court did not apply the same reasoning reciprocally. Had the court done so, it would have 
led to a discussion of the impact the prohibition may have on those who wear the hijab 
through choice. Such consequences could be being deprived of education and employment 
opportunities which would amount to gender discrimination being endorsed by the court as 
opposed to endorsing it. The reference to the impact on other students is a surprising 
approach for the ECtHR to take as McGoldrick notes: 
 
University students will be mature adults who are in a context where tolerance is 
essential and diversity is often valued. Adults might be expected to be capable of 
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dealing with or resisting any negative pressures emanating from another person’s 
religious clothing or its external symbolism.869 
 
The GC appeared to have adopted the chamber’s approach, which in turn was based on the 
Turkish Constitutional court’s view that the headscarf was a political statement, and therefore, 
could be restricted on the grounds of maintaining public order and to defend Turkey’s 
constitutional principle of secularism. The GC relied on the following reasoning of the Chamber 
in what amounted to a political discourse linking the mere wearing of the hijab with extreme 
fundamentalist groups: 
 
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political 
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious 
symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts... It has 
previously said that each Contracting State may, in accordance with the 
Convention provisions, take a stance against such political movements, based on 
its historical experience. The regulations concerned have to be viewed in that 
context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aims referred 
to above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the university.870 
 
This aspect of the judgement was rebuked by Judge Tulkens the dissenting judge from Belgium 
who recognised the negative stereotyping of the hijab and it being declared a symbol of 
extremism without ascertaining its meaning to the applicant: 
 
Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated with fundamentalism and it is 
vital to distinguish between those who wear the headscarf and ‘extremists’ who 
seek to impose the headscarf as they do other religious symbols. Not all women 
who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that 
the applicant held fundamentalist views. She is a young adult woman and a 
university student and might reasonably be expected to have a heightened 
capacity to resist pressure, it being noted in this connection that the judgment fails 
to provide any concrete example of the type of pressure concerned. The 
applicant’s personal interest in exercising the right to freedom of religion and to 
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manifest her religion by an external symbol cannot be wholly absorbed by the 
public interest in fighting extremism.871 
 
The majority in the court found that the wearing of the hijab was contrary to the principle of 
secularism and was illustrative of gender inequality, and therefore found no violation of the 
applicant’s Article 9 rights. But the court failed to address the applicant’s arguments that, the 
same values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others and equality before the law of men 
and women should allow her to succeed in wearing the hijab.872Regrettably the court was 
more concerned with upholding Turkey’s secularism, without which it would not have been 
able to comply with Convention requirements instead of the applicant’s Article 9 rights, 
resulting in the state authorities being afforded a wide margin of appreciation. An important 
opportunity was lost by the GC to exercise greater supervisory jurisdiction and lay down some 
foundational principles upholding the right to manifest one’s religion using symbols. Instead 
the court chose to hide behind the shield of a wide margin of appreciation on the grounds that 
there was a lack of consensus amongst the contracting states. The ECtHR simply accepted the 
Turkish Constitutional court’s reasoning that, secularism is a defender of democratic values 
and as such prevents state preferences to specific religions or beliefs, thereby protecting 
individuals from religious fundamentalists and the ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion could be 
restricted in order to defend those values and principles’.873 The ECtHR found these principles 
to be in tune with Convention values, stating that they are ‘in harmony with the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, may be considered necessary to protect the democratic system 
in Turkey’.874  
Incompatibility of the hijab as religious right with secularism 
The ECtHR cited the Refah Partisi875 case, in which the court referring to principles of 
secularism noted that ‘An attitude which fails to respect that principle will not necessarily be 
accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the 
protection of Article 9 of the Convention’.876 The Sahin court here appears to weigh secularism 
against freedom of religion, instead of looking to harmonise the two and leaves open a 
question that if secularism is compatible with convention values, then secularism should also 
be able to meet the requirements for protection of religion. And as the court deems the state 
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as an impartial entity, that accommodates or organises religious pluralism, there will no doubt 
be friction between religious groups albeit they belong to the same religion as in Turkey. The 
role of the state in such circumstances is ‘not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating 
pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each other’ as stated in Serif v. 
Greece.877 Yet elimination of religious pluralism is exactly what Turkey was aiming to do by 
preventing those Muslim students, who believed it was their religious duty to wear the hijab in 
public from being able to do so in universities. 
 
The role of the Turkish state in this respect was thus to ensure that all groups were able to 
manifest their beliefs autonomously without any external influences, whether by wearing the 
hijab in university or freedom from being pressurised into wearing it. This duty should have 
been discharged by the Turkish authorities and the court should have probed the question 
otherwise it leads to a gap in any later proportionality analysis. However this did not happen 
and no such evidence was presented or any question raised by the court in this respect.  
According to Martinez-Torron the ECtHR appears to have applied the principle of state 
neutrality in a distorted manner whereby it has allowed the state to remove visibility of 
religion from the public space. He claims that as in Dahlab ‘the court seemed to take it for 
granted that the neutrality of the public sphere is best served when religion is absent or at 
least invisible’.878 It is thus paradoxical that the same neutrality that prevents the state judging 
religious doctrines is being used to justify the negation of manifesting religious beliefs by way 
of prohibiting hijab in educational establishments.879  
 
The Turkish government and the European court failed to demonstrate that Turkish secularism 
and public order was under threat and arguably both the state and the court were attempting 
to preserve public order and secularism. This led to judge Tulkens asserting in very strong 
terms that the court had failed to provide real protection to religious practices by intervening 
and exercising genuine judicial supervision: 
 
The Grand Chamber recognised the force of the principle of secularism did not 
release it from its obligation to establish that the ban on wearing the Islamic 
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headscarf to which the applicant was subject was necessary to secure compliance 
with that principle and, therefore, met a ‘pressing social need’. Only indisputable 
facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt – not mere worries or fears – 
are capable of satisfying that requirement and justifying interference with a right 
guaranteed by the Convention. Moreover, where there has been interference with 
a fundamental right, the Court’s case-law clearly establishes that mere 
affirmations do not suffice: they must be supported by concrete examples. Such 
examples do not appear to have been forthcoming in the present case.880 
 
The court seemed to have sided with Turkey in lending a hand in controlling to what it termed 
as ‘political Islam’ at the expense of engaging in a meaningful discussion on how the headscarf 
threatened the principles of secularism. The Sahin case had undertones of the court’s previous 
jurisprudence as a mechanism to control political Islam which had already commenced with 
the Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey.881 In this case, just like Sahin, the court adopted the use 
of terms such as ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ quite loosely, without explaining 
what the terms mean, and why they are being used without any demand of evidence from the 
state.  The Grand Chamber in Refah Partisi upheld the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision 
to dissolve the Refah Partisi Party that was in government on the grounds of the political 
activities the party was engaged in, which included the imposition of Sharia law, 
encouragement of wearing headscarves in public establishments and setting up a plural legal 
system threatening the principles of secularism. The action was commenced under Article 11 
of the ECHR, the right to freedom of association.  
 
The Grand Chamber in Refah Partisi882 took a surprising approach by departing from its 
previous treatment of similar issues involving previous political parties, resulting in opposite 
decisions.883 The European court in the past has described the dissolution of a political party as 
a ‘drastic’ and a ‘radical’ step,884 but it had done just that, not simply a dissolution of a political 
party, but one that was in power. To have dealt with similar issues in the past should have 
been ample opportunity for the European court to develop its jurisprudence on actions raising 
multiple issues that include political parties, democracy, human rights, secularism and religion 
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and how each element interacts with the others. Yet in both cases it failed to do so. One 
concern about both decisions is the penetration of political motives into what should have 
been purely legal judgements, the avoidance of political motivation or influence is something 
which the court had proud history of, but both judgements fail to reflect that.  
 
Turkey used the concept of ‘militant democracy’885 a form of action that itself is undemocratic 
in order to dislodge an extreme party in power, which led Boyle to argue that the Grand 
Chamber judgement was ‘wrong and unfortunate’ and the opinion of the minority judges who 
held the dissolution of the party was disproportionate, is to be preferred.886 According to 
Boyle, the criticism doesn’t come from the dissolution of the party but the ‘court’s application 
to the facts of this case in the light of Convention law.’887 Just like the Sahin case888, in Refah 
Partisi the ECtHR deferred to the state’s argument that the government should be removed 
from power on the grounds that it was a centre of activities contrary to the principles of 
secularism; one of these activities being encouraging the wearing of headscarves in public 
establishments. The two dissenting judges Haşim Kılıç and Sacit Adalı in Refah Partisi were of 
the opinion that in a pluralist system there should be room for debate about ideas thought to 
be disturbing or even shocking, echoing the judgement of Handyside.889 However, the Grand 
Chamber agreed with Turkey dissolving the Refah Partisi party, noting that limitations can be 
imposed on Article 9 rights with respect to religious affiliation and use of the hijab.890 
 
It is a concern for religious freedom, a fundamental democratic right, when the Grand 
Chamber accepts the Turkish government’s argument that encouraging the wearing of the 
headscarf by the chairman of the party before it was in government891 amounts to a reason for 
dissolution of the party. This is not only extraordinary, but indicates the association of the 
headscarf with an extreme religious ideology, an association, which is an affront to the woman 
who wears it as a manifestation of her religious belief and is beginning her life as a student, 
                                                          
885
 A term coined in  Karl Loewenstain, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights’ (1937) 31 
American Political Science Review 638 
886
 Kevin Boyle, ‘Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Partisi Case’ (2004) 1 Essex Human 
Rights Review 1http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/vol1no1.html accessed 18 November 2010 
887
 Ibid 4 
888
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 28) 
889
 Handyside v. United Kingdom, supra (n 630) para 49 
890
 Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 662) para 91-92 
891
 Extracts of the speeches  at para 25 chamber judgment  “... when we were in government, for four 
years, the notorious Article 163 of the Persecution (Torture) Code was never applied against any child in 
the country. In our time there was never any question of hostility to the wearing of headscarves...” 
 “... [University] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power”. 
213 
 
tarnished with an incorrect reading of the meaning of the headscarf; a dangerous 
fundamentalist symbol of intolerance contrary to secularism.  
Secularism versus political and religious expression before the ECtHR  
The ECtHR tainting the hijab as a symbol of gender inequality, intolerance and political Islam 
does not resonate with its own judgement when it concerns freedom of expression. For 
example in Gunduz v. Turkey892 the applicant participated in a debate on a television 
programme that was broadcasted live. The applicant  in his capacity as a religious leader with 
the intention of giving a presentation on the sect he belonged to, which attracted a lot of 
attention due to the black robes they wore, the manner in which they chanted and the sticks 
carried by its members. The programme lasted a number of hours and involved discussions via 
live link with other commentators. After initial discussions, he mounted an attack on live 
television on secularism, democracy and Kemalism. The following is an extract of some of the 
statements he made:  
 
Anyone calling himself a democrat, secularist ... has no religion ... Democracy in 
Turkey is despotic, merciless and impious... This secular ... system is hypocritical  
...; it treats some people in one way and others in another way ... I am saying these 
words while fully aware that they constitute a crime under the laws of tyranny ... 
Why would I stop speaking? Is there any other way than death? 893 
 
His comments then became more offensive, one of them being that 'If [a] person has his 
wedding night after being married by a council official authorised by the Republic of Turkey, 
the child born of the union will be a [bastard] ...'894 He was charged with a criminal offence of 
‘inciting the people to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction founded on religion’ by 
the Turkish authorities. He brought an action to the ECtHR under Article 10 ECHR that this 
amounted to a restriction on his right to freedom of expression. The European court agreed 
with him holding that the state’s actions in convicting him was a violation of his Article 10 right 
to freedom of expression, the court noting that: 
 
Expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, 
including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10 
of the Convention. However, the Court considers that the mere fact of defending 
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sharia, without calling for violence to establish it, cannot be regarded as ‘hate 
speech’...895 
 
It is then questionable why someone who attacks secularism and democracy in Turkey, 
including an attack on people’s morality whilst defending Sharia is found to be protected by 
the court. Yet a peaceful Muslim student who wears a hijab to university without showing any 
signs of intolerance or offence to others, who had no intention, nor did she actually incite 
anyone to wear the hijab, is considered such a dangerous a threat to Turkish secularism and is 
not afforded the same protection by the Convention.  
 
Such a disparity in the application of the convention principles is apparent in the court’s 
treatment of the Sahin896 case where her article 9 and 10 rights were denied whilst Gunduz’s 
Article 10 rights were protected. In both cases there were important rights involved 
considered fundamental in a democratic society but indifferent treatment where a restriction 
in Sahin was considered necessary but not in Gunduz. This can only suggest that in terms of the 
court adjudicating on democratic values, such as secularism and the rights of others, the ECtHR 
is inconsistent as the Gunduz decision clearly challenges the court’s own reasoning in Sahin. 
Similarly in the recent case of Murat Vural v. Turkey897concerning an applicant who brought an 
action under Article 10 because he was imprisoned for pouring paint on a statute of Ataturk, 
which was a criminal offence under Turkish law. He argued that he was exercising his freedom 
of expression and that his actions were to express his dissatisfaction with the Turkish 
authorities, who were running the country in accordance with Kemalist ideology and his 
actions amounted to criticising the ideology itself. The ECtHR held that his imprisonment for 
his acts breached his Article 10 rights. The court’s differential treatment between those 
claiming Article 9 rights and those who claim the other personal freedom rights such as private 
life and freedom of expression means that the Article 9 applicant is at a detriment, as it affords 
far less protection, a view also adopted by Lewis who asserts that the ECtHR is ‘guilty of 
disparity of treatment’898 whilst McGoldrick notes that:  
 
Where religious dress is associated with conveying an element of political speech 
or as part of a political process it might be expected to benefit from the high 
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protection afforded to political speech and so restrictions on it would be difficult 
to satisfy. However…such religious expression via dress has not been highly 
protected and restrictions have been more readily accepted as justified in a 
number of contexts.899 
The margin of appreciation and proportionality analysis  
The GC having found that there was a basis for the restrictions on wearing the hijab under 
Turkish law, for the aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and protection of 
public order, which are legitimate aims under Article 9 (2) leaving the question of necessity of 
the restrictions in a democratic society to be addressed. For the purposes of the review by the 
court, the main reason advocated for prohibiting the hijab in universities by the Turkish state 
was to avert the potential for the rise in fundamentalism and to maintain public order. It is in 
this respect that the state was afforded a wide margin of appreciation. The GC during its 
discussion of the standard of review stated the principle of subsidiarity in that national 
authorities were better placed to assess local necessities. And since the question was one of 
regulating the relationship of religion and the state, the specific restrictive measures were up 
to a point left to the state concerned as it is in a better position to understand the national 
context.900  
 
Even though the state is afforded a level of deference, the court can review decisions to 
ensure restrictions are justified and proportionate, thus the margin of appreciation goes hand 
in hand with the court’s supervision.901 However, the court somewhat dampens the intended 
supervision straight away when it refers to the special importance given to the role of the 
national decision making body stating that ‘This will notably be the case when it comes to 
regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational establishments…’902 This is rather a 
surprising reference, particularly as the court had already stated the importance of the 
national authorities in matters of religion and the state and in the absence of any previous 
precedents concerning religious symbols and higher educational establishments, suggests the 
GC may already have been primed to give an additional level of deference where religious 
symbols were concerned.  
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The court in its determination of the width of the margin of appreciation and the subsequent 
intensity of the review should consider factors such as the seriousness of the interference, the 
nature of the right involved and the position of the applicant in in its assessment of whether 
the interference was necessary.903 But this assessment is lacking in the judgement, had it been 
considered the court would have given effect to the applicant’s assertions that she wore the 
hijab through her own free will without any pressure from someone and her intentions for 
wearing it were not to place any pressure on any other student to do so. From the facts the 
applicant did not associate with any fundamentalist group, and neither did her motivations for 
wearing of the hijab give rise to the link between her wearing it and political Islam. In this case 
freedom of belief and religion was at stake which by the court’s own jurisprudence is 
fundamental to a democratic society904 and the effect on the applicant in her pursuit of higher 
education could have been and indeed was severe. Yet the court does not engage in discussion 
of such important factors before declaring a wide margin of appreciation to Turkey leading to a 
flaw in the court’s determination of the width due to a relaxed scrutiny. 
 
A state is entitled to and at times it is necessary to limit individual rights, in order to ensure the 
rights of others are respected. The Turkish government had a duty towards those who did not 
agree with the wearing of the hijab and fundamentalism was on the rise. This duty extended to 
protect those who wanted to keep the public space secular and free from religion as well as 
from influence of those who do, as the suggestion could be that those who do not wear the 
hijab are not good Muslims. The same reasoning and correctly so, was adopted by the UK 
domestic case Shabina Begum905 except there was strong evidence that by allowing one school 
pupil from all the others to wear a jilbab, would place psychological pressure on the others 
who would be seen as non-conformist to their Islamic faith, and there was evidence to this 
effect from the other students. But in Sahin the court did not make any reference, nor was 
there any evidence tendered by the Turkish authorities of any specific instances of any 
movements of extremists within the university, who had been attempting to impose their 
religious beliefs on other students. And if there were any instances where the measures taken 
to prevent that happening again were insufficient? Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion 
highlights the court’s failure to draw a distinction between, those who wear the hijab as a 
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religious obligation and through free choice and those extremists who wear it to impose their 
views on others.906  
 
The other ground put forward by the Turkish authorities for holding that there was a pressing 
social need, was the need to prevent a threat to the public order at the university. This ground 
was also accepted by the court without any references to instances of public disorder at the 
university. There had been peaceful protests by the applicant with no resulting disorder or 
complaints of any threats to other students. But despite the state’s failure to reach the 
standard of proof, the court still deferred a wide margin of appreciation. It can be argued that 
the court was motivated by an endeavour to control political Islam, at the expense of adhering 
to an already questionable bandwidth of the margin of appreciation. Particularly since the 
court did not inquire into the issue of whether any of the other Turkish universities also viewed 
the hijab as a threat to public order at their campuses. And if so, were the extremist 
movements referred to by the court operational at other universities in trying to impose their 
extreme religious views via the hijab?907 In the Karaduman908 case where a higher education 
student was prevented from graduating in her studies because she refused to remove her 
hijab for a photograph for the diploma, the court also failed to examine this issue attracting 
criticism from Evans.909 It is contended that this assessment by the court was a crucial one and 
since the court accepted there was an interference with the applicant’s right under Article 9, 
the burden of justifying interference was on the university. Thus any nexus between the hijab 
and extremist groups and the hijab being a threat to public order, was for the university to 
prove, which it failed to do so, before allowing a wide margin of appreciation to Turkey. The 
use of mere affirmations by the Turkish authorities instead of evidence by way of concrete 
examples of the threat posed by the hijab was a concern clearly echoed by Judge Tulkens: 
 
Only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt – not mere 
worries or fears – are capable of satisfying that requirement and justifying 
interference with a right guaranteed by the Convention. Moreover, where there 
has been interference with a fundamental right, the Court’s case-law clearly 
establishes that mere affirmations do not suffice: they must be supported by 
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concrete examples…Such examples do not appear to have been forthcoming in the 
present case.910 
 
The assessment of the European consensus on the issue of prohibiting hijab in universities is 
an important factor in the court’s determination of the width of the margin of appreciation. 
This is because it acts as an important yardstick for the European court to use, as practices and 
values of societies change over a period of time and since the Convention is a living 
instrument,911 the ECtHR needs to be mindful of this. It has been stated frequently by the court 
that the lack of consensus at European level on the upholding of an individual’s right results in 
a wide margin of appreciation and the court in Sahin912 invoked the same approach but with a 
defective application of the principle. The court mentioned Turkey, Albania and Azerbaijan 
were the only ECHR member states, who had introduced regulations on restricting the hijab in 
universities, but did not directly compare Turkey to Albania and Azerbaijan. Instead the court 
proceeded on commenting in detail on the status of the hijab in Germany, France, UK, 
Belgium, Austria, Netherlands Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and Finland,913 none of which 
prohibited the hijab in universities.  
 
It is contended that the lack of regulation on religious headwear at universities in European 
states indicated that there was European consensus on the issue of hijab at universities, and a 
clear indication that the need to prohibit was not there. The court’s reasoning in Sahin that 
there was a lack of consensus on the issue of hijab and affording a wide margin to Turkey was 
wrong, as other than Turkey, only Azerbaijan and Albania restricted the hijab in universities. 
This indicates that there was indeed a European consensus, as none of the other states felt 
that restrictions were necessary. This view is shared by Marshall, 914 Gibson915 as well as Judge 
Tulkens in her dissenting judgement, who not only finds lack of consensus, but also a lack of 
supervision by the court that goes hand in hand with the margin of appreciation, particularly as 
the issue of restricting the hijab was not simply a local one concerning Turkey.   
 
The court afforded Turkey a wide margin accepting the state’s argument that it was necessary 
to protect the principle of secularism. This principle is protected by Turkey’s constitution and is 
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directly linked with the state’s history, where the public at large had acquiesced to keeping 
religion out of the public sphere; thus a corresponding duty on the state to give effect to it by 
prohibiting the hijab a religious symbol in public institutions keeping the public sphere free 
from religion. Although historically there is no evidence that the founder of Turkish secularism 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself prohibited the hijab, or attempted to remove it from public 
institutions. The court noted that when it came to regulating the wearing of religious symbols 
in educational establishments, especially since there was a diversity of approaches taken by 
national authorities on the issue, it was not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform 
conception of the significance of religion in society and that the meaning or impact of religious 
symbols would differ according to time and context.916  
 
The application of these principles in this respect was to Turkey’s position as a secular state, 
where the essence of keeping the public sphere secularised was being threatened by 
fundamental movements. And thus the choice and method used to protect the rights of others 
is left to the state in line with what is the most appropriate for the time and context. The 
authorities did not bar anyone from praying as required by their belief so from the 
government’s perspective they had acted proportionally; it was the least onerous means of 
achieving their aim. However, the court failed to examine the issue in detail, which is evident 
in the judgement, as the court simply accepted that Turkish secularism was in harmony with 
the rule of law and human rights and incompatible with the hijab.917 The court did not discuss 
how Turkish secularism was defined, or provide any reasoning as to how such a conclusion was 
reached. Rather it is heavily reliant on the court’s finding that secularism was without doubt 
the fundamental principle of the state and that was in harmony with the rule of law and 
human rights, even though the court and the Turkish state failed to state how that compliance 
was achieved.  In the absence of such reasoning the court leaves open a flaw that Turkey could 
take any measure restricting people’s freedom of religion and belief in the name of secularism 
which could be deemed compatible with Article 9 rights. 
 
Restrictions at primary918 and secondary919 school level have been imposed in some member 
states and the rationale behind that restriction is justifiable when contrasted with Sahin.920 For 
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example, in Dahlab921 the primary school teacher prohibited from wearing her hijab was a 
personification of the neutral state education system, and had to comply with the requirement 
of state neutrality with respect to religious expression in the class room.  Thus, the prohibition 
could be viewed as proportional to the aim pursued by the state, although the reasoning of the 
court was based in the absence of any empirical evidence on the proselytising effect of the 
hijab on young children. Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion in Sahin also points out that 
the grand chamber simply evaded the supervision it was required to exercise over Turkey in 
this instance. She was of the opinion that this was particularly important since the issue wasn’t 
just one of local importance but one of importance to all member states.922  
 
On the issue of proportionality the Grand Chamber in Sahin did not make clear how it applied 
the requirement of proportionality to the facts of the case nor did it refer to any of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence on the issue . Instead, it simply places total reliance on the Turkish court’s 
assessment of the proportionality of restrictions imposed by the university.923 The court 
seemed to be indicating that once a legitimate aim was established by the court, the 
application of the proportionality criterion would not question whether the impugned 
measures, by way of the university’s internal rules met the necessity of the prohibition of the 
hijab on university premises. A full proportionality analysis was crucial since the applicant’s 
religious right was being limited. This analysis allows a determination of whether the means 
used by the university disclosed a relationship to the legitimate aims pursued, which were 
protecting public order and the rights and freedoms of others, in other words the restriction 
was necessary in a democratic society. The necessity element is pivotal to the proportionality 
doctrine as the religious right of the applicant was one classed as fundamental by the court, 
requiring a balance to be struck between conflicts of rights. The proportionality of the measure 
is also intricately linked to the application of the margin of appreciation, which unless a 
proportionality analysis is carried out is likely to be too wide, which is why it is described as 
‘corrective and restrictive of the margin of appreciation’.924 
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In Sahin925 the applicant raised the issue that restrictions on her wearing the hijab would lead 
no alternative choice in pursuing her education. This lack of an alternative should have been 
an important factor in the court’s determination of the necessity of the proportionality of the 
measure deemed necessary by the ECtHR established principles. Yet the court did not address 
this issue when clearly in its previous judgement in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France926the 
Grand Chamber considered it an important factor. In this case the court found no breach of 
the applicants’ Article 9 rights when the French state’s refusal to grant them access to 
slaughterhouses in order to performing ritual slaughter for ‘glatt meat’  in accordance with the 
ultra-orthodox religious prescriptions. This was on the grounds that supplies of the ‘glatt meat’ 
were available from Belgium which the applicants could resort to. This points to an 
unwillingness of the court just as it did in Dahlab to listening to the voices of those concerned 
as here the applicant was clearly able and did in fact exercise her free will and freedom of 
action in wearing the hijab but she is being denied her effective freedom; a right to pursue a 
higher education on an equal footing with Muslim men. Instead the court offered a weak and a 
limited reference to the proportionality of the measures by stating: 
 
Firstly, the measures in question manifestly did not hinder the students in 
performing the duties imposed by the habitual forms of religious observance. 
Secondly, the decision-making process for applying the internal regulations 
satisfied, so far as was possible, the requirement to weigh up the various interests 
at stake. The university authorities judiciously sought a means whereby they could 
avoid having to turn away students wearing the headscarf and at the same time 
honour their obligation to protect the rights of others and the interests of the 
education system. Lastly, the process also appears to have been accompanied by 
safeguards – the rule requiring conformity with statute and judicial review – that 
were apt to protect the students’ interests…927  
 
The court did engage in a limited discussion of balancing the conflicting rights, but it suggested 
that duties imposed by the habitual forms of religious observance were not affected and that 
there was a reasonable relationship between the means used and the aim pursued. Even 
though the court refers to the Turkish authorities having judiciously sought the least restrictive 
method, the actual means considered as alternatives are not cited. Ringelheim notes that the 
                                                          
925
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 28) 
926
 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], supra ( n 729)  
927
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 28) para 159 
222 
 
court eluded a difficult question relating to the proportionality of the legitimate aim and the 
means to achieve it:  
 
Ms Sahin did not represent the state and was not in a position of authority with 
respect to other students. It was not claimed that the way she had personally 
worn the headscarf had caused any disruption or been accompanied by 
provocative or proselyte behaviour. Yet the court abstains from verifying whether 
less restrictive measures, such as sanctions limited to individuals who would have 
exerted pressure, would have permitted the pursued aims to be reached.928 
 
The court did not refer to any test of proportionality, rather the dissenting judge Tulkens 
offered a tripartite test that should have been used.929 This not only demonstrates a real a lack 
of an appropriate level of scrutiny of the proportionality of measures by the court in Sahin, but 
also indicates a weakness with judgements of the ECtHR in general, as there is no universal 
test for proportionality that is consistently applied. Even Judge Tulkens does not elaborate on 
her test but simply asserts that the reasons for the restriction on the hijab were not relevant 
and sufficient without referring to other means of a less restrictive nature.   
 
In the judgement the court attempts to justify the proportionality of the measures by stating 
that: 
 
It is quite clear that throughout that decision-making process the university 
authorities sought to adapt to the evolving situation in a way that would not bar 
access to the university to students wearing the veil, through continued dialogue 
with those concerned, while at the same time ensuring that order was 
maintained…930 
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This judicial attempt at a proportionality analysis is weak, as it is questionable how engaging in 
a dialogue with those whose rights were at stake could ever be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of proportionality analysis. No evidence was tendered, nor was there any 
discussion as to how the hijab posed a threat and or caused public disturbances at the 
university, or the way in which the hijab places psychological pressure on those women who 
do not wear it, and whether such a threat to those who do not wear the hijab was present in 
every Turkish university. If the hijab did indeed have such a link then it is questionable why it 
would only be prohibited in a university setting and not in all public places as surely the 
suggested power of coercion must be the same. It was a function of the ECtHR to assess the 
means used with the aim of establishing the proportionality of the measure concerned as part 
of its supervisory role, especially since the power of appreciation is not unlimited and goes 
hand in hand with supervision by the court.  This supervision was particularly crucial since a 
fundamental right was at stake but the following statement by the court suggests an 
abandonment of any form of such strict scrutiny: 
 
Besides, having found that the regulations pursued a legitimate aim, it is not open 
to the Court to apply the criterion of proportionality in a way that would make the 
notion of an institution’s ‘internal rules’ devoid of purpose.931 
 
 A mere symbolic linking of the symbol with political Islam perceived as a threat to Turkish 
secularism, without considering the many reasons a woman may wear the hijab for,  does not 
for the purposes of proportionality demonstrate a reasonable relationship of the applicant’s 
reasons for wearing the hijab, and the message transmitted by it to others. Otherwise such 
reasoning effectively signals a free hand to the Turkish authorities for the hijab to be restricted 
in all public spaces under the pretext of maintenance of public order.  
Adoption of negative stereotypes by the ECtHR 
There are a number of stereotypes associated with veiling held not only by non-Muslims but 
also by Muslims who question the obligatory nature of veiling. Some of these negative 
stereotypes of Muslim women have pervaded judicial reasoning in cases involving Islamic 
veiling in domestic proceedings, as well as those brought under the ECHR. There are numerous 
examples of national judges in European states who have referred to the religious status of 
veiling. For example Shadid and Van Koningsveld note that some judges in Belgium have 
commented on the religious status of the hijab such as ‘There are a sufficient number of sects 
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and/or groups in Islam where head-covering is not prescribed and even not practised’ or that 
‘The Muslim Turkish Prime Minister appears in public without a veil’.932 Such comments have 
not just been confined to national judges but even the ECtHR has fallen foul of the principle 
that the courts should not engage in discussing the legitimacy of religious beliefs held or 
whether religion does or does not prescribe a practice; that is a matter to be decided by the 
applicant subjectively.933 The legitimacy of a religious belief held is not easily appreciated by 
others, for example they may not understand the sacredness of the hair under the turban of a 
Sikh and why he protests so strongly when asked to remove it at airports,934 or why a Muslim 
schoolgirl does not want to wear shorts or take her hijab off during her sports classes,935 or 
indeed why a Muslim woman may want to cover her face in front of men.936  
 
For the woman who veils it does not matter that the practice or belief held is one of a minority 
view amongst the other sects in Islam, as noted by Nussbaum in respect of those who engage 
in a practice considered non-standard ‘If someone has a non-standard interpretation of his or 
her religion, it cuts no ice to say that the majority of that religion’s members do not agree’.937 
The ECtHR has engaged in inappropriate comments in relation to convictions held, for example 
in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia the court has said: ‘the rites and rituals of many 
religions may harm believers’ well-being, such as, for example, the practice of fasting, which is 
particularly long and strict in orthodox Christianity, or circumcision practiced on Jewish or 
Muslim babies…’938 Similarly with respect to the hijab, the ECtHR in Dahlab and Sahin has held 
the view that the hijab is not easily reconciled with the message of tolerance and respect for 
others and is a symbol of gender inequality.939 Such a stance does not just contradict the 
ECtHR own previous reasoning, but such judicial engagement in the legitimacy of beliefs is not 
only inappropriate,940 but also stigmatises the applicant leading to questioning their autonomy 
of choice in appropriating a particular meaning to the chosen practice in question. 
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The ECtHR has adopted two common stereotypes with respect to the hijab; that it is an 
expression of or propagates Islamic fundamentalism and that veiled women are victims of 
oppression. The use of such stereotypes by the ECtHR in its jurisprudence has been noted by a 
number of commentators.941 The first of the stereotypes where the court has erroneously 
arrived at the conclusion that the woman who wears a hijab, does so in order to propagate the 
fundamentalist nature of it as a symbol. She is viewed as dangerous for others and is an 
aggressor and a fundamentalist ‘who forces values onto the unwilling and undefending’.942 And 
as such has the ability to proselytise children, adult students in higher education and cause 
public disorder and protest. She also upsets the state with her symbol of intolerance, 
threatening the whole system of equality and neutrality guaranteed by a secular state.  
Although such an image of Muslim women who wear religious symbols is common in the 
mainstream media, political debate and feminist discourse, but for the court to import such 
images upon which legal reasoning is based on contradicts the spirit of the ECHR as well as 
human rights. 
 
The hijab as a symbol of inferiority and oppression of Muslim women is the second stereotype 
that has gained prevalence in the ECtHR jurisprudence. The false assumption is that Muslim 
women are coerced into veiling which facilitates gender oppression by religion, community 
and family, a view which Bullock calls ‘Popular Western cultural view’.943 The veiled woman in 
this stereotype strikes the image of the victim whose religion is gender oppressive and who is 
subjugated not only by her religion, but also fathers, brothers and husbands who force the veil 
upon the docile and passive victim. And this victim does not speak out, as she has internalised 
the oppression having adapted her religious preferences to be in tune to those who impose 
the practice on her and thus in great need of saving by the state via the ECtHR.  
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There is no doubt that there are women who have the hijab or the veil imposed on them by 
their family members. Indeed there are limited examples in qualitative research where Muslim 
women have acknowledged they veil or have done due to pressure from husbands or the 
community but not actual coercion.944 Or as in two Islamic schools in the United Kingdom who 
‘Taught their students that the face veil is a compulsory…religious practice for Muslim 
women’.945 However, such acknowledgements cannot drown the voices of all the other Muslim 
women who veil through their autonomous choice, particularly as the applicants who have 
come before the ECtHR had reminded the court of such choice-based decisions. 
 
Both stereotypes were employed by the ECtHR against two women of the same group in the 
cases of Dahlab946 and Sahin.947 But surprisingly the court overlooked the conflict between the 
two stereotypes. On the one hand these applicants were painted with the image that they 
were walking symbols of fundamentalist Islam, actively pushing extremist agendas, even 
though there was no evidence presented of this, with the supposed effect that they were 
proselytising the young impressionable children in Dahlab and the mature and autonomous 
students in university in Sahin. Yet on the other hand, the same ECtHR seemed to be on a 
mission to save these two women from the gender oppressive practice they had adopted 
through religious and familial coercion, and as subjugated victims of this patriarchy that was so 
onerous, that the court and the respondent states in both cases had to save them from their 
plights. In Evans terms, both women transform from women who need rescuing from Islam to 
women from whom everyone else needs rescuing.948 And as attempts to control these women 
by the state are undermined by the families of girls, as in France where they are forced to 
remove their hijab in schools. Their parents remove them from schools and if they force girls 
to wear the hijab the state bans them, the contestation leading to a battle of cultural 
control.949 In both cases the voices being lost are those of the women who wear the hijab, not 
just by the state, religion and family but by the court as well, a point Evans thrusts bluntly: 
 
When those who are not Christians but whose rights have been violated can gain 
no relief from the Court because the Court employs stereotypes and refuses to 
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engage with the complexity of modern religious pluralism, then religious freedom 
and pluralism are undermined and the notion of human rights degraded. 950 
Conclusion 
Despite cases such as Dahlab951 and Sahin952 concerning religious clothing coming before the 
ECtHR, it has failed to grapple with reasons why Muslim women wear the hijab and that its 
different meanings is dependent upon the Muslim woman’s own relational link with religious 
clothing. This contextual aspect of veiling is something the German Constitutional court 
commented on in the Fereshta Ludin case concerning a Muslim Teacher prohibited from 
teaching in a primary school on the grounds of wearing a hijab. McGoldrick correctly refers to 
the German Constitutional court on the issue of what a hijab actually means and symbolises, 
noting that ‘the meaning of hijab could only be determined with reference to the person 
wearing it’.953 The judges in the majority also noted that the head scarf cannot be ‘simply 
considered as a mere sign of suppression of women’.954 Yet the ECtHR failed to appreciate such 
important issues and instead gave weight at judicial level to negative stereotypes irrespective 
of the voices raised by the applicants. Instead of the court offering reasoned judgements it 
entered the domain of theological opinion, something the court had itself delivered warnings 
against. Such use of language not only blurred the reasoning of the court but failed to 
demonstrate the court’s impartiality towards the applicants.  
 
There appeared to be a departure from the established principles by the court, for example 
there is a level of dissonance with established principles when applying the limitation clauses 
of Article 9(2) in the Sahin judgement, where the GC accepts Turkeys aims of protection of 
public order and the rights and freedoms of others as the reasons for the university’s 
decision.955 But it is evident from a later part of the judgement that Turkish secularism was the 
main force behind the decision as the court stated that ‘It is the principle of secularism, as 
elucidated by the Constitutional Court …which is the paramount consideration underlying the 
ban on the wearing of religious symbols in universities’.956 Indeed secularism may have been 
the prime motivation for Turkey and its constitutional court, but the ECtHR cannot and should 
not allow it to override freedom of religion, especially since no previous judgement of the 
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court has ever interpreted the legitimate aims under Article 9(2) to include secularism. The 
court was the place where the applicants placed reliance on, yet they were dealt with an 
additional blow; being silenced and subjected to contradictory stereotypes. The controversy 
and the reluctance to understand religious symbols according to Danchin is because Islam, as 
symbolised by the headscarf, is seen through the lens of state nationalism as a threat to the 
secular character of European states.957This unease is not only evident by the prohibitions on 
veiling but other forms of Islamic symbolism such as the Swiss Minarets.958  
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CHAPTER 5 - THE ECTHR AND THE FACE VEIL 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter the application of Article 9 ECHR to the hijab worn by a student in 
higher education and a teacher in a primary school was examined. The issues with the hijab 
were different as it didn’t cover the face fully and the prohibition was in a specified location; in 
school and at university. This chapter examines the extension of those issues as the practice in 
question concerns full face covering not only in public institutions but in all public spaces. This 
chapter’s focus is on the first ever case concerning the full face veil to come before the Grand 
Chamber, where the right to wear such face coverings are prohibited under French law. The 
ECtHR has upheld that law as compliant with Article 9 ECHR on the grounds that the full face 
veil interferes with the rights of other. The chapter analyses the arguments presented by the 
French state and the applicant, together with the court’s assessment of those arguments, as 
well as the application of Article 9 jurisprudence to full face veiling in public spaces. The 
chapter then proceeds with the wider sociological arguments prevailing over veiling in public 
spaces and its impact on integration and social interaction, particularly its effect on 
communication. The discussion also engages in arguments on the court’s failure to take 
account of the voices of those women who veil. Finally, arguments are presented on the 
inadequate consideration of the application of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR to full face veiling in the 
judgement and the influence of negative stereotypes related to veiling on the court. 
 S.A.S. v. France 
In Dahlab959 and Sahin960 the European court had to deal with applicants who had been 
affected by restrictions on wearing the Islamic headscarf in educational settings by a teacher in 
Dahlab and a student in higher education in Sahin, although issues surrounding veiling and 
other religious symbols have been dealt with by national courts in other contexts, primarily in 
employment or the service sector.  In S.A.S. v. France 961 the Grand Chamber dealt with a case 
concerning full face coverings in public spaces for the first time, with the matter coming before 
it after the chamber relinquished jurisdiction under Article 30 ECHR and Rule 72 of the court 
with neither party objecting. 962 The case also attracted third party interventions by way of 
written submissions with the Belgium government given leave to take part in the hearing. 963  
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The action was brought by a 24 year old Muslim female who is a French national against 
France’s Law that ‘prohibits the concealment of one’s face in public places’.964 Under this law 
no one is permitted to wear clothing designed to conceal the face in public places,965 which are 
defined as a public highway, any place open to the public or assigned to a public service,966 
unless authorised by legislation for health or occupational reasons or if worn in context of 
sports, festivities or artistic or traditional events. The penalty for breaching the law is a 
maximum of 150 euros or a requirement to follow a citizenship course.967Anyone who uses 
threats, coercion, abuse of authority or office, on account of another’s gender forces anyone 
to conceal their face would be punished with a one year prison sentence and a fine of 60,000 
euros, with the prison sentence doubled if against a minor.968The law had been drafted in 
neutral terms targeting concealment of the face as opposed to veiling per se. 
 
The applicant voluntarily without any familial pressure wore both the burqa and the face veil 
as and when depending on her spiritual feelings, for example, during religious events such as 
Ramadhan. Her aim was not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace with herself and 
explained that she wore the niqab in public and private places but not systematically, for 
example, she would not wear it when visiting the doctor, meeting friends in a public place or 
socialising in public.969 She stressed that she did not expect to keep the veil on when asked for 
a security check at banks and airports and would remove it for identity verification purposes. 
She claimed the law breached her Article 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR rights for the following 
reasons: Article 3 because she would incur a criminal sanction if she breached the law and 
would also suffer from harassment and discrimination; Article 8 because the law prevents her 
choosing how to dress; Article 9  as the law prevents her from manifesting her religion and 
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beliefs; Article 10 because it prevents her from wearing a face veil in public places which 
denies her dressing in a way that expresses her faith, religious, cultural and personal identity; 
Article 11 since she cannot assemble with others in public wearing a face veil and Article 14 
because the French law would discriminate against her based on her gender, ethnicity and 
religion.  
The French government’s submissions 
The French government argued that their first aim under Article 9 limitations was the need for 
identification which was necessary in order to prevent danger, protect safety of people as well 
as property and to fight identity fraud. Secondly, it was to secure the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others by ensuring ‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open 
democratic society’970 which entailed three important values. The first one of these values was 
the observance of the minimum requirements of life in society. The French government argued 
that the exposure of the face is important in human interaction compared to other parts of the 
body, since the face identifies the individual as a unique person, it also embraces shared 
humanity, as well as otherness and hiding the face is to break this social requirement and 
refusing to adhere to the principle of ‘living together’ (le ‘vivre ensemble’). Secondly, the ban 
would promote equality between men and women, as concealing the face denied the women 
their existence as individuals, where their individuality is only exercised in private or 
exclusively female company. Thirdly, full face veiling effaces women from public spaces and 
was dehumanising and inconsistent with human dignity. 
 
The government did not accept veiling was emancipatory and questioned the research reports 
presented by the third party interveners, on the basis that they were conducted using small 
samples (27 and 32) using the ‘snowball method’ that was not reliable and only provided a 
partial view of reality. The government argued the measure was proportional since it allowed 
women to wear other religious dress and in any event, the penalty is small. The government 
argued Article 8 did not apply as it targeted only public places where an individual’s physical or 
private integrity was at stake and that Article 14 claims were ill placed since the prohibition 
was to address the discrimination to veiled women who become effaced from public space. 
Furthermore, the said law did not target Muslim women and effacement by the veil or burqa 
was incompatible with social existence. Finally the government argued that the restriction 
applied to everyone irrespective of the religious beliefs or gender.  
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The applicant’s arguments   
The applicant claimed the French law prevented manifestation of her Islamic belief in public 
and although the prohibition was ‘prescribed by law’971 it did not pursue the legitimate aim of 
‘public safety’972 since the measure did not address specific instances or circumstances where 
the risk to safety is high, but instead was a blanket ban applicable to almost all public places. 
She also claimed that the state’s justification, that the law is to ensure respect for ‘minimum 
requirements of life in society’ and the importance of exposed faces in French society, does 
not accommodate those cultural practices that do not share the same philosophy or non-visual 
communication. She asserted that the wearing of the veil was not to please men, but herself 
and her conscience, and an abstract idea of gender equality could deny personal choice to 
women who veiled, with the imposition of legal sanctions simply exasperating the inequality 
the measure was aimed at remedying.973 The applicant also argued that the government’s 
claim that the prohibition was to achieve respect for human dignity was an attempt to justify 
this by basing it on the negative stereotypes that wearers of the veil were effaced.974 
 
On the issue of whether the measure was ‘necessary in a democratic society’,975 the applicant 
argued that the state cannot validate religious beliefs. And that the prohibitory measure 
deterred women who veil from socialising and might breach the right to gender equality in 
International law, as noted by the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment no.28.976 
Furthermore, just because a measure has wide political support does not mean it is necessary 
in a democratic society, and even if the aim pursued by France was legitimate, it was not 
proportional, as it was not the least restrictive measure adopted by the state. 
 
On the issue of public safety, the applicant argued that it should be enough for the state to 
incorporate identity checks at locations that are a security risk, which could involve removing 
the veil only when required. As for the state’s argument in terms of ‘respect for human 
dignity’, the applicant asserted that the interests of those who oppose the veil, must be 
weighed against those of the women affected, for whom it means a choice between going 
against one’s beliefs, stay at home or breach the law. All of which would be detrimental to 
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them. Furthermore, her right to private life was affected by the prohibition in three ways: 
veiling was part of her cultural and social identity; the zone of private life in terms of social 
interaction, extended beyond the family circle and included a social dimension and that if she 
went out wearing a veil, there was a likelihood of hostility and exposure to criminal penalties. 
And In respect of Article 8 the threshold for necessity in a democratic society was higher 
compared to the limitation under Article 9 and that the state had not reached that in their 
argument. 
 
The applicant’s final argument was her Article 14 rights on grounds of sex, religion and 
ethnicity claiming this led to indirect discrimination between a Muslim woman who didn’t veil 
and one who did, as well as between a Muslim woman and a Muslim man. Furthermore, the 
French law discriminated against a Muslim veil wearer who was bound by the law even during 
Ramadhan, whereas, it did not apply to Christians participating in festivities or celebrations 
such as Catholic religious processions, carnivals or rituals. 
The Grand Chamber’s assessment of the arguments 
The GC found that the applicant’s claim for violations of Articles 3977 and 11978 were manifestly 
ill founded and the claim under Articles 8, 9 and 10 was found admissible. The court 
acknowledged that an individual’s personal choice of dress in public or private, is an expression 
of personality and part of private life protected by Article 8, and a restriction to that choice 
constitutes an interference with Article 8 rights, as it entails a dilemma for Muslim women 
between refraining from dressing according to religious belief or face a criminal penalty in 
doing so.  
 
In terms of the two legitimate aims of public safety and the protection of rights and freedoms 
of others, the court accepted that the impugned measure sought to address issues of public 
safety and noted that during its legislative stages, the explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the Bill cited that as a possibility, which was also affirmed by the Constitutional 
Council and the Counseil d’état. On consideration of the second legitimate aim ‘respect for 
minimum set of values of an open society’ for which three values were highlighted: respect for 
gender equality, human dignity and minimum requirements of life in society which could be 
connected to the protection of rights of others, the court noted that these three values did not 
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correspond with the legitimate aims stated in Articles 8(2) and Article 9 (2). The only aims 
relevant to the case on hand being ‘public order’ and the ‘protection of rights and freedom of 
others’ of which the public order is not an aim contained in Article 8(2) thus the court 
concentrated on the protection of rights and freedom of others.  
 
The court held that a state cannot invoke gender equality when a practice was defended by 
women as with the applicant and on human dignity the court noted that no matter how 
essential it may be, a blanket prohibition on concealment of the face cannot be justified by the 
state. The court reminded that even though some members of society may perceive a full face 
veil as strange, veiling is an expression of cultural identity979 that is part of pluralism, a 
democratic value and that there is no evidence that the wearer of a veil intends to act in 
contempt against members of society or to offend the others’ dignity. Finally, the court 
acknowledged ‘respect for the minimum requirements of life in society’ or as the government 
put it ‘living together’ can be associated with the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others and thus the court needed to assess whether this aim was necessary in a democratic 
society.  
The Grand Chamber’s application of Article 9  
The court found that it was not necessary to uphold the ban for reasons of public safety on the 
grounds that it would amount to a proportionate and legitimate aim only where there was a 
general threat to public safety, which the state had not shown. And that women who veil 
would have to give up, ‘…completely an element of their identity’ whereas, the state could 
achieve its aim by a simple obligation on such women to identify and themselves, where there 
was a risk of safety to people and property or a suspicion of identity fraud. Thus a blanket ban 
could not be considered necessary in a democratic society for requirements of public safety 
under Articles 8 and 9.980 
 
On the second aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others the court accepted that the 
authorities placed particular emphasis on the problematic of concealment of the face with 
‘living together’ in French society and that ‘The systematic concealment of the face in public 
places, contrary to the ideal of fraternity, ... falls short of the minimum requirement of civility 
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that is necessary for social interaction’981 making the measure justifiable in principle, so long as 
it seeks to guarantee the conditions of ‘living together’.  
 
The court acknowledged that the French law to a certain extent restricted the reach of 
pluralism, as it prevents women who veil from expressing their personality and beliefs. But the 
court was convinced by the state’s argument that the practice was incompatible with the 
ground rules of social communication and living together, which protected the principle of 
social interaction deemed essential for pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. The court 
concluded that whether someone should or not be allowed to wear a veil in public is a ‘choice 
of society’.982 Therefore the court would exercise restraint in scrutiny of compliance with the 
Convention by the state, as that would lead the court into scrutinising the balance that had 
been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question. It further 
concluded that as there was a lack of consensus on the issue surrounding veiling in public, 
France has the benefit of a wide margin of appreciation.983 Since the margin afforded is a wide 
one, the court stated that the ban was proportionate to the aim pursued of ‘living together’ as 
an element of ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ and thus no breach of either 
Article 8 or 9 of the ECHR.   
 
For the applicant’s claim under article 14 together with Articles 8 or 9, the court acknowledged 
citing D.H and Others v. the Czech Republic984 that a general ban that has a prejudicial effect 
disproportionately can be considered discriminatory even if that was not the intent or aim.  
However it indicated that it was only if a state measure did not have an objective and 
reasonable justification, in that it fails to pursue a legitimate aim or if it is not proportionate to 
the means and the aim pursued. The court concluded that in the present case this was not so 
thus no violation was found of Article 14 taken together with articles 8 or 9. The court held: 
unanimously, the complaints concerning Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention, taken 
separately and together with Article 14 of the Convention, admissible, and the remainder of 
the application inadmissible; by fifteen votes to two. It further held that there has been no 
violation of Article 8 or 9; unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 14 taken 
together with Article 8 or with Article 9 and unanimously, that no separate issue arises under 
Article 10, taken separately or together with Article 14. 
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Analysis of the Grand Chamber’s reasoning  
For the first time, a state, in this case France, by prohibiting concealment of the face has 
criminalised actions of Muslim women who veil in public spaces. Even if the veiled woman is 
welcomed or invited without any objection to her veiling, she is still caught out by the law, as 
she cannot enter that space without breaching the conditions of entering public space, which 
would be full exposure of the face, which in Vickers words ‘criminalises the manifestation of 
religion’.985 
 
There are several features of the case that warrant closer examination with the reasoning of 
the court demanding a critical examination, including some positive features of the judgement. 
Post Dahlab986 and Sahin987 it is refreshing to note that the court refrained from engaging in a 
theological opinion on the requirements or non-requirements of Islam in that veiling is not 
mandatory as most Muslim women do not veil. The court, rightly so, held that whether Muslim 
women feel veiling is obligatory is irrelevant and since the applicant’s wearing of the veil was a 
religious motivation, it was sufficient for the action to be framed under Article 9.  
 
The GC in S.A.S. took a major step forward in the right direction by putting to rest the gender 
inequality argument, a justification proving successful in prohibiting religious clothing that had 
prevailed in the ECtHR jurisprudence in its previous case law. The gender inequality and 
coercion argument featuring so vehemently in Dahlab and Sahin was rejected by the court on 
the ground that it did not apply as some women cover their faces through choice. This is a real 
recognition by the court that Muslim women can and do make choices voluntarily and can 
dispel the negative stereotype that Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil are coerced 
and even if they are not, the choice is not a real choice as it is a feature of false consciousness. 
Although the court noted that gender equality arguments can lead to restrictions of 
Convention rights, but ‘a state party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice 
that is defended by women… unless it were to be understood that individuals could be 
protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms’.988  
 
Even though the recognition of Muslim women’s choice by the court is a positive increment, 
there are still profound effects of the French law on those Muslim women who veil through 
                                                          
985
 Lucy Vickers, ‘Conform or be Confined: S.A.S. v France’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 2014)  
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?s=conform+or+be+confined> accessed 18 July 2014 
986
 Dahlab v. Switzerland, supra (n 27) 
987
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 28) 
988
 S.A.S. v. France [GC], supra (n 29) para 119 
237 
 
choice and wish to manifest their religious belief, as they would be confined to their homes, 
and being forced to disappear from the public space by the state in the absence of any 
evidence of oppression against them. This can only play into the hands of those men, if any, 
who do subjugate Muslim women leading to the opposite effect of the French laws, as these 
women would be prevented from employment, educational, recreational and social 
opportunities. Therefore, the French law would be replacing the social method of controlling 
Muslim women with a legal one and still dictating how Muslim women should dress; from the 
veiled to the unveiled. The confinement of these women to private places due to the law also 
give rise to assumptions by others, that the said women are oppressed, as it would be difficult 
to ascertain why they do not leave the house. The other effect in these circumstances is that a 
Muslim man who does not impose veiling on female members of his household, could be 
incorrectly attributed with a negative stereotype that he is a controlling husband, brother or 
father who does not allow these women out of the home.  
 
The court recognised that laws criminalising veiling are a serious matter and may inculcate 
negative stereotypes, yet still went ahead and found that the prohibition was a legitimate aim.  
The use of criminal law is subject to criticisms also by Morondo Taramundi: 
 
Criminal law (and, even more, criminal law on its own) cannot change hegemonic 
social practices and attitudes; that there is nothing to prove that prohibiting face 
veils will enhance Muslim women’s power within communities, or protect them 
from gender violence, or hinder patriarchy.989 
 
Yet according to Raday, the court had allowed too much deference to the applicant. She takes 
issue with the decision in S.A.S. on the grounds that ‘The discriminatory impact of giving 
license to the full-face veil on women’s autonomy and freedom of choice’ were not 
satisfactorily considered.990 She challenges the court’s reasoning based on women choosing to 
veil being the reason gender equality arguments were not invoked by the court. According to 
her, the court failed to take account of the harmful practices such as FGM and discriminatory 
practices such as polygamy, which under international law should be prohibited, irrespective 
of whether women defend these practices or not. Furthermore she argues that the consent 
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argument lacks empirical evidence arguing that ‘for every woman in a liberal democracy who 
chooses the burkha there are other women who are compelled to wear the burkha in the 
context of family or community patriarchal control’.991But what she fails to address is the 
question posed by McGoldrick that even if it can be accepted that veiling is an instrument of 
oppression, does that make it ethically worse than state compulsion not to wear it?992 She 
further argues that full face covering depersonalises women in the field of social interaction 
and is harmful to women’s freedom of expression, also preventing women from accessing 
healthcare, gaining employment where facial communication is required and restricts their 
mobility by loss of field of vision.  
 
Raday appears to rely on the weak and commonly cited arguments used by those who attempt 
to justify banning face veiling by Muslim women. First of all, there was evidence tendered by 
the intervening parties that demonstrated that not all women are forced to veil and those who 
were part of the study carried out by Brems show that they decide to veil through their own 
choice.993 Secondly, practices such as FGM are indeed harmful to women, especially since they 
are targeted against young girls and warrant protection by the state, even though the girls may 
appear to consent in order to appease the family and community. But Raday does not 
distinguish between the harm inflicted by practices such as FGM, which is a direct physical 
harm that is not reversible and primarily against a child and that of face veiling, which is not a 
form of physical harm and a Muslim wearer of the veil can decide not to wear the veil at will.  
 
As for those women who are forced by family members, Raday does not point to any empirical 
evidence that demonstrates that such coercion is a major issue in European states, yet on the 
issue of those who veil voluntarily, she points out that the consent argument is not empirically 
persuasive. This view is an emulation of the court’s view, which disregarded the empirical 
studies involving full face veiling in France by the Open Society Foundation,994 Moors in the 
Netherlands995 and Brems in Belgium.996 Raday’s other arguments based on restricted 
healthcare, harm to freedom of expression and restriction of mobility through loss of field of 
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vision are weak arguments. Dress itself can be a form of expression and an assertion of one’s 
identity; punks, skinheads and Goths all being examples of those who use dress as a form of 
self-expression.997 Therefore to say veiling is harmful to freedom of expression is an oxymoron.  
 
A veiled woman requesting a female doctor is not an unusual demand, of course resource 
permitting and it is not unusual when compared to gendered searches carried out for example 
at police stations in the UK which are stipulated in law.998 Furthermore, the loss of field of 
vision argument has been shown to be a weak one by research carried out by Pearce, Walsh 
and Dutton to ascertain whether face veil wearers’ visual field was adequate to satisfy 
European driving standards. According to them women who wore the face veil in the scientific 
tests, all achieved a visual field that satisfied the UK and European driving standards.999 Of 
course it has to be acknowledged that there may be certain types of burqas with slits over the 
eyes that can affect the field of vision. Raday also refers to the ‘choice of a handful of women 
in democratic countries who wear the burkah is perhaps an ethnic and religious identification 
symbol but it is also a symbol of identification with women’s oppression’. Indeed she is 
referring to regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan but the oppression against those 
women in such regimes cannot be used as a justification of banning veiling in Europe, where 
women do not have veiling imposed by the state and forms an element of free choice, thus 
there is no comparative.   
 
The ECtHR has not always taken a problematic stance against those who wear Religious 
clothing. In Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey,1000 the court held that religious clothing such as 
hijab can be worn in public spaces as a right to freedom of religion. Furthermore the court 
acknowledged in S.A.S. that since some women veil through choice, the practice of veiling 
cannot be deemed contrary to gender inequality. But the ECtHR in S.A.S.  appears to have gone 
against the reasoning it adopted in Arslan, which concerned 127 Turkish Nationals who 
belonged to a religious group and met in Ankara to attend a religious ceremony at Kocatepe 
mosque. The group walked around the streets wearing religious clothing that was distinctive 
and made up of a turban, baggy trousers, a tunic and carried sticks. They were arrested under 
anti-terrorism laws but then appeared before the State Security Court wearing their dress and 
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were subsequently charged and convicted with wearing religious headwear and religious 
garments in public contrary to Turkish law. The group brought an action under Article 9 which 
the ECtHR heard. The court held that the group were punished for wearing particular dress in 
public areas that were open to everyone and the case could be distinguished from other cases 
of wearing religious dress in public establishments where the requirement of religious 
neutrality might outweigh the right to manifest one’s religion. The court further held that in 
this case there was no evidence of a threat being posed by the group or any involvement in 
attempts at proselytising by putting undue pressure on any passers-by and thus the necessity 
of the restriction had not been convincingly established by Turkey. 
 
There are similarities between Arslan and S.A.S. the ECtHR was aware of, which is why it 
expressly distinguished it on the facts. However, the court distinguished the case on the 
grounds that the concealment of the face was only relevant in the present case and by doing 
so in a ‘far-fetched way, the ECtHR happily accepted the new principle of living together’.1001 
Although it is worth questioning if the real distinguishing feature in Ahmet Arslan was that the 
applicants were all men wearing religious clothing, whilst the S.A.S. case concerns women? 
According to Keenan, extending prohibitions on veiling from schools and against teachers to 
ordinary citizens was ‘going too far’. He correctly questions the likelihood of a French citizen 
coming across a burqa clad woman, with whom communication and socialising was so badly 
needed, that the notion of ‘living together’ would suffer. And further questions, if political 
questions could be solved by law, whether on part of the state or the individual?1002 And there 
are those who wonder whether banning the hijab would be next?1003   
 
In respect of France’s argument that veiling is an attack on the human dignity of others, the 
court held that no matter how essential the requirement of such respect, a blanket ban cannot 
be justified:   
 
The Court is aware that the clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of 
those who observe it. It would point out, however, that it is the expression of a 
cultural identity which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in democracy. 
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It notes in this connection the variability of the notions of virtuousness and 
decency that are applied to the uncovering of the human body. Moreover, it does 
not have any evidence capable of leading it to consider that women who wear the 
full-face veil seek to express a form of contempt against those they encounter or 
otherwise to offend against the dignity of others.1004 
 
Although the court appears to pay heed to the subjective intentions of women who veil, it 
raises questions about the objective notions of dignity. For example the practice of ‘dwarf 
tossing’ can be considered  by the wider society as undignifying for the dwarf, yet subjectively 
the dwarf may find that the practice would be more dignifying than being unemployed.1005 In 
terms of veiling being contrary to the concept of dignity and equality the court was of the view 
that where the woman veils through her own choice, then the gender equality argument 
cannot be invoked to restrain that choice. However the court here has taken a simplistic 
approach to dignity here. If the example of FGM is taken, then just because a woman consents 
to the practice does not mean that it turns what would be an indignant act to one that is 
dignified. To suggest that voluntary choice bars any engagement of restrictions based on 
gender equality would lead to such protections devoid of meaning. 
The margin of appreciation and proportionality in S.A.S. v. France 
In reviewing the European consensus on banning full face coverings in public spaces, the court 
found that there was no consensus against banning of the burqa or face veils and that the bans 
had been the subject of discussions in many European states.  The court’s reasoning here is 
questionable as other European states had not banned veiling in public spaces, which means 
that there was consensus on the issue; that full face veils need not be banned in public spaces. 
The ECtHR put forward an unconvincing finding of European consensus; that bans had been 
discussed in several European states.1006 Indeed debates about prospective laws common to 
European states are regular occurrences and as demonstrated in part one of this thesis, there 
are wide and controversial debates about the meaning of the Muslim veil and whether it 
should be prohibited, but to hold that such debates indicate consensus on the veil’s 
prohibition is illogical and an incorrect inference drawn by the court to reach a desired 
conclusion for the French government.  
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As the court was faced with such a fundamental right being restricted with serious 
consequences for Muslim women’s freedom of choice in dressing the way they want to and 
how rest of society who disagrees with their choice may treat them, it was expected to engage 
in a detailed analysis of the legitimate aim pursued by France. This is especially so, considering 
the court by its own volition stated that ‘in view of the flexibility of the notion of ‘‘living 
together’’ and the resulting risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of 
the necessity of the impugned limitation’.1007 But that detailed examination was absent and 
instead of offering a reasoned analysis, the court had effectively offered reasons why the 
judgement in this case should have been the inverse of the ultimate decision. The court had 
effectively contradicted itself, as on the one hand it was suggesting a closer scrutiny, yet on 
the other it afforded France a wide margin of appreciation. 
 
The ECtHR reasoned that because the law did not target wearers of the Islamic veil specifically, 
the measures were proportionate to the aim pursued, but the court avoided the consideration 
that France had sought the advice of its Conseil d’état on whether banning the veil would be 
contrary to its Constitution and breach the ECHR. The French government seeking such an 
opinion shows that the intent of the law was to focus on veiling, even though the law is 
drafted in linguistic terms to appear neutral prohibiting the concealment of the face. The 
legislative history leading to the conception of the law on concealment of the face was 
highlighted by the court, making it evident that the aim was to focus on combatting the 
Muslim veil, yet there still appears to be an attempt at justifying the neutrality of the law. The 
court refers to the ban mainly affecting Muslim women and finds it significant that it is not 
based on any religious connotations of the veil, but the mere fact that veils conceal the face 
and are primarily worn for religious reasons shows the contradiction.1008 This is a weak 
argument as the practical effect on women who veil is the same, irrespective of whether the 
law has religious connotations or neutral and for all intents and purposes the general law was 
phrased neutrally to ensure the effect by the French government, rather than it being seen as 
a law that just targeted veiled women. This was a missed opportunity for the court to engage 
in a discussion of the multiple meanings of the veil and the difficulty of distinguishing 
areligious veil from one that is worn for any other purpose. 
 
It is rather surprising that as part of the court’s assessment of proportionality it took into 
account what was termed sanctions ‘provided for by the Law’s drafters are among the lightest 
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that could be envisaged, because they consist of a fine at the rate applying to second-class 
petty offences (currently 150 euros maximum), with the possibility for the court to impose in 
addition to or instead of the fine, an obligation to follow a citizenship course.1009 Such 
comments are difficult to defend even if someone is convicted for a single event, especially 
since the criminal law is invoked against Muslim women for mere compliance with their 
religious beliefs in the absence of any harm threatened by the veil on others and especially 
since the court itself realises that ‘The idea of being prosecuted for concealing one’s face in a 
public place is traumatising for women who have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons 
related to their beliefs’.1010 Those who feel religiously obligated to wear the veil would no 
doubt incur cumulative penalties and in any event, the court’s argument has patronising 
undertones as it should not matter what the penalty is, if the ban breaches a woman’s right, 
then even a token penalty cannot possibly be a reason to legitimise it. 
 
In holding the French measure proportional the court seems at dissonance with its own 
jurisprudence that makes it clear that, not only must there be a pressing social need,1011 but 
the interference must be proportional to the grounds put forward by a state, which must be 
interpreted narrowly.1012 This means the ECtHR imposes an additional requirement that the 
measure chosen by the state must exert the least amount of interference1013 and the balancing 
approach suggested by the dissenting judges in Francesco Sessa v. Italy1014 is useful to highlight 
this. In the case a Jewish Lawyer brought an action under Article 9 claim when an Italian Court 
refused to adjourn a case so it does not coincide with Yom Kippur and Sukkot Jewish holidays. 
Although his claim was dismissed, the dissenting judges Tulkens, Popovic and Keller were of 
the opinion that the interference was not the least restrictive, as the lawyer had given the 
court ample notice of the holidays and it would not have caused an administrative burden and 
therefore would have been ‘a small price to be paid, in order to ensure respect for freedom of 
religion in a multi-cultural society’.1015However this principle appeared to be absent from the 
court’s reasoning and it was perfectly possible for France to impose limitations on those who 
veil to areas only where identification of the face is essential. Although the court used this 
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argument for the security and identification grounds, it seemed to have ignored it when the 
issue was one of being veiled in public space.  
 
The court acknowledges that the number of wearers of the full face veil was around 1900 at 
the end of 2009 of which 270 were in French administered areas, representing a small 
proportion of about sixty five million and to the numbers of Muslims living in France.1016 Thus 
the prospect of the ordinary person coming across someone veiled and the need for direct 
contact is limited, and there is no evidence provided by the French authorities that veiled 
women posed any threat or danger. In such circumstances the requirement of a pressing social 
need is not justified, especially since the negative impact of the measure on those women who 
feel it is a religious duty to veil is confinement to private spaces imposing a limitation on their 
choices and the freedom from external constraint, which is the same freedom Muslim veiled 
women are considered to be lacking by those who find the the practice oppressive as 
discussed in part one of the thesis. The resultant loss to the Muslim women who veil is the loss 
of all the opportunities available to others who have access to public places, which in effect is 
is a form of state seclusion from public spaces. Furthermore the court noted that there were a 
large number of organisations national and international, who were of the opinion that a 
blanket ban would be disproportionate. Although the court is not legally bound by such 
opinions, but for the purposes of local and international consensus playing a part in the width 
of the margin of appreciation, it should have been a factor taken into account. 
 
It is troubling that the court found that whether or not the veil should be permitted was a 
choice of society1017 and its prohibition would make living easier for the French society. But the 
French government or the court does not state how the majority chooses? Is there a criterion? 
How does France or the court know it was a choice of the French society? Was it just a political 
choice or a choice of the French people? And in any event, how is it that one French citizen can 
choose what another French citizen can wear or not? This begs the question that if French 
society chooses that Muslim men were not allowed to wear beards, would that be acceptable? 
These questions are clearly those that needed to be probed by the court when determining 
the necessity of the measure just as the court in Vajnai has reminded: 
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A legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the 
dictates of public feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the 
pressing social needs recognised in a democratic society, since that society must 
remain reasonable in its judgement. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom 
of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto.1018  
 
The S.A.S. judgement failed to engage in an adequate proportionality analysis by its failure of 
closer scrutiny just as in Sahin,1019 despite the court suggesting that it was an important 
requirement in order to prevent an abuse of rights by the French law ‘In view of the flexibility 
of the notion of “living together” and the resulting risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a 
careful examination of the necessity of the impugned limitation’.1020 The proportionality 
approach by the court in S.A.S. is just as envisaged by Howard, who predicted that because the 
issue is politically charged, the court in S.A.S. would not engage in the detail and analysis that 
was required as to whether the ban was necessary in a democratic society and it would not 
engage in a detailed proportionality assessment. According to her and rightly so ‘The ECtHR 
should not abdicate responsibility for the protection of the freedom to manifest one’s religion 
in this manner, but should, instead, follow Arslan v Turkey and apply a rigorous justification 
and proportionality test’.1021 However the court has done precisely what she expected, but 
may not have wanted.   
The concept of ‘living together’ as a legitimate aim under Article 9 
France argued that the law prohibiting the concealment of faces pursued two legitimate aims: 
public safety and respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society. 
The French government argued that respect for minimum requirements of life in society could 
be linked to the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.1022 The government added that 
concealing one’s face in public leads to the breaking up of social ties and expresses a rejection 
of ‘le vivre ensemble’ the principle of ‘living together’. And that exposure of the face has a 
significant function when humans interact over and above other parts of the body, and the 
face identifies the uniqueness of an individual and represents the collective as well as 
otherness. It is worthy of noting that the French Council of State had in the past taken a 
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diametrically opposed position on the same issue. Shadid and Van Knoningsveld note that 
although the Council had said that France had the right to legislate as it deems fit, but: 
 
To force a Muslim woman to take off her headscarf which expresses her religious 
conscience and her free choice, is to be considered as the severest kind of 
oppression of women which is contrary to the French values calling for respect for 
the dignity of women and their religious, human and personal freedom.1023 
 
Although it could be distinguished that the effect of wearing a headscarf and a face veil is 
different on others, albeit they are both motivated by religious belief, the effect of prohibiting 
either form of religious dress is the same on women. The court rejected all other arguments 
put forward by the French government and accepted only one; the minimum requirements of 
life in society.1024 The court was of the opinion that this argument fell within the scope and was 
justified in order to ‘protect the rights and freedoms of others’ as required by Article 8 and 9. 
The court accepted France’s argument that the prohibition was targeted to safeguard the 
minimum requirement of civility that is required for social interaction. This was on the grounds 
that it was within the remit of France to secure conditions, which would foster diversity 
attaching particular weight on face concealment, which may impact on social interaction.1025 
The court went on to say that it could understand: 
 
The view that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see 
practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into 
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an 
established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within 
the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier 
raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent 
State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which 
makes living together easier.1026  
 
However, the court indicated that the notion of ‘living together’ was a flexible one and there 
was an element of a risk of abuse and thus it needed to engage in a careful inquiry into the 
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necessity of the limitation. But despite recognising the risk of abuse of such an abstract 
principle, the court failed to heed to its own concern by allowing France a wide margin of 
appreciation. Disappointingly, the court simply reviewed previous case law under Article 9, 
without any discussion of what ‘living together’ means, concluding that that the French 
authorities had attached great importance to it, which was apparent from the explanatory 
memorandum accompanying the law in its legislative stages. The greatest concern in the 
judgement has been the court’s acknowledgement of this abstract notion of ‘living together’ 
which in the absence of the prescribed legitimate aims contained in Article 9(2) was relied 
upon by the state. On the one hand the court reiterates that: 
 
The enumeration of the exceptions to the individual’s freedom to manifest his or 
her religion or beliefs, as listed in Article 9(2), is exhaustive and that their 
definition is restrictive… For it to be compatible with the Convention, a limitation 
of this freedom must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of 
those listed in this provision… 1027 
 
Yet on the other hand the majority in the court concedes to the state’s claim that living 
together is relevant to the recognised aim of ‘protecting the rights and freedoms of others’. It 
is this lack of correlation which makes the reasoning and the justifications provided in the 
judgement questionable. It is thus no surprise that the two dissenters, judge Nussberger of 
Germany and judge Jaderblom of Sweden express in blunt terms their disagreement with the 
forced fitting of this new and novel legitimate aim. They were of the opinion that concrete 
Convention rights were being sacrificed to abstract principles and doubted that the French 
government pursued a legitimate aim and in any case, such a ban affecting women’s right to 
cultural and religious identity was not necessary in a democratic society..1028 The dissenting 
judges disagreed that a legitimate aim in ensuring living together through the observance of 
the minimum requirements of life in society could amount to rights and freedoms of 
others.1029 They based their argument on the lack of clarity in the ECtHR jurisprudence as to 
the coverage of rights and freedoms of others outside the Convention. Therefore the ‘very 
general’ concept of living together cannot be incorporated directly and in any event they 
stated it was ‘far-fetched and vague’.1030 
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Justifications for the notion of ‘living together’ 
The court makes statements about ‘living together’ and the reasons the full face veil is 
incompatible with the notion, but nowhere does the court or the French government actually 
state what the notion means. The court does not go beyond mere statements declaring veiling 
to be incompatible with the concept, with no real explanation of why that may be so or what 
these conditions comprise. From a legal perspective this is not only a surprise but 
unacceptable, considering it is being used to justify a limitation to a fundamental freedom that 
could have far reaching effects in signatory states to the ECHR where Muslim communities are 
established. The French constitutional court when considering an application to have the 
French law annulled said that the French government ‘sought to defend a societal model 
where the individual took precedence over his philosophical, cultural or religious ties, with a 
view to fostering integration for all’1031 and that the individuality of every subject was 
inconceivable without visibility of the face, which was fundamental in a democratic society. 
Accordingly the French government was entitled to adopt the view that the ‘creation of human 
relationships’ necessary for living together would be rendered impossible by veiling in the 
public sphere, leading to a loss of individuality and therefore met the pressing social need 
requirement.1032 But this reasoning of the French constitutional court relied upon by the S.A.S. 
court is problematic as it suggests that visibility is a pre-requisite of individuality, when clearly 
this cannot be the case, as that would mean that someone in contact with a blind person or 
people who are unable to communicate face to face would have no individuality. Additionally 
the reference to the impossibility of creating human relationships, which is premised on being 
in the public sphere, is a weak argument as that excludes the possibility of such relationships 
being formed in the private sphere, thus rendering the impossibility argument to a possibility 
one at the most.  
The individuality perspective is also not free from flaws, since the security concerns are already 
dismissed and even if it is argued in the context of personal identity, then the removal of the 
veil that results in Muslim women being unveiled in public, but  veiled in the private sphere, 
defeats that aim. This then leaves the issue surrounding the role that visibility of the face plays 
in social interaction, which according to the French government has the effect of breaking 
social ties if the face is concealed and would amount to a manifestation of the refusal to live 
together.1033 But this is also problematic as all the state does is assert the incompatibility of 
veiling and living together, the court nor the government explain with any precision what living 
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together entails or how the incompatibility is justified. Instead the court makes a departure 
from the earlier arguments related to individuality and creation of human relationships, 
attempting to justify the notion of ‘living together’ by stating that it is amenable to the view 
that those others in public spaces: 
may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there which would 
fundamentally call into question the possibility of open interpersonal 
relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable 
element of community life within the society in question. The Court is therefore 
able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is 
perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a 
space of socialisation which makes living together easier.1034  
This rationale by the court takes a totally different turn since prohibition of veiling is now 
simply being justified by how some French people may not agree or dislike veiling. From a 
human rights perspective, this would simply be the court deferring to a majority opinion based 
on a mere disliking of or the shocking effect of the veil, which is contrary to the courts own 
jurisprudence where in Handyside the court said that the Convention protects not only ‘ideas 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also 
to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’ and that there 
would be no democracy without pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.1035Thus to 
prohibit a practice on the basis that it leads to a dislike or disagreement by a majority has 
neither a legal basis, nor demonstrates tolerance or broadmindedness of the majority society 
to religious practices of a minority, thus fracturing the hallmarks of a democratic society and 
rendering human rights for Muslim women who veil in Europe to be a hollow guarantee. The 
preference of the majority leads to switching the meaning of the veil from a religious to being 
a symbol of intolerance of others who don’t veil as intimated in Sahin1036 and Dahlab1037 and to 
one that is intolerated by the others. To use such an approach to prohibit the veil is incorrect 
as stressed by Baroness Hale in the UK Shabina Begum case, reminding that mere disliking or 
discomfort is not a strong reason for legal prohibitions on religious symbols: 
If a woman freely chooses to adopt a way of life for herself, it is not for others, 
including other women who have chosen differently, to criticise or prevent her… 
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Likewise, the sight of a woman in full purdah may offend some people, and 
especially those western feminists who believe that it is a symbol of her 
oppression, but that could not be a good reason for prohibiting her from wearing 
it.1038  
In respect of allowing the voice of the majority to prevailing over the minority rights the ECtHR 
jurisprudence has reminded that: 
Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a 
group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always 
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment 
of minorities and avoids any abuse of dominant position.1039  
Yet despite such strong judicial pronouncements in the past, the court in S.A.S. still attempts to 
justify the principle of living together by adopting the majority view with an exaggerated 
importance attached to the principle of interaction, instead of a balanced view of tolerance 
and broadmindedness in respect of values and practices of all communities living together, 
which is required in plural societies: 
The respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction between 
individuals, which in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, 
but also of intolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 
democratic society.1040 
Such justifications are surprising, since it is the prohibition on veiling that acts as a limiter of 
pluralism and the French government can be perceived as fostering the intolerance of religious 
practices of minorities, which certainly does not constitute broadmindedness of French society 
if it is contingent on visibility of faces without veils. 
Ultimately the Grand Chamber and the French government failed to provide with any clarity 
what the conditions of living together comprise, and the explanations provided are simply not 
congruent with the justifications provided, signalling a failure of the court to act as the 
guardian of the applicant’s Article 9 rights. The Convention requires consistency in the 
application of the principles, particularly the stated legitimate aims under Article 9(2), which is 
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lacking in the case. This is due to France and the S.A.S. court force fitting the ‘living together’ 
principle with the legitimate aim of protecting the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ in order to 
justify the prohibition on the Muslim veil in the absence of consistency, certainty and 
transparency of reasoning behind the principles invoked. 
Empowering the majority French identity 
The terms empowerment or control of identities has been borrowed from Marshall’s recent 
work on the S.A.S. judgement and how that has and can impact on individual rights from an 
identity perspective.1041 The French state did not specifically raise secularism as a ground for 
prohibiting the veil; however such a motivation cannot be discounted even though it would 
not withstand any legal justification. Article 1 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 makes it 
implicit that the French concept of citizenship and belonging to the state is the priority over 
other entities such as religion, race, culture or any form of communitarianism. This 
assimilation and political unity leads to the consequence that those who are not of French 
heritage have to adopt the cultural norms of the French society and become assimilated to 
French values: 
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall 
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race 
or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis. 
Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and 
posts as well as to professional and social positions.1042 
The requirement here from people of different backgrounds from the majority society in 
France is that they must join the homogenous French unity and the visibility of cultural or 
religious practice in the public sphere must give way to the idea that all French citizens are 
equal and the same. It is this national French identity that must prevail over individual 
differences such as religious and cultural identities. This requirement of sameness causes 
difficulties to those who wish to wear the full face veil in France and is the probable reason 
why the French report cited in S.A.S. finds it ‘a practice at odds with the values of the 
Republic’, as expressed in the maxim ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ and that ‘the full-face veil 
represented a denial of fraternity, constituting the negation of contact with others and a 
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flagrant infringement of the French principle of living together’.1043  This view and the court’s 
reference to the restriction on full face veiling being a choice for the French society1044  is 
consistent with the findings of a Global Attitudes survey carried out in twenty two different 
countries on banning of the Islamic veil which showed that 82% of French people approve of a 
ban on Muslim women wearing full veils in public, including schools, hospitals and government 
offices, while just 17% disapprove.1045 Even though the dissenting judges described the notion 
of ‘living together’ as a ‘far-fetched and vague’1046 the court still deferred to France a wide 
margin of appreciation from which it is deducible that it was in light of the majority’s 
preference of the collective French identity and concept of citizenship.   
The French Parliament with a legitimate political majority via informed discussions, and having 
sought advice and opinions from national and international bodies, even though it was not 
heeded to1047 reached a conclusion that the restriction on full face veiling was necessary in 
France. This required a balancing act between the fundamental rights of those who wear the 
full face veil and their restrictions considered necessary a democratic society by the French 
government. The balancing of the rights has to be inevitably in favour of one of the parties 
even though in some cases it means a restriction of minority freedoms, but providing the state 
has acted and engaged in that democratic process, then majority political opinion cannot 
always be rejected outright. Protecting fundamental rights of minority citizens is an aim of 
human rights but that does not mean that they must always prevail over the majority, 
otherwise practices such as polygamy, FGM and some types of participation in the sex industry 
would never be restricted in Europe. However this has to be subject to the proviso that such 
interference with the rights of minorities and the vulnerable would disclose a clear legal 
justification articulated with a genuine necessity, unlike the S.A.S. judgement. 
These arguments can add force to France’s perspective but one of the major flaws in the S.A.S. 
legal judgement in this respect is the concept of ‘living together’ through ‘the observance of 
the minimum requirements of life in society’ being classified as a legitimate limitation imposed 
‘for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ as contained in Article 9(2). There is a 
lack of clarity as to what amounts to the ‘rights and freedoms’ of others,1048 with the court not 
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only applying such a limitation clause to cases where fundamental convention rights of others 
have been affected,1049 but has also utilised the category with respect to prevention of 
commercial advantage which is not a fundamental right in the Convention sense.1050 The court 
and the French state failed to put forward the precise rights of others that were under attack 
by the concealment of the face and exactly whose rights were attacked and how? There is a 
total lack of analysis by the court of the precise rights of others affected. The use of the term 
‘the observance of the minimum requirements of life in society’ just suggests an interest of the 
majority French society, which is a dislike or an intolerance of the veil due to its difference 
from the majority’s appearance, as opposed to a right. A better view is articulated by the 
dissenting judges commenting that even if the veil was a barrier to communication or 
integration there is no right ‘not to be shocked or provoked by different models of cultural or 
religious identity, even those that are very distant from the traditional French and European 
life-style’1051and furthermore: 
It can hardly be argued that an individual has a right to enter into contact with 
other people, in public places, against their will. Otherwise such a right would have 
to be accompanied by a corresponding obligation. This would be incompatible 
with the spirit of the Convention. While communication is admittedly essential for 
life in society, the right to respect for private life also comprises the right not to 
communicate and not to enter into contact with others in public places – the right 
to be an outsider.1052 
Despite such clear views of the dissenting judges in S.A.S., the Barthold 1053case, which 
protected a commercial interest, suggests that interests of others can be taken into account 
but a greater problem in the veiling case is the lack of specificity as to exactly who the others 
are? Is the whole of French society affected? Is it children or adults or both? Is it men or 
women or both? Do the others include Muslims? Are Muslim women who do not veil 
included? All of these categories to some extent or other may well have their interests 
affected by veiled women, but whether and which of their fundamental rights or freedoms are 
affected, as required by the Article 9(2) clause is a major omission on part of the court and the 
French government, and certainly reminiscent of the Sahin1054 judgment on the same issue. 
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Such lapses in the judgment of a case expected to counteract the lack of explanation in the 
reasoning of Sahin1055 can only play a part in furtherance of doubts as to the legal status of 
religious symbols such as the face veil in public spaces of Europe.  
Controlling the identity and personalities of women who veil  
Muslim women’s identity through the wearing of the veil is being perceived as different to 
those who form the majority society in European states, just as in the French case where some 
Muslim women’s form of dress, which inhibits social interaction when accompanied by the veil 
is considered as not conforming to that of the majority and contrary to requirement of living 
together. The use of dress as a form of expression of our identity or personality is not a new 
concept and certainly not confined to the religious only. Through history and in current times 
many youth subcultures have utilised forms of dress to project their social identities and 
personalities via appearance, which may not have been in conformity with the majority 
society, but nevertheless recognised and tolerated as a matter of individual choice in a liberal 
society. Such recognition is gained through the existence of human rights that uphold the right 
to freedom of expression, which has further developed into recognition of identity and 
personality via the ECtHR interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR leading to an empowerment 
of identites.1056 However, the Grand chamber’s interpretation of the concept of ‘living 
together’ in S.A.S.1057 questions whether Muslim women’s right to appear how they want to 
and their identity or personality is accorded the same recognition as the majority society, 
which seems too have been empowered, whilst that of Muslim women who choose to veil 
being controlled.  
Human rights are about choices individuals make and that includes Muslim women’s choice of 
dress, for which national policies and the law should provide an environment, which fosters 
such free and autonomous choices. This in turn would provide conditions that enable the 
formation, maintenance and the variation of their identities, just like the applicant in S.A.S.1058 
stated that she wore the veil in public and in private and would not wear it during visits to the 
doctor and socialising with friends in public. She chose to wear the veil intermittently 
depending on whether she was feeling spiritual but wore it during religious events and as a 
means of religious, personal or cultural expression without any intent to annoy anyone.1059 But 
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such choices for those who want to wear the veil are not free from interference and Marshall 
reminds that human rights law stipulates who is included or excluded from its protection and 
in this process the recognition or misrecognition of identities takes place.1060 The court’s 
acceptance of the prohibition of the veil because it fails to respect the conditions of ‘living 
together’, which although not defined or elaborated on by the court, is based on the choice of 
the majority society. Such an interpretation has the effect of limiting if not an outright 
rejection of the freedom of expression and the recognition of individual identities whilst 
empowering majority identities.  
According to Marshall the way human rights law treats people’s identities has an impact on 
their perception of themselves as ‘individuals and collectively’ and such legal and political 
treatment pushing people in particular ways of living is part of who people are, which can 
‘empower or constrain’ them and their ‘identities and personalities’ leading to a priming of 
particular types of identity.1061 She adds that: 
In particular, when people are socially powerless, their freedom, starting with the 
imagination in their own heads-unfettered freedom of conscience-can lead to 
empowerment. Human rights law, like all law, can play a role in how those ‘heads’ 
develop and become our own, through the interpretation it gives to explicit legal 
provisions.1062  
Thus interpretations of human rights law can play a role in empowering women who veil by 
setting the enabling conditions for the free creation, maintenance and variation of their 
identities instead of prohibiting them from wearing the veil and rendering them powerless 
socially; in public spaces.  Indeed such empowerment can also be enabled by prohibiting the 
veil in public spaces through interpretations of the law when the issue concerns the veil that 
has not been freely chosen and has been forced upon them . This mode of empowerment 
would allow the Muslim women’s personhood to be developed without her conscience being 
influenced, leading to greater freedom to decide whether or not to veil in public spaces. 
However such reasons were not canvassed by the court in S.A.S. explicitly and if anything, the 
court recognised the validity of the choice to wear the veil by departing from the Dahlab1063 
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and Sahin1064 position where the veil was interpreted as being a symbol of gender inequality. 
Empowerment or liberation within the feminist framework for gender equality was used as a 
justification by France when it removed the hijab worn by schoolgirls using the force of law.1065 
This led to the perception of the French government acting as the enforcers of equality who 
remove oppressive practices against young Muslim girls, which would allow them to exercise 
their freedom of choice without patriarchal constraint in an educational setting. The French 
government hoped that having enjoyed that autonomy without the hijab, they would enter 
employment and public spaces with their head or face uncovered. However if the same young 
women having matured into adults decide to veil through free choice in public spaces, then 
interpretations of human rights law such as the ‘living together’ principle in the S.A.S1066 case, 
which constrains Muslim women’s ability or desire to form an identity by wearing the veil can 
lead to their misrecognition as persons and contributes to rendering them ‘powerless and 
excluded’.1067 Such controls over Muslim women’s identity contradicts France’s aim to 
empower them, as what use is the fostering of free choices in schools to form identities if they 
are not going to be recognised during adulthood in public spaces? The controlling of identities 
according to Marshall’s interpretation is out of tune with the respect for freedom and dignity 
envisaged by the ECHR.1068 The ECtHR has developed jurisprudence under Article 8 that 
recognises individual identity and autonomy in cases involving many aspects of private and 
intimate life including sexual orientation1069 gender recognition1070 and in Gough v. United 
Kingdom the court even considered an Article 8 identity claim for the applicant’s appearance 
with a total lack of clothing asserting that ‘The concept of “private life” is broad in scope and 
not susceptible of exhaustive definition’.1071 Similarly the GC in S.A.S. also affirmed the 
application of Article 8 to the desired appearances through personal choices.1072  
Another interpretation of the ‘living together’ notion offered by the French government as 
noted by Marshall  is based on the use of dignity as a form of constraint where the prohibition 
of the veil would safeguard the dignity of ‘society as a whole, of women as a group and of the 
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individual woman who wears it’.1073 She notes that this constraining form of dignity imposes a 
duty on individuals to protect their own dignity through a limitation of free action and can be a 
legitimate aim under the limitation clauses of Articles 8-10.1074 This constraining form of dignity 
could be considered in cases of FGM and women in the pornography industry, however in the 
case of the Muslim veil, the court in S.A.S. 1075 was of the view that the veil did not offend the 
dignity of others and as such a blanket ban on the veil could not be justified on such the 
grounds. Although it is unfortunate the court did not engage in any further analysis on this 
issue, it had afforded recognition to the principle that everyone should be able to live in 
accordance with their convictions and personal choices, especially since there is no harm 
inflicted on the self or others through veiling, and such a stance by the court is highly 
welcomed by commentators such as Marshall who is a leading proponent and developer of the 
principle of dignity in human rights law.1076  
Concerns surrounding the ‘living together’ aim 
The previously unheard concept of the ‘living together’ aim does raise some concerns as it has 
the potential to water down the certainty that is required in law and an applicant’s Article 9 
rights. For example, it can be used to buttress future manifestations of religion by those in 
Europe who may wear religious head dress like the Sikh turban or the Jewish kippa. It begs the 
question whether any kind of behaviour could be curbed because the majority society finds it 
intolerable or uncomfortable and not conducive to ‘living together’ or indeed any other 
religious practice that offends or is out of tune with a majority’s norms or expectations. 
Furthermore the court has simply not listened to the voices of women who veil, had it done so 
it would have realised that it is not Muslim veiled women who do not want to interact with the 
wider society but rather the majority society do not want to interact with them. Surprisingly 
the court allows restriction of religious pluralism echoed in Kokkinakis1077 as being the 
foundation of a democratic society, in order for the French government to protect the 
principle of social interaction, which strangely would lead to maintenance of pluralism and a 
spirit of tolerance and broadmindedness in society. It is questionable how removal of pluralism 
can lead to pluralism, especially since those Muslim women who wish to abide by their 
religious beliefs would have no choice but to remain in private places. The court simply ignores 
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the fact that a state either tolerates religious pluralism or it doesn’t. Degrees of pluralism 
dependent upon a state’s version to satisfy the majority society that exclude veiling, or burqas, 
cannot be considered as tolerating a religiously pluralistic society. It is disappointing that the 
Grand Chamber concedes to such a paradox and ignores its own principle that when there is a 
conflict of values then the role of the state in such circumstances is ‘not to remove the cause 
of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other’.1078 This is especially when the court reminds those individuals who are prevented from 
manifesting their religion through veiling that: 
 
Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a 
group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always 
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair treatment of people 
from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.1079 
 
Despite previous equitable jurisprudence from the court, in the present case the dominant 
position of French society who had decided that women who veil do not conform to its 
standards of living together was favoured by the court, with no indication of how it balanced 
the competing interests, of those who want to veil and those who object to the practice. 
Indeed the court was faced with the same dilemma over applying human rights to the veiling 
issue as the oppressive versus emancipatory debate and the danger of adopting polemic views 
or avoiding difficult issues is highlighted by Nussbaum very well:  
 
To say that a practice endorsed by tradition is bad is to risk erring by imposing 
one’s own way on others, who surely have their own ideas of what is right and 
good. To say that a practice is all right whenever local tradition endorses it as a 
right and good is to risk erring by withholding critical judgement where evil and 
oppression are surely present. To avoid the whole issue because the matter of 
proper judgement is so fiendishly difficult is tempting but perhaps the worst 
option of all.1080  
 
There are legitimate arguments of gender equality and dignity for those who have the practice 
imposed on them and it is the forced practice the majority perceive veiling as, a perception the 
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court in Dahlab1081 and Sahin1082 had favoured. The difficulty which the court faces and has 
hesitated to engage in fully is that veiling has different meanings for different women, which is 
further exasperated by the global contexts within which veiling takes place such as the 
enforced practice as in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iran that play an influential role in 
perceptions about the practice in Europe.  
 
The ECtHR acknowledged ‘variability of notions of virtuousness and decency in relation to 
clothing’1083 but fails to engage in any discussion on the multiple meanings of the veil in its 
analysis. It would have been an ideal opportunity for the court to extend and apply to veiling 
its previous reasoning on symbols that possess more than one meaning. For example as in 
Vajnai v. Hungary1084 where the applicant wore the ‘red star’ as a symbol of the international 
workers movement and criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, for having 
worn a totalitarian symbol in public, a criminal offence under Hungarian law. The court held 
that the applicant’s rights to Article 10 had been infringed and cautioned on restricting the use 
of symbols which have more than one meaning, suggesting that a blanket ban may not be 
justified since that can restrict the use of that symbol in a context where the restriction might 
be unjustified: 
 
Utmost care must be observed in applying any restrictions, especially when the 
case involves symbols which have multiple meanings. In such situations, the Court 
perceives a risk that a blanket ban on such symbols may also restrict their use in 
contexts in which no restriction would be justified… and there is no satisfactory 
way to sever the different meanings of the incriminated symbol. 1085 
 
It is unfortunate the utmost care was not prominent in the judgement and a discussion of the 
multiple meanings and contexts of veiling were never discussed by the court, despite the 
research provided by the third party interveners containing the voices of those who veil and 
their motivations for doing so. Rather the court’s version of enhanced scrutiny is simply 
confined to its observance that the French authorities had attached much weight to the notion 
of living together. And that the minimum requirement of civility necessary for social 
interaction, falls within the competence of the state to ensure that conditions can be secured, 
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whereby individuals can live alongside each other in their diversity, with concealment of the 
face adversely affecting this interaction.1086 According to Vickers and the dissenting judges, the 
far-fetched and vague noting of living together was one of the weakest legitimate aims relied 
upon by the state and the court. Vickers finds it surprising that despite the ECtHR recognising 
that this was a flexible notion, which should have warranted enhanced scrutiny to ensure the 
aim was necessary, the court still went ahead and accepted the aim as being legitimate, giving 
France a wide margin of appreciation holding the ban as being a proportionate measure.1087  
 
The use and upholding of a fluid and a slippery term like ‘living together’ in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence leaves uncertain how the rights of others may have been so seriously affected 
by Muslim women veiling that they warranted an outright ban on the practice? Despite the 
lack of clarity, two main arguments are evident from the proceedings in S.A.S.; veiling 
problematizes integration of veiled Muslim women into the majority society and the lack of 
transparency in communication due to face concealment. 
Does prohibiting veiling in public spaces promote Integration? 
The theories on Integration in the field of social sciences are multi-dimensional and in the 
context of veiling by a minority in a majority society, where the practice is not a norm, it can be 
described as a two way process. This process requires minorities to adopt the laws, values and 
democratic rights of the majority culture. In return, the host culture is flexible and tolerant to 
the retention of cultures and group identities of the minorities. Thus facilitating the influence 
and understanding both cultures would have on peaceful accommodation and commitment to 
live and let live. Banning face concealment on the grounds of it disrupting the integration 
process of women into the French way of life is an absolute argument, as unlike other 
coverings that don’t conceal the face, the burqa or the face veil effaces the wearers identity 
and renders her isolated and segregated.1088 As segregation is naturally opposed to integration, 
it is a concern for European states and this argument is recognised by Howard citing 
McGoldrick, who says that ‘There are widespread concerns in a number of European states 
that significant elements of Muslim communities are not sufficiently integrated’ and that some 
states: 
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Have recognised that they need to take more positive measures to integrate 
Muslims institutionally, politically, substantively, economically and culturally. 
However, there is also a widely held view that Muslim communities must 
themselves do more to engage socially and politically and to contribute more to 
their integration. In this context the wearing of the headscarf – hijab can be 
viewed not only as a cultural or religious manifestation, but also as a symptomatic 
of a reluctance to integrate.1089 
 
Howard goes on to say that this segregation or ‘setting apart leads to the creation of separate 
communities within society which are reluctant to meet and mix with others’.1090 Segregation 
does indeed lead to divided and separate communities and this is evident in a number of 
European states. For example, Amara gives the example of the French banlieues where Muslim 
veiling is dominant due to its enforcement by men from the North African community, who 
use violence against women to conform to strict religious codes1091 and the segregated 
communities have been the subject of many riots. Similarly in the United Kingdom there have 
been a number of riots in the Northern towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley where the 
majority and minority communities are sharply segregated. This led to Cantle using the term 
‘parallel lives’ to describe the white and Asian communities who had little or no contact and 
had developed separately, leading to little convergence of shared experiences and values.1092  
 
In Howard’s view, arguments based on integration in favour of bans on veiling could be used in 
places such as schools, where divergent forms of dress can divide and lead to formation of 
separate groups and prohibitions on veiling could promote social cohesion in schools. Her 
views resonate with those of Ferrari who argues that simply banning veils from public space is 
not acceptable, as the public sphere needs to be deconstructed into three separate entities.1093 
First there is a common space where people go about their everyday business like shopping, 
travelling and going to work. The other spaces are political space and institutional space. She 
argues that the rules that apply to these different spaces is different and neither are the rules 
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the same for a private subject entering these spaces; teachers and students enter the same 
space but their behaviour and clothing is different. According to Silvio, freedom to wear 
religious or cultural dress should not be restricted to common space, unless it can be shown it 
does concrete damage to others enjoyment of this space. She argues that the same argument 
should apply to political space as it must be free and plural and this guarantee of pluralism is 
what a democratic society is founded upon. But she asserts that in the institutional space 
things can be different for example in the courtroom or as in schools. 
 
The integration argument with respect to forced unveiling is not free from weaknesses. There 
are those who are against the wearing of veils and burqas yet disagree on the use of the law to 
unveil women, for example Berlinski states strongly the oppressive effects of the burqa: 
 
What about the women who are extorted into cloaking themselves under pressure 
from a culture characterized by arranged marriages and honour killings? These 
women are pressured to submit because others have submitted. ...These women 
and girls are in France, but they are not free. They are "shut out from social life 
and robbed of any identity," as (French president Nicolas) Sarkozy puts it, and the 
burqa is their moving prison, enveloping every step. It extends the republic's 750 
zones urbaines sensibles, "sensitive urban areas" - Islamic enclaves over which the 
French state has effectively ceded sovereignty to sharia authorities.1094 
 
Berlinski further goes on to argue that the use of the law to unveil women is not the 
appropriate mechanism as the issue of veiling is: 
 
A social problem, not a legal one. Law is the steel by which a body politic 
reinforces its vibrant, pre-existing mores. It is not a device for creating mores or 
for bringing to heel those who are at war with the body politic. ...For a dying 
society, though, a law, like the burqa law, is about as useful as a band-aid.1095 
 
Bans on veiling instead of leading to better community cohesion, can lead to those who 
sincerely believe it is a religious mandate to be pushed into private space in the home. This 
would impact negatively on the women concerned and would further drive them into 
segregation, as that would be the only place where they could remain free from criminality. 
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This could also lead to limitations on the ability of these women to pursue education, gain 
employment and the opportunity to interact with other members of society. The effect of this 
would be to reverse the original aim; to encourage coming out of seclusion and into 
integration. Not only does the integration argument prevent expression of the women’s 
identity of being a Muslim, but also suggests that all those Muslim women who do not veil are 
better integrated into the majority society. 
 
Prohibiting veiling in public space distorts the principle of live and let live, as the majority 
society do not want to give and blame the minority for refusing to live together as in the 
French S.A.S. case. Even those Muslim feminists such as Gohir who concedes that veiling is a 
barrier to communication questions how forced unveiling can better integrate Muslims:  
 
I accept the veil impedes communication and integration but how is preventing a 
few thousand women in Europe from covering their face helping the majority of 
Muslims integrate? If concerns were genuine, then politicians would be 
attempting to tackle the real barriers to integration such as high unemployment 
rates and the multiple forms of discrimination experienced by the Muslims.1096 
 
To suggest that veiling prevents integration and contributes to the lack of community cohesion 
would be to suggest that non-Muslim communities such as the Sikh community in the Southall 
area of the UK or the Hindu community in Leicester in UK are better integrated and don’t lead 
parallel lives. The direct link of veiling with lack of integration as suggested by those who 
support the ban in public spaces is not a strong argument, considering the small number of 
women who engage in the practice in Europe. Whilst Muslim women have the hijab and the 
face veil imposed on them by gendered Qur’anic interpretations in the absence of their voices 
as discussed in part one of this thesis, where the limited choice for them is to remain out of 
public spaces, unless veiled so they can be considered modest. In the S.A.S. case the court is 
effectively ignoring the voices of those who veil, forcing a similar imposition; unveil in order to 
step out into public spaces and be seen as integrating or remain inside the home. In both cases 
the choices of the women are being replaced with those considered to be the right choices by 
the discourse on veiling. 
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Does veiling impede communication? 
According to the court that veiling impedes communication, is the second limb of the ‘living 
together’ argument. There are those such as Ferrari who believes that full face veiling and the 
burqa impede communication, yet feels prohibiting it is not the answer and leads her to 
suspect that: 
 
The ban on wearing the burqa and the niqab in the streets and in other public 
places is not aimed at solving the concrete problems that these garments can give 
rise to. Such a ban is intended to communicate a message of condemnation of a 
religion and of a culture that are considered backward compared to others which 
are viewed as more respectful of the dignity of the human being, women’s rights 
and gender equality1097  
 
Similarly, Howard whilst agreeing that the communication argument is ‘probably, a valid one’, 
does not believe that ‘headscarves which leave the face free should be banned for this reason, 
nor that full face covering should be banned in all circumstances and at all times’.1098  The full 
face veil or the burqa can hinder communication and social interaction between individuals, a 
point which Ali Bhai Brown makes very well as she reminds that ‘When faces are hidden, what 
goes missing are those tiny, vital, facial signs of human contact and undeclared 
mutuality’.1099This social interaction can take place in a number of settings: in private, public or 
public spaces, whether that is out on the street, in day to day contact with individuals or in an 
employment setting. It is not confined to the spoken words only; it includes gestures, the 
expression of emotions, facial expressions or simply the demeanour of a person. These are 
further coupled with other bodily cues for example the use of eyebrows to show surprise or 
confusion, frowning, smiling, the twitching or biting of lips. Some or all of these signals form 
the communication process between individuals. There may be people who have auditory 
impairments and may need to lip read. Wearing a face veil can result in the absence of some of 
these which leads to decoding communication more difficult. 
 
The communication argument in the veiling debate surfaced strongly when Jack Straw, 
member of parliament of Blackburn in the United Kingdom, asked one of his constituents who 
had come to see him in one of his advice surgeries to remove her veil, as it made him 
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uncomfortable speaking to people who came in to see him if he couldn’t see their face. He is 
quoted as saying that a veil could be seen as ‘a visible statement of separation and difference’ 
and further stated that: 
 
I felt uncomfortable about talking to someone ‘’face to face’’ who I could not 
see…I think…that the conversation would be of greater value if the lady took the 
covering from her face. Indeed, the value of a meeting, as opposed to a letter or 
phone call, is so that you can – almost literally – see what the other person means, 
and not just hears what they say. So many of the judgements we all make about 
other people come from seeing their faces. 1100 
 
Although Mr Straw is reported as having made the comments to attract the white voters, he 
apologised for his comments four years later which some commentators criticise as a publicity 
stunt trying to win back votes from his Muslim constituents he had offended by his 
comments.1101Nevertheless, Mr Straw had raised a very important question about veiling and 
social interaction. The communication argument with respect to veiling has to be de-
structured into two elements in order for an effective analysis. First, the effect of veiling on 
communication in an employment or an educational setting and secondly, the impact of veiling 
on communication in public spaces needs to be examined. Although there have been many 
cases regarding the use of headscarves in employment and education settings, the issue 
surrounding communication is only relevant to cases of full face veiling in those settings. The 
ECtHR has not had a case come before it specifically on this issue, other than the S.A.S. case 
where discussion by the court has been limited. Two UK domestic cases concerning the 
prohibition of the full face veil in employment and an education setting are worthy of 
discussion, one involving a bi-lingual support worker in a junior school and the other a 
secondary school pupil.  
 
In Azmi v. Kirklees1102a bilingual support worker who worked in a junior school that consisted 
of predominately Muslim children, was suspended on the grounds for refusing an instruction 
not to wear her veil when in class with pupils assisting a male teacher. The applicant alleged 
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this was direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion. The school had found that 
although ‘Gesture and body language including facial expression reinforce the spoken word’ 
and noted the applicant’s ‘lovely friendly smiling manner with the children and how they 
responded well to this,’ the children could not respond to her teaching so well when her face 
was concealed.1103The school argued that: 
 
Obscuring the face and mouth reduces the non-verbal signals required between 
adult and pupil, both in the classroom and other communal parts of the School. A 
pupil needs to see the adult's full face in order to receive optimum 
communication.’ And furthermore ‘Schools are professional settings where 
communication is vital, both between adults and pupils and between adults.’ And 
‘It follows that for teachers or support workers wearing a veil in the workplace will 
prevent full and effective communication being maintained.’ And therefore in the 
school’s view ‘the desire to express religious identity does not overcome the 
primary requirement for optimal communication between adults and children.1104 
 
The Tribunal found that that the decision to suspend the applicant was not direct 
discrimination, on the grounds of religion or belief and though it was indirectly discriminatory, 
it was lawful, being proportionate in support of a legitimate aim, thereby upholding the 
school’s decision to suspend her for refusing to remove the veil.  
 
Similarly in X v. Y1105where a secondary school girl was suspended for refusing to remove her 
full face veil. In the failed judicial review action against the school’s decision where the school 
argued the importance of unimpeded communication, in which the veil acts as interference to 
that process. First of all the school argued that wearing the veil ‘would tend to undermine the 
development of empathy between staff and students and between the students themselves 
and as such it may affect positive relationships.’1106 And furthermore in respect of the veil’s 
impact on effective teaching, just as in the Azmi case, the school argued that effective teaching 
depended on students being able to interact with each other, in particular with the teacher 
who in her own words stated: 
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Being able to see facial expressions is a key component of effective classroom 
interaction. Successful teaching depends on the teacher being able 'to read' a 
student to see if the student understands, is paying attention, is distressed, or is 
enthusiastic. This also applies to interaction between students in group work. I 
think that wearing a niqab would impede this interaction between students in 
group work. I think that wearing a niqab would impede this interaction between 
staff and student.1107  
 
Both of these examples are where the veil does act as a barrier to effective communication 
and disclose legitimate grounds for prohibiting the wearing of the full face veil. The negative 
effects of veiling on learning are acknowledged by Muslim female teachers such as Fatema 
Mayata, a young religious studies teacher who wears the veil, but at the same time says ‘there 
are limits to wearing the veil’ and admits that ‘One cannot teach students when the face is 
covered’.1108 There are cases other than in teaching where wearing the veil has been seen as a 
hindrance to communication, for example, where a judge had to stop proceedings when a 
Muslim woman legal executive representing a client before the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal refused to remove her veil when asked to by the judge, because he could not hear her 
properly. 1109 This became a live issue for the courts and led to Guidance for the judiciary on 
the wearing of veils in court, drawn up by the President of the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal  who said has said judges can request the removal of a veil if: 
 
A judge or other party to the proceedings is unable to hear the representative 
clearly then the interests of justice are not served, and other arrangements will 
need to be made… Such arrangements will vary from case to case, subject to 
judicial discretion and the interests of all parties.1110 
 
However, the matter of veils did not simply stop at lawyers veiling in court, but also extended 
to the question of witnesses refusing to remove their veils whilst testifying. This led Judge 
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Murphy to consider the issue of veiling by defendants in court and he ruled that the defendant 
was free to wear the veil during trial, but added that it was crucial for the jury to see her while 
she was giving evidence, concluding that ‘If the defendant gives evidence she must remove the 
veil throughout her evidence.’ He further stated that the face veil had become the ‘elephant in 
the court room’.1111 In all the above cases there has been an institutional space approach. 
However, there are grey areas such as hospitals where according to Ferrari, a ‘healthy 
pragmatism is needed’.  She elaborates that ‘A patient who asks to be admitted to hospital 
wearing a veil is one thing but a teacher who wants to teach from behind a screen is 
another’.1112 
 
The negative impact that face coverings have on impairment to speech intelligibility has been 
confirmed by scientific studies, but has been confined to a focus on masks used by the 
military,1113 emergency services1114 and the use of masks by students in oral language 
examinations during the SARS outbreak.1115 Similarly, the negative impact on acoustics and 
speech intelligibility by veiling has been studied by Donnelly, Llamas and Watt culminating in 
findings that confirm that it can impede communication.1116 Therefore the communication 
argument has cogency when the veiled woman is in a situation where speech intelligibility or 
decoding is crucial, and the use of visual cues would allow the receiver of speech to better 
decode the meaning vis-à-vis those with a hearing impairment. 
 
The education setting and the emergency services would be prime examples where the 
auditory is combined with the visual, to enable, either effective learning in the classroom or to 
provide a service in an emergency situation, where on the spot decisions are made. An 
example of this would be where a doctor in an emergency situation may rely on facial 
expressions during a course of treatment. Studies have affirmed this as in the one carried out 
by Mistry Et Al on the effects of veiling when carrying out psychiatric assessments. They 
conclude that the majority of psychologists and psychiatrists believed that ‘clinical assessment 
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may be compromised, although [they were] aware of cultural sensitivity around the area’ and 
some professionals ‘reported that they feel unable to assess or treat if the request to take the 
veil off is declined’. 1117 
 
The importance of visual cues as part of body language has been the subject of many studies 
affirming that facial expressions and body language have more weighting than auditory 
signals.1118 For example, according to Lewis just facial signals used in communication can result 
in the expression of no fewer than seventeen emotions.1119 Of course there are other examples 
in employment settings where visual cues are not required, such as those who are employed in 
call centres or are in contact with people during their course of employment using information 
technology. 
 
The second aspect of the communication argument is where the issue of ‘civility and 
sociability’1120 arises in everyday social interaction, where barrier free communication between 
individuals could only take place in an environment of transparency. This requires everyone to 
be able to see each other’s faces and all parties subject to this communication process are in 
an equal power situation. This leads to mutual respect and does not expose one party to any 
vulnerability and is even more crucial for those who have auditory impairment or are reliant 
on an element of lip reading and visual cues to enable effective communication.1121 There are 
however those who argue that people are very good at adjusting to the modalities of 
communication, so it would not take long for people to adjust to someone communicating 
with a veil, for example Nussbaum who is against the banning of the burqa and veils, states 
that: 
 
People who are blind notoriously develop hyper-acute auditory skills and are 
usually able to recognise individuals by their voices-as, of course, are people who 
contact one another regularly by telephone. In addition to eye contact, the Burqa 
certainly permits voice recognition, as well as recognition of characteristic bodily 
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postures and gestures. I see no reason to think that people cannot quickly adjust 
to new ways of recognising individuality, as the situation requires.1122 
 
Indeed there are times when the veil needs to be removed at airports or at banks and there 
are many obstacles to communication other than veiling. For example those who wear 
sunglasses and especially since a lot of people wear standard glasses that are photo chromatic 
and become dark disabling the reliance of expressions of the eye. But we never ask them to 
remove their glasses when communicating. Nussbaum uses the example of normal dress in the 
form of scarves covering people’s faces in winter, yet we do not prohibit such activities on the 
grounds of communication.1123 She questions whether it is the veil itself that is objectionable 
as she asserts ‘What inspires fear and mistrust in Europe, clearly, is not covering per se, but 
Muslim covering’,1124 a point which the dissenting judges also raised in S.A.S: 
 
The majority speak of “practices or attitudes ... which would fundamentally call 
into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships”… The 
Government of the Netherlands, justifying a Bill before that country’s Parliament, 
pointed to a threat not only to “social interaction”, but also to a subjective “feeling 
of safety”… It seems to us, however, that such fears and feelings of uneasiness are 
not so much caused by the veil itself, which – unlike perhaps certain other dress-
codes – cannot be perceived as aggressive per se, but by the philosophy that is 
presumed to be linked to it. Thus the recurring motives for not tolerating the full-
face veil are based on interpretations of its symbolic meaning… 1125 
 
The dissenting judges provide evidence of such fears from the French law’s legislative history: 
 
The first report on “the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory”, by a 
French parliamentary commission, saw in the veil “a symbol of a form of 
subservience”. The explanatory memorandum to the French Bill referred to its 
“symbolic and dehumanising violence”… The full-face veil was also linked to the 
“self-confinement of any individual who cuts himself off from others whilst living 
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among them”… Women who wear such clothing have been described as “effaced” 
from public space…1126 
 
It is questionable as to the frequency of direct communicative contact a non-wearer of the veil 
has in their day to day lives with those who wear the veil for it to be problematic, and this is 
something the court in its own assessment made a reference to, highlighting how small the 
numbers of women who veil reside in France and therefore the incidence of communication 
being very small: 
 
It can be seen, among other things, from the report “on the wearing of the full-
face veil on national territory” prepared by a commission of the National Assembly 
and deposited on 26 January 2010, that about 1,900 women wore the Islamic full-
face veil in France at the end of 2009, of whom about 270 were living in French 
overseas administrative areas (see paragraph 16 above). This is a small proportion 
in relation to the French population of about sixty-five million and to the number 
of Muslims living in France. It may thus seem excessive to respond to such a 
situation by imposing a blanket ban.1127 
 
The issue in S.A.S. is not just about communication but social interaction generally with the 
wider population. There is no doubt that some people simply do not understand why women 
would want to veil and more so, young children would wonder why some have their faces 
covered? The requirements of civility of social interaction is thus not erasure of the face in 
public, but the open and transparent expression of being open to interaction, which is free 
from fear shock or disturbance from the sight of a veil or a burqa. However a point 
Nussbaum1128 notes which the dissenting judges also echo, is that just because the exposed 
face plays an important part in social interaction, it cannot be said that human interaction is 
impossible if the full face is not shown. They give examples of skiing, motorcycle helmets, and 
costumes in carnivals which no one can claim that ‘the minimum requirements of life in society 
are not respected. People can socialise without necessarily looking into each other’s eyes’.1129 
This is especially so in the contemporary world where the use of information communication 
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technology and the use of social networking sites has proliferated and a person need not even 
be in the physical presence of others to deem it social interaction.  
 
Even if the majority society disagrees with or is shocked or offended by opinions or fears them, 
the ECtHR jurisprudence is clear that they are not grounds for prohibition. Since these 
principles are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there 
is no democratic society,1130 the same principles must be applicable to veiling. Another 
compelling argument put forward by the dissenting judges on the issue of social interaction is 
that one does not have a right to make contact with others against their will in public places; 
otherwise the right would also have a corresponding obligation which would be contrary to the 
ECHR. Although communication is an essential element of life in society, respect for private life 
entails the right not to communicate, enter into contact with others in public places; 
effectively the right to remain an outsider.1131 In this respect Mancini argues that personal 
freedom must prevail over paternalistic considerations as the judgement on what’s best for 
others is based on our own values, principles and habits. 1132 
 
However, it has to be equally objectionable if young girls are being encouraged to veil and that 
choice of optimum communication is being inhibited at an early stage of their lives, where 
there is a danger of ostracisation if they don’t veil, and being dejected if they do. In this 
respect Ali Bhai Brown notes that ‘Parents of tiny girls with headscarves tell me they are 
training them to cover themselves. Informed choice is one thing, but trained choice? Or a 
choice where females know they will be ostracised if they don’t comply’?1133However concerns 
over children although valid do not always pay heed to the realities of the framework of law, 
which encourages the young to appreciate and understand their autonomy, for example by 
consenting to medical treatment1134 or have body piercing.    
 
The lack of the prescribed legitimate aims, which were tenuously connected by the slippery 
and novel notion of living together arguably, gives states a much easier route to prohibit 
religious practices of minorities, simply based on subjective arguments that a particular 
practice offends the requirements of living together. Especially as no definition of the term 
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was furnished, leaving it very much in the hands of a state with the consequence that each 
offending state could present the court with a different meaning of the term. Such fluidity in 
what should be a concrete principle, considering it can have such drastic impacts on those 
affected, leaves the jurisprudence of the court far from satisfactory in terms of consistency 
and certainty of the law. The endorsement of such a principle by the court gives rise to the 
argument that the court appears to be drawing a distinction between the homogenous 
majority society and the ‘other’ minority society that engages in religious manifestations in 
public spaces. 
Veiling and Article 10 ECHR 
It has already been established that veiling is highly contextual with no static meaning and 
goes beyond just an Article 9 action. The applicant in S.A.S. also framed the action under 
Article 10 but the ECtHR did not give it the consideration it warranted. McGoldrick is clear that 
some women ‘regard wearing the hijab as a part of their individual and group identity’1135 and 
according to him freedom of expression can be framed as a right to an identity that publicly 
expresses a link with groups, communities or by choice of dress and symbols. The French law 
prohibiting face concealment leads to the misrecognition of Muslim women that is harmful to 
their selfhood. Such harm from misrecognition is noted by Taylor who states that it ‘can inflict 
a grievous wound, saddling it’s victims with a crippling self-hatred’1136 and ‘Non recognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, 
distorted, and reduced mode of being’.1137 And as such, he observes that it is important to 
understand other people’s language of self-understanding as it can lead to protection against 
the host society’s ethnocentrism.1138 The importance of such an observation is evident in the 
passing of the French laws on full face concealment because as Eisenberg notes, such ‘conflicts 
will be understood in light of false stereotypes about minority groups and false assumptions 
about the neutrality and fairness of dominant practices and procedures’.1139  
 
The Muslim identity transmitted via the face veil is considered important to the wearers of the 
veil, as it projects their attachments to a particular community with a particular way of life, 
sets of beliefs, or practices that play a central role in their self-conception or self-
                                                          
1135
 McGoldrick, ‘Extreme Religious Dress; Perspectives on Veiling Controversies’ , supra (n 859) 405 
1136
 Charles Taylor, Multiculturism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press 1994) 26 
1137
 Ibid 25 
1138
 Charles Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’ in Charles Taylor (ed), Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge University Press 1985) 126 
1139
 Avigail Eisenberg, Reasons of Identity: A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment of 
Identity Claims (Oxford University Press 2009) 140 
274 
 
understanding. So practices such as veiling for some Muslim women are an important aspect 
of their identity and that was recognised by the court too.1140 Such a practice according to 
Eisenberg ‘reflects something important about their sense of who they are or that they cannot 
realize something important about their sense of who they are or that they cannot realize 
something important about themselves without access to it’.1141 Dress is not politically or 
culturally neutral, it is loaded with significance and we must interpret the language of dress in 
any given situation. If veiling is found to be offensive to the majority society, then the ECtHR 
needed to refer back to its own jurisprudence where it has held that freedom of expression:  
 
 is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that 
offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is 
no "democratic society". This means, amongst other things, that every "formality", 
"condition", "restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.1142  
 
As discussed in part one of the thesis, some women veil in order to express resistance to 
political control, modernity, to avoid being judged by their looks or as a symbol of culture and 
a woman is entitled to express each one of these meanings. Had the court considered the 
multiple meanings of the veil, it may have acknowledged the right to such freedom of 
expression.  Certainly, dress is and can be used as a form of social control and behaviour by 
groups1143 but how women choose to dress should not be dominated by others who may be 
offended by a particular form of dress, or by the law, bar where intercession of the law is 
necessary for legitimate reasons. Otherwise, as Keenan notes we may all become ‘inveterate 
hermeneuticians engaged in a never-ending round of conjecture and refutation as to what this 
or that look is saying’?1144  
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Veiling and Article 8 ECHR 
Choice of dress is clearly within the ambit of Article 8 as a right to private life1145 and even 
those women, who do not veil, oppose any prohibition on the ground that women have the 
right to choose1146 and the court in S.A.S. acknowledged this stating that ‘The Court is thus of 
the view that personal choices as to an individual’s desired appearance, whether in public or in 
private places, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion 
of private life’.1147 The opposition to outright banning is wrong and even feminists such as Ali 
who is vehemently opposed to the practice of veiling considers as an inappropriate method to 
deal with the issue of oppression raised by those who oppose the practice.1148The dignity, 
autonomy and self-determination of an individual and the resultant development of a right to 
identity as a derivative of dignity is something the ECtHR has acknowledged in its 
jurisprudence under the right to respect for one’s private life under Article 8.1149 And this has 
been recognised as a right by the UN human Rights Committee1150 and the European Court of 
Justice.1151 The Grand Chamber also affirmed in S.A.S. that ‘Personal choices as to an 
individual’s desired appearance, whether in public or in private places, relate to the expression 
of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life.’ And that: 
 
A measure emanating from a public authority which restricts a choice of this kind 
will therefore, in principle, constitute an interference with the exercise of the right 
to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention... 
Consequently, the ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public 
places, pursuant to the Law of 11 October 2010, falls under Article 8 of the 
Convention.1152  
 
Yet the court still allowed the French law to prohibit this expression of personality. The 
applicant in S.A.S. and the veiled women affected by the ban were expecting the court to have 
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their private life respected, which according to McGoldrick would be recognition of not ‘merely 
equality of treatment, but rather equality of respect’. This respect according to Moore has a 
clear link with the identity and self-esteem of women,1153 affirmed by Marshall who referring 
to Honneth states that ‘The three components of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem 
enable our identity to be recognised’.1154  
 
There is a relationship between identity and respect, because identity is linked to the distinct 
method by which individuals can understand themselves in a social context and according to 
Taylor is the ‘background against which our …desires and opinions and aspirations make 
sense’.1155 This suggests that Muslim women who veil for reasons of enhancing their piety or 
because they believe that it is a religious mandate can lose that self-respect if they are 
prohibited from doing so. Being treated differently from others would have the consequence 
of loss of self-respect as noted by Marshall who states that ‘Self-respect is the matter of 
viewing oneself as entitled to the same status and treatment as every other person. The law 
represents a relation of mutual recognition through which every person, as bearer of the same 
claims, experiences equal respect’.1156 Furthermore she notes that ‘When an inferior or 
demeaning image is projected on another by the state or through others and the state allows 
this to happen, this can distort.’1157 Citing Taylor she adds that the denial of recognition can be 
a form of oppression.1158 
 
If the objection to veiling by the French society is that forced veiling is wrong, then surely the 
same society should object to forced unveiling, because for the women in question the 
consequence of forced unveiling as in France and forced veiling as in Afghanistan is the same. 
This in Hirschmann’s words is replacing ‘one form of social control with another’,1159 thus 
prohibiting veiling is misrecognising Muslim women and disrespecting their identity.1160 Such 
prohibitions lead to their confinement to within the walls of their homes and cutting out 
employment prospects. Breaking this link with the wider society results in a failure of due 
respect or recognition, and such denials of social contact ‘fails dismally to accord them respect 
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or recognition’.1161Although in this respect McGoldrick points out that in an international 
veiling context, if forced veiling as in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan is not seen as violating 
international human rights mechanisms, then a state could prohibit veiling under certain 
circumstances or contexts, but he doesn’t highlight these.1162 But that would indeed be the 
equivalent of fixing or freezing one’s identity in law ‘which is problematic’ as it limits the 
choices veiled women can make and try new or different ‘means of living and being’.1163 
 
Marshall’s approach is more sensitive of preserving the dignity of the veiled women based on 
the interpretation of human dignity and freedom which empowers women, rather than 
constrain them. This would allow creation of their identity and its recognition thus facilitating 
veiling choices and identity development as they deem appropriate1164 and in this respect she 
projects her view on criminalising veiling clearly: 
 
The fear of the other, imposing criminality onto the wearing of a piece of clothing, 
fails to recognise the other person completely in a democratic society as worthy of 
respect for who they are…Criminalising anyone for looking a particular way does 
the opposite to building qualities of self-confidence, self-respect and self-
esteem…It is not a human rights court’s role to decide whether or not a woman 
needs to wear a full face veil according to the precepts of Islam. What is decisive is 
that the woman considers it be necessary in her interpretation or opinion…she 
may want to wear it as an expression of her personality for some other reason. 
That view should be respected.1165 
 
Through the lack of respect for her private life as guaranteed by Article 8, Muslim veiled 
women in France are misrecognised, with the consequence that their social recognition is 
being withdrawn by the French law on full face concealment. This leads to them being 
otherised not just by those who oppose veiling, but the state, as well as the ECtHR that should 
be the guardian of their right to identity and dignity under Article 8. If the court had listened to 
the voices of Muslim women who veil, it would have realised that the meaning of veiling 
extends beyond Article 9 and warrants a greater analysis of Article 8 rights associated with 
veiling giving recognition to their identity, dignity and personality.  
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Conclusion 
The case on hand was a great opportunity for the Grand Chamber to amend its previous 
inadequate jurisprudence on religious symbols cases, but it did not do so. The decision and the 
court’s reasoning in S.A.S. is surprising as it is incongruent with the ultimate result and the 
court’s own comments. On the one hand the court finds that France had the power to secure 
the conditions for its society to live together as that was within the scope of protection of 
rights and freedom of others. Yet on the other it had highlighted the weaknesses in the 
judgement suggesting that the prohibition on veiling was disproportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued by France. For example, the court by its own acknowledgement recognised that 
the number of women who veil is small and thus hardly a threat to life in a democratic state: 
 
It is true that only a small number of women are concerned. It can be seen, among 
other things, from the report “on the wearing of the full-face veil on national 
territory” prepared by a commission of the National Assembly and deposited on 
26 January 2010, that about 1,900 women wore the Islamic full-face veil in France 
at the end of 2009, of whom about 270 were living in French overseas 
administrative areas…This is a small proportion in relation to the French 
population of about sixty-five million and to the number of Muslims living in 
France. It may thus seem excessive to respond to such a situation by imposing a 
blanket ban.1166 
 
The French law could have a negative impact on these women by way of isolating them and 
restricting their Article 9 rights, autonomy and right to private life, as well as a threat to their 
identity.1167 There were a number of international bodies who felt the restrictions on veiling 
were disproportionate, yet the court did not pay any heed to such consensus. 1168Furthermore 
the court found that the fact that homophobic remarks preceded the adoption of the French 
law and although, it is not the court’s place to comment on the desirability of such a law, it 
contributes to consolidating stereotypes that affect minorities and of intolerance when the 
state has a duty to promote tolerance. The court also noted that offending remarks against 
religious and ethnic groups ‘are incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and 
non-discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall within the right to freedom 
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of expression that it protects’.1169 Since the court had these concerns one would expect greater 
scrutiny to ensure that the intolerance against veiled women had no influence on the adoption 
of the French law. This was an issue raised by the dissenting judges who noted that the 
prohibition could be viewed as selective pluralism and limited tolerance against minority 
communities. And that rather than ensuring tolerance between the majority and minority 
community by France, it simply removed what it saw as the cause of the tension which is 
contrary to the court’s previous jurisprudence on article 9 cases.1170 The court tried to justify 
the small criminal penalty for those convicted for veiling under the France law, which means 
that the fact that veiling in public had been criminalised was a concern for the court, otherwise 
why would it try to justify it? What the court seemed to overlook was not just the cumulative 
penalties for those who wished to veil but the fact that they were being criminalised for an act 
that contains no element of harm, and arguably if the penalty was that small then why was 
there a need to have it at all? 
 
Such weaknesses made evident by the court itself pose a question mark on the proportionality 
of the French law, yet it still found France’s pursuit of a legitimate aim proportionate and 
deferred a wide margin of appreciation to the state. Such a conclusion as Vickers says is 
‘disappointing, particularly the reliance on the nebulous concept of ‘’living together’’, an aim 
which could equally be met by promoting a ‘’live and let live’’ attitude, and which moreover 
could lead to bans on anything that makes the majority feel uncomfortable.’1171 The decision is 
problematic  considering the ECtHR judges albeit in their dissenting opinions in FeldeBrugge v. 
Netherlands1172 and Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 1173 had warned the court against 
introducing new concepts or spheres of application to be introduced into the Convention and 
that Convention rights should not be interpreted in a way that impairs the essence of that 
right. And as such the decision is ‘a worrying development’ if the right to manifestation of 
religion is to ‘have any ‘practical meaning’.1174 
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The court failed to listen to the voices of those women who veil by not taking on board the 
research presented by the third part interveners, resulting in a lost opportunity to lay to rest 
some of the negative stereotypes associated with veiling. Instead it allowed the creation of a 
new negative label that Muslim women who veil refuse to integrate with the wider society and 
live together. Had the court paid more regard to the woman at the centre of the debate, it 
may have considered her Article 8 and 10 rights more seriously than it did. That would have 
been an acknowledgement that veiling is contextual and has many meanings, which would 
have been more in tune with deciding cases on an individual basis, rather than the judicially 
preferred Article 9, which is proving to be affording little if any protection to those who veil. 
This coupled with the acceptance by the court of a state created principle of ‘living together’ 
may mean that it is not only full face veiling that could be prohibited but the extension of the 
principle to other forms of dress or behaviour is not impossible. Thus the court although 
having moved in the right direction by recognising that women who veil through their own 
free will are not the victims of the gender inequality echoed in Dahlab1175 and Sahin1176 has 
now left an additional problem for manifestations of religious practices of minorities in 
Europe; an obscure requirement of ‘living together’ that incorporates the views and values of 
the majority society, but without any indication of what those values are, leaving open to 
threat those religious and cultural practices, which the majority disagrees with and takes a 
dislike.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1175
 Dahlab v. Switzerland, supra (n 27) 
1176
 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC], supra (n 28) 
281 
 
CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
 
The hijab and particularly the full face veil have been the subject of many controversies 
evoking polarised discourses of oppression and emancipation, which have been at the 
forefront of the debates and are still pervasive. This thesis examines and links three distinct 
perspectives; the religious, socio-feministic and the legal. By doing so, the analysis conducted 
here attempted to reflect the fact that the practice of veiling has no singular universal meaning 
but is dependent on individualities and multiplicities. The discourses have associated veiling 
with: negative and positive stereotypes, objectification, control of female sexuality, gender 
oppression, Islamic fundamentalism, cultural customs, political protest, false consciousness, 
proselytism, security concerns, refusal to live together, modesty, resistance to modernity, 
deflection of the male gaze, emancipation, expression of identity, patriarchal bargaining, 
fashion and compliance to state enforced dress codes. Such variations have not only made it 
difficult to discern the non-religious from the religious, with some Muslims declaring them as 
cultural edicts whilst others projecting them as religious duties but have also made it 
extremely difficult to ascribe an all embracing meaning to the practice. The tension within the 
debates on Muslim veiling has been primarily due to the binary standpoints of the adherents 
and opponents of veiling, each claiming that their respective discourses hold the true 
understanding, meaning and significance of veiling. The discrepancies between the polarised 
positions have led to many of the controversies surrounding the practice with those who 
oppose it calling for the practice to be prohibited in public places whilst its supporters place 
reliance on the right to religious freedom and have looked to the ECtHR for protection of that 
freedom using the ECHR framework of human rights. 
The hijab and the veil are items of clothing and like all other clothes they are loaded with many 
symbolic meanings and can serve many purposes. Dress codes are based on social 
expectations, culture, context and location and the forms of dress are subject to generational 
differences. For example, in a European setting denim jeans and pumps worn by young boys in 
the late 60’s were directly associated with their family’s financial inability to buy trousers and 
shoes for out of school wear, whereas jeans and trainers in current times have become the 
most popular dress items throughout the world and are considered trendy items. Similarly 
dress codes have been at a variance amongst Muslim women who have been motivated by 
different factors and situations, just like other people around the world have expectations and 
social norms that influence how people are to dress, for example people do not go to church 
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or the opera wearing shorts and flip flops. Yet no other item of clothing has generated such 
fierce oppositions in recent times as did items of clothing worn by Muslim women.  
Modesty and its discontents 
The first perspective examined by this thesis is that of the beliefs or perceptions of Muslim 
men and women that the hijab or the veil is a religious obligation related to modesty. Verses of 
the Qur’an, which are believed by Muslims to apply to Muslim women’s dress codes and the 
meanings of these, have been the inventory entirely comprising of male religious scholars, 
with no woman exegete playing any substantial role in interpreting or bearing responsibility 
for any of the traditional understanding of how women should dress. The meaning and 
application of these dress codes was decided centuries ago when cultural customs such as 
tribal and family honour coupled with subordinate roles of women were crucial to the control 
of women and the male imposed social order.1177  
Arguably, Muslim women’s veiling is a product of history and culture and not purely an Islamic 
creation, therefore like the other Abrahamic religions it is not free from such influences. Such a 
background to the Qur’anic hermeneutics raises a question of whether those interpretations 
imposing modes of dress on Muslim women who comply in the name of modesty are based on 
free choice of women or in compliance to custom and tradition as opposed to a religious duty. 
This is an important issue surrounding choice because any later reliance by these women on 
the law via human rights mechanisms such as the ECHR is dependent on whether these 
choices are free or not and whether the applicant subjectively held the belief that the hijab or 
the veil are obligated by Islam. This reasoning is adopted by those who argue the veil is 
mandated by religion in order to be modest and that idea of a free choice has to be questioned 
as the current interpretations of the verses only allow limited options for making such choices; 
wear the hijab or the veil in order to be modest or neither and be seen as immodest. This 
argument from a freedom perspective is challengeable since there are no options or limited 
options, which are pre-determined by patriarchal interpretations of the sacred texts. Freedom 
requires not only options but the ability to choose or reject and being free from coercion or 
influence.  
The restriction of the options available to Muslim women by men with power and monopoly to 
interpret the religious texts has allowed religious scholars to suit themselves and men in 
Muslim societies. Since such dress codes do not apply to men and they have been generated 
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by male interpretations it is argued that they have used sacred texts to regulate women’s 
presence in public spaces, whilst allowing themselves the freedom to such spaces and 
gendered power and control over the religious discourse, thus ensuring that Muslim women 
are silenced in matters associated with religious dress. 
One of the most cited reasons used by Muslim women and men for veiling has been the 
concept of modesty believed by them to be a religious duty. Indeed there are women who veil 
for reasons of modesty and this is linked with faith, but Islamic ethics extends beyond just a 
question of dress and is reflected in a number of other positive attributes  of a person 
including speech, conduct in public and aspects of inner modesty before God. This thesis has 
shown that the use of clothing as a form of modesty is open to a number of challenges, for 
example, the use of the hijab or the veil as a method of expressing and preserving modesty is 
premised on the notion that those who do not use such clothing are immodest. There is a 
majority of non-veil wearing Muslim and non-Muslim women who do not veil, yet they 
maintain their modesty by controlling their sexualities internally without the need for religious 
clothing and to be pronouncing these women as immodest by default is inscribing non-veiled 
women with a negative gender stereotype and is essentialist in nature.  
The thesis also showed that the use of the modesty doctrine as a means of limiting a woman’s 
sexuality as mandated by classical interpretations and the religious discourse on veiling is 
objectionable on the grounds that Muslim women are being considered as having unleashed 
sexuality, which needs to be chained for the retention of family honour as well as being 
responsible for the sexual urges of men leads them to being treated as cultural objects, instead 
of equal beings as affirmed by the Qur’an. Thus the gender equality between Muslim men and 
women is being fractured by male orientated interpretations, which have the effect of placing 
the burden of controlling men’s sexual desires and urges on Muslim women instead of the 
men taking religious responsibility for their own inner immodesty.  
The Islamic religious discourse paradoxically uses the veil as a tool for deflecting the male gaze 
as a means of preserving modesty through the restriction of female sexuality. This is because 
the face of the woman that attracts men is not discernible and in any event Muslim men are 
under an obligation to lower their gaze too, but without the need to cover their own face, 
which leaves open the possibility of the veiled woman being attracted to a man. Furthermore 
this creates not only an uneven burden on the woman who veils but it is questionable whether 
it achieves its purpose. This is because in Muslim countries the majority male population is 
Muslim and the veil in such locations may serve the desired purpose of maintaining Islamic 
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modesty by deflecting the male gaze, but women who wear the full face veil in European 
countries, where the majority male population is non-Muslim and not bound by any divine 
injunction on lowering the gaze results in the veil being an object of attention, thus defeating 
the intended objective. This unintended result of veiling is that it confines to the private what 
should be public parts of women giving an opportunity for others to eroticise, which from a 
modesty perspective has to be considered unacceptable. Additionally the male gaze deflection 
purpose becomes devoid of meaning since the Qur’an imposes a duty on men to avert their 
gaze and if that duty was discharged as required by Islam, then Muslim women would need 
not veil because any risk to the modesty of the sexes would be achieved through self- control. 
It is this imbalance and the disregard for the contextualised interpretations that leads to the 
conclusion that the use of religious clothing to avoid attention as per the traditional 
interpretations of the Qur’anic verse was contextual and only intended for a particular time in 
Islamic history and for a particular purpose. 
The religious mandate of the veil in order to avoid being harassed by men is still being 
perpetuated and used by male scholars as a means of ensuring Muslim women veil and 
segregate themselves from men, even though such threats are not as evident and in any event 
are catered for by the laws of European states. Even if this was a correct interpretation and 
meant to be ahistorical, it means that veiled women are responsible for diverting sexual 
harassment to women who do not veil, which from an Islamic equity viewpoint is clearly 
erroneous. If anything current research demonstrates that women who veil are being regularly 
subjected to threats and violence for wearing a veil,1178 therefore it is questionable why 
religion would permit the use of the veil to avoid harassment but it does not allow for its 
disuse in order to avoid physical threats and attacks.  
The above criticisms of Muslim women’s veiling in order to comply with male orientated 
interpretations have not only led to subordination of Muslim women by men but have also 
generated internal disagreements amongst Muslim men and women on the mandatory nature 
of veiling in Islam.1179 Such a state of affairs makes it difficult for those in European societies to 
understand the compulsory nature of veiling when Muslims themselves cannot agree. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the veil as per the traditional interpretations declaring it a 
religious obligation leads to the silencing of the voices of women who wear the hijab by those 
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scholars who interpret the veil as obligatory and similarly those women who veil are muted by 
the opinions of the scholars who are of the opinion that only the hijab is a religious obligation. 
Each standpoint is questioning the choices of women and the interpretations of the Qur’anic 
texts that lead to the act of choosing to adopt the hijab or the veil. It is veiling in the context of 
this milieu that suffers from a hermeneutic deficit, which can only be addressed by re-
interpretation of those texts believed by Muslims as imposing veiling on Muslim women. Such 
re-interpretations and polysemic readings have been and can be carried out by Muslim 
women,1180 in order to eliminate the patriarchal classical readings. This will enable the voices 
of those who veil to be heard opening up more options with respect to the dress codes for 
Muslim women and will lead to enhancing their freedom to choose their own option on how 
to discharge their religious obligations, as well as achieve freedom from the male control of 
their sexuality and religious knowledge. 
The arguments adopted by those who oppose and support veiling consist of supporters of the 
veil arguing that a lack of or revealing clothes results in objectification of women whilst those 
who oppose the veil argue that covering the face also results in objectification. Both 
arguments are ineffective and inappropriate at improving the position of Muslim women who 
veil; this is because in each case the woman is objectified for the benefit of men. Whereas if 
those projecting these arguments were to pay attention to the damage to women by both 
standpoints and focussed on the recognition of choices by women as being free and 
autonomous irrespective of under or over clothing, that would achieve greater benefits for 
both groups of women involved as opposed to deflecting attention towards each other’s 
inauthentic choice of clothing.  
Despite some of the criticisms of the modesty doctrine, religious patriarchy does not simply 
belong to Islam’s domain since textual interpretations of all the Abrahamic religions have been 
accused of male control over women and what is important is respect for religious choices 
made by Muslim women who veil, as without that the danger is that any inquiry would result 
in the complexities of testing the validity of the truths held by such women, which is beyond 
the remit of this thesis. 
The oppression versus emancipation dichotomy 
The theoretical socio-feministic framework is dominated by clashing viewpoints where one 
discourse negatively stereotypes veiling as an oppressive practice grounded in socialisation 
and wish for it to be banned in public spaces in Europe in order to liberate veiled Muslim 
                                                          
1180
 Barlas, supra (n 99); Wadud, supra (n 197) 
286 
 
women. Whilst others inscribe a positive stereotype on the veil as a symbol of emancipation, 
asserting that the oppression perspective is rooted in cultural insensitivity and lack of 
understanding, which is due to the adoption of colonialist attitudes and a refusal to accept 
difference based on reductive assumptions of veiling. This then leads to ignoring contexts and 
individualities of women who adopt the practice, thus universalising the oppression associated 
with veiling.  Although both viewpoints have dominated the discourse on veiling, neither 
perspective can address the complexities of the issue as each remains preoccupied with 
weakening the others perspective without acknowledging its own untenable position. 
  
In order for the supporters of the dichotomous perspectives to gain a better understanding of 
veiling, the different meanings, situations and contexts of veiling have to be acknowledged. For 
example patriarchy exists in Muslim societies as it does in Western ones and it has to be 
accepted that the fact that women veil due to patriarchal households does not necessarily 
mean that prohibiting the veil would eliminate it, as that would only replace one method of 
control with another one that is equally oppressive for veiled women. This can be seen with 
the prohibition of the veil in France. In many cases Muslim women in such settings use the veil 
as a means to negotiate their access to public spaces, education and employment facilitating 
integration with the wider society, which helps strike a balance between the cultural and the 
modern, with a secondary effect that the level of patriarchy over any younger girls in the 
household would be decreased. So in this sense veiled women limit their agency in order to 
bargain for some and an increased freedom for other women in the household. This is because 
for some women it would be better to have some freedom than none and in any event over a 
period of time the gender relations would settle leading to more agentic lives for veiled 
women. Such increments of agency is evident from the younger Muslim women using hijabs 
and veils of different colours, styles and combining them with Western clothes. Therefore to 
declare such women as oppressed or emancipated by treating them as homogenous 
categories does not help them or hold strictly true for either standpoint, and rather than 
campaign for extremes such as bans on veiling or challenge free veiling, it is better to facilitate 
a gradual elimination of the subordination of women via the male imposed veil. 
The academic Ping-Pong and refusal to acknowledge the others’ viewpoints does not serve the 
veiled women at the centre of the debate. Neither does the feminist agenda based on the 
imperative to eliminate discriminatory practices affecting women. This is evident from the 
discourse on the hijab and the veil just as it was during the debates on the French prohibition 
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on religious symbols in state schools where feminists such as Amara1181 were defending the 
prohibition and others such as Delphy who still continues to oppose it.1182 Such difference does 
not portray feminism as an effective movement if the focus is on lack of parity between 
different factions of women. The effect of this warring is a loss of important discourse 
emerging which could service a theory that would truly enhance the positioning and parity of 
women. What appears to feature in a limited manner in the discourse on veiling is the 
positioning of those who maintain a middle ground that contains elements of gender equality 
that is coupled with some pragmatism such as Gohir who states: 
 
Personally I am not keen on the veil as it overwhelmingly reinforces every 
conceivable Western prejudice about Muslims and Islam. I would even urge veiled 
Muslim women to consider the impact their choice is having on Muslim 
communities living in the West. However, from a gender perspective, I will 
vociferously continue to speak out on the right of women to make autonomous 
choices about their bodies whatever that may be – whether they live in the West 
or in Muslim countries.1183 
 
Greater eminence is needed of commentators who acknowledge that women may be 
subjected to gender inequality due to patriarchal interpretations of the religious texts, or 
cultural norms and encourage Muslim women to emancipate themselves through un-reading 
such patriarchal interpretations. This has to include those feminists who adopt a middle 
ground in upholding Muslim veiling in Western societies, on the basis that veiling does contain 
an element of personal choice, thus preventing the issue of women’s rights from getting 
drowned in the debate. The importance of this has been eloquently stated by Kacere: 
 
A beautiful aspect of feminism is learning to see beyond the surface – seeing 
beneath the propaganda that teaches us how gender should be…We are so good 
at speaking of agency and bodily autonomy; we use it to talk about our right to 
have an abortion and to challenge rape culture. We used it to start a movement 
last year when Slutwalks throughout the continent expressed outrage at slut-
shaming and our culture’s notions of women’s sexuality, challenging the legal 
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and cultural justifications for telling women what to wear and what to do with 
their bodies – and yet many feminists around the world supported France’s 
decision to ban the wearing of burqas last year.1184 
The problem of dual essentialisms 
A problematic issue addressed in the thesis is the oppositional stance adopted by the 
oppression and emancipation discourses highlighting the dual essentialisms evident in both 
discourses. There are elements of essentialism present when those who oppose veiling judge 
Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil according to whether such women are free to 
make real choices restrained by the bonds of patriarchal traditions, but in such assessments, 
veiled women’s subjectivities and their voices are ignored or overridden. Indeed this may be 
due to false projection of repressed desires as inequality issues affecting women in Western 
societies are far from total elimination and deflecting focus onto women of other cultures 
appears to be an easier option in a climate where the place of religion especially Islam in the 
public sphere is being contested. The feminist project is an ongoing one playing a crucial role in 
eliminating inequalities, discrimination and oppression against women in Europe and the rest 
of the globe. However the goal of removing oppressive practices against women cannot be 
furthered by deflecting Western female inequalities and judging Muslim women who wear the 
hijab or the veil by benchmarking them with liberal values and mores. Too much covering or 
not enough covering of the body equally leads to gratification by the male gaze and in both 
cases the woman becomes the object. Therefore it is not appropriate to claim that voluntarily 
wearing short skirts, high heels and cosmetics is liberatory whilst pronouncing veiling is 
oppressive. Similarly it is equally questionable for Muslim women who veil to argue it deflects 
the male gaze and thus liberates their bodies from being sexualised when they become the 
object of the gaze of non-Muslim men in Europe and become a source of negative stereotypes 
against non- veiled Muslim women as immodest. 
There are dual essentialisms at play when supporters of veiling allege Orientalism whenever 
challenges to veiling are made by those from other cultures. For those who question why 
Muslim women’s modesty troubles those who do not veil, then just because there is a rebuttal 
argument against some Western modes of female dressing does not mean that their 
opposition to oppressive practices of other cultures is wrong. Highlighting such issues affecting 
women is a means of drawing attention to discriminatory practices, which is needed to inform 
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public policies and resultant laws to help eliminate them. However if veiling is what some 
feminists want to save Muslim from then a natural question is what form of modesty do they 
want them to adopt having been saved from their version of it? This approach fails to take 
account of differences among women of other cultures and is premised on cultural hegemony 
and such standpoints contribute to non- recognition of the lived realities of other women, 
which if considered would highlight that veiling is full of multiplicities and a failure to factor 
this into the discourse leads to the silencing of Muslim women who wear the hijab or the veil 
as it ignores their subjectivities.  
Whilst the dominant discourses engage in oppositional perspectives of the oppression versus 
emancipation dichotomisation of veiling, some contemporary and nuanced internal debates 
on veiling amongst Muslim women are being lost. For example some Muslim women whilst 
dressing modestly using the hijab are also using it as a form of adornment due to the bright 
colours, different styles of wearing it and combining it with Western clothes. Other Muslim 
women who have a more conservative interpretation of what the hijab should be are of the 
opinion that this aestheticisation of the hijab or wearing the veil with very heavy eye make-up 
is against the essence of what Islamic modesty should represent as that attracts the male gaze 
rather than deflect it. Thus generational issues exist between the younger girls adopting the 
hijab that also crosses over as a fashion item combined with the tight jeans, whereas the more 
traditional Muslim women object and consider the accultured hijab as un-Islamic, as their idea 
of modesty is based on the more conservatist black hijab worn over traditional clothes.  
The consequence in terms of limitations on women who veil is different, the younger 
generation of Muslim women are making choices in relation to what they deem appropriate by 
wearing the hijab of varying colours, designs and methods enabling them to express their 
identity in different ways and entering education and employment, without any resultant loss 
of freedom. Whilst for the older generation of Muslim women the traditional hijab is tied up 
with patriarchy and the role of the woman confined to the home. Such internal generational 
debates amongst Muslim women show that veiling and modesty in Islam has become socially 
constructed and depends on an individual’s interpretation of the concept, where the 
prohibition for the older generation may not have severe consequences in terms of their 
understanding of the practice, it could have crippling effects on the younger women. This 
demonstrates the importance of listening to those who veil and moving away from 
oppositional stances, which blur some of the more pertinent issues amongst those at the 
centre of the debate. 
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There are Muslim women who wear the hijab in response to imposed modesty codes and 
family honour and patriarchy, similarly there are those who believe full face veiling is a 
religious mandate even though some Muslim scholars are of the opinion it is cultural symbol 
only with no religious obligation. Furthermore some Muslim feminists have been striving to 
penetrate the male power structures who consider themselves as holders and guardians of 
religious knowledge to propagate alternative meanings of the sacred texts, which question the 
compulsory nature of veiling. Indeed individuals are entitled to adopt particular views on 
religious doctrine especially since there is no real consensus among Muslims or religious 
scholars whether full face veiling is compulsory or not, as individuals are entitled to have their 
own convictions but the starting point is about having different options to choose from. 
A refusal therefore to acknowledge that some Muslim women who veil are victims of 
patriarchy and cultural impositions is also a refusal to listen to those whose voices are 
important to the debate. Similarly claims of the veil being emancipatory based on women 
having access to public spaces is also questionable and suggests that such women lack the 
initial freedom to enter public spaces without any covering and therefore oppressive as the 
choice to enter public spaces with a veil is no choice if it is not allowing the option to enter the 
same spaces without the veil. Additionally, arguments advanced on the grounds of veiling as a 
sign of modesty perpetuates the negative stereotype held by those who support veiling that 
those Muslim women who do not wear the hijab or the veil by default must be immodest, 
especially since both discourses are lacking the voices of those Muslim women who do not 
veil. The key to achieving a better understanding of veiling is for both standpoints to 
acknowledge their respective weaknesses and strengths of the other and instead of a head on 
opposition, let the discourses on veiling incorporate some objective truths by listening to the 
voices of those who live the veiling experience. 
Weaknesses of the false consciousness argument 
Muslim women’s choice to veil is frequently challenged by the discourse that opposes veiling 
by invoking the false consciousness argument, but this refusal to acknowledge veiled women 
as agentic subjects devalues these women’s authenticity of choices and is open to a number of 
criticisms. First of all the false consciousness argument could apply to many situations where 
women make choices, for example a woman may choose to wear a short skirt because that is 
what she prefers to wear, but the false consciousness reasoning would attribute that not to 
her authentic choice but to the male dominated society, which has conditioned her to want to 
wear clothes that pleases men and benefits them. Similarly the same reasoning can apply to 
make-up, hairstyles the way she walks and postures herself. Secondly there are simply too 
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many reasons why women veil and under the false consciousness arguments, these women’s 
own motivations, opinions, desires and experiences such as the use of patriarchal bargaining 
as a method of accessing options normally out of reach are ignored leading to a rejection of 
their agency as it is assumed these are merely by-products of patriarchy, despite their 
individualities.   
 
Thirdly and more importantly those who argue that veiled women suffer from false 
consciousness are mistakenly holding themselves as being privy to the real truth which the 
veiled objects are not. Thus the women who veil having already been silenced by male 
religious scholars taking advantage of social power structures and acting as the holders of true 
knowledge of the sacred texts are now being subjected to the same self-serving power 
dynamics resulting in being silenced by the socio-feministic discourse. This indicates an 
adoption of the paternalistic view where the proponents of false consciousness claim the 
privileged position of understanding and judging complex power relationships whilst ignoring 
the realities of the world, where freedom and autonomy are always influenced by the context 
within which people live in as demonstrated by some narratives in this thesis of the women 
who veil. This is a problematic aspect of the false consciousness argument as veiled women are 
marginalised, whilst those invoking the argument are designating themselves as the liberated. 
This can be challenged on the grounds that those women who wear low cut dresses, short 
skirts or a bikini are not exercising their free choice either, as they have internalised male 
expectations. Thus they do not wear those garments as free agents but as a result of 
objectification that pleases the male gaze. It could be argued that some of those who oppose 
veiling are using the false consciousness argument as a mirror of the colonialist image where 
the Western women legitimise their moral authority to speak on behalf of women of other 
cultures as if the others were victimised and had no voice of their own. The problem here is 
that in doing this they are applying a much stricter and a different standard when interpreting 
freedom and autonomy to cultures other than their own.  
The pervasiveness of negative stereotypes associated with veiling 
There are negative and positive stereotypes that have been employed in the socio-feministic 
discourses on veiling but they have not been confined to those debates as they have also 
penetrated judicial reasoning of the ECtHR. Judges have made inappropriate comments 
relating to veiling and the legitimacy of religious beliefs held by women who veil despite that 
being an area, which the judges should not engage in. In both Dahlab and Sahin the court 
pronounced the hijab as a symbol of gender inequality and one that is irreconcilable with 
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tolerance and respect for others1185 adopting the two common negative stereotypes; that the 
hijab expresses or propagates fundamentalism and women who wear it are victims of 
oppression. The ECtHR proceeding on the basis that the hijab has a proselytising effect on 
children in Dahlab1186 and adult students in higher education in Sahin1187, whilst against the 
state it was considered a symbol inciting public disorder and intolerance of equality and 
neutrality. Such an inappropriate approach by the court goes against the spirit of the ECHR and 
although the employment of such negative stereotypes could be sounded in political debates 
and the media, but for the court to adopt them forming the basis of its legal reasoning goes 
against the grain of human rights protection, which the applicants in both cases were seeking 
from the law. 
The ECtHR also adopted the second stereotype that associates Muslim women’s veiling with 
oppression but failing to note the contradiction between the two, on the one hand the woman 
who veils is seen as an activist with fundamentalist agendas yet on the other she is seen as a 
victim of patriarchy and in need of saving even though there was no evidence of either. If the 
court had listened to the voices of the two applicants it would have found that they fall into 
neither of the two generalisations and were an example of two young women who were far 
from oppressed and their choice to wear the hijab was a personal and an unfettered one. 
However instead the court placed more reliance on the Federal court’s assessment of the 
situation in Dahlab, whilst in Sahin the Turkish constitutional court’s assessment had the 
judicial influence, the effect of both was that the legitimacy of the hijab was erased and the 
applicants at the centre of the issue were silenced. This resulted in a loss of opportunity not 
only to understanding the issue of veiling but also of recognising and giving effect to the 
applicants’ right to religious freedom, which would have countered the harm of the 
stereotypes they were inscribed with. 
S.A.S. and the emergence of a new label for women who veil 
S.A.S. v. France1188 was an opportunity for the ECtHR to correct its previous deficiencies when 
dealing with the issue of the hijab in Dahlab and in Sahin with an opportunity to settle some of 
the socio-feministic standpoints on veiling as well as the lack of consistency in the application 
of the Convention principles such as the margin of appreciation and the proportionality 
doctrine. It should also have been an occasion to facilitate a better understanding of the 
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Muslim veil through a sociological perspective of the symbol just as the court did with the 
position of the Christian wooden crosses in state schools in Italy in the Lautsi case1189 and 
provide reasoned justifications for its decision. Regrettably the court fell short of such 
expectations, although it took an important step in the right direction by recognising that the 
gender inequality argument can be discounted if the applicant asserts that she veiled through 
her own free choice. But the GC in S.A.S. in upholding the prohibition on full face veiling 
effectively recognised and accepted the French government’s argument that veiling breaches 
the rights of others to live in a place of socialisation, which makes ‘living together’ easier and 
that this was a choice of the French majority society. This is the first time the ECtHR has ever 
recognised such a right, although barriers to social interaction may interfere with living 
together but for such an hypothesis to evolve into a right in the opinion of the dissenting 
judges is a sacrifice of concrete individual rights to abstract principles that are far-fetched.1190  
According to one national judge such creative interpretations are contrary to the Vienna 
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties,1191 but even if that was indeed a right then as the 
dissenting judges noted, people have the right not to socialise with anyone in other words as 
they said a ‘right to be an outsider’.1192 If the French society cannot socialise with Muslim 
women who veil in the public sphere as it is the choice of society then those women who veil 
have a reciprocal right to choose who they wish to socialise with too. Rights are about choices 
people make irrespective of how unpopular they may be with the majority, it wasn’t that long 
ago that homosexuality was a considered worthy of punishment by criminal laws. Choice is not 
just about burqas or the face veil being oppressive as some argue, it is also about other things 
such as expression and clothing too. 
Even if the right to socialisation and to be an outsider existed, the ECtHR has ignored the 
voices of those women who veil and have expressed concerns that post the ban on full face 
concealment they do not leave their homes, which has led them being isolated. Furthermore 
aggression against them has increased as the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University who as 
an intervening party in S.A.S. presented in their submission based on research on the effects of 
face veil bans in Belgium. Similarly the Open Foundation Society report clearly showed that the 
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women who veil after the ban are now less sociable1193 and the court in S.A.S. itself noted that 
‘The ban may have the effect of isolating [full-veil wearers] and restricting their 
autonomy….’1194 The evidence makes it clear the French ban does not further any right to live 
in a space of socialisation that makes living together easier, if anything it has now made it 
more difficult because women who wear the veil have been removed from the public sphere, 
and this interferes with the novel principle of living together. Therefore the ECtHR has ended 
up endorsing a method, which instead of furthering or securing the rights of others, it inhibits 
those rights or the stated aim of promoting living together by the French state.   
Although the gender equality argument was put to rest and proselytism was not an issue, the 
veil in S.A.S. was still being perceived as an intolerant symbol of French values just as the hijab 
was in Dahlab1195 and Sahin1196 even though not described as a symbol of political Islam by the 
court, it still clashes with French values, which is reminiscent of the clash of civilisations 
rhetoric. People do not have to like the veil to tolerate it, civility appears to be trumping 
religious rights even though the full face veil does not attack the majority religion in France or 
anywhere else, yet the majority’s social dislike limits religious rights. True freedom can only be 
secured when society allows the minority to manifest the beliefs, of which the majority 
disapproves. France’s attempt to treat all its citizens alike in terms of everyone being French 
first but those who are religious and wish to manifest their belief by veiling are being 
marginalised in their own society and community by not allowing them to dress as they wish. 
This makes the public sphere burdensome, unfair and unequal for women who veil, which 
leads to resentment and is not the civility of living together. The whole essence of human 
rights is tailored to protect those who might suffer from the tyranny of the majority and the 
fact that these women are in a small minority demands that they should be afforded the same 
rights as the majority and at the same time they are identified with the French nation of which 
they are citizens. 
Yet, there is a part of the ECtHR reasoning in S.A.S., which should be welcomed as it is a sign of 
a real positive development in terms of elimination of some of the negative stereotypes 
associated with women who veil. The court in this case dismissed the argument that women 
who veil are victims of gender inequality irrespective of the presence of choice. The court 
acknowledged in S.A.S. those women who veil through their own choice and the issue of any 
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links between veiling and Islamic fundamentalism was not raised by France or the court by its 
own volition. However, both the state and the court in asserting that full face veiling can be 
prohibited legally on the grounds that it affects the rights and freedoms of others as it 
breaches the principle of ‘living together’ have replaced the gender oppression stereotype 
with the imposition of a different but equally negative label on the Muslim woman who veils; 
that by veiling, the Muslim woman refuses social interaction and opts for isolation from the 
rest of society. The emergence of such a connotation, which is based on stereotypical 
assumptions made by the court and France, is also apparent from the report on the draft 
resolution that was proposed on the law prohibiting the concealment of the face as the 
following extract shows:  
The evidence we have gathered during our hearings show also the difficulties and 
the deep unease felt by people who everyday are in contact with the 
public…Barbarity is growing. Violence and threats are frequent…This is not 
acceptable, and each time such an attack takes place it is our living together based 
on the Spirit of Enlightenment that is violated. 1197  
 
The tone of such language and the link between the assumption that veiled women are 
subjugated and subjected to violence from their husbands in order to gain control over them 
are clearly not based on any substantive evidence. This is especially so considering the 
authorities only interviewed one veiled woman during the proposals for the new law,1198 which 
was no better than the Stasi Commission who during the French Headscarf Affair in state 
schools only gathered evidence from one Muslim woman. Furthermore such assumptions are 
in contradiction to the available evidence that presents a contrary picture. John Bowen an 
American anthropologist who was asked by the French government to testify before the 
French Parliamentary Commission, when it was investigating the possibility of prohibiting full 
face veiling had collected evidence that there were no indications of forced veiling or any 
oppressive practices associated. Although he acknowledged the difficulty of finding women 
who had been forced to veil and were willing to be interviewed1199 which is something also 
observed by Brems in her qualitative study on the insider realities of veil wearers.1200 The 
results from these qualitative studies formed part of the written submissions on behalf of the 
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Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, one of the interveners in the action in S.A.S.1201 The 
women interviewed as part of the research clearly indicate that they veil as a matter of free 
choice and this is further affirmed by a more recent qualitative research carried out in the 
United Kingdom.1202 The research also highlights that Islam prohibits compulsion and many 
women participating in the research stated that they enjoy full interactive lives, without the 
veil hindering communication or social participation. Thus blanket bans simply re-inforce 
negative stereotypes related to veiling and were based on erroneous assumptions in the 
context of moral panics. 
 
The French law does not protect veiled woman from any coercion in private places and it 
would be unjust to prohibit those who voluntarily veil in order to demonstrate tokenistic 
protection of those who are forced to do so. If protection from coerced veiling was the aim 
behind the French law, then that could have been achieved by criminalising forced veiling, 
rather than criminalising the victim of the forced veiling as well as curbing the autonomy of 
those who veil through their own free choice.  
 
Gender stereotypes were considered by the Grand Chamber in Konstantin Markin v. Russia, a 
case concerning discriminatory treatment against a male member of the military who was 
denied parental leave whilst females were allowed. In the case the GC stated that stereotypes 
must not influence discriminatory treatment ‘The Court agrees with the Chamber that gender 
stereotypes, such as the perception of women… cannot, by themselves, be considered to 
amount to sufficient justification for a difference in treatment…’1203 It is unfortunate the ECtHR 
failed to heed by the same principles when the matter before it involved Muslim veiling. 
 
The major criticism of the S.A.S. judgement is that the court found that the prohibition of the 
veil was necessary to pursue the legitimate aim of securing the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others by ensuring ‘respect for the minimum requirements of life in society’ or as 
the government put it ‘living together’ and because the face individualises a person, hiding the 
face broke this social requirement. Not only was this the first time such a right had been 
asserted but such an extension of the legitimate rights of others was unprecedented. The court 
upheld the prohibition on veiling without specifically stating who are the others? Are they the 
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young or old or both? Are Muslims included? Does it include Muslim women who veil or are 
un-veiled? Does it include only those who disagree with the veil? The court’s failure to address 
these important questions effectively limits any attempt at understanding the deeper 
reasoning by the court and leaves the principle of certainty and transparency of the judgement 
fractured and reminiscent of the approach the ECtHR took in Sahin. Similarly as the court 
effectively allowed the creation of a new right of ‘living together’, it would be expected that 
the court would have stated what are the conditions for living together? And who decides 
these conditions? But the court failed to state that and effectively left the matter for others to 
second guess the meaning of the legitimate aim of ‘living together’, which is regrettable for a 
court upholding a novel aim at the expense of limiting religious freedom considered a 
fundamental right by the ECHR, which the court itself acknowledged would place veiled 
women with a dilemma ‘Either they comply with the ban and thus refrain from dressing in 
accordance with their approach to religion; or they refuse to comply and face prosecution’.1204  
Inconsistent margin of appreciation and proportionality in veiling 
cases  
The margin of appreciation doctrine is a vital tool that enables uniformity in human rights 
protection afforded to citizens of signatory states whilst allowing the ECtHR to take into 
account of prevalent domestic and European conditions when interpreting the Convention. 
The doctrine was developed to allow the Commission and the ECtHR to exercise a supervisory 
jurisdiction over state interference with an individual’s Convention rights, but the doctrine is 
riddled with inconsistencies and nowhere is this more apparent than the hijab and veiling 
cases decided by the ECtHR. The availability of concepts such as consensus and proportionality 
to the court ought to have injected some certainty into the application of the doctrine; 
certainty being an important interpretive principle developed under the Convention. But the 
same concepts have been used by the court to the detriment of those who veil without 
adequate judicial discussion. In both Sahin and S.A.S. there has been a failure by the court to 
offer an adequate analysis of the balancing exercise used by the court in holding the 
prohibitive measures proportionate. At the same time the court appears to have reached an 
erroneous conclusion on the existence of a European consensus on prohibiting veiling in public 
spaces. France and Belgium are the only two states with national bans on full face veiling and 
for the court to treat that as a European wide consensus is clearly wrong and the court 
inferring consensus from mere debates on veiling is a highly questionable approach to 
establishing the existence of a consensus. Majority of the European states do not have legal 
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prohibitions on the face veil in public spaces, which means there is consensus on non-
prohibition of veils in public spaces in Europe, thus the margin of appreciation should have 
been narrower with greater judicial scrutiny, instead of the wide margin deferred to France.  
 
The ECtHR in S.A.S. highlighted the factors that make the prohibitory French law 
disproportionate yet the court reached an inverse conclusion, leaving the supervisory power of 
the court questionable and it is suggested that the ECtHR has hidden behind the margin of 
appreciation doctrine allowing the rights of veil wearers to be interfered with without the 
protection of their rights as guaranteed by the Convention. Despite the ECtHR asserting many 
times that the margin of appreciation is not unlimited; it appears that in the adjudication of 
veiling cases the court failed to follow its own legal pronouncement. In both Sahin and S.A.S. 
the prohibitions on hijab in universities and the veil in all public spaces by Turkey and France 
respectively was an imposition of their own preferred version of Islam because both states are 
forcing Muslim women who want to attend universities and be in public spaces to either 
choose their desired form of religious dress or one preferred by the state, which in the French 
case would leave the face visible and in the Turkish case leave the hair visible. In both cases 
there is punishment being meted for these women for holding and exercising their religious 
beliefs in the sense that in Turkey a Muslim hijab wearing woman could never attend 
university and in France a veiled woman could never step outside of her home with the veil 
without breaching criminal laws. In both cases the court by focussing on general interests such 
as public order and rights of others in Sahin and the notion of living together in S.A.S. as 
opposed to a focus on the individual rights of the applicants was already primed against 
listening to the voices of the women in question.   
The importance of human rights demands consistency and clarity in application of the ECHR 
but both are missing when the matter before the ECtHR is one concerning the hijab or the 
Muslim veil. Legitimate aims are subject to the proportionality requirement whereas the lack 
of clarity on the aim of the French law is problematic as it makes determination of whether the 
ban is proportional or not difficult. This lack of consistency appears to be prevalent in cases 
involving veiling, for example the balancing test used for proportionality analysis is too 
ambiguous and the ECtHR in Dahlab, Sahin and S.A.S. failed to determine or say what standard 
of measure was used for the proportionality analysis, which led to inconsistencies in the 
decisions. An example of this can be seen in the Ahmet Arslan1205 case where the court stated 
that as the applicants were simply wearing religious clothes in public and they did not intend 
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any threat on others and that the state should not interfere with such rights unless there are 
ramifications for others. Yet in S.A.S. the court upheld the prohibition on the veil in the 
absence of any evidence of the veil’s threatening effects on others. The meanings of the 
Islamic veil does an can have one meaning for the wearer yet a different one for the perceiver 
and how such meanings are decoded by the wearer and the perceiver could only be 
understood if an applicant’s subjectivities are taken into account and the harmful effects of 
stereotyping the practice are acknowledged. However to date the ECtHR has never probed 
into the different meanings and how they are subject to change due to the situational and 
contextual settings, had the court listened to the voices of those who veil by engaging in that 
enquiry the outcome of Dahlab, Sahin and S.A.S. may well have been different.  
The failure of the ECtHR to listen to veiled women’s voices  
The ECtHR when adjudicating on the legality of prohibiting Muslim religious symbols has 
frequently relied on the margin of appreciation doctrine when interpreting the hijab as a 
symbol, which clashes with Western values.1206 This adjudication process has elements of 
being perception-based and defers to stereotypes without listening to the voices of the veiled 
that would have highlight the multiple meanings of the hijab and the veil, a sentiment shared 
by Judge Tulkens who reminded the majority in her dissenting judgement in Sahin:  
 
Wearing the headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practice that is engaged in for 
a variety of reasons. It does not necessarily symbolise the submission of women to 
men and there are those who maintain that, in certain cases, it can even be a 
means of emancipating women. What is lacking in this debate is the opinion of 
women, both those who wear the headscarf and those who choose not to.1207 
  
In this respect Marshall notes that human rights law can act as an enabling mechanism as 
opposed to restricting one’s choice formation by listening to the voices of particular 
individuals. For her, individual identities are linked with how others perceive and relate to 
individuals and any disrespect or unjust treatment due to limitations on the fluidity of identity 
restricts, instead of enabling individuals to pursue their achievement of the goals related to the 
self. In order to change this and enable such individuals to be who they want to be warrants 
‘Listening to those people, taking their participation and voices seriously…’1208  
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Human rights must recognise that individuals need to be allowed to choose their own ways of 
living with the law creating conditions that facilitate such freedoms. Women who veil do so for 
a number of different reasons ranging from Islamic modesty to experimenting with different 
identity formations such as a modest woman, a spiritual woman, someone who resists forced 
unveiling, an emancipated woman, someone who resists the traps of modernity and someone 
who can choose when and how to veil. If the court has given recognition to the choices of 
those who engaged in consensual homosexual activities behind closed doors1209 and those who 
wish to change their gender identity1210 and rightly so, then the same court must allow Muslim 
women who veil, enabling conditions, instead of creating barriers to their own way of choosing 
how to live and choosing identities to form at different times of their lives.  
 
Bans on veiling are the clearest constraint on Muslim women’s choice of how they want to live 
and create their identity. Stripping them of these choices using criminal laws as a means of 
removing their religious clothing can hardly be conducive to the promotion of their freedom, 
autonomy, self-esteem or self- respect.  In contrast there are Muslim women such as Fereshte 
who question the use of the veil as a means of identity formation and argues that the veil 
erases a woman’s identity completely and the face veil is an absurd form of modesty since it 
removes a woman’s presence from the public sphere and it makes life more difficult and 
dangerous for other women.1211For Feresthe the women who veil have an impact on how 
women who do not veil are treated and for her the distinction between the individual identity 
and religious or group identity are distinct with assertions of group identity having a negative 
impact on the personal. Her comments are also important as they demonstrate that negative 
views on veiling are not the sole confines of the non-Muslims; some Muslim women disagree 
with veiling in public spaces too and their voices also need to be factored. 
 
Wearing the veil may demonstrate hostility to Western traditions but that is not a ground for 
prohibiting it, otherwise plurality of cultures and freedom of expression will disappear from 
the public space, therefore it is better to have veiled Muslim women in public spaces than not 
to have them there at all. Diversity and expression through clothing is an indication of a 
healthy democracy but using the law to regulate such practices is inadequate as law is too 
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blunt and it is not readily discernible whether such practices as seen through the legal lens are 
considered statements of culture, religion, presence or the absence of freedom or an attack on 
Western society’s values. Even though the applicant in S.A.S. affected by the ban turned to the 
ECHR, which champions values such as toleration, equality and broadmindedness, regrettably 
these values are not neutral as they themselves are tied up with European history and earlier 
foundations. The French state wished to ban veils in order to preserve the French identity but 
then the creation, change or expression of a different identity must be protected too as 
Marshall argues ‘Human rights law’s purpose is to empower individuals, recognising and 
protecting their identities. It should not interpret concepts within the ECHR as constraining 
identities’.1212 Muslim women who veil should not be punished using criminal law as in France 
for espousal of values such as freedom, choice and identity, which are the same values the said 
laws are supposed to uphold, instead their identities need to be seen as representative of the 
community they belong to as well as entering and leaving it as individuals and not view it just 
in terms of their relationality.  
 
For Muslim women to be free they must attain both positive and negative freedoms, which are 
ideals for every state to guarantee and If Muslim women were allowed to wear the veil as a 
free autonomous choice by all states in public spaces, their greater incorporation into the 
majority European society may be encouraged by the state’s individualist and liberal role not 
just as a guarantor of positive liberty but also as a protector of individual choice and negative 
freedom. For those who have security concerns about veiling, the majority of Muslim women 
would and do remove the veil when required with a possibility of a real minority who act 
unreasonably by refusing, but with such women it has to be questioned whether the veil is a 
religiously motivated stance or simply a political one. Islam is not as rigid as perceived and 
contains ample flexibility even in those practices considered obligatory. For example the 
prayer in the mosque is considered the most pure and sacred with a dog being considered a 
dirty animal, yet Muslim scholars have agreed that a blind person can take a guide dog into a 
mosque.1213  
The situation in the public sphere need not be full face veil or nothing and has to be a matter 
of balancing religious, cultural and Western values, which is precisely the pluralism, tolerance 
and broadmindedness the ECtHR constantly refers to, which means that the Muslim women 
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who wear the full face veil must be compromising on their part too. Indeed it is difficult to 
compromise values people hold onto dearly especially in matters that are religious but religion 
especially Islam allows for pragmatism allowing for modification of religious practice in 
accordance with the situational. There is no doubt that wearing the veil impedes 
communication in certain situations such as emergency medical situations and therefore to 
insist that the veil is worn unless a woman is attended by a female doctor in circumstances 
where one is unavailable would be unreasonable, similarly wearing the veil in school where 
children’s educational development could be hindered is inappropriate or insisting the veil is 
worn in nursery schools where it is common for fathers to bring their children in and need 
assurance that the person they have handed over custody of their child is authentic.  It is the 
insistence of the veil when it could reasonably be removed or its prohibition when it is not 
necessary that is problematic and that can only change with those who adopt strict 
oppositions to pay regard to the requirement of respect, tolerance and broadmindedness, thus 
dislike of others values should not dictate insistence on veiling or its removal.  A good example 
of a compromise struck is in the United Kingdom where in a courtroom women are allowed to 
wear the veil but they must remove it while giving evidence. 
When majority societies via their laws consider religious symbols such as the veil to be 
products of a patriarchal order, then upholding laws prohibiting such items of clothing simply 
offers Muslim men who impose them a psychological edge over the women, as the legal 
prohibition would be used as a justification to keep women out of the public sphere by not 
letting them out of the home unveiled. The best remedy to use for combating such gender 
inequality is not total prohibitions using the law as they are detrimental since they target 
victims as opposed to the perpetrators, but through listening to those who veil and the 
education of Muslim and non-Muslim members of society in a better understanding of veiling 
in European contexts, social values, respect and tolerance of different cultures with a clear 
campaign coupled with dialogue and support for Muslim women’s rights. This dialogue 
between all concerned will enable each party to express true concerns and any 
misunderstandings, which may exist with the aim of settling oppositions and focussing on the 
realisation of religious rights, expression and autonomy. Importantly such dialogue or 
discussions have to be with those women who veil not just for religious reasons but all the 
other purposes behind the practice and incorporate the different age groups and backgrounds 
of those who engage in the practice.  
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There should be no representation on behalf of these women by Muslim men or any cultural 
insiders, although their views have to be received but only in their capacity as Muslim men and 
women. It is equally important that the views and voices of those women who do not veil or 
wear the hijab are incorporated into the dialogue as that is one group of Muslim women 
whose voice in the debate on veiling is also lacking. From a legal perspective any human rights 
judgement that upholds a ban if it is deemed so necessary, must contain total transparency of 
the justifications by the court with such justifications and principles to be applied consistently 
to Article 9 rights, irrespective of whether the issue is one involving religious symbols such as 
the hijab or the veil. This will not only address the oppressive veil but will also recognise the 
freely chosen veil and will help eliminate the essentialisms associated with binary discourses, 
leading to Muslim women’s rights to dress the way they want to and respect for those rights 
from all members of society and will be an acknowledgement of their voice.  
This thesis has demonstrated that the religious, socio-feministic and legal discourses on veiling 
are problematic in their approach to addressing issues surrounding women; however one 
certainty that has been made evident is that the veil cannot be confined to a singular meaning, 
context or a truth. In order to go beyond the misunderstood practice of veiling the thesis has 
shown that it is necessary to step beyond the half- truths, which all of the discourses discussed 
failed to since each discourse silenced the women who veil by failing to listen to their voices, 
despite these women being the real holders of the truth behind their veils. This extra step 
requires a wider understanding gained through the process of dialogue and communication 
mentioned above, which dis-entrenches cultural practices like veiling through challenging the 
ethnocentric yardsticks employed by those opposing or supporting the universalism of such a 
practice. This can only be facilitated by listening to the experiences and subjectivities of those 
who veil but without the essentialist standpoints or the maintenance of the stereotypes in the 
discourses on the matter.  
To truly understand the veil does mean that when we view the practice it has to be seen as an 
entity that is complex and has historical, cultural and religious contexts that disallow it to be 
treated as a static object without variables. To treat the veil as oppressive or emancipatory 
would be ignoring some of the greater problems Muslim women who veil face, such as 
employment, equal treatment, education , forced marriage, honour based violence or female 
genital mutilation. Therefore to inscribe just the veil with oppression would be a denial of the 
multi- faceted ways in which oppression against women operates. The aim of this thesis was 
never to adopt a positioning on whether the veil is oppressive or not but to highlight that in 
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the endeavour by the discourses to force-fit the veil into a self-serving meaning of the veil 
leads to those women who veil to a triple bind where they are silenced by the religious 
discourse the socio-feministic discourse and finally when they challenge the prohibitions 
imposed on them, the ECtHR silences them. 
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